ORBIS

journal of world affairs

Volume XVIII Spring 1974 Number 1

RECEIVED
U.S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
AUG 6 1974
LIBRARY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20545

Reflections on

The Philippines; French Elections; The Middle East; Coup d'Etat in Portugal; Dissent in the Soviet Union; Raw Materials and LDC Cartel Tactics

Articles

Focus on WARS OF NATIONAL LIBERATION

Frank N. Trager on U.S. Policy and Wars of National Liberation in the 1970's

Justus M. van der Kroef on Guerrilla Communism in Thailand

William H. Overholt on U.S. Policy for Building a New "Structure for Peace"

George H. Quester on Taiwan and Nuclear Proliferation

Mojmir Povolny on the European Security Conference

Wolfgang Hager on Europe and the Mediterranean

Additional Articles and Book Reviews

FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE
in association with
THE FLETCHER SCHOOL OF LAW AND DIPLOMACY
TUFTS UNIVERSITY

ORBIS, a journal of world affairs
published by the
Foreign Policy Research Institute
in association with
The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University

Editor: Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.
Managing Editor: Robert C. Herber
Associate Editor: James E. Dougherty
Assistant Editor: Margaret M. Capotrio
Circulation Manager: Carol P. Engleberth

Editors Emeritus: Robert Strausz-Hupé, William R. Kintner

Editorial Board: Alvin J. Cottrell, William E. Griffith, Walter F. Hahn, Don D. Humphrey, J. C. Hurewitz, David C. Jordan, Morton A. Kaplan, Geoffrey Kemp, Norman D. Palmer, Stefan T. Possony, Uri Ra'anan, Alvin Z. Rubinstein, Robert A. Scalapino, W. Scott Thompson, Frank N. Trager, William R. Van Cleave, Richard L. Walker, Arthur P. Whitaker.

Editorial Advisory Board: Loren E. Eiseley, Lawrence B. Krause, Covey T. Oliver, Sidney I. Ploss, Froelich G. Rainey, J. K. Zawodny.

Editorial Research Staff: Todd S. Collins, Jacquelyn K. Davis, Adam M. Garfinkle, Joanne S. Gowa, Lawrence E. Grinter, Ann M. Lesch, William Perry, Diane K. Pfaltzgraff, Robert F. Rogers, Alan N. Sabrosky, Harvey Sicherman, Nils H. Wessell, Gerald T. West.

The Editors welcome articles that examine problems in international relations. Articles should be submitted in the original, accompanied by a self-addressed, stamped envelope if the author desires to have his manuscript returned. Articles should conform to Orbis style and format; text and footnotes should be double-spaced, and the latter placed at the end of the article. Address editorial communications and manuscripts to the Managing Editor.

Books, monographs and pamphlets for review or listing should be sent to the Managing Editor. Address correspondence relating to advertising, subscriptions and bulk orders to the Circulation Manager.

Orbis is indexed by *Public Affairs Information Service, Social Sciences and Humanities Index, Current Contents, Behavioral, Social & Management Sciences* and *ABC Pol Sci.* Abstracts of Orbis articles appear regularly in *Historical Abstracts* and *America: History and Life,* both of which are publications of the American Bibliographical Center, as well as in *International Political Science Abstracts,* published in Paris by the International Political Science Association.

The opinions expressed in articles and reviews in this journal are those of the contributors and should not be construed as representing those of the Foreign Policy Research Institute, the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, or the Editors of Orbis.

Copyright © 1974 by the Foreign Policy Research Institute, a Delaware nonprofit corporation.

Out-of-print issues of Orbis, Vols. I-V, are available in reprint editions from the Kraus Reprint Company, Route 100, Millwood, N.Y. 10546, at $105.00 for the five volumes, clothbound; $80.00, paperbound; and $16.00 a volume, paperbound. For Vols. VI-X, available in spring 1975, Kraus prices for the five volumes are $200.00, clothbound; $175.00, paperbound. Per volume, paperbound, Vol. VI is $25.00; Vols. VII through IX are $35.00; and Vol. X is $45.00. Individual issues and complete volumes from Vol. XI on are obtainable by writing to the Circulation Manager. Please note, however, that Vol. XI, No. 4, Vol. XII, No. 4 and Vol. XIII, No. 3 are now out of print. Prices for complete volumes are at the yearly subscription rate of $9.00; individual copies are $3.00. Reprints of articles published in Orbis, as long as they are available, are 35 cents each.

Orbis is published four times a year, February, May, August, and November, by the Foreign Policy Research Institute. Editorial and business address: 3508 Market Street, Suite 350, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104. The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, is located in Medford, Massachusetts 02155. Subscription rates: one year, $9.00; two years, $16.50; three years, $23.00. Single copy, $3.00. Student rates: $7.50, $13.00, $18.00; single copy, $2.00. Second-class postage paid at Philadelphia, Pa., and at additional mailing offices.

ORBIS

A Journal of World Affairs

VOLUME XVIII SPRING 1974 NUMBER 1

Reflections on the Quarter 3

From the Politics of Weakness to the Politics of Strength .... *William H. Overholt* 27

Wars of National Liberation: Implications for U.S. Policy and Planning .... *Frank N. Trager* 50

Guerrilla Communism and Counterinsurgency in Thailand .... *Justus M. van der Kroef* 106

Taiwan and Nuclear Proliferation .... *George H. Quester* 140

Peking and Washington in a New Balance of Power .... *T. C. Rhee* 151

Dismemberment of Pakistan, 1971: Its International Implications .... *G. W. Choudhury* 179

The Soviet Union and the European Security Conference .... *Mojmir Povolny* 201

The Mediterranean: A European Mare Nostrum? .... *Wolfgang Hager* 231

Viet Nam and the Professional Military .... *Sam C. Sarkesian* 252

Obstacles to Reform in Foreign Affairs: The Case of NSAM 341 .... *William I. Bacchus* 266

The Brazilian Economy: Trends and Prospects ...... *M. S. Marzouk* 277

Reviews:

- **From Superiority to Sub-Parity** .... *Colin S. Gray* 292
- **Reporting on World Affairs: The Memoirs of Isaac Don Levine** .... *Eugene H. Methvin* 297
- **The Changing Prospects of European Unification** .... *Werner J. Feld* 303
- **Tito's Victory, 1941-1945** .... *Andrew Gyorgy* 306
- **The Public Career of Adolf A. Berle** .... *Willard Barber* 309

Books Received 313

Contributors to this Issue 330

FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE BOOK SERIES

Strategy and Values: Selected Writings of Robert Strausz-Hupé

Edited by

WILLIAM R. KINTNER AND ROBERT L. PFALTZGRAFF, JR.

With an introductory essay by the editors, this volume presents selections on politics and culture, the nuclear revolution, alliances, and United States and Soviet foreign policy by an eminent American academician and diplomat who is currently U.S. Ambassador to Sweden. He was the founder and first Director of the Foreign Policy Research Institute and Editor of ORBIS. 1974 127 pp. $13.00

Message Dimensions of Television News

By ROBERT S. FRANK

A definitive study of network news message content during the 1972 Presidential election campaign, this book examines the nature of reporting on major issues. There is also a survey of the theoretical-historical role of the mass media, a comparison of television news and *New York Times* reporting, and measurements of change in public opinion against change in emphasis of network news. The coding methodologies employed are appended. 1973 144 pp. $10.00

The Power Capabilities of Nation-States

By WAYNE H. FERRIS

A theoretical-empirical study that presents eleven hypotheses relating the power capabilities of nation-states to their involvement in conflict, military hostilities and war, and to the duration, devastation and outcome of war. The author devises an index for measuring the comparative power capabilities of all nation-states between 1850 and 1965 and employs it to test his hypotheses. 1973 192 pp. $12.50

Order from HEATH

D. C. HEATH AND COMPANY
125 Spring Street
Lexington, Massachusetts 02173

Reflections on the Quarter

Clearing the Minefields in the Middle East

"WE and the Arabs . . . must, like sappers working their way through a minefield, step by step, with great care defuse the complexes, suspicions and phobias . . . so that it will be possible to clear the field and sow the seeds of peace in it." In 1972 Arie Eliav, a leading dissident within the Israeli Labor Party, thus urged the Israeli government to initiate a dialogue with the Arab states and to overcome its deep phobias based on Tsarist pogroms and the Holocaust, just as the Arabs would have to overcome their fear of Israel as a European "expansionist" power. His call fell on deaf ears in 1972, but it has evoked a wider response within Israel in the traumatic aftermath of the October 1973 war.

Israel is adjusting painfully to an altered world in which it cannot act without regard for external constraints, cannot be certain that it boasts crushing military superiority over the Arabs, and cannot extract peace from its opponents without relinquishing substantial territories. This adjustment has its counterpart in the difficult shifts that are beginning to occur within the Arab world. Before the October war, only King Hussein of Jordan and President Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia spoke publicly of peace with Israel. The Arab residents of the West Bank and Jerusalem, as a result of their daily unavoidable contact with Israel, reluctantly acknowledged the state's permanency. But Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser—despite his official recognition of UN Resolution 242 in 1967 and his acceptance of the U.S. initiatives in 1970—found the issue of recognizing Israel too sensitive emotionally to handle in public statements. Only since the October war and the military disengagement along the Suez Canal has his successor, President Anwar Sadat, asserted publicly his aspiration for "a durable, just and honorable peace" between Israel and the Arab states and stressed the possibility of "normal relations" between Egypt and Israel within a few years.

Since October, such moderate Syrian and Palestinian leaders as Hafez Assad and Yasir Arafat have also reassessed their attitudes toward Israel. President Assad has accepted a peace based on UN Resolution 242 and Arafat, head of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), has begun to visualize a Palestinian state alongside of, rather than replacing, Israel. The emotional wounds and distrust remain so deep, however, that only the insistent prodding of Sadat, the diplomatic finesse of U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, and the military support of Soviet Chairman Leonid Brezhnev have persuaded President Assad to set aside Syria's *non possumus* attitude and negotiate a military disengagement on the Golan Heights. Similarly, the PLO is considering forming a government-in-exile and staking a claim to the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, but it awaits the Golan disengagement and possibly additional diplomatic moves before it takes the final step.

In all the Middle East countries, powerful forces oppose any accommodation. The right-wing Likud bloc in Israel, which criticized even the limited disengagement with Egypt, received 30 per cent of the vote in December and has a popular spokesman in Major General Ariel Sharon, who led the Israeli counteroffensive across the Suez Canal in October. The National Religious Party and elements in the ruling alignment also oppose substantial territorial concessions.

Syrian Deputy Premier Abdel Halim Khaddam has long opposed any diplomatic opening toward the United States, much less any agreement with Israel. His views are echoed by key segments of the Syrian armed forces and the Ba'th Party. Similarly, Palestinian splinter groups seek to disrupt any diplomatic accord that does not take Palestinian demands into account. The factions that killed eighteen Israelis in Qiryat Shemona on April 11 and twenty in Ma'alot on May 15 explicitly challenged the "appeasement" of Israel by Sadat and Arafat. Even in Egypt, where Sadat's policies receive broad support, Islamic fundamentalists allied with Qaddafi tried to assassinate Sadat on April 18 in order to forestall further moves toward peace.

Finally, relations between the superpowers and their local clients are changing, and the change, here too, is not easy. Sadat—who sought American diplomatic aid as early as 1970 and began to loosen his military ties to Moscow in 1972—has begun to forge a close relationship with Washington that could provide the United States with an important entrée into the Arab world; it has already stung Moscow sharply. Sadat's opening toward the United States has won him Kissinger's effort to extract a Syrian-Israeli disengagement accord, which Sadat insists is a prerequisite to further Egyptian peace initiatives. He has also secured American aid in clearing the Suez Canal and provisional pledges of substantial funds to help rebuild the shattered cities along the canal. In return, after two months' strenuous effort, he persuaded the Arab oil-producing states to lift the embargo against the United States on March 17. Moreover, American interest in supporting the moderate forces in the Arab world led to U.S. endorsement of the UN Security Council resolution that condemned Israel's reprisal raid against southern Lebanon without explicitly mentioning the prior guerrilla attack on Qiryat Shemona. Only last year, Washington was abstaining or even vetoing comparable UN resolutions.

The Egyptian move toward Washington, accompanied by Dr. Kissinger's diplomatic acrobatics and Sadat's criticism of Moscow, seriously antagonized the Soviet Union. Moscow had undertaken a massive resupply of arms to Egypt and Syria during the October war and, in late October, had even challenged Washington to stop Israel from strangling the Egyptian Third Army Corps. Now it found its position in the key Arab country undermined and its role at the Geneva peace conference, where it treasures equal diplomatic status with the United States, bypassed. The Soviets responded to these affronts by deriding Kissinger's efforts, urging the oil states to continue their embargo against the United States, and reinforcing the Syrian hard-liners' demand that military disengagement be linked firmly to an Israeli pledge to withdraw from all the territory occupied in 1967. Recognizing that Moscow could effectively prevent a Syrian-Israeli accord, U.S. diplomats privately urged Sadat to moderate his criticism of the USSR. In addition, Kissinger demonstratively included Gromyko in his Syrian-Israeli disengagement negotiations. These efforts mollified the Soviets to the extent that they no longer opposed disengagement.

Israeli-American relations have similarly been strained by Washington's rapprochement with Egypt and desire to placate moderate Arabs. Israelis fear that they will have to pay a heavy price in Arab territory given back, if not in American military supplies, for Washington's policies. American condemnation of Israeli raids on Lebanon is viewed as further evidence of Washington's altered mood, as well as an indication of Israel's serious diplomatic isolation.

Moreover, Israel, in the throes of internal political upheaval, is uncertain of its own direction. The December elections elicited a major protest vote against the Labor Party, which had dominated the government since the inception of the state and was still run by an aging coterie of pre-state pioneers. There was also serious dissension within the party, as most members felt incapable of dismissing old leaders or instituting new programs.

After exhausting negotiations, Premier Golda Meir managed, on March 6, to assemble a new government that was based on the prewar coalition and displayed the same faces in the key ministerial posts. But after barely a month, the government succumbed to its first serious crisis. Premier Meir resigned on April 10 in the wake of a public outcry of "whitewash" against the interim report issued by the special commission appointed to inquire into the October war. The report—ironically intended by the government to bolster its position—placed the blame for military unpreparedness and delays in mobilizing the reserves on the military commanders, particularly Chief of Staff David Elazar, and exonerated Premier Meir and Defense Minister Moshe Dayan. Much of the pent-up public resentment over the wartime losses and the government's prior complacency and self-assurance—resentment already manifested on February 17 in anti-Dayan demonstrations—again focused on General Dayan. Demonstrations against him and petitions calling for his resignation were strongly supported within the Labor alignment. Not only Eliav but also Finance Minister Pinhas

Sapir, Deputy Premier Yigal Allon and the new Labor Minister Yitzhak Rabin urged Dayan—and Mrs. Meir—to resign.

With Mrs. Meir's resignation, rank and file party members sought a fundamental change in the leadership. On April 22 Rabin was elected party head by the 614-member Central Committee—the youngest person and the first native-born Israeli to be a candidate for Premier. As Rabin stated in his acceptance speech: "The time has come [for] the sons of the founders of the state to take over their role." His coalition government has new and younger faces and is more homogeneous and dovish in character than the outgoing government, but it has only a one-vote majority in the Knesset and will therefore have to proceed cautiously.

The most tangible achievement in "clearing the minefields" has been the Egyptian-Israeli disengagement, which was completed by March 5. In late March, when Israel charged Egypt with deploying more artillery pieces on the east bank than were permitted, Israelis feared a repetition of Egypt's serious 1970 cease-fire violations, but they were relieved by Sadat's prompt correction of this violation. Egypt has since begun operations to clear the canal of mines, with American, British and —at Moscow's request—Soviet aid.

The next step was taken on the Golan front, where Kissinger's "shuttle diplomacy" faced formidable obstacles. The process of whittling down the differences between Israel and Syria had proceeded quite far by the time he left for the Middle East on April 28, but both regimes were too weak to make major diplomatic concessions.

The initial exploratory moves in January did not become serious negotiating proposals until late February, after Syria made the good-faith gesture of handing Kissinger the POW list to deliver to Israel. Israel then presented Kissinger with a disengagement proposal that apparently provided for its withdrawal from the Golan territory occupied in 1973 and for that entire wedge to be demilitarized under UNEF control. The Israeli plan further called for the Syrian and Israeli forces on each side of the UNEF zone to be thinned out, according to the model of the Sinai agreement.

Assad's counterproposal, however, tied disengagement to Israeli withdrawal from all occupied territories. He insisted that the disengagement terms specify Israel's withdrawal not only from Golan territory occupied in 1973 but also from a substantial part of the land occupied in 1967, including the town of Qunaitra. This demand was made in order to establish the principle—and precedent—of erasing Israel's gains from both wars. Assad also rejected the idea of a UNEF buffer, although he suggested establishment of a no-man's-land between the Syrian and Israeli forces and continued use of UN observers. He further sought to make disengagement a prerequisite to lifting the oil embargo.

By the end of March, however, the oil embargo was lifted provisionally, and Dayan came to Washington with a specific Israeli plan, entailing reduction of the UNEF buffer zone but still rejecting any Israeli pullback behind the 1967 lines. Despite this limited change, Kissinger waxed optimistic and stated that the disengagement would be complete by the time the oil states reconsidered the embargo on June 1. On April 13, he received from a Syrian envoy a detailed plan and map which proposed a demilitarized zone whose western lines would fall a mile or two inside the 1967 lines. The zone would include Qunaitra, thereby allowing Syrian refugees to return to the town and permitting the re-establishment of Syrian civilian administration without the presence of Syrian military forces. Kissinger apparently believed the Israelis might accept this token withdrawal behind the 1967 lines, particularly since it would not uproot the settlements that had been placed about three miles from the border. But he still sought Syrian agreement to a UNEF presence in the demilitarized zone, and Egypt presumably supported him in this effort.

By the end of April, when Kissinger again departed for the Middle East, he evidently thought that a settlement largely following the Syrian proposal was feasible. A mutual thinning-out of forces along the truce lines and the exchange of POW's would also take place. However, fears remained that the Israeli caretaker government would feel too weak to agree to even a minimal withdrawal behind the 1967 lines, and that the Syrian government might, at the last minute, impose unacceptable conditions on the disengagement. Meanwhile, military hostilities along the cease-fire lines and on the contested peaks of Mount Hermon kept the atmosphere highly charged. Although most observers, including Dayan, viewed the artillery exchanges as a form of diplomatic pressure on each of the contestants and on Kissinger, the resulting casualties and high tension exacerbated the distrust on each side.

Kissinger won a Syrian-Israeli disengagement agreement only after a month of arduous "shuttle diplomacy," thus initiating the painful venture toward clearing the minefields on the Golan Heights. Although strains between Israel and Syria will remain far more severe than those separating Egypt and Israel, disengagement, the first tangible step toward accord after twenty-six years of unremitting hostility, is a major accomplishment in itself. It may nudge open the door to further agreements between Egypt and Israel and even to negotiations on the most difficult issues involving the Palestinians, without whose accord no final mine-clearing and no genuine peace will be possible.

France After Gaullism

GENERAL Charles de Gaulle left numerous legacies to France, most notably the Fifth Republic's presidential system of government and a distinctive foreign policy. He believed strongly in his country's complete independence, especially from "Anglo-Saxon hegemony," and hoped that a French-led Europe might become a "third force" between the United States and the Soviet Union. To this end, he ordered the construction of an independent French nuclear force, attacked American policies in Southeast Asia, sought a special relationship with the Soviet Union and, in 1966, withdrew France from NATO's military organization. De Gaulle opposed British entry into the Common Market and fought any strengthening of the Common Market's supranational institutions; he wished to maintain strong influence over the policies of West Germany.

If de Gaulle's foreign policy tended to be opposed on principle to American initiatives, his domestic policy was founded on anti-communism. Limited to a choice between de Gaulle and the Communists, the French voter was expected to prefer de Gaulle, and de Gaulle himself customarily ran elections based on this arrangement. Hence the Fifth Republic's electoral system proceeded on two rounds, the first to select a majority candidate and, failing that, the second to choose the winner in a runoff between the two most popular figures. Given the strength and discipline of the French Communists, they were bound to appear more dangerous when separated neatly into the opposition camp. The Socialists and Centrists were then faced with a baffling task: how to combat the government with Communist help but dispense with that help during the second round.

Gaullism's main political doctrines were wearing thin when President de Gaulle elected to withdraw from office in 1969. A massive student rebellion and nationwide strikes in 1968, together with the loss of a general referendum on the issue of political decentralization, indicated French disenchantment with de Gaulle's leadership. The French *volte face* on Israel after the 1967 war and Paris' inability to influence negotiations toward a settlement laid to rest French pretensions to great-power status in the Middle East. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 dashed French notions that a special relationship with Eastern Europe or the Soviet Union might be forged. Finally, the burgeoning strength of the West German economy and Chancellor Brandt's evolving *Ostpolitik* indicated that the Federal Republic of Germany, and not France, was the strongest state in the Common Market and that policies toward the East could be pursued successfully without antagonizing Washington.

De Gaulle's successor, Georges Pompidou, had been the General's trusted assistant and Premier for some time before the 1968 turmoil. His distinguished behavior during the riotous events of that year earned him a dismissal by de Gaulle from the premiership. Nonetheless, in 1969 he ran as the Gaullist presidential candidate and won. The question then before Pompidou and France was whether Gaullism was simply the institutional manifestation of a personality or a lasting political phenomenon with its foundations in a distinctive ideology. If Gaullism was a force independent of de Gaulle, the constitution of the Fifth Republic would survive; if it was not, the manifestations of Gaullism would not long survive the General's departure.

President Pompidou began with compromises. He was forced to devalue the franc in order to strengthen the French economy in competition with West Germany. Britain was admitted to the Common Market partly to counterbalance German influence. France did not rejoin NATO's integrated military command but some military cooperation was resumed. Similarly, French pretensions outside Europe and the Mediterranean area were curtailed, thereby ending the bizarre episode of French support for an independent Quebec.

Beyond these changes, Pompidou proved unable to alter Gaullist doctrine or make it more flexible. As a consequence, French diplomacy could not supply a new vision for European unity after having stifled the old. The French government presented no alternatives to Atlantic defense arrangements. In the Middle East, French attempts to exchange arms and economic agreements for influence found takers (primarily in Libya) but not much influence.

The immobility of French policy soon led Paris into a series of embarrassing contradictions. The French government described Soviet-American rapprochement as dangerous because it would threaten a great-power condominium, but a Franco-Soviet special relationship would be safe because it promised a Moscow-Paris axis over Western Europe. According to France, the United States could not be trusted to defend Western Europe and the French therefore needed an independent nuclear force, but Paris was opposed to any withdrawal of American troops from Western Europe because European defense was impossible without them. Libyans bought French jets and France posed as an alternative to the Soviet Union in backing the Arabs, but the Libyan Mirages were used without French permission in the Yom Kippur War and France obtained neither cheaper oil nor political advantages in the Middle East.

The progressive decline of Gaullism as an effective foreign policy was accompanied by a progressive decay of the Gaullist domestic administration. Numerous scandals burst around the Pompidou government in 1971-1972, one of which resulted in the resignation of Premier Chaban-Delmas over his tax returns. Persistent international monetary problems complicated the French economy, and Common Market partners grew restless over an agricultural policy subsidizing French farmers at incredible cost. The great triumph of Anglo-French cooperation, the Concorde supersonic jetliner, proved an expensive project with little hope of finding an adequate market.

In March 1972, President Pompidou began to appear unwell. His schedule became increasingly erratic, with frequent cancellations of ceremonial appearances because of health problems. By September 1973, various figures in the government including Edgar Faure and Chaban-Delmas (both former Premiers), Pierre Messmer (then Premier) and Giscard d'Estaing (the Finance Minister and a non-Gaullist) were canvassing for support as Pompidou's successor.

The President's declining health was accompanied by strong reassertions of the old international principles of Gaullism. When the Yom Kippur War broke out, the French government proclaimed anew its pro-Arab policy and worked to impress its position upon a confused European Community. The Arab oil embargo soon brought forth sympathetic pronouncements from London and Bonn and a joint Common Market statement distinctly echoing the Arab interpretation of UNSC Resolution 242 on the Middle East. When the embargo was thereupon restricted to the Netherlands, the French brought strenuous pressure upon Britain and West Germany to force the Dutch to "recant" their supposedly pro-Israel sympathies. The West Germans and other members of the Market expressed extreme irritation at French tactics.

The height of friction between France and its allies was reached at the Washington Energy Conference in February 1974, to which the Pompidou government had come grudgingly and reluctantly. Foreign Minister Jobert, suspected of harboring ambitions for the Presidency, outdid all previous French efforts in casting aspersions on American purposes and attempting to sabotage joint action in favor of bilateralism. Forced by French tactics to choose between Washington and Paris, the other Europeans chose Washington. This was a stunning blow to French pretensions in Europe, but in the context of internal Gaullist politics it was proof once more that only France was a truly "independent" European state.

On April 2, Georges Pompidou died in his private Paris apartment. He left no political testament. The scramble for succession began: Chaban-Delmas and Giscard d' Estaing were the leading contenders for support from the Gaullist party and the Independent Republicans, the main partners in the government. Outside the government, the opposition coalesced around the Socialists led by François Mitterand. The Communist Party decided early to back Mitterand, who was thereupon caught in the old Gaullist trap. His election campaign became a long explanation of how a Socialist-Communist coalition could change conditions without necessarily giving too much authority to the Communists—though they were necessary for electoral success.

On May 5, the first election round was held. Mitterand received the largest percentage (43.3); Giscard was second (32.7); Chaban-Delmas finished a distant third (14.7). The election issues were primarily domestic and the initial balloting proved that pure Gaullism, or even Gaullism in Pompidou's image, was incapable of gaining majority support. Only 5 per cent separated the total votes for all the Center-Right candidates and all the Left-Socialists; it had been more than 11 per cent in

1965, more than 12 per cent in 1969 and almost 9 per cent in the March 1973 parliamentary elections.

Giscard spent the remaining time before the second round in securing Gaullist support. Despite some bitterness over his opposition to de Gaulle in the fatal referendum of 1969, the Gaullists had little choice. His theme for the second round was the same as for the first: a change away from Gaullism but not a change toward communism.

Mitterand's last-minute campaigning was dogged by increasing ambiguity over Communist influence and his personal beliefs. There was a bizarre note when the Soviet Ambassador paid a call on Giscard, ostensibly to discuss "bilateral" trade matters. The French Communists regarded this as a clear signal from Moscow that Giscard was preferable to Mitterand.

On May 19, Giscard won the second round against Mitterand. His margin was little more than 1 per cent. France was now split nearly evenly between advocates of Left and Right, a situation traditionally making for weak government in Paris. The old Gaullist tactic of posing a choice between Gaullism and communism in order to gain a strong majority had worn out.

In his victory announcement to the French people Giscard declared: "You want changes—politically, economically, socially. You won't be disappointed." There is indeed room for change in French foreign and domestic policy. Gaullism has proved to be largely a product of one personality rather than a lasting ideology. Its foreign policy was contradictory and its domestic reputation appears to have been discredited. Yet Giscard must still depend on Gaullist support to govern. The question is whether he and his allies will have the skill and wisdom to discard some of the less attractive features of Gaullism without burying the Fifth Republic in a return to the economic and political instability that preceded it. In any event, France is finally entering the post-Gaullist era.

The Portuguese Coup

FORTY-SIX years of autocratic rule in Portugal came to a dramatic conclusion on April 25 when the army deposed Premier Marcello Caetano. The move was swift and virtually bloodless; it was over in less than seven hours and only five deaths were reported. Prior to the event, there was little to indicate that a coup could be accomplished so easily. Under Salazar, organized political opposition had been successfully suppressed for forty years. Until recently it appeared that Caetano had inherited the resilience of his predecessor. Both Salazar and Caetano concentrated upon retaining control rather than directing an effective strategy of national development. With the aid of the secret police, political dissent was regularly crushed almost as soon as it became audible.

But there were stirrings of discontent prior to the coup. Only six weeks earlier, the Caetano regime had quashed a military plot to overthrow the government and had arrested thirty-three officers. The primary source of this disaffection was Portugal's military embroilment in its African possessions—Mozambique. Angola and Portuguese Guinea. For thirteen years, the government had been attempting to suppress guerrilla activity in these three colonies. Despite the presence of more than 160,000 troops, more than half of the Portuguese army, the insurgency persisted. Morale within the military began to deteriorate as it became clear that Portugal could not force a military solution and would not seek a political one. Domestically, draft evasion was increasing and the conflict, which drained over 40 per cent of Portugal's meager budget, was not popular.

Amid this atmosphere of disillusionment, General Antonio Sebastino Ribeiro de Spínola, the country's leading military figure, published *Portugal and the Future* in February. The book was essentially a critique of Portuguese policy in Africa, coupled with some general criticisms of the Caetano government's lack of attention to democracy and national development. Its publication shocked the nation, both because of its content and because of the eminence of its author. Spínola was a hero of the African wars, having received Portugal's highest military decoration. Criticism by such a respected national figure rocked the Portuguese political scene. In response to the book, General Spínola was dismissed from his post of Deputy Chief of Staff of the armed forces. His superior, Chief of Staff Francisco da Costa Gomes, was also fired for refusing to dismiss him.

As a result of these developments a group of middle-level officers—the Movement of the Armed Forces—resolved to bring down the Caetano regime. At 12:30 a.m. on April 25 the signal was given for the coup to begin. By 6:00 key points in Lisbon had been encircled and Premier Caetano had fled to the barracks of the paramilitary Republican National Guard. At the behest of the Movement negotiations began between Caetano and Spínola. By four o'clock the Premier had imparted his willingness to hand over power "so that the government would not fall into the streets" and at 8:30 the Movement of the Armed Forces announced Caetano's surrender. General Spínola was appointed head of a governing Junta of National Salvation. Thereupon Caetano and a few high-level associates were quietly sent to the resort island of Madeira and later into exile in Brazil.

With the fall of Caetano all major political appointments were vacated, including those held by the colonial governors of Portuguese Africa. Among the junta's first actions was the unraveling of Portugal's security network. All political prisoners incarcerated by the Salazar and Caetano regimes were released and a purge of "fascist elements" was promised. Censorship was lifted, and scores of newspapers inundated the populace with news and opinion concerning the coup. Exiled leftists were invited to return to Portugal. The most prominent of these were Mario

Soares, a Socialist, and Alvaro Cunhal, the Secretary-General of the Communist Party.

These actions came as a surprise to some of those familiar with Spínola's past. Having been trained in Nazi Germany after voluntary service for Franco in the Spanish Civil War, he could scarcely be characterized as a liberal. Although he had advocated the liberalization of the Portuguese political system in his book, he also emphasized that it would be necessary to maintain "discipline and firm authority" in pursuit of that goal.

The junta's domestic policies are, in part, a natural reaction to the Salazar and Caetano policies. They are also a partial response to the euphoria that greeted proclamation of the coup—a sense heightened by each announcement of liberalizing innovations. While in the short run such actions have enhanced the new regime's legitimacy, the government will be forced to formulate policies designed to deal with a broad range of political, economic and social problems facing the nation, as well as with the revolutionary movements in the overseas territories.

Only a few days after the coup, Portugal's steelworkers threatened to strike to secure changes in management procedures and working conditions. Employees of the telephone company, the post office and the railroad demonstrated against top officials, accusing them of fascism in an attempt to hasten the promised purges. Although the steel strike was avoided, workers throughout the nation began to strike. On the day Spínola took office as President, 8,500 workers of Lisbon's biggest shipyard occupied the plant and demanded a doubling of wages and worker control. Thousands of textile workers threatened to strike for similar demands.

On May 15 General Spínola was installed as provisional President of Portugal, replacing the military junta. A civilian, Adelino da Palma Carlos, was named Premier of the provisional government, which is in charge of organizing the proposed elections. Socialist Mario Soares was named Foreign Minister, and Alvaro Cunhal, the Communist Party leader, became a minister without portfolio. Eleven other civilians assumed posts in the cabinet.

The government has promised free elections within a year and the establishment, thereafter, of democratic government. Fulfillment of that promise, however, will depend on the ability of the new leaders to solve many practical political problems. For example, the precise form of government and the procedures of election are yet to be determined. Even under the best of circumstances, establishing a proper balance between authority and democracy will not be an easy task. Moreover, the Communist Party will play a role in the emerging political alignment and has already been assigned two cabinet seats in the provisional government including the Ministry of Labor. Although small in numbers (perhaps five thousand before the coup), the Communists maintained rigorous discipline throughout the tenure of Salazar and Caetano.

The new government also faces economic problems, including high rates of inflation and a low GNP, but perhaps the most pressing task will be to end the revolutionary warfare in the overseas territories. Since this conflict was one of the chief reasons for the coup, it will be incumbent upon Spínola to find an acceptable solution. He apparently envisions the formation of a federation of states, which he calls the "Lusitanian community." In this community, each state would have a substantial degree of local autonomy, although Portugal would still make the decisions concerning foreign affairs, economic policy and defense. Many of the newly emerging political forces, including certain military factions, however, regard the granting of outright independence as the only realistic policy option.

Prospects for an amicable solution may be damaged by the tension between the interests of blacks and whites in the territories. The Portuguese colonists (ranging from 8 per cent of the population in Angola—some 400,000 people—to considerably smaller minorities in Mozambique and Guinea) desire a strong voice in any local administration and relatively close ties with Portugal. But any government that was not of an indisputably black African character would probably have little chance of acceptance by radical black groups. Agostino Neto, the leader of the People's Liberation Movement of Angola (MPLA), has stated that guerrilla activity will continue until outright independence. Rebel leaders in Guinea and Mozambique have expressed the opinion that Spínola merely favors a veiled retention of Portugal's empire. An outcome satisfactory to all parties may well be impossible to attain, but Foreign Minister Soares is making every effort to achieve a negotiated solution.

In attempting to resolve the African question, Portugal will be subject to political pressure from African states. Rhodesia and South Africa have an interest in maintaining a "buffer zone" between themselves and black states such as Zambia, Zaire and Tanzania. Rhodesia would be particularly vulnerable to subversion in the event that a radical black regime came to power in Mozambique; in addition, she would lose access to the Indian Ocean through Mozambique and would be forced to send goods on a circuitous route through the Republic of South Africa. At the same time the black nations will continue pressuring Lisbon to grant the overseas territories full independence. Currently, Zaire, Zambia and the Republic of Guinea, all of which are adjacent to the Portuguese territories, provide sanctuary, medical aid and even military aid to guerrillas. In the case of Guinea, the supply of Soviet, Czech and Chinese arms to Guinea-Bissau guerrillas has included SAM-7 anti-aircraft missiles.

General Spínola began his book with the sentence, "Portugal is living today, without doubt, in one of the gravest hours, if not the most grave, of her history." Considering the problems ahead, his words appear to have been fraught with prescience. While Portugal's new leaders would prefer to deal cautiously with the country's complex problems, the exigencies of the altered situation will probably force crucial decisions. For the present, they must maintain order. Yet in doing so they realize that they cannot reinstate the restrictions of the past without placing in jeopardy their image as Portugal's "liberators." The volatile pre-electoral period and the cast of the government that results from it will be critical to the course of the country's political development. On the outcome will hinge, not only stability and progress in Portugal and her African possessions, but the relationship between Portugal and the West.

Soviet Internal Dissent and Soviet-American Relations

RECENT months have witnessed the improvement of prospects for expanded Soviet-American economic cooperation and a freer exchange of ideas and people. Although the cooperative outlook has increased the likelihood of greater economic interchange, however, the Soviet Union has shown no signs that it will relax its campaign of ideological vigilance.

Overshadowing all developments on the Soviet side was the forced exile of Alexander Solzhenitsyn in retaliation for his permitting the publication in Paris of *Gulag Archipelago*, the Nobel prize winning novelist's laboriously researched reconstruction of how the Soviet penal system operated between 1918 and 1956. Solzhenitsyn's arrest and deportation were accompanied by a press campaign of tasteless and hysterical vilification, unusual even by contemporary Soviet standards. A major attack mounted by *Literary Gazette*, the weekly organ of the Soviet writers' union, linked Solzhenitsyn with other "filthy provocateurs," accused him of welcoming a Western military conquest of the Soviet Union, and inveighed against his writings as an example of "the dirty traces left by a little group of people who are called dissidents in the West."

Inevitably, "outraged" workers wrote to *Pravda* that Solzhenitsyn had gotten what any "traitor" deserved. A *Pravda* editorial a month before his expulsion went to the heart of the matter in identifying his unforgivable error as the endeavor "to prove that the violations of legality were not a deviation from the norms of socialist society but arose from the very nature of socialism [i.e., Soviet communism]." Underlying this criticism has been the accusation that Solzhenitsyn's writings are designed to sabotage improved relations between East and West.

Solzhenitsyn's arrest prompted the Soviet poet, Yevgeny Yevtushenko, to spring to his defense. Yevtushenko, who has become increasingly orthodox since his youthful days of anti-Stalinist protest, followed up a telegram to Brezhnev with an "open letter" denouncing the official reprisal against his colleague. His letter provided a striking insight into political socialization in the Soviet Union. Yevtushenko told of an incident last year in Siberia as he was sitting around a campfire with a group of teen-agers. Startled to see a young girl, eighteen years of age, raise a toast to Stalin, he asked her how she could do such a thing. She replied that under Stalin the Soviet people had been united and triumphant. When the poet pointed out that millions of Soviet citizens had been arrested in Stalin's purges, the teen-agers were disbelieving. They had supposed that only a few dozen, maybe a few hundred, persons had been victims. "And then I suddenly understood, as never before," Yevtushenko concluded, "that the younger generation really does not have sources today for learning the tragic truth about that period because they cannot read about it in books or textbooks. . . . This is especially dangerous for the spiritual health of our youth, because youth that does not know authentic history will be unable to see the present in its true light." The suppression of Solzhenitsyn's writings makes it apparent that present Soviet leaders seek just such a result.

Although Solzhenitsyn's expulsion also evoked expressions of protest in the U.S. Congress, the long-term, international effect of the Soviet government's action will probably be relatively modest. By declining to send the novelist to a labor camp, Soviet officials avoided creating a martyr. Moreover, exile has already made Solzhenitsyn less newsworthy by removing the aura of heroic defiance enveloping his statements while he was still subject to police repression in the USSR.

Nevertheless, controversy continues to surround both Solzhenitsyn and the Soviet dissident movement. Reprisals taken against Yevtushenko and the "voluntary" emigration of Pavel Litvinov (grandson of the former Soviet foreign minister) keep Moscow's policies of internal repression in the searchlight of international publicity. The abrupt cancellation of a poetry reading by Yevtushenko was followed by criticism of him in the pages of *Literary Gazette,* which castigated him for failing "to sort out the complexities of the contemporary ideological struggle." Litvinov's flight from the USSR in April occurred after agents of the Committee for State Security (KGB) made him an offer he could not refuse: emigration or several years in a labor camp. Litvinov, who like an increasing number of Soviet Jewish emigrés may take up residence in the United States in preference to settling in Israel, has sought to correct the misconception that Western public opinion cannot hope to exert an impact on Soviet internal policy. A veteran of four years' exile in Siberia for protesting the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, he told a press conference in Rome that "we have survived because the West exists."

Solzhenitsyn's exile, prompted in part by his "Letter to the Rulers of the Soviet Union," has served to publicize some long-standing differences within the Soviet dissident movement, which is far more multifaceted in viewpoint than many Western observers have realized. The "Letter," actually an extended essay addressed to the Brezhnev leadership in September 1973, urges the abandonment of communism as the guiding philosophy of the Soviet regime and the relinquishing of Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe and the non-Russian republics. These republics merely provide the façade of representation to the 46 per cent of the Soviet population that is not ethnically Russian. Solzhenitsyn also advocates a return to traditional Russian rural values and rejection of Western democracy as an alternative to a benevolent authoritarianism (as distinct from the Soviet variant). The ethical vacuum that he sees engulfing Western democracy, with its interplay of conflicting interests, reinforces his belief that Russian tradition is preferable to Western models. In this respect his views represent a continuation of the Slavophile school of thought of the nineteenth century.

Some of the views expressed in the "Letter" were supported in April by Andrei Sakharov, the nuclear physicist credited with the primary role in developing the Soviet nuclear bomb. Sakharov endorsed Solzhenitsyn's proposals for the regime to renounce Marxism and surrender its sway over Eastern Europe and the non-Russian republics. But he flatly rejected the novelist's emphasis on Russian nationalist values and his complaint that Soviet natural resources were being "sold off" to foreign countries. Instead, Sakharov advocated greater economic and scientific collaboration between East and West, leading to what he believes will be the convergence of their social and political systems.

Of most immediate interest to American observers have been the differences of opinion among Soviet dissidents on the extent to which Western pressure can modify Soviet policies of domestic repression. Sakharov has vigorously supported U.S. Congressional action to link trade with free emigration in the belief that the Soviet regime's appetite for Western technology provides the United States with usable leverage on the Brezhnev leadership. But his views provoked a demurrer in late April from Roy Medvedev, the dissident Marxist historian still resident in the Soviet Union. In a *samizdat* essay (self-published in typewritten form), Medvedev acknowledged the importance of Western support for the Soviet dissenters' survival but urged rejection of measures linking trade and emigration as threatening "an uncontrollable and destructive escalation of mistrust and rivalry" between the superpowers. Neither U.S. credits nor tariff reductions, in his view, can exert sufficient leverage on the Politburo to induce basic alterations in domestic or foreign policy.

This fundamental difference of view, expressed from the seemingly remote vantage point of Moscow, has underlain Congressional debate in the United States over the Jackson-Vanik amendment. This measure, presently being considered by the Senate after two favorable House votes in December, would deny the Soviet Union and other "non-market economies" most-favored-nation tariff reductions and government-backed export credits unless the country in question permits free emigration. Ultimately, a legislative compromise may be reached whereby the Soviet Union would be required to maintain present emigration rates without having to permit unrestricted emigration. Despite co-sponsorship of the Jackson-Vanik amendment by more than eighty Senators, some Senate strategists reason that while the Soviet leadership would be loath to permit free emigration, it could live with an annual emigration rate of 35,000 to 50,000 persons, the overwhelming majority of whom would presumably be Jews.

As a measure of the leverage already exerted by the proposed amendment, the USSR granted an estimated 35,000 exit visas last year, mostly to Jews seeking to emigrate to Israel. Ironically, however, passage of the Jackson-Vanik amendment as presently formulated could sacrifice these gains by stiffening Soviet resistance to U.S. Congressional pressures. If Soviet hopes for increased trade with the West were to founder on the shoals of Congressional opposition in the United States, Soviet leaders would no longer have an incentive to maintain present emigration rates.

In any event, it is not clear that an enduring "structure of peace," envisaged by the Nixon Administration, can be built by relying on economic cooperation to cement Soviet-American bonds. Reliance of this sort has always assumed a probably unwarranted degree of economic determinism in international relations. The Soviet commitment to secrecy and to securing the advantages of a one-way flow of technology has made economic cooperation a weak reed with which to build a cooperative relationship.

Thus, it was not really surprising that Moscow failed in February to supply the United States with agricultural production data, as provided for by the U.S.-Soviet agricultural exchange agreement. Under the accord the Soviet Ministry of Agriculture was to furnish the United States with information that would make it possible for American farmers to know what crops to plant and in what quantity. In return for the Soviet data, the United States agreed to negotiate about exporting agricultural machinery to the USSR. The U.S. strategy has been to help spur Soviet livestock production in the interest of expanding the Soviet market for American feed grains. But the Soviets reneged on their commitment to provide extensive agricultural information. Instead, the Soviet data proved to be only slightly more informative than statistics normally carried by *Pravda*. At least, however, the United States has taken precautions to prevent another "wheat deal" similar to that of 1972. New export reporting rules will prevent Soviet purchasers from seizing the opportunity they had two years ago to buy up American wheat clandestinely at rock-bottom prices.

The energy crisis and accompanying world price movements have also exerted an impact on the ability of Congress to ensure that Soviet-American trade entails commensurate benefits for the United States. As a result of the worldwide rise in the price of raw materials, the Jackson-Vanik amendment has lost some of its earlier leverage. The need for credits has thus far been a stumbling block preventing the USSR from fully capitalizing on prospects for technology transfer and U.S. capital investment. Because windfall profits from Soviet sales of raw materials for hard currency have substantially reduced the need for credits from the United States, Soviet efforts to import Western technology will in all likelihood be less tied to long-term credits than in the past. Even in the absence of a need to provide such credits, however, the United States should continue to seek a more durable basis for an improved relationship with the Soviet Union, measured by Moscow's willingness to forgo marginal political-military gain at the expense of the United States and the Western allies and to lift some of the onerous limitations on the movement of ideas and people to and from the Soviet homeland.

Marcos, Martial Law and the "New Society" in the Philippines

WITH the enactment of martial law in the Philippines on the night of September 22, 1972, President Ferdinand Marcos changed the rules of the game in Philippine politics. Events culminating in the imposition of martial law were an outgrowth of rising social and religious tensions, political chaos, natural disaster and a series of bizarre incidents. During Marcos' first term as President, local violence had run rampant in a country where the citizens possessed more firearms than the police and armed forces combined. In the south, the persisting Muslim insurgency, marked by conflicts over land rights, had intensified. While politicians ruled by dint of private goon-squads, government programs became mired in endless political bickering. In July 1972, amid the political and social upheaval, massive floods in Central Luzon destroyed rice and sugar crops.

Three incidents that alarmed the government during this period provided Marcos with justification for his move. The first was the discovery of insurgent weapons and ammunition in a fishing trawler headed for a point in northern Luzon, which is the base of the New People's Army (NPA), a Maoist-styled guerrilla force. The second and third provocations were a rash of bombings in the Manila area followed by an attempt to assassinate Defense Secretary Juan Ponce Enrile. There is evidence that the assassination attempt, and the Manila bombings, were orchestrated in the Presidential Palace to allow Marcos to impose martial law.

Whether one agrees with the President's supporters who view martial law as the only means of restoring civil order, or with his critics who consider it simply a pretext to unlimited power, questions remain about both the necessity for and the effectiveness of such extreme measures. To the government's credit, martial law did result in a nationwide collection of about half a million firearms.

Moreover, the atmosphere under which the law is operating is relatively relaxed, notwithstanding the jailing of Marcos' political opponents (including the main contender, Senator Benigno Acquino) and rigid censorship of the press.

Partly to make the suspension of civil liberties more palatable, Marcos proclaimed the "New Society" (a kind of mixed New Deal and Great Society) which, at least on paper, represents a broad program of social and economic reform. He has also gone to extraordinary lengths to legitimize his martial rule by undertaking constitutional revisions. At the end of 1972 he created a nationwide system of citizens' assemblies, or *barangays*, which overwhelmingly approved continuation of martial law and an eventual new constitution that is to replace the presidential form of government with a parliamentary system. However, the President has convened no parliament, nor has he proclaimed himself Prime Minister. He continues to rule by decree, a situation that could last indefinitely.

Marcos' opponents consider his invocation of the communist threat to be another example of his efforts to take into his hand, all power. Whether the fishing trawler incident was choreographed by the Palace or not, rather than being a genuine threat, the NPA, which now numbers about 1,000 full-time troops, some 6,000 active supporters and several thousand sympathizers, has had only limited success in recruiting guerrillas.

Martial law is meeting its greatest test in the current exacerbation of tensions between Muslims and Christians on Mindanao and in the Sulu Archipelago. To many Muslims, the law seemed simply a device enabling the predominantly Christian army to carry out a brutal pacification campaign. Citing centuries of abuse by the Christian majority, the Muslims (who constitute only 5 per cent of the population) have reactivated an old demand for a separate Muslim state, the Bangsa Moro Republic (BMR). The destruction of Jolo town on Jolo Island in the Sulu chain is the most recent example of the seesaw fighting, and that incident is remarkably reminiscent of both Spanish pacification attempts in the area ninety-eight years ago and the more recent Viet Nam war, in which the insurgents frequently succeeded in goading the government into massive overreactions.

Although Manila considers the Muslim rebels to be communist-inspired, there appears to be little unity among separate rebel bands, and the character of the uprising differs by region. On Mindanao the dispute arises in large part from tension between Muslim farmers and the Christian settlers encroaching upon their land. In the Sulu Islands, the struggle centers on general grievances against the Manila government and corrupt local politicians. The government's attempt at conciliation had mixed results: while it seems to have divided the Muslims into two factions—those willing to surrender their weapons and the hard-core insurgents—it also generated more violence. Overall tensions have intensified: Christian fear of Muslim has increased Muslim fear of Christian; newly created refugees add to the instability; provincial distrust of the central government remains strong.

The Muslim rebellion once again highlights the chronic political instability in the Philippines and the failure of the central government to provide effective leadership to alleviate social tensions. Perhaps the final judgment on President Marcos' performance will rest on economics. Considered in the broadest perspective, Manila cannot afford to alienate itself from the Muslim nations that provide the Philippines with 80 per cent of its oil. Ironically, however, martial law has not slowed foreign investment in the Philippines. Indeed, just the reverse seems to be the case: by executive decree Marcos has modified or eliminated Supreme Court rulings which had restrained foreign investment. He has ordered the simplification of tariff, tax and banking regulations, reduced the stock transfer tax and suspended the capital gains tax, all in an attempt to spur the economy. With the passage of the Oil Exploration and Development Bill, the government has opened up the possibility of broad offshore oil exploration.

The Philippines has largely recovered from the 1972 floods that produced an estimated $300 million damage and a tremendous, if temporary, jump in the cost of living index (37 per cent). Owing to the wreckage of Luzon's sugar and rice crops the economy's overall rate of growth (about 6 per cent) slumped to 4 per cent. However, by mid-1973, using emergency relief operations and diverting half of the U.S. FY 1973 aid allotment of $155 million for flood relief, Manila was able to bring the situation in Central Luzon under control. The government also had at hand a 1970 stabilization agreement with the International Monetary Fund under which other important steps were taken: devaluing the peso, tightening domestic credit, reducing budgetary deficits, and inaugurating a four-year plan. World Bank loans to the Philippines have increased, too, and an annual $250 million aid consortium headed by the United States and Japan is providing assistance. As a result, during 1973 and the first quarter of 1974 the Philippine economy improved its performance. Exports rose 60 per cent over 1972, and the balance of payments situation had eased as foreign exchange reserves climbed.

But these developments cannot compensate for the poor conditions in which most peasants still live, the rampant undernourishment among children, the usurious sharecropping and debt encumbrances, the urban unemployment of over 15 per cent, and the continuing serious inflation of about 25 per cent. The annual population growth rate goes on undiminished at over 3 per cent. Despite years of promises the Marcos government has made no systematic effort at effective land reform. Since the enactment of the 1963 agricultural reform code, only a small percentage of hectares earmarked for expropriation and redistribution has been acquired by the government.

By 1973 only about 10 per cent of the more than one million rice and corn tenants had even received title to their land.

By the spring of 1974 one of the most critical economic issues involved negotiations over the U.S.-Philippine Laurel-Langely Trade Agreement, scheduled to expire on July 3. A continuation of the parity privileges enacted under the 1946 Philippine Constitution, this agreement gave American citizens rights equal to those of Philippine citizens in the exploitation and development of natural resources in the Philippines. This put Filipino operations at an inherent disadvantage, as U.S. concerns are the second biggest employer in the islands. It is likely that the Laurel-Langely agreement, under hot debate for several years, will lapse. However, its economic basis is expected to continue largely intact. Overall U.S. private investment in the Philippines exceeds $1 billion, mainly in oil and representing about 80 per cent of all foreign investment, although the Japanese are rapidly increasing their holdings. The Filipinos clearly want to retain certain preferential links with the United States, since they enjoy access to the U.S. sugar, coconut and oil market.

Washington's policy of "reordering" relations with the Philippines is not expected to disturb American military facilities at the Subic Bay Naval Base, Clark Air Force Base and other smaller installations (valued at about $2 billion and for which the United States pays no rent). There will be some continued attempts to enlarge Filipino jurisdiction over U.S. servicemen, but these are minor matters. Under the Nixon Doctrine U.S. military facilities in the Philippines have become even more critical than before to U.S.-Asian defense relationships. The strength of the U.S.-Philippine bonds, hence, will be vitally affected by the capacity of the Philippine government and its opponents to compromise their differences and arrive at a *modus vivendi* permitting a relaxation of martial law and the achievement of greater liberty and economic growth for all groups of the population.

Raw Materials and LDC Cartel Tactics

THE vast increase in oil prices, together with restrictions on oil distribution effected through a collaborative stand taken by the Arab oil-producing states during the 1973 Middle East war, has introduced a new political dimension into existing patterns of international trade. The action of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in bringing producer countries together to increase prices has raised the possibility that other states which are major raw material exporters may take similar action in an effort to achieve political goals or improve their economic position.

The question whether other producer states can employ the tactics of the Arab oil cartel effectively to induce consuming nations to increase aid allotments, relax trade barriers, share new technologies, or take other steps the producers deem desirable commanded world attention during the United Nations General Assembly's special session on raw materials and development, which began in New York on April 9. The UN meeting, convened at the request of Algerian President Houari Boumedienne, sought to explore the possibility of inaugurating "a profound reorganization of economic relations between rich and poor countries, tending toward a distribution of the benefits of growth and progress —a distribution which in order to be equitable must be in accord with the needs, priorities and legitimate interests of the parties concerned."

Although the underdeveloped and the developed nations alike had expressed a desire to avoid confrontation, several areas of disagreement became apparent during the course of the meeting. The Special Session evolved into a forum for the less developed to air grievances against the more developed and to launch a campaign against alleged inequities of the international economic system. Identifying the OPEC boycott as "a decisive turning point in international relations," whereby the developing world has initiated a new pattern of global market relationships, Boumedienne introduced a proposal that set forth changes sought by poorer nations in commodity and trade policies, the world monetary structure and the distribution of foreign aid, and presented a program of action by which these nations could secure their objectives. The Declaration of a New Economic Order and Action Program included the right of Third World countries to nationalize their own resources, control sales from abroad, join together in price-fixing cartels, and renegotiate their debts to the industrialized world. The eagerness with which other less developed countries supported Boumedienne's proposals reflected the increasing perception of a widening gap between rich and poor that characterized the Special Session.

Boumedienne's approach contrasted sharply with Secretary of State Kissinger's call, in a speech to the Special Session, for international cooperation to "spur both the world economy and world development." Dr. Kissinger emphasized the world's growing interdependence by stating that "the great issues of development cannot any longer be realistically perceived in terms of confrontation between the 'haves' and the 'have nots,' or as a struggle over the distribution of static wealth." By cautioning against "the politics of pressure and threats," he disagreed with Boumedienne's assessment of recent Arab actions and suggested that "large price increases coupled with production restrictions involve potential disaster: global inflation followed by global recession from which no nation could escape." The transfer of raw materials and commodities from the developing to the developed states must involve a cooperative effort if new ideas about commodity arrangements, trade preferences and monetary policies are to be effected.

Defining six problem areas that are detracting from world prosperity, Kissinger proposed an international program of action to: (1) expand the supply of energy at equitable prices; (2) secure a global commitment both to conserve existing resource supplies and to develop alternative energy resources; (3) achieve a balance between food supplies and population needs and provide a means by which food emergencies may be met; (4) provide less developed states with more relief in the face of natural disasters; (5) rely more on scientific and technological achievements to answer future energy needs; and (6) revise international trade and monetary policies to take account of the needs and interests of less developed countries.

To buttress his suggestion, Kissinger indicated that the United States was prepared to increase its aid to developing countries from $258 million to $675 million during 1974, and is further willing to engage in a diversified program of cooperative efforts designed to improve their standard of living, including the development of a new chemical fertilizer to increase agricultural production and the development of birth control aids to help curtail population increases. Kissinger's UN speech was followed by an Administration proposal for a $4 billion program to aid the most economically distressed countries.

A particular aspect of the United States' proposal that elicited heated UN debate was the provision by which the industrialized consumer states together with the wealthy oil-producing states would grant emergency relief to the less developed countries during the next year and a half. For identifying the OPEC price increases as an aggravating factor in the present economic situation and including the Arab states in its plan to grant aid, Washington's initiative was viewed by some, especially Boumedienne, as a ploy to generate dissent among Third World countries. Accordingly, the Algerian delegation called for the rejection of the U.S. plan and at the same time moved for immediate UN endorsement of the Declaration of a New Economic Order and Action Program. The adoption of the Algerian-sponsored program, without vote, on April 29, reflected an attempt by the developing world to assert a new, and more influential, international economic role.

From the perspective of the less developed states, the Special Session served as a useful forum to attract world attention to their needs and problems. The approval of a wide range of tactics to effect changes in the international economic system, including collaboration in cartels, has spurred several states to action. Already some countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America are taking steps to form price-fixing cartels. For example, Jamaica, the world's leading exporter of bauxite and the United States' largest supplier, announced that it plans to increase the taxes and royalties it takes from foreign aluminum companies engaged in the mining of bauxite, causing the largest price hike for a raw material since the Arab action of last year.

More important to the stability of the international economic system, however, is the Jamaican government's pressure in the International Bauxite Association (IBA) for the formation of a cartel similar to the OPEC. Whereas at present other IBA members — especially Australia, which produces almost one-fourth of the world's bauxite and holds nearly one-third of the world's reserves — are wary about participating in any action that might decrease their volume of exports, OPEC's obvious successes may induce IBA members to act collectively. Similar efforts can be expected on the part of raw material associations such as the Intergovernmental Council of Copper Exporting Countries (CIPEC) or the International Tin Council (ITC).

But the extent of the threat to the industrialized world posed by the formation of numerous raw material cartels is disputed by economic analysts. Some experts believe the proliferation of price-fixing cartels will adversely affect the world economic situation by aggravating the current inflationary trend toward worldwide recession. Other economists are dubious about the effect the formation of additional raw material cartels will have on the economies of the developed world, on the grounds that other commodities, however vital, do not lend themselves to cartel control as does petroleum. A number of reasons sustain this judgment. For example, the membership of most of the other raw material associations, including the CIPEC and ITC, includes both developed and developing states; the common political outlook which cemented the OPEC alliance is therefore lacking.

Even if there is a common desire among association members to increase the price of their raw materials, on some items restricting output or raising prices would only mean less income for the exporting countries. Furthermore, even though certain raw materials are important to the industrialized world, oftentimes other materials may be substituted. Thus, if Jamaica insists upon raising the price of bauxite, the industrialized world could utilize copper, tin or steel in place of aluminum. Also, the development of new technologies increases the possibilities for synthetic substitutes for a material such as tin. The outlook for future cartel actions is therefore not assured. In the absence of a common political goal, a total embargo by producing states is unlikely; because their common purpose is economic, the result of a successful cartel would only be higher prices.

What is needed to alleviate the formidable economic problems facing the world's producer states and to assure adequate supplies of vital raw materials to consumer states is a collaborative effort encompassing producers *and* consumers. If events of recent months have indicated the urgency of such collaboration, the problems that surfaced during the UN General Assembly Special Session provide evidence of the great obstacles in its way.

THE
Atlantic
Community
QUARTERLY
SPRING 1974

Volume 12, Number 1

NATO's 25th Birthday	*Joseph M.A.H. Luns*
Security Aspects in French Foreign Policy	*Marc Ullmann*
The Washington Energy Conference	
The American Challenge	*Henry A. Kissinger*
The French Response	*Michel Jobert*
The British View	*Sir Alex Douglas-Home*
The German View	*Helmut Schmidt*
The Japanese View	*Masayoshi Ohira*
The Norwegian View	*Jens Evensen*
The View of the European Communities	*Walter Scheel*
The Need for Closer International-Financial Cooperation	*George P. Shultz*
The Idea of Europe Runs Out of Gas	*Walter Laqueur*
European Union is Germany's Hope	*Willy Brandt*
The U.S. and the USSR: Conflict and Cooperation	*William R. Kintner*

Single copy $1.50
Annual subscription $5.00 to U.S. and possessions and Canada; $6.00 elsewhere.

D.C. Heath and Company
125 Spring Street, Lexington, Mass. 02173

FROM THE POLITICS OF WEAKNESS TO THE POLITICS OF STRENGTH

by William H. Overholt

INTERNATIONAL politics has undergone a decisive change in the late 1960's and early 1970's. Americans have given the name "multipolarity" to this transformation, but the concept of multipolarity, as employed, is ambiguous, misleading and sterile, and much of the world distrusts U.S. policies based on it. This essay seeks to define the change in world politics more precisely, as a change from a politics of weakness to a politics of strength. But first it will be useful to explore the concept of multipolarity.

Multipolarity and Its Misuses

Multipolarity is, above all, ambiguous in the modern world. Traditionally the concept referred to regional or world political systems characterized by relatively fluid interactions among major powers of comparable political, economic and military strength. Yet today's powers are not comparable, and the number of poles depends on one's terms of reference.

In purely military terms, today's world looks bipolar, or tripolar, or multipolar, depending on the perspective employed. From a *nuclear* perspective it remains essentially bipolar, although it is rapidly becoming tripolar — largely as a result of a joint American and Soviet decision to restrain the development of defensive systems that might have held the People's Republic of China to a decidedly inferior nuclear status. With regard to *conventional offensive* military operations the world remains bipolar. Only the Soviet Union and the United States can undertake major military initiatives far beyond their own territory. China's domestic military requirements, nearly impassable borders and inadequate logistical facilities confine her largely within her own boundaries. From a *conventional defensive* viewpoint, on the other hand, the world is tripolar, because China is certainly capable of defending herself against defeat by any other power. Seen from the aspect of *guerrilla defense* the world appears more multipolar. North Viet Nam, Brazil and other actors could undertake a successful guerrilla defense against any but the most uninhibited and unlikely forays of the major powers.

These military perspectives contrast with the perspectives of economics and ideology. There are several great *domestic* economies: the United States, the Soviet Union, Japan and the European Economic Community. China, with an economy the size of Italy's, does not count here; nor does Brazil, whose economy will not surpass Canada's by 1990, even if 10 per cent GNP growth rates persist. But the United States, Japan and the EEC (and temporarily the Middle East) are the only individually powerful units in the *international* economy.

From the standpoint of *ideology* the world can be viewed still as divided between communist and noncommunist nations, or it can be viewed as a great hodgepodge of different ideological stances.

Thus, "multipolarity" proves imprecise. One could argue that the complexity of the situation requires a description like "multipolarity," but such an obtuse concept stymies analysis. To be sure, "multipolarity" describes some real changes. Some process has partially dissolved bipolar relationships, diminished U.S. influence, allowed the big powers to exploit common interests, and forced American decision-makers to give substantial weight to the views of a larger number of foreign powers. But the concept of multipolarity does not cut at the joint of what has happened. It deals only with the big powers, whereas small-power trends are equally important, and it fails to explain clearly why big powers can emphasize common interests. It obfuscates where enlightenment is possible.

More important, it provides false enlightenment, for "multipolarity" has become loaded with false, reassuring connotations of stability and U.S. maneuverability. Suppose that, instead of calling the world "multipolar," we had called it a "hodgepodge world" or a "world of incongruity." Such terms are equally descriptive, but frightening rather than reassuring.

That Asian multipolarity would prove stable became a popular idea late in the Johnson Administration. President Nixon, Dr. Kissinger and others generalized the stable multipolarity concept from post-Viet Nam Asia to the post-Viet Nam world. The idea that multipolar systems are inherently stable came to pervade the national security bureaucracies; often the pressures of intellectual faddishness were helpfully supplemented by explicit directives.

The principal example of stable multipolarity has been the nineteenth-century balance of power, which Dr. Kissinger analyzed in his dissertation on Metternich. Various scholars[1] have punctured possible analogies between today's world and nineteenth-century Europe, whose stability rested on unique balance and cooperation among the principal powers. European states then shared conservative ideology and fear of revolution, and were so united by birth, marriage and common culture that balance or coordination of policies proved achievable with relative ease. Today, while common interests exist in arms control, trade and other fields, there is no question of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China becoming fully conservative powers, so consensus will remain elusive. Moreover, the international system now includes powers whose cultural and linguistic differences make communication difficult — as shown by recent experience with China and Viet Nam — although the rapid pace of modern events leaves stability ever more dependent on clear communication.

Past Asian multipolar systems have certainly not proved stable. For instance, in the 1920's a great American initiative to bring China into the system as a full member of the community of nations was expected to herald a new era of multipolar diplomacy in which economic competition would replace military battle as the dominant mode of international interaction. In fact, the attempt at the Washington Conference of 1922 to establish peace through stable multipolarity led to disaster. The leaders of the 1920's miscalculated the likelihood that China would fulfill her allocated role and neglected the damage to Japan's interests resulting from the U.S. fixation with China. Severance of the Anglo-Japanese alliance induced Japanese anxiety and anomie, and thereby facilitated World War II. One cannot maintain that multipolarity was stable but the *breakdown* of multipolarity produced the war, since the breakdown was inherent in the most essential features of the multipolar system of the day. The aftermath of 1922's euphoria over emergent multipolar stability in Asia casts ominous shadows on the similar euphoria of 1972.[2] And the lessons of worldwide multipolarity in the 1920's and 1930's are as salient (and as flawed) as the lessons of nineteenth-century European multipolarity.

---

[1] In 1968, Robert E. Osgood was already criticizing exaggerations of the advantages of multipolarity, or balance of power, or pluralism, in Asia. Cf. Robert E. Osgood, George R. Packard III and John H. Badgley, *Japan and the United States in Asia* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1968), Chapter 1. More recently, Stanley Hoffmann, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Robert Bowie and others have offered trenchant critiques. Kissinger clearly comprehends the key limitations of the analogy with nineteenth-century Europe, but remains associated with a rhetoric of stable multipolarity that seems redolent of the last century. In much national security planning his carefully hedged metaphors ("a structure of peace") get translated into explicit dogma associating multipolarity with stability. A major statement of the multipolarity thesis for Asia is A. Doak Barnett's "The New Multipolarity in East Asia: Implications for United States Policy," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,* July 1970. This article has been extensively used by USIS in Asia to explain American policy. For a spirited but unconvincing defense of the thesis for the world, see Alastair Buchan, *Power and Equilibrium in the 1970's* (New York: Praeger, 1973), Chapter 2. Buchan's characterization of the direction of trends is incisive, but he fails to consider how slowly these trends operate.

Likewise, in view of the stability of the last quarter-century, it is extraordinary that the bipolar situation is so universally regarded as being inherently unstable. The popularity of the concept of stable multipolarity among many scholars and officials derives not from logic but from reaction against the tenseness of bipolar crises. Forgotten is the careful, focused study and planning made possible by the relative predictability, in a bipolar world, of who one's opponent would be and how he would behave.

The fallacy of multipolar stability complements a fallacy that the United States and its allies gain net advantages of maneuver in a multipolar system. Innumerable discussions have pointed out that in a multipolar world the United States can play the Soviet Union and China against each other. This advantage was indeed absent in the bipolar world, but other powers gain parallel advantages. Democracies, by nature dependent upon public opinion for support of foreign policy, may prove more ponderous than their authoritarian counterparts. This is particularly true of the United States, where Congress is increasingly asserting its authority, and of Japan, where consensus decision-making makes rapid policy changes difficult. The Kremlin also has serious inhibitions on rapid maneuver, but not necessarily greater ones than Tokyo and future U.S. administrations. Moreover, to the extent that the United States adapts to a game of maneuver, its domestic ideals are likely to suffer. Success in this game requires high centralization of authority over foreign affairs and low input from public opinion. It probably means heavy reliance on covert operations and increased emphasis on secrecy and ambiguity.

Various civilian and military officials have emphasized the advantages of secret maneuver. But so far secrecy and ambiguity have imposed greater costs than benefits on the United States. Secrecy regarding the China trip, for instance, magnified domestic publicity, inhibited some potential opposition, and surprised Moscow, but it also permanently damaged relations with Japan, disenchanted smaller Asian allies, antagonized Europe, and precipitated an alliance between India and the Soviet Union.[3] Domestically, public outcry against secretive foreign policies is increasing.

---

[2] The impressive analogies between 1922 and 1972 are explored in W. H. Overholt, "President Nixon's Trip to China and Its Consequences," *Asian Survey*, July 1973.

Discussions of multipolarity have usually ignored the extent to which it is a self-fulfilling prediction, a projection abroad of American policies. There is a real, and external, component of the trend toward multipolarity: the Sino-Soviet split, the rising self-confidence of Europe and Japan, and so forth. But multipolarity of political influence in Southeast Asia, the original referent of the concept, followed from *American* disillusionment with *American* errors; despite Japan's rising economic influence and China's increasing nuclear power, multipolarity still results more from American mood and American military posture than from foreign processes. To a lesser extent, worldwide multipolarity also reflects American policies. Rising Japanese and European autonomy attests not only to these centers' growing strength, but also to American actions that force allies into independent, and sometimes antagonistic, policies.[4] Misunderstanding of the partial but important extent to which multipolarity is a self-fulfilling prophecy has stimulated gratuitous abuse of allies and been used to justify those abuses — frequently in the service of U.S.-USSR negotiations conducted in classical bipolar style.

So multipolarity is a flawed concept, with misleading connotations. But one must go beyond criticism to constructive analysis.

The Life Cycle of Foreign Policy Doctrines

In such an analysis, it is crucial to distinguish the fundamental from the ephemeral, the long run from the short run. Current attention is mesmerized by short-run crises that obscure rather than illuminate fundamental changes.

The key to discerning the long run and fundamental is an insight about the birth, life and death of major foreign policies. Major policies, especially those axiomatic assumptions that Americans call "doctrines," are formulated in response to some crisis, often a relatively minor one. A series of minor flaps in U.S. relationships with China, Britain and Japan precipitated the Open Door Policy. The Monroe Doctrine was born during a minor territorial crisis between Britain and Venezuela; the Truman Doctrine during a limited crisis in Greece and Turkey. However, these doctrines became the axioms of American foreign policy for a generation or more, not because of their effectiveness in response to a single crisis, but because they were consistent with the basic historical relationships of an era. History remembers the long-term policies and their historical context and downplays the specific crises that serve as midwives.

---

[3] Again, these were the costs of secrecy, not of the China trip itself. For details, see *ibid.*

[4] *Ibid.*, as regards Japan. On Europe, cf. Raymond Vernon, "Rogue Elephant in the Forest," and Z, "The Year of Europe?," *Foreign Affairs,* April 1973 and January 1974, respectively.

Once formulated, doctrines that seem successful become institutionalized. Whole bureaucracies are redesigned to implement them and are staffed by men whose reputations and careers become inextricably associated with devising the necessary policies. Major social groups come to accept the wisdom of the doctrines unquestioningly and to denounce deviations from them. Even the intellectual community typically reaches a near-consensus on the axioms of policy, although it prides itself on iconoclasm because of disagreement over details. ("Details" can, of course, be most important – given the generality of the "axioms.") Policy analysis becomes focused on means rather than ends.

The momentum thus acquired is augmented by the flexibility of doctrines. Great policy doctrines must be exceedingly flexible in order to remain appropriate for a historical period. The Monroe Doctrine, which retained a core of meaning and congruence with historical relationships, was once a doctrine of nonintervention and later a doctrine of intervention. The Open Door Policy underwent similar transformations, but also retained an axiomatic core that influenced decisions over two generations. To argue that there were several Monroe Doctrines or several Open Door Policies is to miss the point. These doctrines dominated the imaginations of officials and scholars but in different circumstances supported varying emphases and tactics. Their organizational momentum inhibited change and their flexibility inhibited recognition of the need for change, thus ensuring that they endured past their time. Doctrines change *fundamentally* only in response to crisis, and crisis is ensured by the widening gap between policy and reality.

Many of today's crises result from the obsolescence of successful old doctrines. These crises lead writers to perceive fundamental weakness and failure, but old policies have in most cases become inappropriate as a result of successes so extraordinary that they have transformed the context which originally made them appropriate. Like industrializing countries that face pollution problems, today's nations find themselves coping with the consequences of success. A key danger of this process is that short-term crises will obscure long-term trends and that policies will therefore respond to mere ephemera.

We can document this life cycle by looking first at various foreign powers and regions and then at the United States.

THE DOMINANT PATTERN: POSTWAR WEAKNESS, DOCTRINAL SUCCESS, CRISES OF OBSOLESCENCE

Japan after World War II was utterly dependent upon the United States. Her single diplomatic alternative, the USSR, she viewed as malignant. To rebuild her economy and feed her people she desperately needed imports, and to pay for the imports she had to export. These considerations dictated the axioms of postwar Japanese foreign policy: military alliance with the United States, diplomatic dependence on the United States, and an economic policy best summarized by the maxim, "We have to export in order to live."

By 1970 the Japanese economic policy had been so successful that Japanese exports threatened to unravel the entire world monetary system — a system on which Japan depends more than almost any other power. Extraordinary success had rendered the policy counterproductive. But obsolescence did not cause immediate change. Japanese scholars realized the need for policy change long prior to the diplomatic and monetary crises of the past two years. But public opinion had taken an emphasis on exports and the yen's stability as axiomatic. The Ministry of International Trade and Industry was committed, as an institution and as individuals, to the old policy. The economy had been so geared to the export emphasis, despite the greater profitability of the internal market, that abandoning it would damage politically influential groups. Thus, "We have to export in order to live" persisted as the economic rule until monetary crises and diplomatic friction forced a change.

Likewise, Japanese economic success and the decline of the Cold War outmoded the policy of utter diplomatic dependence on the United States. Japan's declining vulnerability, and the apparent diminution of potential threats to the nation, made possible American initiatives like the opening to China, which would have been impossible in an era of Japanese vulnerability and failure. At the same time, Washington's irritation over obsolete economic policies enhanced its willingness to conduct initiatives in ways abrasive to Japan. Thus, the success of Japanese diplomatic and economic policies caused obsolescence, and paved the way to a crisis of obsolescence. (The military alliance remains appropriate.)

Japanese, like Americans, have tended to regard recent crises as consequences of weakness rather than strength and to read the present faults of their policies back into the past. Many Japanese scholars speak of the failure of their foreign policies, just as they speak of the failure of their "Income Doubling Plan" (which more than doubled income) because income growth led to pollution. But there is a difference between failure of a policy and the need to cope with the consequences of success.

China suffered long from instability and from foreign manipulation through diplomacy, loans and investments, and direct military action. As a consequence of the century of foreign manipulation between the Opium Wars and the communist takeover, she adopted a *policy of self-reliance*, shutting herself off from foreign aid, foreign investments, foreign loans, and foreign military and policy dependence. Continuing weakness, however, forced post-1949 China to rely heavily on the Soviet Union. Self-reliance, and alliance with the USSR, successfully protected her sovereignty and enabled her to establish a relatively stable government and effective economic administration. But here as elsewhere success generated its own problems.

Success enabled China to assert self-reliance even toward the Soviet Union — thereby stimulating Soviet hostility. But self-reliance, especially in extreme Cultural Revolution form, isolated her diplomatically at a time when Soviet hostility created a need for friends. Likewise, political cohesion[5] and economic improvement made refusal to participate in the world economy gratuitous and costly; now China needed trade and foreign technology and had little to fear from participation. But Peking's policies continued until Soviet pressure and Japanese economic success forced the reconsideration that facilitated Chinese rapprochement with the United States and Japan. China has not thereby abandoned self-reliance but has modified it to adapt to current conditions of strength as opposed to previous grave weakness.

---

[5] The basic cohesion is not threatened by upheavals like the Cultural Revolution.

Taiwan's post-1949 policies confronted the disastrous conditions resulting from failures of the mainland Kuomintang. The Nationalist Chinese did not reconquer the mainland, but a decade of 10 per cent growth rates in GNP, and creation of a powerful military machine, constituted success for Taiwan. Continued economic growth is likely to ensure Taiwan's internal stability and persistence as an international actor with a substantial voice. By 1980 it should be able to support at least a billion-dollar defense budget. Its international trade is currently comparable in volume to the PRC's and may grow faster.[6] But the Nationalist regime's very success made the United States less fearful of diplomatic initiatives toward the PRC. Had Taiwan's foreign policies failed, President Nixon's trip to China would have threatened Taiwan's independent existence and would thus have been impossible. (Without Nixon's trip, the admission of the PRC to the United Nations would have been a far less serious crisis for Taiwan.)

Taiwan's frantic post-1949 emphasis on diplomatic recognition had been essential to military and economic survival. Now military and economic success made diplomatic recognition less important, and other trends made diplomatic success unattainable. So Taiwan found that successful policies created conditions which made those policies obsolete and created crises for that diplomacy. Taiwan's (correct) response to the crisis was to de-emphasize diplomatic aspirations, expand commercial contacts, and revitalize its economic effort — with the result that the Taiwanese economy increased its growth rate from 10 per cent to 12 per cent in the year after President Nixon's trip to Peking.

In *South Korea,* economic and military chaos in the early 1950's gradually gave way to creation of one of the world's largest and toughest armies and to building (after years of fumbling) an economy that grows about 10 per cent annually and now supports her defense posture. Because the South Korean divisions were virtually impenetrable, North Korean infiltrators learned that they had to steal through the lines of the single American division along the DMZ. Yet withdrawal of much of the American military force from Korea, and movement of the remaining U.S. division away from the DMZ, created a sense of military crisis in Seoul, and President Nixon's visit to China evoked a sense of diplomatic crisis. Once again, however, had South Korea been on the brink of defeat by North Korea and had China been aggressively supporting North Korea, the American troop withdrawal and Nixon's China trip would have proved impossible. Present crises by no means threaten to reverse earlier successes. Likewise, following the failure of its earlier aggressive strategy (manifest in capturing the *Pueblo,* downing our EC-135, and trying to assassinate Park Chung Hee), North Korea moved to a smiling political strategy of demanding reunification. This initiative was also viewed with alarm in South Korea, but it resulted from South Korea's success, not from failure.

---

[6] The 1971 estimates were: PRC, $4.66 billion; Taiwan, $4.13 billion. Taiwan's international trade grew 50.2 per cent in 1973. Its 1973 trade with Japan ($2.261 billion) still exceeded the PRC's ($2.015 billion).

Southeast Asia similarly faces crises of success. The fundamental problems of Southeast Asian countries in the postwar era consisted of (1) creating national identity and unity, (2) attaining defense against powerful communist guerrilla movements, and (3) establishing the basis for sustained economic development. In seeking these goals they found themselves trapped in the cruel paradox that they needed economic development for long-term stability, but economic development undermined short-term stability by mobilizing previously quiescent social groups into political activity. In the postwar period almost every country in Southeast Asia had to contend with an apparently overwhelming guerrilla threat; by the late 1960's such threats had degenerated into minor problems except in Indochina (although some could again become dangerous). Likewise, each country except Papua-New Guinea and perhaps Burma has acquired a sense of national identity. As argued elsewhere,[7] the region is poised for a period of economic development that may prove to be one of the great movements of history. Moreover, the paradox of growth and instability may here have been largely resolved. Increasing governmental competence, more efficient intelligence to detect insurgencies early, and improved tax collection, all increase governments' benefits from economic growth and decrease insurgencies' benefits.

But these successes transformed the situation and produced crises. The basic security of most of the region outside Indochina combined with the trauma of Viet Nam to justify a Nixon Doctrine of reduced American aid — thereby creating an atmosphere of military and economic crisis. The poor prospects of Southeast

---

[7] W. Overholt, "The Rise of the Pacific Basin," *Pacific Community,* July 1974.

Asian insurgencies outside Indochina, and termination of the Chinese Cultural Revolution, led China to move from emphasizing relations with insurgencies to emphasizing relations with governments — creating crises for governments that had to adapt but could not easily reverse old policies of isolating themselves from China. Chinese-American rapprochement, whose long-run causes and consequences were primarily auspicious for Southeast Asia, came to countries from Thailand to Indonesia as a shock.

Spread over a longer period was another form of political crisis. As national identity and substantial unity were achieved, charismatic leaders like Sukarno, Tunku Abdul Rahman, and pre-1971 Filipino politicians were increasingly turned out in favor of technocrats who would emphasize growth. Thus in Southeast Asia, too, the most visible consequence of long-run success was short-term crisis which obscured more fundamental achievements. In Korea, Taiwan and Southeast Asia the successes were, inevitably, more ambivalent and more reversible than those of the major powers, but the overall improvement in the region's fortunes between, say, 1952 and 1972, is unmistakable.

Western Europe's prosperity and the likelihood of it accelerating because of the expansion of the Common Market (EEC) ensure high standards of living and economic capacity to support European defense needs. Expansion of the EEC to nine nations makes unity far more difficult to achieve, but increasing prosperity makes unity less necessary to successful defense. Hudson Institute projections indicate that by the late 1980's the combined economies of Germany and France should be larger than the economy of the Soviet Union, so cooperation between these two countries alone could guarantee successful defense of the region.[8] But Europe's greater capabilities occasion reduced American willingness to undertake disproportionate efforts for European defense. Thus eventual withdrawal of all or most American forces from Europe is likely, and this implies a security crisis — a crisis of success. Despite the ubiquitous view that the United States and Europe are acting from weakness, if any serious threat to European security arose the U.S. Congress would probably respond appropriately. The security "crisis," if misinterpreted as a consequence of fundamental weakness, could presage the widely feared Finlandization of Western Europe, but if it is properly interpreted as a crisis resulting from fundamental success, then Western Europe should achieve high morale and adequate defense.

---

[8] Most of the European considerations mentioned in this article rest on projections by Edmund Stillman. He is not, of course, responsible for the use I make of his research.

The Soviet Union's classic goals of attaining a modern society, strategic parity with the United States, and international recognition of the permanence of postwar European boundaries, are achieved or on the verge of being achieved. Soviet missile and naval expansion ensures the defense of Soviet interests and some expansion of Moscow's influence. On the other hand, the USSR faces a substantial internal crisis of ideological and technological obsolescence and it also faces hostility from its former Chinese ally. Thus, at its moment of greatest military strength and greatest attainment of postwar foreign policy goals, it needs the assistance of those countries against which its tremendous military power has been directed. The current technological crisis is not directly attributable to Soviet military and foreign policy successes, but it does derive from the emphasis on ideological unity, heavy industry and military technology necessary to those successes. The costs of these policies included ideological rigidity, neglect of welfare and agriculture, and the resulting ideological malaise and technological obsolescence. Soviet crises result as much from the prices paid for success as from success itself, and in the long run the successes are more ambivalent and more dangerous to the Soviet Union and her neighbors.

In *the Middle East* the Arab world has moved from fundamental weakness to considerable strength as a consequence of the worldwide energy shortage, although the goal of subduing Israel has proved unattainable. Increasing confidence, unity and prosperity have led to crises in relations with the Soviet Union and with oil importers. Clearly these crises are caused by strength rather than weakness. Since 1967 Israel's assurance has created small crises of success in her relations with the United States, but none serious enough to force fundamental policy changes — unless the 1973 war changes this situation. *South America* and *sub-Saharan Africa* follow the change to a politics of strength to an even lesser extent, although Brazilian growth and Japanese investment will fundamentally improve Latin America's position by the 1980's.

The pattern of successful policies designed to cope with post-World War II weakness, followed by obsolescence and crises of success, applies strongly to the big powers, moderately to important small powers, and weakly or not at all to regions which were neither devastated by World War II nor centrally involved in the Cold War.

THE UNITED STATES

Just as Japanese scholars believe their "Income Doubling Plan" failed because, while doubling and redoubling income, it produced serious pollution problems, so American students of foreign affairs now explore endlessly the failure of America's postwar foreign policy and the decline of American world power. Radical and conservative scholars join in interpreting reduction of U.S. bases and declining U.S. political and economic dominance as the denouement of failure. Our economy, once half of the world economy, now is only a third. The once triumphant dollar is weak. Our bases are far less numerous. We lack the monopoly of nuclear weapons we possessed after World War II, and our ability to rapidly mobilize conventional capabilities superior to those of any potential opponent is in doubt. Small allies manipulate us, and several medium-sized allies are estranged. To the extent that we sought empire we have failed. The question is whether one wants to interpret success or failure in terms of empire-building.

One cannot deny that expansionist nationalism has repeatedly inspired U.S. foreign policies, from the shelling of Quallah Battoo in 1830[9] to the conquest of the Philippines, to the drive to make the world safe for democracy, to the present. America's quest for economic growth has sometimes brought government support to beleaguered companies. Military leaders, pressed to improve the odds in an uncertain world, push for additional control over military contingencies and by logical extension even over sociopolitical change. But even in its heyday the drive to imperial strength was peculiarly muted and illegitimate in comparison with its European counterparts. To the extent that these pressures have influenced American policy they have suffered a decisive reverse.

The near-universal view that the failure of imperial policies implies the failure of America's postwar policies in general must be confronted by another view, more consistent with nobler U.S. traditions. The consequences of U.S. policies have included, along with failure in the dubious pursuit of imperial power, achievement of the more inspiring and legitimate goals. In terms of those goals we appeared to be *weak after World War II*, although we held half the world's economy and had the military force to dominate much of the world, and we are *strong today,* despite a period of military disaster in Viet Nam, possibly impending Soviet strategic superiority, and some kinds of economic weakness.

---

[9] See Tyler Dennett, *Americans in Eastern Asia* (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1963), p. 31.

A central feature of every major American foreign policy has been concern for the self-determination of other countries, relative to other foreign powers. The Monroe Doctrine insisted that European nations should not intervene in Latin America. The Open Door Policy supported the territorial and administrative integrity of China. The ill-fated Eisenhower Doctrine supported the autonomy of the Middle East. The Truman Doctrine committed us "to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures." It did not commit us to exploit the weakness of those countries to create an American empire, and it would have been repudiated if it had done so even implicitly.

These commitments to the autonomy of other nations did not arise solely from generosity. The Monroe Doctrine was an expression of nationalism and has often been used to justify U.S. intervention. The Open Door Policy was a statement of U.S. desire for equal commercial advantage and also a statement that we would not expend extensive resources to back up our policies. The Truman Doctrine expressed at least strategic needs on top of altruism. But just as one must not ignore these mundane calculations in any accounting of American policies, so it will not square with history to ignore the independent impact of the ideal of self-determination. The United States supported West European unity despite awareness that such unity would produce a major economic competitor and perhaps an eventual political-military competitor. It consciously rebuilt Japan into a strong competitor, and returned Okinawa at considerable cost to its military posture, although in the nuclear age that island could have been held indefinitely, in the way the Soviets hold the Kuriles. The United States also pressed most allies into decolonization.

Support for the self-determination of other countries, imperfect and polluted with other motives as it has often been, has deep roots in American history and conscience. In part it constitutes a projection abroad of pluralist ideals and a tradition stressing "no entangling alliances" as a proper policy for young and unpowerful states. These attitudes have naturally competed with others, particularly in the recent past, but as the above examples show, the pluralist tradition has often competed successfully. Moreover, the Truman Doctrine period — in which our own bloc seriously compromised short-run self-determination — was one of peculiar U.S. power and peculiar allied helplessness, and American policies were consistent with *long-run* support of pluralist, autonomous policies.

Support for the self-determination of foreign states and regions also constitutes the quintessential diplomatic and military strategy of the United States. America's most vital interests are its own autonomy and democratic institutions. The autonomy of the nation can be threatened only, if at all, by an extraordinary coalition of foreign states. Its internal democracy is most vulnerable, not to subversion or quirks of domestic politics, but to a garrison-state mentality resulting from public reaction to perceived foreign menace. Thus, support for self-determination is the foundation upon which detailed defense policies are constructed.

Throughout the twentieth century the ideal of self-determination has been a central requirement for public (especially intellectual) support of American foreign policies, and contradiction of this ideal has constituted a brake on foreign policies (albeit a brake which operates slowly). That is to say, we have traditionally regarded policies consistent with the self-determination of other nations as legitimate, and policies blatantly contradictory to that ideal as illegitimate. Moreover, as we have become accustomed to being a major force in world politics, this conception of legitimacy has strengthened; the Spanish-American War was not an aberration, but it was a gaucherie committed by a nouveau riche state.

As regards the prospects for empire, America was powerful immediately after World War II. But from the perspective of the more legitimate support of self-determination, we were terribly weak. Those nations to which American ties of culture, democracy, history and strategic interest were strongest had been rendered helpless by the war. Western Europe was devastated. Japan's economy had been leveled to the point where specialists concurred that her eventual resurrection as a major industrial power was exceedingly unlikely. Most Southeast Asian countries had lost both their colonial governments and the economic, human and institutional resources that would have constituted their capability for self-government — at a time when each faced an insurgency enjoying immediate prospects of success. Over every region hovered the influence of a then-unified communism which threatened the autonomy of Berlin, Italy, France, China, and most of Southeast Asia. The growing domestic feedback of this situation threatened to degrade American democracy through overreaction.

Key American foreign policy interests were endangered to a degree previously possible only in the early weakness of the Republic and at the height of the world wars. The United States possessed extraordinary military and economic resources, perhaps adequate for creating a strong bloc, but by no means equal to the challenge of maintaining allies' independence. Under these conditions (of apparently serious threat, low allied capability, high U.S. interest and high U.S. capability), the Truman Doctrine, which in context came to mean American willingness to escalate automatically wherever necessary to defeat a communist threat, was an appropriate and defensible policy despite frequent overreactions.

This statement must not be misunderstood. As a basic, axiomatic stance in response to the conditions mentioned, the Truman Doctrine is hard to fault. Such a straightforward doctrine, following so directly from historical conditions, is the *sine qua non* of deploying effectively the resources of a huge organization like a modern government. Without this clear and simple stance as a guideline for coordinating policy, the American response to the world situation of the late 1940's and early 1950's would have been confused. But the same organizational qualities of government that make such a doctrine necessary also ensure that the policy's implementation will be somewhat clumsy, fragmented and rigid. Moving government rapidly, while keeping political, economic and military policies internally consistent and relatively coordinated, is a major feat. Once such an organization gets moving, it lacks the finer qualities of ballet dancers. Thus, we systematically overestimated the intensity and unity of the threats, overemphasized military responses and thereby probably provoked increased threats, and frequently offended our own allies.[10] Other governments had the same problems. In Europe, Japan and China the USSR provoked precisely the threats it feared most. China prepared gratuitously for a quarter-century for American invasion, and fought the Korean War on the mistaken assumption that invasion was imminent. Such actions are not irrational or devious; they are almost inescapable.

---

[10] As I understand much of the debate between conservatives and revisionists over postwar foreign policy, the conservatives maintain that, in the organizational equivalent of defying the laws of gravity, they avoided virtually all such excesses. The revisionists argue that the entire government succeeded in masterminding, with watch-like precision, a devious policy quite different from that professed in official documents. For the conservative position George Kennan's *Memoirs, 1950-1963* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1972) provides an effective antidote. For most revisionist positions chapter five of Barrington Moore's *Reflections on the Causes of Human Misery* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1972) performs a similar service.

At least by the mid-1960's, however, the Truman Doctrine was maintaining its momentum in a fundamentally changed situation. Whereas communism had once appeared unified and aggressive, now neither the USSR nor the PRC seemed willing to undertake great risks to export revolution. Moreover, both increasingly diverted their energies to mutual conflict.[11] The Soviet Union, ascendant and threatening in the 1950's, headed in the 1960's into a period of ideological and technological obsolescence that will bedevil it at least through the 1970's and 1980's.

Likewise, whereas America's friends and allies were nearly helpless in the immediate post-World War II period, they are currently strong and prosperous. Projections indicate that by the late 1980's Japan may have an economy larger than that of the Soviet Union, and, as noted before, the combined German and French economies will probably surpass the Soviet Union's in that period. Southeast Asia is by no means as strong as these more developed regions, but most Southeast Asian countries find themselves more secure than a generation ago.

At the same time the relative power of the United States has declined. Having held half the world economy, we now hold only a third. U.S. military superiority has been eroded by others' recovery. For the most part these changes betoken no real decline in the United States; they reflect instead the postwar resilience of much of the world — based in substantial part on successful American policies that promoted the prosperity of friends and allies. America's relative economic position is now comparable to what it was immediately before World War II, and its military situation is a very strong one, weakened only by comparison with the abnormal conditions characterizing the immediate postwar period. Finally, most threats to American interests occur now in areas that are relatively unimportant to the United States and where winning is peculiarly difficult, as in Viet Nam. Under these new circumstances Truman Doctrine policies are outdated. Not only do they impose an excessive burden on the United States, but it also becomes far more difficult to arouse popular support for an active and interventionist policy.

---

[11] The Sino-Soviet split has often been misinterpreted in relation to American interests. While in a purely military sense the split reduced the threat to the United States, it did not necessarily make communist ideology less threatening to democratic ideologies. Historically, ideologies are often most dynamic and expansive precisely when they are internally divided. (I am indebted to Frank Armbruster for insights on this point.) The Soviet Union and China frequently found themselves competing against one another to prove which regime was the more revolutionary, and found themselves innovating new ideas and policies in order to gain advantages in the competition. Thus communist ideology was potentially more expansive in a period of ideological split than in a period of unity.

Liberals who ignore this or deny its importance suffer from an ironic fixation on military considerations at least as rigid as that of conservatives who long ignored the significance of the split. But it is now clear that later there developed the potential for putting the Soviet Union and China into a position of competitive rapprochement with the United States and its allies. To the extent that this was possible, the threat to American interests was greatly reduced and the opportunity costs of Cold War-type policies were far greater than was recognized at the time.

Here again the record is often misinterpreted. It is said that something strange has happened to American public opinion, that American cohesion has declined because of domestic crises and increasing softness. As a consequence of Viet Nam this may prove true, but as an interpretation of public reaction to Viet Nam it is flawed. Many opinion leaders simply did not perceive serious threats to the United States and its interests. Although protesters were sometimes irrational, they influenced policy because rational analyses by responsible people perceived no serious threat. So to some extent the change in public support for strong foreign policy derived from a rational orientation to real changes, to long-run foreign policy success rather than to deterioration of domestic political life. It is at least arguable that, if in the 1960's foreign threats had appeared as serious as in the 1950's, domestic cohesion and support for strong foreign policies would have proved equally strong.

Under these circumstances, a Nixon Doctrine emphasizing continued support for self-determination and U.S. willingness to counter nuclear threats, but also emphasizing that other nations must pull their weight, is appropriate. Retraction of bases and of political involvement in other nations appears in this perspective to be not a weakening of the American world position, but a response to long-run success.

For the United States as for every other major power, the extraordinary success of postwar policies transformed the conditions in which those policies operated and rendered them inappropriate long before they were actually changed. Momentum was built into organizational structures and scholarly assumptions, and perhaps most of all into public opinion. Just as Japan could not adapt to the overwhelming success of her export promotion, and therefore continued promoting exports until the world monetary system nearly collapsed, so the Truman Doctrine and its institutions and assumptions persisted to the point of disaster, to Viet Nam.

Major foreign policy doctrines die only in crisis, just as they are born only in crisis. Viet Nam is to the Nixon Doctrine as Greece and Turkey were to the Truman Doctrine and as Venezuela was to the Monroe Doctrine. Viet Nam is neither the essence of the Truman Doctrine nor the essence of the Nixon Doctrine; it is the midwife of the new era. What makes world prospects auspicious for the United States is neither a solution to Indochina's agony, nor the fantasy of stable multipolarity, but the extraordinary degree to which America's more idealistic dreams for self-determination have been realized.[12]

From the Politics of Weakness to the Politics of Strength

The postwar world was one of historically unusual, worldwide weakness. Today's nations exhibit historically unusual security and prosperity. A politics-of-strength world should differ from a politics-of-weakness world. First, decisions made under conditions of basic security and prosperity rather than terrifying weakness are less likely to be overreactions or emotional errors. In a nuclear world this is a crucial advantage.

Second, a politics-of-strength world allows more big-power disengagement from minor issues. A world of fundamental insecurities regarding military survival and economic prosperity is one of fear that minor disadvantages could lead to the unraveling of fundamental interests, a world of all sorts of domino theories. In such a world the future of mankind can be threatened by events in Laos and West Berlin. But in a politics-of-strength world there is enough leeway for minor losses to make disengagement from minor conflicts more often possible. This explains convergence of big-power policies in much of the world toward a Nixon Doctrine-type approach in which the big powers support their interests in small countries through economic and military aid and ideological exhortation, but avoid direct military involvement. Such policies now predominate in Western Europe, the United States, the Soviet Union, Japan and China. In Europe, Japan and China they also existed in the politics-of-weakness period, but are enhanced by the politics of strength. For instance, China would not now fear American involvement in Korea or in Southeast Asia as intensely as before. But, most important, the superpowers now feel that they can disengage themselves more than in the past from minor issues — although the USSR has changed less than the United States.

---

[12] It is important to emphasize the view of Viet Nam as a transitional phenomenon, and as a consequence of excessive success. But it is important not to whitewash Viet Nam either. I am aware of no law of history that made it necessary for the crisis of obsolescence to be located in Viet Nam or that determined that the crisis should reach such magnitude before policies were changed. Despite the necessity for *some* crisis of obsolescence, decision-makers remain responsible for their decisions, and the United States will long have to live with the strategic, political, morale and moral consequences of Viet Nam.

Third, the politics of strength permits emphasis on exploitation of common interests, whereas the politics of weakness tends to force emphasis on conflicts. In a situation of fundamental weakness, trade, diplomatic relations, arms control, negotiations regarding the legitimacy of boundaries, and exchanges of high-level official visits may represent such high risks that conflict must be stressed over exploitation of mutual interests. Moreover, a period of widespread internal political weakness inspires exaggeration of foreign enmities to enforce domestic cohesion. By contrast, when nations feel secure regarding basic internal security and economic needs they can stress common interests by taking limited risks in the above fields. Such is the basis of the current replacement of competitive disruption with competitive rapprochement.

Fourth, in the politics-of-strength world, strength multiplies policy options both by increasing resources available for implementing policies and by reducing the fears that force nations into rigid postures. This diversification of options increases uncertainty and magnifies the risks in proposed policies, especially in policies which inherently carry high risk such as those where national survival is at stake. Thus, today the calculations of a Soviet general contemplating action against China or Yugoslavia are so complex as to deter overly ambitious initiatives. However, against this benefit of complexity one must assess a substantial cost.

The obvious cost of increased uncertainty is increased likelihood of miscalculation, as exemplified by the aftermath of President Nixon's trip to China. History may yet judge that one cost of the secrecy surrounding preparations for that journey was initiation of a vicious circle in American relations with Japan which could constitute the major foreign policy agony of the next generation. Dr. Kissinger has stated that policymakers simply did not understand the likely Japanese reaction. The politics-of-strength world induces rapid maneuvering which in turn induces such errors. Militarily the likelihood of miscalculating oneself into a nuclear crisis substitutes for the old tension resulting from omnipresent domino theories. There is a parallel cost for the deterrence that results from uncertainty. While moderate men may be deterred by uncertainty, fanatical men may thrive in such a milieu.

The dangers from increased uncertainty peak in the current period of multiple foreign policy crises, because fundamental relationships with Asia, Europe, the USSR and the Middle East can change so rapidly. Upon the American-Japanese economic relationship hinges the choice between a great period of economic development[13] and a possible collapse of Asian development and trade. On the American political-military relationship with Japan depends much of the future of nuclear proliferation, arms control, peace in the Pacific, and continuation of the Sino-Soviet split (which could be terminated by fear of a future militaristic Japan). Western Europe's economic successes will be accompanied by profound social stresses, caused by the economic rise of the Mediterranean countries; the relative decline of northern Europe and probable drastic decline of Britain; the obsolescence of much of the British and German economies; and the rise of subnationalist and transnationalist identities that threaten the cohesion of the European nations. The international consequences of these trends depend upon whether Europeans see themselves as weak or strong, whether they see themselves as partners of the United States or as betrayed in favor of a great-power condominium.

The dangers from uncertainty also peak in the transitional period because of the tendency to perceive crises as signs of weakness. This misperception of the crises of transition is important because each of the major benefits of the politics-of-strength world has a psychological component; perceived weakness implies fear, domino theories, greater likelihood of miscalculation, and inability to exploit common interests even in a context of real strength. For both liberals and conservatives the politics of breast-beating creates self-fulfilling prophecies.

The concept of multipolarity, with its false correlate of stability, is itself a miscalculation born of hasty analysis. Multipolarity, as previously argued, is in part a self-fulfilling prophecy, but its association with stability may be self-defeating. If the ideal of fluid multipolarity translates, or appears to translate, into gratuitous coldness to allies, the consequence could be Japanese-American-European disarray with no compensating advantages. Theo Sommer recently remarked on the apparent Nixon-Kissinger "curious obsession" with the idea of

---

[13] Overholt, "The Rise of the Pacific Basin," *op. cit.*

> a Pentagonal world in which five major units, all equidistant from each other, keep the world in balance. By stressing equidistance, the President seemed to deny the possibility of closer relations between some of the five poles than amongst others; by putting the emphasis on balance of power rather than on community of interest, he appeared to turn his back on the earlier concept of interdependence; by ignoring Atlantic solidarity, he ran the risk of inciting a bitter Transatlantic contest.[14]

The same kind of concept could explain in part why Washington has been so willing to let solidarity with Japan deteriorate.

Without wishing to recrystallize Cold War views, one must also note the danger — on both sides — of misinterpreting American relations with the Soviet Union. American satisfaction with parity and détente, which is justified, comes mixed with an unmistakable sense of decline and failure, which is unjustified. Many intellectuals read the Vietnamese disaster back into the distant past and forward into the distant future. Even the strongest critics of allegedly imperial American policies fail to discern the triumphs of nonimperial policies. The pervasive low morale resulting impedes our ability to sort error from virtue in present policies and attain traditional, proper, publicly supported, nonimperial goals in the future. It also infects allies with low morale and a sense of weakness utterly inappropriate to their present situation.

Concurrently, while the West is feeling futile and allowing Viet Nam to distort its vision of the past and the future, the Soviet Union has been mixing conciliatory diplomacy with a strong sense of international ascendancy and triumph. Soviet analysts, with their emphasis on "objective factors," see in their rise to parity (and possibly beyond parity) the decline of the West as well as the triumph of the USSR. Such a calculation is as erroneous as the West's opposite mistake, for the extraordinary expansion of Soviet rocketry and naval power contrasts with the profound organizational and economic problems of domestic Soviet life. It might seem that the miscalculations of the West and the miscalculations of the Soviet Union are congruent, and therefore not terribly explosive although unhappy for the West. But after a series of crises the West would most likely rediscover its strength and principles. Then Soviet miscalculations could prove disastrous.

Dangers also exist in realms far from those of Cold War allies and adversaries. We have already overreacted to the temporary energy shortage in ways that could make near-permanent political disputes out of medium-term (seven-to-twelve-year) shortages; we may be making the dispute between energy importers and exporters into an unnecessarily serious one at the same time that our unrelated slights to Europe and Japan have damaged any possibility of unity among the importers. Likewise, in an emotional overreaction to environmental problems and the past frustrations of our aid programs, we may be moving toward neglect of economic development precisely at the moment when events in East Asia, Latin America and the Middle East promise a conclusive answer to the question of whether all of mankind can eventually attain decent standards of living. We are in danger of abandoning our belief in democracy for developing nations just when improved national unity, technical competence and economic growth make possible many of the democratic goals we espoused with such misplaced optimism in the 1950's and abandoned with such adolescent disillusionment in the 1960's.

---

[14] "After Vietnamization — Europeanization?," *Survival*, May-June 1973.

In the past few years Americans have adopted two contradictory attitudes toward this new world whose opportunities and hazards equally impress the imagination. First, we have expressed euphoria, because we imputed to multipolarity a false stability. Second, we have flagellated ourselves for the failure of our postwar foreign policy — because an imperial Pax Americana has proved infeasible and because of the excesses of Viet Nam. More realistically, we should enter this new world with trepidation as well as exhilaration at having taken important initiatives like the China trip. We should recognize that the politics-of-strength world itself constitutes the success of U.S. postwar foreign policies — even after acknowledging excessive rigidity in promoting those policies.

The same conditions that doom any aspiration to a global, imposed Pax Americana constitute substantial fulfillment of the noblest and most enduring U.S. foreign policy goals. They also constitute the best attainable international climate for America's economy and democracy. Our postwar success must be measured less in terms of stability and more in terms of human dignity. It is right for errors to sober us, but wrong for them to blind us. It is right to correct deviations, wrong to forget the main trend. We must view the opportunities of the new world as an outgrowth of the extraordinary successes of our own and others' postwar foreign policies.

WARS OF NATIONAL LIBERATION: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY AND PLANNING*

by Frank N. Trager

THE problem of deciding what to include in the first part of this study — dealing with Soviet and Chinese communist concepts of wars of national liberation — arises not because the subject matter is either strange or difficult. Quite the contrary. It is because so much has been written on the subject by so many with apparently so little operational effect on U.S. policy. Along with the abundance of literature on Soviet and Chinese communist concepts, such material is also presented in the more expansive context of "guerrilla," "partisan" or "insurgency" warfare with which it is frequently compared and contrasted.[1] In this connection some authors, notably Michael Elliott-Bateman,[2] appropriately begin with a consideration of Sun Tzu's *The Art of War*;[3] others, such as Paret and Shy, start with Clausewitz's *On War*[4] because, in their words, Clausewitz made "the first serious attempt to synthesize the characteristics of irregular operations and to define their role in warfare."[5]

Although the student of wars of national liberation may choose to ground his discussion in the works of Sun Tzu or other strategic thinkers, it is important to note that the intellectual antecedents of Marxist-Leninist theory concerning such wars are to be found in the writings of Clausewitz. The following passage from Lenin's *The Imperialist War* (1915) will serve to illustrate this point:

---

*An earlier, somewhat longer draft of this article was prepared for the Strategic Studies Center, Stanford Research Institute. Robert F. Bordonaro and Frank Simonie, Senior Graduate Fellows in the National Security Program, New York University, assisted the author in preparing this edited version of that paper.

[1] See, for example, the "Bibliographical Essay," pp. 449-456, in C. E. Black and T. P. Thornton, editors, *Communism and Revolution: The Strategic Uses of Political Violence* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964); and D. M. Condit, *et al.*, editors, *A Counterinsurgency Bibliography* (Washington, D.C.: The American University Special Operations Research Office, 1963).

[2] "The Nature of People's War" and "The Form of People's War," pp. 127-176, in Michael Elliott-Bateman, editor, *The Fourth Dimension of Warfare: I, Intelligence Subversion and Resistance* (New York: Praeger, 1970).

[3] Translated by Samuel B. Griffith (London: Oxford University Press, 1963).

[4] Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, translated and edited by J. J. Graham and F. N. Maude, 3 vols. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1967), Book VI, Chapter 26.

[5] Peter Paret and J. W. Shy, *Guerrillas in the 1960s*, revised edition (New York: Praeger, 1965), p. 11.

> "War is Politics by other (i.e., forcible) means." This famous dictum belongs to one of the profoundest writers on military questions, Clausewitz. Rightly, the Marxists have always considered this axiom as the theoretical foundation for their understanding of the meaning of every war. It is from this standpoint that Marx and Engels regarded wars.[6]

Clausewitz's influence on Lenin was profound. Like the Prussian strategist, Lenin stressed the primacy of politics in war: "Politics is the reason, and war is only the tool, not the other way around. Consequently, it remains only to subordinate the military point of view to the political."[7] This axiom continues as the theoretical foundation of Soviet and, more generally, communist strategic thought. As recently as 1962 Soviet military theorist Marshal V. D. Sokolovsky argued that: "The acceptance of war as a tool of politics determines the relation of military strategy to politics; that relation is based completely on the dependence of the former on the latter."[8] This dependence is expressed in a variety of ways – in the determination of general and particular strategic aims and the general character of state strategy, and in the selection of forms and methods of warfare. Since political considerations are of decisive importance for the conduct of military strategy, it follows that various types of warfare are possible depending on the nature of the political aims and the "objective conditions" under which they are pursued.[9] The present study seeks to explore the nature of one such type – wars of national liberation – and its place in the typology of warfare employed by communist theorists, with a view to assessing its implications for United States policy and planning.

---

[6] *The Imperialist War: The Struggle Against Social-Chauvinism and Social-Pacificism, 1914-1915* (New York: International Publishers, 1930), p. 224. Mao Tse-tung — without mentioning Clausewitz by name — quotes him and simultaneously refers to Lenin's quotation of Clausewitz. See "On Protracted War" (May 1938) in Mao's *Selected Military Writings* (2nd edition; Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1963), pp. 226-228. See also Sigmund Neumann, "Engels and Marx: Military Concepts of the Social Revolutionaries," Chapter 7 in Edward Mead Earle, editor, *Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler* (New York: Atheneum, 1966); and Stefan T. Possony, *A Century of Conflict* (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1953). According to Possony, when Lenin went briefly into hiding in July 1917 he took with him two books, Marx's *The Civil War in France* and Clausewitz's *On War*.

[7] Quoted in Marshal V. D. Sokolovsky, editor, *Military Strategy: Soviet Doctrine and Concepts* (New York: Praeger, 1963), p. 17.

[8] *Ibid.*

[9] *Ibid.*, pp. 18-19.

SOVIET AND CHINESE CONCEPTS OF WARS OF NATIONAL LIBERATION AND SOME COMMUNIST VARIANTS

The Soviet Concept

The theory of war and its place in history are central to any understanding of Marxism-Leninism and all its variants. History for all professed Marxists consists of a series of materialistically determined, successive stages: primitive communism, slavery, feudalism, capitalism and socialism or communism. Marx states in his Preface to *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* (1859) that history begins with men in a society seeking to gratify their needs. The forms of production, the mechanisms of exchange for the goods produced, and the relations men involuntarily enter into in order to fill these needs determine the nature of every social structure or society.[10]

Perhaps in the presumed era of primitive communism there existed a kind of harmony or peace. But, Marxists hold, the acquisition and control of property and inequality in the distribution of wealth fracture the social order into warring classes. History from that time forward until socialism or communism necessarily triumphs is the record of "class struggle" or war.[11] Force, in some sense of its aggressive connotation, is, in Marx's words, "the midwife of every old society pregnant with a new one."

Marxists believe that though the historical transition to each "higher" stage is inevitable, men must recognize the issues current in each stage and advance the process by "fighting it out." When Marx's predictions failed to materialize, Lenin extended his analysis of inevitable history by positing a substage, that of imperialism, between capitalism and communism. The expansion of the capitalist states by the acquisition and exploitation of colonies and colonial masses temporarily saved them, according to Lenin, from the effects of their own "contradictions." His 1916 *Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism* purported to demonstrate that World War I was caused by the predictable competition between and among expansionist monopoly capitalists in the international arena. Imperialist warfare in the future would continue to be inevitable. Therefore proper revolutionary ideology, zeal, guidance, and especially organization, would assist the imperialist warmakers to dig their own grave. The Leninist slogan adopted at the beginning of World War I to hasten this process was "revolutionary defeatism," which meant to "turn the imperialist war into a civil war — the main enemy is at home."

---

[10] See F. N. Trager, editor and co-author, *Marxism in Southeast Asia: A Study of Four Countries* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1959), p. 5-10.

[11] See Hugh Trevor-Roper, "Marxism and the Study of History," *Problems of Communism*, September-October 1956. The "state" in Marxism-Leninism is an instrument of class rule and represents the power or coercive force of that class. Hence in a classless society — the utopia of the predicted communist period — there will not be a "state." Its obvious continuing existence in all states controlled by communist parties has given rise to a large body of apologetic literature.

After World War I, and more particularly at the 1920 Second Comintern Congress, Lenin further developed the tactical line of his anti-capitalist revolutionary warfare strategy, adding to it the ideological basis for the Soviet appeal to what we today call the Third World. His "Theses on the National and Colonial Questions," adopted at the Congress and thereafter achieving a hallowed place in Soviet ideology, provided for the inclusion of "national liberation movements and oppressed nationalities in the colonies" in the struggle against imperialism. Such movements, "especially the peasant movements in the backward countries and in the colonies" must be supported. They, and even the hated bourgeois democrats in such areas, must be brought into an alliance with the communists, who nonetheless "must not merge . . . must unconditionally preserve the independence of the proletarian movement."[12]

Lenin described this strategy as one of "pushing the situation further forward," a phrase he began to use frequently after his 1905 critique of the Mensheviks in *Two Tactics of Social Democracy in the Democratic Revolution.* In part, it epitomizes what he understood from Clausewitz's theory of war as the continuation of politics by other means.

Thus he developed a more complete theory of war based on the earlier essential of "class warfare" and his own addition of inevitable warfare between capitalo-imperialist powers. The Leninist combination of Marx and Clausewitz posited an ongoing, politico-war continuum in which the party (the "apparatus"), leading the proletariat and other more or less useful sectors of the people, adopted various tactics (or "lines" or policies) to push the situation forward, adjusting the levels of violence according to its diagnosis of the "objective conditions." Communists and others have come to call this theory revolutionary warfare. As Lenin wrote (in "Farewell Letter to Swiss Workers," April 8, 1917): "We are not pacifists. We are opposed to imperialist wars . . . among the capitalists, but we have always considered it absurd for the revolutionary proletariat to disavow revolutionary wars that may prove necessary in the interests of Socialism."[13] In his polemics with Rosa Luxemburg he went on to argue that "national wars . . . are not only probable but inevitable"; they are the "inevitable continuation of national-liberation politics. . . ."[14]

---

[12] See Trager, *Marxism in Southeast Asia . . . , op. cit.*, pp. 244-248; F. N. Trager, "The Communist Challenge in Southeast Asia," in William Henderson, editor, *Southeast Asia: Problems of United States Policy* (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1963), pp. 134-164; Alvin Z. Rubinstein, "Soviet Policy Toward the Third World in the 1970's," ORBIS, Spring 1971, pp. 104-117. For a useful compendium by Soviet writers, see T. P. Thornton, editor, *The Third World in Soviet Perspective: Studies by Soviet Writers on the Developing Areas* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964). See also V. I. Lenin, *The National Liberation Movement in the East* (Selections in English) (Moscow, 1957).

The conduct of revolutionary warfare fascinated Lenin. Again and again in his writings he reverts to the theme called variously "partisan warfare," "armed struggle," "guerrilla warfare" or "armed insurrection," which he defines as a "special form of political struggle," an "art" that requires reliance on "a revolutionary upsurge of the people," a sense of a "crucial moment."[15]

In his view, guerrilla operations are not merely diversionary or supporting actions but an "essential component" of revolutionary warfare. Like Mao Tse-tung and others, he long ago ("The Lessons of the Moscow Uprising," 1906) began to lay down the still valid rules for such warfare:

> . . . rebellion is an art, and . . . the principal rule of this art is that a desperately bold and irrevocably determined offensive must be waged. . . . The organization required for such [guerrilla] tactics is that of mobile and exceedingly small units, units of ten, three, or even two persons. . . .

Lenin's coup d'état in Russia in the 1917 October Revolution succeeded in seizing the instruments of coercive authority, never relinquished since by any communist party anywhere in power. Unexpectedly, he and his fellow Bolsheviks did this not by conducting an insurrection but by what Sun Tzu called "taking the state intact." In the October Revolution Lenin's political forces subverted the Russian armed forces as they won them over, and then proceeded by a graduated variety of violent means to legitimize Communist Party power.

---

[13] V. I. Lenin, *Letters from Afar* (New York: International Publishers, 1932), p. 45.

[14] The *Junius* pamphlet was written in July 1916 and published in October. It was a critique of Rosa Luxemburg, who had used this *nom de plume*.

[15] See, for example, V. I. Lenin, *Marx, Engels, Marxism,* 5th edition (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1953): "Partisan Warfare" (1906), pp. 206-220; "Marxism and Insurrection" (1917), pp. 463-470; "Advice of an Onlooker" (1917), pp. 471-473. In this latter item Lenin summarized five "principal rules of this art," formulated by Marx. These rules are not unlike others we will meet in Lenin's own writings and those of his successors, including Mao Tse-tung.

It took approximately two decades of planned revolutionary warfare for Lenin and his followers to find the road to power. In the process there emerged two major propositions subsumed in the current concept of wars of national liberation:

(a) Utilize, with whatever forceful means may be necessary, the "contradictions," i.e., domestic and international conflicts or crises, in the capitalo-imperialist world to push the situation forward and advance the revolution.

(b) The revolutionary base is always the independent communist party, but expedient alliances with peasant movements and other bourgeois elements are justified provided the immediate goal of such alliances is "national liberation." Moreover, "there is," writes Lenin, "no salvation for dependent and weak nations except in a union of Soviet republics."

Lenin regarded imperialist war as inevitable. Stalin agreed with him, and after Lenin's death in 1924 he specifically countered the charge that "Lenin's thesis that imperialism inevitably generates war must now be regarded as obsolete."[16] The Second World War provided Stalin — as the First World War had provided Lenin — with opportunities "to push the situation forward" and make genuine gains. During the period of the Nazi-Soviet Pact (August 1939-June 1941) the Soviet armed forces occupied and incorporated into the USSR Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, and absorbed a piece of Finland. At the end of the war Soviet armies occupied and helped to bring communist parties to power in Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, North Korea, Poland and Rumania.

At most, Stalin added to Lenin's concept of the inevitability of war between capitalo-imperialist states the gloss that these states would inevitably attack the Soviet Union. Essentially, however, he presented such views in orthodox Leninist terms of "two camps" or two classes locked in unceasing struggle, with a predetermined victory for "socialism."

In many quarters, Khrushchev is credited with introducing a modification in the Leninist-Stalinist theory of war, to wit, that imperialist war is not "inevitable." For the purposes of this study we will accept this as if it were true. (Actually I agree with Stefan Possony that Khrushchev's views constitute a more sophisticated

[16] Stalin died in March 1953. As late as October 1952, in his *Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR,* he sweepingly reaffirmed this stand "no matter what form the alliances [among capitalist powers] take." There are, he wrote, "only 'breathing spells' between wars. . . . To eliminate the inevitability of war, it is necessary to abolish imperialism."

approach to the problem of war, a refinement, not a modification, of classical Leninism into a "two-tier" or "two-pronged" approach, based on government-to-government and party-to-opportunity relations. In either context Khrushchev was certainly more aware than Stalin of the significance of nuclear weapons, both those in the U.S. arsenal and those that were rapidly being developed by the Soviet Union.[17])

Khrushchev's modification first appeared in his Report to the Central Committee at the CPSU's Twentieth Party Congress in February 1956,[18] wherein he attempted to distinguish his line from Stalin's while still preserving his Leninist orthodoxy. As is typical in all such situations, a communist ideologue takes a fresh look at the "objective conditions" so as to apply strategic doctrine "correctly." Khrushchev was interested in advancing the view that the Soviet Union "fundamentally" accepted "the principle of peaceful coexistence." This principle concerned "questions of relations between states." In such relations he held that "the socialist system will win in competition between the two systems — the capitalist and the socialist"; but this victory "by no means signifies . . . armed interference by the socialist countries in the internal affairs of the capitalist countries." Marxism-Leninism will win out because it "possesses decisive advantages over the capitalist modes of production."

"Peaceful coexistence or the most destructive war in history" are the alternatives; and quoting a favorite Lenin dictum, "there is no third way." The "radical" new situation giving rise to Khrushchev's optimism is the "mighty force" of the "world camp of socialism" and its relationship to the "large group of other countries with a population running into many hundreds of millions which are actively working to avert war." This group of nations make up what the Twentieth Congress called the "zone of peace" led by "bourgeois nationalists" who could and should be won over to the camp of socialism on a program of "peace and anti-imperialism." They are the countries of the Third World, particularly those influenced by "the famous Five Principles [of Peaceful Coexistence], advanced by the People's Republic of

---

[17] See Stefan T. Possony, *Analysis of the Khrushchev Speech of January 6, 1961*: *Hearing*, Before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act. . . Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, 87th Congress, 1st Session, June 16, 1961. Possony's dissection of this speech should be carefully studied. The full text of the speech is printed in Appendix III of this *Hearing*.

[18] (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1956). Unless otherwise specified, all quotations in this and the following two paragraphs are from Khrushchev's report.

China and the Republic of India and supported by the Bandung Conference [Indonesia, 1955]. . . ."

Imperialism, according to Khrushchev, is no longer "an all-embracing world system." This fact, when coupled with the "mighty force" of the socialist camp and its actual or potential supporters in the Third World, has so altered the balance of forces that "war is not fatalistically inevitable." Though in his January 6, 1961 speech Khrushchev dropped the word "fatalistically," neither in that speech nor in the earlier one did he overlook the possibility that "in a number of capitalist countries the violent overthrow of the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie and the sharp aggravation of class struggle connected with this are inevitable. . . ." The language of 1956 was, in effect, repeated in 1961: "It is obvious that in the countries where capitalism is strong, where it has a high military and police apparatus, the transition to socialism will unavoidably take place in conditions of an acute class struggle."

Thus it may be said that though Khrushchev is less blunt than Stalin in predicting the inevitability of war, he nonetheless reverts to the orthodox Leninist strategy of revolutionary warfare in the event that "the reactionary forces" (i.e., strong capitalist countries) offer resistance to their overthrow. There are other capitalist and former colonial countries — presumably those in the "zone of peace" — in which "the winning of a stable parliamentary majority backed by a mass revolutionary movement . . . could create . . . the conditions needed to secure fundamental [i.e., communist] social changes." For these countries, "the decisive and indispensable factor is the political leadership of the working class headed by its vanguard [i.e., the communist party]. Without this there can be no transition to socialism."[19]

In this context Khrushchev formulated his 1961 typology of wars, maintaining that "in modern conditions the following categories of wars should be distinguished: world wars, local wars, liberation wars, and popular uprisings."

A careful reading of his text indicates that he was thinking of "world wars" in both Leninist (i.e., the clash of rival imperialisms) and Stalinist (i.e., the attack of big capitalo-imperialist powers against the Soviet Union and its socialist camp) terms. With regard to these two types of wars, he held that the

---

[19] In the January 1961 speech Khrushchev explicitly applies the Leninist doctrine of revolutionary defeatism, "the main enemy is at home," to those situations where the "ruling classes counter revolution with force." He also downgrades a purely parliamentary transition to socialism: "such are alien to Communists."

Soviet Union might not be able to prevent the first but might derive certain gains from it, as did "the Bolshevik Party and Lenin." Such wars are still "the most probable . . . and should not be ruled out." The "imperialists can unleash [a war against the Soviet Union] but they must think hard about the consequences." Nuclear warfare would be so "destructive" as to suggest that such wars "are not necessary" even to bring about "the victory of socialism throughout the world." Further, Khrushchev pointed out that "local wars" are, in effect, a subspecies of world wars; they "may grow into a world thermonuclear rocket war. We must therefore combat both world wars and local wars."

However, national liberation wars are something else again. These, Khrushchev argues, frequently begin as "uprisings by the colonial peoples against their oppressors" and become

> guerrilla warfare. Liberation wars continue to exist as long as imperialism exists, as long as colonialism exists. These are revolutionary wars. Such wars are not only admissible but inevitable . . . the Communists fully support such just wars and march in the front rank with the people waging liberation struggles.

Here, once again, he is at one with Lenin and the Second Comintern Congress.

In June 1969 the long delayed International Conference of (seventy-five) Communist and Workers Parties resolved to support what Brezhnev termed "a platform from which they can further step up the national liberation movement in a worldwide revolutionary process."[20] The final document, called "Tasks at the Present Stage of the Struggle Against Imperialism and United Action of the Communist Parties and All Anti-Imperialist Forces," reaffirmed the Khrushchev line without reference to the deposed leader and resolved that:

> The existing situation demands united action of communists and other anti-imperialist forces so that maximum use may be made of the mounting possibilities for a broader offensive against imperialism, against the forces of reaction and war . . . the world revolutionary movement continues its offensive despite the difficulties and setbacks of some of its contingents. . . .
>
> The upsurge of the national liberation movement of the Afro-Asian peoples has been a telling blow at the positions of imperialism on these continents. Despite serious difficulties, these people are continuing to

---

[20] "Communist Movement Is in the Period of a Further Uplift," *Problems of Peace and Socialism,* August 1969. See F. N. Trager, with R. F. Bordonaro, "The Ninth CCP Congress and the World Communist Conference: Their Meaning for Asia," ORBIS, Fall 1969, pp. 736-762.

struggle against colonialism and neo-colonialism and contribute to the general offensive against imperialism. . . .[21]

Moreover, in his Report to the Twenty-fourth Soviet Party Congress in March 1971, Brezhnev concluded his guidelines concerning Soviet foreign policy with a reiteration of "undeviating support to the people's struggle for democracy, national liberation and socialism."[22]

Thus in the twenty years since Stalin's death five overlapping, summarizing propositions have guided Soviet strategic thought. These may be added to the (a) and (b) developed earlier and outlined above.

(c) If, as is probable, imperialists make war against each other, take Leninist advantage of the situation.

(d) Avoid, if possible, large or local wars that involve nuclear weapons. Where such war-threats are directed against the "socialist camp," be prepared to inflict such military damage on the perpetrators as to inhibit their attack.

(e) The best instrument for advancing the historic class struggle is to support revolutionary warfare in capitalist countries and any place else where such warfare may be apposite.

(f) People's struggles or wars of national liberation are just wars and are to be undeviatingly supported.

(g) A parliamentary road to power is possible — though it is "alien" to the communist party — provided it is undertaken by a communist party capable of holding the leadership of the revolutionary masses.

The importance of a theory of war to all Marxist-Leninists consists in the fact that war, any kind of war, represents a crisis of maximum magnitude for the government waging it or engaged in it. And as Cyril Black points out, "Soviet theorists have . . . concluded from their own experience that wars and military crises have provided the most fertile soil for revolution."[23] Also of interest in this connection is the volume of essays edited by Marshal Sokolovsky, which contains both the presentation of Leninist war theory and its integration with military strategic thinking.[24] To quote a summary page from that volume:

---

[21] Reprinted in Supplement to *New Times* (Moscow), June 10, 1969, pp. 25-39. See also major excerpts in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), Special Russian Edition, June 18, 1969.

[22] For a full exposition of Brezhnev's "line" see Boris Ponomarev, "Topical Problems in the Theory of the World Revolutionary Process," *Kommunist,* October 1971.

[23] Black and Thornton, editors, *Communism and Revolution. . . , op. cit.*, p. 426. Professor Black is here summarizing pp. 607-610 of *Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism* (English edition, Moscow, 1961). This book, edited by O. V. Kuusinen, appeared in a second English edition in 1963. Thornton points out that the two editions "do not vary much." He calls the book "a summa of contemporary Communist doctrine."

> Studying the nature of these wars, Soviet military strategy starts with the fact that in the present era, the following basic categories of war are theoretically possible:
>
> *World war* between the imperialist and socialist camps, which — if not prevented — would be, in political essence, a decisive armed clash of two opposing world systems. Such a war would be aggressive, rapacious, and unjust on the part of imperialism and a liberating, just revolutionary war on the part of socialism.
>
> *Small imperialist wars* on a local, limited scale, started by the imperialists for the purpose of suppressing national liberation movements and for maintaining colonies. Small, local wars are also possible between imperialist countries. All these wars are aggressive and unjust on the part of imperialism.
>
> *National liberation, civil, and other popular wars*, for the repulse of the aggressive, predatory attacks of the imperialists and for freedom and independence. These wars are just, liberating, and revolutionary.
>
> The Communists were always the most resolute enemies of world wars, as well as of wars in general. Wars are needed only by the imperialists for the capture of foreign territories and to enslave the peoples.
>
> The CPSU and the entire Soviet nation have always been the first to oppose any and all aggressive wars (wars between capitalist countries as well as local wars intended to hinder national liberation movements) and they consider it their duty to support the sacred struggle of the oppressed peoples and their just wars of liberation against imperialism. It is understandable that the causes and development of such wars will differ on each occasion.
>
> There will be a sharp distinction between the military-political and strategic aims of the participants, and also between the ways and means of conducting these wars. This poses a serious problem in the development of the theory of military strategy: to study and analyze the problems of modern war not in general, but as applied to a given concrete instance.[25]

Interestingly enough, Marshal Sokolovsky's military strategists, writing immediately before September 1962 (when the book was published in the Soviet Union), do not discuss guerrilla warfare. Its absence paralleled a similar absence in American military writings of the period; but in the Soviet case internal warfare or revolutionary warfare in its early and middle stages is the responsibility of the party and its cadres, as Lenin so clearly prescribed. In the final analysis "just wars," or as Sokolovsky calls them, "sacred" struggles, are any crises or conflicts promoted and/or utilized by self-styled communist revolutionary cadres for advancing the cause of a communist take-over. Such crises or conflicts, sufficiently fueled, become wars of national liberation to which every communist leader from Lenin to Brezhnev has given what the latter described as "undeviating support."

---

[24] *Military Strategy. . . , op. cit.*, particularly Chapter I on "General Concepts" and Chapter IV on "The Nature of Modern War."

[25] *Ibid.*, p. 178.

The Soviets clearly understand that "peaceful coexistence," as the *World Marxist Review* pointed out long ago,[26] is

> a principle of relations between states, and not only does not restrict the unleashing of class warfare of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie in capitalist countries . . . but on the contrary makes that struggle possible by shielding peoples and states from any interference from the aggressive forces of imperialism from without. . . .

The advanced noncommunist countries are therefore to be deterred if possible by negotiations (SALT), conferences (the European Security Conference), treaties and threats from helping each other and from coming to the assistance of beleaguered countries in which "civil wars" and revolutionary warfare are waged by communist and/or united-front forces supported by the USSR and its satellites. Correlatively, Soviet intervention in support of wars of national liberation and even against communist regimes whose policies are not to Moscow's liking (Hungary 1956, Czechoslovakia 1968) is both sanctioned and sanctified.[27] The moral of all this "theory" or "ideology" is that prudent men should not lightly dismiss the expressed intentions of their adversaries.

The Chinese Concept

Lin Piao in his *Long Live the Victory of People's War!* remarks:

> Only when the people . . . are awakened, mobilized, organized and armed can they overthrow the reactionary rule of imperialism and its lackeys

---

[26] June 1963, p. 4.

[27] The Brezhnev thesis of "limited sovereignty," i.e., "justified intervention across boundaries on behalf of socialism," is a contemporary expression of a long-standing Leninist doctrine known as "principles of proletarian or socialist internationalism." See U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations, *Czechoslovakia and the Brezhnev Doctrine,* 91st Congress, 1st Session (Washington: GPO, 1969); also Charles T. Barock, *The Soviet Doctrine of Sovereignty* (the so-called Brezhnev Doctrine) (Chicago: American Bar Association, Standing Committee on Education about Communism and Its Contrast with Liberty Under Law, 1970). The *New York Times* (September 23, 1971) quoted Brezhnev as denying the existence of a Soviet doctrine of "*limited sovereignty.*" Nevertheless, the party chief has continued to adhere to the basic doctrine undergirding those words: "socialist internationalism." The latter justifies what Brezhnev did in Czechoslovakia.

> through struggle; their role cannot be replaced or taken over by any people from outside. But this does not exclude mutual sympathy and support. . . . Our support and aid to other revolutionary peoples serve precisely to help their self-reliant struggle.[28]

However discredited China's late "crown prince" may be, his well-known "Commemoration of the 20th Anniversary of Victory in the Chinese People's War of Resistance Against Japan" is a reliable, if slavish, summary of the main features in the Maoist model of revolutionary warfare,[29] in which Mao Tse-tung is of course the central figure. During the past half-century Mao rose — not without occasional retreats — from an agit-prop provincial leader in his native province of Hunan to become the object of a cult second to none in the communist world. "The Great Helmsman," as he is referred to in a song of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (GPCR), consolidated his party position and paramount power by 1935. For the next two decades his party leadership remained unchallenged by any effective faction. Under him the inner party cadre group — be it called Politburo, Executive Committee or Central Committee — was universally regarded as one of the most unified and coherent communist groups anywhere in the communist world.[30] Even the issue of succession seemed to be settled in favor of Liu Shao-ch'i, at least until Mao launched the GPCR. But then the seams of this well-knit CCP fabric began to show strain. In the three major plenums of the Central Committee of the CCP's Eighth Congress, held between November 1958 and August 1959, it became apparent that the solidly organized and unified Chinese leadership had factionalized over policy, especially the line that led from "100 blooming flowers" to the "Great Leap Forward" and "People's Communes."

The factional issue, sharpened by events influencing the beginning and end of the GPCR, should not be closed, however, without pointing out that, in all the turmoil of party life and strife Chou En-lai, the master administrator-diplomat, managed, as he has since he joined the Communist Party in France in 1920, to remain near the top and on the winning side. In the 1960's Mao had Chou's able assistance when, utilizing sections of the armed forces, which were then controlled by Lin Piao, and the Revolutionary Red Guards, he emerged victorious in the factional struggle. But this was only at the expense of downgrading, if not splitting, the party.[31]

---

[28] (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1965), pp. 63-64.

[29] It is academic to argue whether Lin Piao's prescription is "do-it-yourself" or "interventionist." Proponents of one or the other of these two interpretations tend to ignore the dialectical — or reciprocally related — character of Marxist and Maoist thought. To stress either approach to the exclusion of the other is to misunderstand how and through whom the "people . . . are awakened, mobilized, organized and armed." For a sophisticated debate on the implications of this issue, see "Is China Expansionist?" by Franz Michael, and "Mao Tse-tung and Revolutionary 'Self Reliance' " by Peter Van Ness, in *Problems of Communism*, Special Issue, "Focus on Asia," January-April 1971, pp. 62-74. In my view, Professor Van Ness defines "expansionism" in a much too limited fashion and fails to appreciate what I have called Mao's dialectical approach to issues.

[30] Perhaps only Ho Chi Minh and his leadership cadre in North Viet Nam could have been considered in the same category.

The Cultural Revolution, based on what Ch'en Po-ta (Mao's "secretary and ghost writer") had earlier called the "banner of Mao Tse-tung's thought," was the instrument for the Mao-Chou-Lin maneuver. In effect, it deified the "thought of Mao Tse-tung" (TMTT) to rebuild Communist China as Mao would have it, while relying for its success on the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and the Red Guards (who were later discarded). Mao's goal was to restore to China its revolutionary zeal for progress at home and for world revolution abroad.

Since the Ninth National CCP Congress (in April 1969), Mao's name in Communist Chinese publications has been formally coupled with those of Marx and Lenin so as to indicate his equal stature. Marxist-Leninist-Mao Tse-tung thought is now "the theoretical basis guiding" the party. In the 1969 Constitution Mao is described as having brought Marxism-Leninism "to a higher and completely new stage . . . in which imperialism is heading for total collapse and socialism is advancing to world-wide victory."[32]

Many analysts hold that Mao's contributions to the theory of Marxism-Leninism have been rather slight.[33] However, his analytical understanding of, and ability to prescribe for, communist warfare, including guerrilla warfare as a phase of revolutionary action, place him in the first rank of military strategists and tacticians. Mao began writing on political-military matters in the late 1920's but his most creative period came in the late

[31] See Franz Michael, "Ideology and the Cult of Mao," and William W. Whitson, "The Military: Their Role in the Policy Process," in F. N. Trager and W. Henderson, editors, *Communist China, 1949-1969: A Twenty-Year Appraisal* (New York: New York University Press, 1970).

[32] The new constitution stipulated that Lin Piao would succeed Mao. Lin's long, dull and repetitive report to the Congress reaffirmed support for wars of national liberation and revolutionary struggles and preparation for expected imperialist nuclear and conventional wars. See Trager and Bordonaro, "The Ninth CCP Congress. . . ," *op. cit.*, p. 736 ff.

[33] See, for example, Arthur A. Cohen, *The Communism of Mao Tse-tung* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966).

1930's[34] — witness *Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War* (1936), *On Guerrilla Warfare* (1937), *Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla War Against Japan* (1938), *On Protracted War* (1938), *Problems of War and Strategy* (1938), among other treatises.

In *On Guerrilla Warfare* Mao refers to several wars of the nineteenth century in which guerrillas were an active ingredient. He points out that though there is some "consistency" in guerrilla warfare patterns, yet "times, peoples and conditions" produce significant differences. He offers both Clausewitz and Lenin as authorities for his approach to warfare:

> Clausewitz wrote, in *On War*: "Wars in every period have independent conditions, and, therefore every period must have its independent theory of war." Lenin, in *On Guerrilla Warfare*, said "As regards the form of fighting, it is unconditionally requisite that history be investigated in order to discover the conditions of environment, the state of economic progress, and the political ideas that obtained, the national characteristics, customs and degree of civilization. . . . It is necessary to be completely unsympathetic to abstract formulas and rules and to study with sympathy the conditions of the actual fighting, for these will change in accordance with the political and economic situations and the realization of the people's aspirations. These progressive changes in conditions create new methods."[35]

This Clausewitz-Lenin combination has clearly influenced Mao's thinking, for much of his military writing arises from his analysis of "independent forms and conditions and periods." In the opening chapter of *Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War*[36] he sets forth his views on "How to Study War," especially the "laws of war," including revolutionary war. "It is well known," he writes, "that when you do anything, unless you understand its actual circumstances, its nature and its relations to other things, you will not know the laws governing it, nor know how to do it, nor be able to do it well." He points out that "war is the highest form of struggle for resolving contradictions, when they have developed to a certain stage, between classes, nations, states or political groups, and it has existed ever since the emergence of private property and of classes." But "different wars" in time, place and nature call for "different laws" for their direction. "Basically," he asserts, "there are only two kinds of war in history, 'revolutionary' or 'just' wars and 'counterrevolutionary' or 'unjust' wars. . . . We support 'just' wars."[37]

---

[34] See *Selected Works*, Vols. 1 and 2 of four vols. (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1961-1965), and *Selected Military Writings, op. cit.*

[35] *On Guerrilla Warfare*, translated with an Introduction by Brigadier General Samuel B. Griffith (New York: Praeger, 1961), p. 49.

[36] *Selected Military Writings, op. cit.*, pp. 71-79.

Mao's emphasis on the conditions that determine how to conduct war, or more exactly how to formulate the "laws" that should govern a particular war, has led to development of the Chinese model for revolutionary warfare. This is recommended to all who unite to bring down *any* opposition (called therefore "counterrevolutionary" regimes or forces). It has grown out of Mao's experience in the struggles against the Kuomintang government (1927-1949), the "People's War of Resistance Against Japan," and the desire to demonstrate the correctness of the Chinese pattern in extending revolutionary warfare throughout the world.

The extraordinary amount of detail in Mao's military writings is outside the scope of this study.[38] Concerning the concept of people's war and its relation to wars of national liberation, which is our primary interest, Maoist thinking revolves around three central ideas: man and terrain are more important than weapons; politics (before the GPCR one would have more narrowly written the party) controls the army; and the army must be the army of the people. When Lin Piao replaced P'eng Teh-huai as Minister of Defense in 1959, he wrote, in *An Instrument of Political Struggle* (*Peking Review,* October 6, 1959):

> Some comrades . . . say that modern warfare is a war of technique, of steel and machinery and that in the face of these things, man's role has to be relegated to a secondary place. . . . Contrary to these people, we believe that while equipment and technique are important, the human factor is even more so. . . . Men and material must form a unity, with men as the leading factor.

Here Lin was simply restating the well-known Maoist principle that:

> The revolutionary war is a war of the masses; it can be waged only by mobilizing the masses and relying on them. . . .
>
> What is a true bastion of iron? It is the masses . . . who genuinely and sincerely support the revolution. . . .
>
> The richest source of power to wage war lies in the masses of the people. . . .[39]

---

[37] In an earlier translation in 1951, revolutionary wars were called "holy." The statement read "we support holy national revolutionary wars and holy class revolutionary wars."

[38] The interested reader can pursue this for himself. Ralph L. Powell provides a useful analytical guide in "Maoist Military Doctrines," *Asian Survey,* April 1968, pp. 239-262.

[39] Taken from the Little Red Book, *Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung,* Section VIII, "People's War" (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1966). The Little Red Book notes where these passages can be found in Mao's writing.

To make this emphasis on man over weapons specific, Mao concretely supplied the following "principles of operation":

(1) Attack dispersed, isolated enemy forces first; attack concentrated, strong enemy forces later.

(2) Take small and medium cities and extensive rural areas first; take big cities later.

(3) Make wiping out the enemy's effective strength our main objective; do not make holding or seizing a city or place our main objective. Holding or seizing a city or place is the outcome of wiping out the enemy's effective strength, and often a city or place can be held or seized for good, only after it has changed hands a number of times.

(4) In every battle, concentrate an absolutely superior force (two, three, four and sometimes even five or six times the enemy's strength), encircle the enemy forces completely, strive to wipe them out thoroughly and do not let any escape from the net. In special circumstances, use the method of dealing the enemy crushing blows, that is, concentrate all our strength to make a frontal attack on one or both of his flanks with the aim of wiping out one part and routing another so that our army can swiftly move its troops to smash other enemy forces. Strive to avoid battles of attrition in which we lose more than we gain or only break even. In this way, although inferior as a whole (in terms of numbers), we shall be absolutely superior in every part and every specific campaign, and this ensures victory in the campaign. As time goes on, we shall become superior as a whole and eventually wipe out all the enemy.

(5) Fight no battle unprepared, fight no battle you are not sure of winning; make every effort to be well prepared for each battle, make every effort to ensure victory in the given set of conditions as between the enemy and ourselves.

(6) Give full play to our style of fighting—courage in battle, no fear of sacrifice, no fear of fatigue, and continuous fighting (that is, fighting successive battles in a short time without rest).

(7) Strive to wipe out the enemy when he is on the move. At the same time, pay attention to the tactics of positional attack and capture enemy fortified points and cities.

(8) With regard to attacking cities, resolutely seize all enemy fortified points and cities which are weakly defended. At opportune moments, seize all enemy fortified points and cities defended with moderate strength, provided circumstances permit. As for all strongly defended enemy fortified points and cities, wait till conditions are ripe and then take them.

(9) Replenish our strength with all the arms and most of the personnel captured from the enemy. Our army's main sources of manpower and material are at the front.

(10) Make good use of the intervals between campaigns to rest, train, and consolidate our troops. Periods of rest, training and consolida-

> tion should not in general be very long, and the enemy should so far as possible be permitted no breathing space.
>
> These are the main methods the People's Liberation Army has employed in defeating Chiang Kai-shek. They are the result of the tempering of the People's Liberation Army in long years of fighting against domestic and foreign enemies and are completely suited to our present situation. . . . Our strategy and tactics are based on a people's war; no army opposed to the people can use our strategy and tactics.[40]

If in the plenitude of Mao's military writings one selects a "best" illustration, he might choose the series of lectures delivered in Yenan during May-June 1938 and since known as *On Protracted War*.[41] Here, in considering the People's War of Resistance Against Japan, Mao develops his basic concepts: "why a revolutionary war is protracted"; the "three stages" of such a war ("the enemy's strategic offensive and our strategic defensive; the enemy's strategic defensive and our preparation for the counter-offensive, and our strategic offensive and the enemy's strategic retreat"); and what the revolutionary does at each stage. Once again he reverts to what is surely his favorite theme in having the East Wind prevail over the West Wind. He writes (paragraph 48):

> The so-called theory of "weapons decide everything". . . is a mechanistic theory of war, a subjectivist and one-sided view. Our view is contrary to this; we see not only weapons but also the power of man. Weapons are an important factor in war but not the decisive one; it is man and not material that is decisive. The contest of forces is not only a contest of military and economic power, but also one of the power and morale of man. Military and economic power must be controlled by man.

Thus, people's war for Mao has an expanded but distinctive Marxist-Leninist flavor. The communist military must rely on and win over the masses while the dominant communist political leadership (generally, the party) mobilizes and organizes the masses for direct and indirect military support. The regular armed forces must coordinate with local forces, especially when the former are engaged in conventional warfare and the latter in unconventional and guerrilla warfare. Though "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun,"[42] the gun must be coordinated and, in effect, subordinated to the larger purposes of political advance and ideological cohesion — these produce the "power and morale of [revolutionary] man."

[40] "The Present Situation and Our Tasks" (December 25, 1947), *Selected Military Writings, op. cit.,* pp. 349-350.
[41] In *ibid.*, pp. 187-266.
[42] Mao, "Problems of War and Strategy," in *ibid.*, pp. 268-283.

As Professor Ralph Powell points out:

> Mao's major contribution has probably been the eclectic development of a systematic and comprehensive doctrine of protracted insurrectionary warfare that can be used with considerable effectiveness against a colonial power, a foreign invader or an independent national government. ... Mao's broadly distributed writings are meant to serve as textbooks for revolutionaries. Peking claims that the "thought of Mao Tse-tung" serves as an appropriate model for revolutions, that is "wars of liberation" or "people wars" in Asia, Africa and Latin America.[43]

Communist and Related Variants

In every year since World War II some form of communist-inspired and communist-conducted insurgency or rebellion or guerrilla warfare — all included in the general category of just or holy armed struggles for liberation — has been under way in both hemispheres. Afro-Asian states newly emerging from colonial hegemony have more frequently been the targets of these conflicts, but older states in Europe and Latin America have not escaped attack. Though the canonical writings of Lenin and Mao provide the basic patterns for conducting such warfare, the practicing "disciples" have also produced a body of operational literature. Among the more prominent of these, besides the already referenced Lin Piao, are General Vo Nguyen Giap,[44] Truong Chinh[45] and Che Guevara.[46] A noncommunist whose early work may be included in this list is General Abdul Nasution of Indonesia.[47]

As Sun Tzu[48] and Clausewitz, Lenin and Mao endlessly repeat, the historical, objective conditions in any given area must be analyzed thoroughly by those — communists and others — who conduct the war. In this connection any reader of Giap, Truong Chinh, Che, Nasution and the others will easily find variations among them and between them and their political-military idols. Georges Boudarel points out in his Introduction to Giap's *Banner of the People's War, the Party's Military Line,* that the latter's

---

[43] Powell, *op. cit.*, p. 247.

[44] See *La Guerre de liberation et l'armee Populaire* (Hanoi, 1950); the collection, *People's War, People's Army* (Hanoi, 1961); and *Banner of the People's War, the Party's Military Line,* with Preface by Jean Lacouture, Introduction by Georges Boudarel (New York: Praeger, 1970).

[45] *Primer for Revolt, the Communist Takeover in Viet-Nam,* with Introduction and notes by Bernard B. Fall (New York: Praeger, 1970).

[46] *Che Guevara on Guerrilla Warfare,* with Introduction by Major Harries-Clichy Peterson, USMCR (New York: Praeger, 1970).

[47] *Fundamentals of Guerrilla Warfare and the Indonesian Defence System Past and Future* (Djakarta: Indonesian Armed Forces, Information Service, 1953).

[48] *The Art of War* was translated from the Chinese into Vietnamese by the People's Army Press in 1964.

> ideas are closer to Che Guevara's . . . than to Mao's theories . . . [but then] . . . the Vietnamese conception of the launching of a guerrilla movement is nevertheless very different from that of the Cubans. For the Vietnamese, the guerrilla movement always starts with a peasant type of self-defense (as in China) while, in the Cuban *foco* formula, an outside force intervenes to instigate a military movement and then undertakes to create a political movement.[49]

The variations, serious though they have been and may become again in creating factional struggles among communist leaders,[50] can here be safely bypassed. What is significant is that if one reads the texts and blanks out local references to personal names and places, he will find no important deviations in basic theory and practice. Any one of these writers could have theorized as follows:

> (a) The revolution revealed three fundamental conclusions about armed *revolution: (1) Popular Forces can win a war against an army.* (2) One does not necessarily have to wait for a revolutionary situation to arise; it can be created. (3) In the underdeveloped countries . . . rural areas are the best battlefields for revolution.
>
> (b) In history, there are two kinds of wars: just wars and unjust wars. Just wars are wars against oppressors . . . to safeguard the people. . . . From the strategic viewpoint, we must prolong the war; but in every individual campaign and from a tactical viewpoint, we must achieve rapid settlement. . . . to achieve good results in warfare, we must mobilize the people to support the armed forces . . . the people are the eyes and ears of the army, they feed and keep our soldiers . . . the people are the water and our army the fish. . . .
>
> (c) The Party's leadership of the uprising of all the people and people's war has been reflected primarily in the way it determines the correct political and military lines, sets forth the tasks and the basic and urgent goals of the revolution, and determines and leads the implementation of revolutionary methods, the forms of organizing forces, the methods and tricks involved in the struggle, and the most appropriate, sharpest, and most effective and revolutionary combat methods. . . .
>
> (d) In summary it becomes obvious that there are overall essential conditions which need to be fulfilled to reach victory in a guerrilla war. These are: a people to give the guerrillas assistance, a favorable geography and a long war. . . . There is really only one strategy in

---

[49] P. 21, footnote 2.

[50] For example, Giap and the late General Nguyen Chi Thanh — as well as Giap and Truong Chinh — differed on analysis, strategy and tactics with respect to particular times, places and estimates of their adversary: in brief, on the day-to-day, month-to-month campaigning. However, the basic assumptions from which they started, the hagiographical texts to which they politically gave obeisance, the overall revolutionary strategy and the goals to which they directed their collective energies and resources varied hardly at all. See Patrick J. McGarvey, *Visions of Victory, Selected Vietnamese Communist Military Writings, 1964-1968* (Stanford: The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University, 1969).

> wars, of which the military, political, psychological and economic strategies constitute parts.[51]

There is a two-part conclusion to be drawn from this brief reference to derivative communist literature on revolutionary warfare:

(1) Despite more than a decade and a half of polycentric communism and almost as long a time of contention between Moscow and Peking for revolutionary communist leadership, an overwhelming congruence in theory and its application distinguishes the strategy and tactics of revolutionary warfare. Conflict between and among communists has not altered the basic concepts of communist conflict against others.

(2) Specific denotations of the generally held and applied concepts of revolutionary warfare will, as Lenin indicated, vary from place to place according to "the conditions of environment, the state of economic progress and the political ideas that [obtain], the national characteristics, customs and degree of civilization." Hence, the counteraction of communist revolutionary warfare must include the consideration of historical and contemporary local variables.

HOW MOSCOW AND PEKING USE SUCH INSTRUMENTS OF POLICY

It should be clear from the foregoing that political philosophy or ideology — a set of defined values and goals — is posited by a revolutionary leadership. The objects or targets of the prescribed views are determined by an analysis of history and by opportunities seized upon for one reason or another in any current context. Mao, even more than Lenin, emphasized military means to achieve political ends; and, more than Lenin, developed the strategy and tactics of protracted war. This study argues, however, that the "more than" in this proposition derives from the Leninist insistence on treating each set of local variables as needed. Hence, Mao is a reliable Leninist even where he seems to deviate from Lenin. So are their chief auctorial followers.

If the immediate objects of revolutionary zeal are targets of opportunity, the long-range objective is a highly conscious global or universal revolutionary mission. (The combination is sometimes referred to as a "model" for universal revolutionary behavior.) "History" and "material conditions" necessarily make it so. In this context how do Moscow and Peking employ the concept of, and precepts for, people's wars in the conduct of revolutionary war?

---

[51] (a) Che Guevara; (b) Truong Chinh; (c) Giap; (d) Nasution.

During the last years of Stalin and the early years of Khrushchev, the Soviet and Chinese regimes pursued in the main the same policies or "line." The "hard" or "left" revolutionary line following the organization of the Cominform in 1947 lasted at least until 1953. It was then superseded by what may be designated as the "soft" or "right" strategy of "peaceful coexistence" at the government-to-government level but support for "anti-imperialist" and "liberation" movements wherever possible.[52]

When Peking broke from Moscow over policy, and charged the latter with "revisionism," the essential difference hinged upon its allegation that Moscow carried "peaceful coexistence," or improvement of relations with the West, too far, and did so at the expense of its support for national liberation movements. Peking claimed that it was therefore reversing the emphasis.[53] Regardless of the degree of factionally hostile contention for dominance in the communist movement between Moscow and Peking since the late 1950's, in the execution of policy this "reversal" was and still remains a distinction without a difference. Both capitals operated on and held to the same objectives. Their applications varied according to their perceptions of the targets of opportunity and the local variables. Therefore, though we may and should study the "objective conditions" in any given situation as case histories, so as to discern the particulars in the use of people's wars or national liberation wars as communist instruments of policy, we can generalize with respect to such usage both for Moscow and Peking.

It cannot be stressed too much that wars of national liberation are fomented or undertaken wherever this special kind of turbulence seems, to its communist leaders, to have a chance of implementing a larger or more inclusive set of communist revolutionary policy goals. Such wars, frequently touted as anti-imperialist struggles, have been and are being undertaken in target countries or situations where even alleged remnants of colonialism or imperialism have long since been removed, e.g., as in Burma and Indonesia.

---

[52] See Trager, "The Communist Challenge in Southeast Asia," *op. cit.*, pp. 134-164. "Hard" and "soft" are perhaps better terms than "left" or "right" because they refer, in my analysis, more aptly to the organization theory on which they are based. During the periods of Comintern, Cominform and since, the hard line always has meant that communists push the situation forward by a "united front from below." That is, they make alliance with no one not directly communist or tightly controlled by communists. In this context even the *petite bourgeoisie*, socialists and noncommunist trade unionists are placed among the class enemy, are "social fascists" or "running dogs of capitalo-imperialism" or their equivalents. The soft line, always more dangerous because it appeals to peaceful rather than conflictual attitudes, has meant that the communists push the situation forward by organizing "united fronts or people's fronts from above." That is, alliances are permitted with virtually anybody, to further one or another of the present or short-range communist policies. In such "fronts" the communist will be overt but apparently nondominating. However, both the hard and soft lines are distinctive long-range steps in the communist theory and practice of the road to power.

[53] See Tang Tsou and M. H. Halperin, "Maoism at Home and Abroad," *Problems of Communism*, July-August 1965.

What, one may ask, are the general conditions that make a country or situation a communist target for wars of national liberation? Below is a sufficient list of factors applicable alike to old and new states. It is made up of a mix of two orders: those (1) that primarily stem from the internal environment of the target and those (2) that are brought to the target by the external communist revolutionary decision-makers.[54]

(1) a. Domestic institutional weakness giving rise to disaffection for or disillusionment with existing government.
   b. Religious, cultural, ethnic, racial strife; urban-rural cleavage.
   c. The destabilizing concomitants of the ongoing process of modernization.
   d. A postwar or severe postcrisis wake producing psychological malaise, a variant of frustration-aggression response.
   e. Suitable terrain for insurgent supply, training and protection, including sanctuary areas.
   f. An accessible sector of the population for permission/coercion to provide recruits, information, shelter and food; and for the formation of "united fronts."

(2) a. The unity of "theoretical and practical work," which as Lenin (quoting Liebknecht in German) insists, demands, "Studieren, Propagandieren, Organisieren" for mobilization and motivation.
   b. A dedicated, indoctrinated and trained cadre party, "red" to the point of accepting death if necessary. (Or, as a substitute, a cooperative regime.)
   c. A desirable but not essential contiguous border or a related access route to the target situation.
   d. An international propaganda machine including a psychological warfare apparatus for "clean" and "dirty" tricks.

To this list of ten sufficient conditions, others may be added. For example, Mao has given attention to the proper deportment of communist regular and guerrilla forces so as to guide their behavior among the masses.[55] Another item that may be included is the existence and utilization of training centers in communist states for foreign potential revolutionary cadres. This practice, begun by Lenin at the University of the Toilers of the East, has continued to the present with the Lumumba (or People's Friendship) University and similar centers throughout the Soviet Union and other communist states. North Korea's "Foreigners Special Training Center" is reported to have become fully operational by 1966. One unclassified intelligence report from South Korea maintains that this center "since 1966 has trained as many as 1300 men from Latin American countries and another 700 men from the Asian and African regions." These potential guerrillas are assigned to ten training bases located within a maximum radius of seventy miles from Pyongyang.[56]

---

[54] Many books and articles have been written on this subject. From the abundant literature, two titles are suggested as essential reading: Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf, Jr., *Rebellion and Authority — An Analytic Essay on Insurgent Conflicts* (Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1970), and Douglas Pike, *Viet Cong: The Organization and Techniques of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam* (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1966). For a shorter volume, see Pike's *War, Peace and the Viet Cong* (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1969).

[55] See "The Three Main Rules of Discipline and the Eight Points for Attention," in his *Selected Works*, Vol. 4, pp. 155-156.

The Case of Thailand

A synopsis of a case history involving the People's Republic of China and Thailand may be useful to illustrate the possible combination of internal and external conditions. It suggests how a war of national liberation is started and stoked.

The history of insurgency in Thailand begins with the formation in the early 1950's of the so-called Free Thai Movement operating out of a "Thai Autonomous Area" in Yunnan province, China. The alleged leader of the movement at that time, Pridi Phanomyang, was a former Thai Prime Minister who had been displaced from office in 1947 and had retired to Communist China in 1949 after an abortive attempt to regain political power.[57] The

---

[56] Following is a list of the countries and activist groups from which, purportedly, guerrillas were recruited for training in North Korea:

Nine Latin American countries: Guatemala, Uruguay, Peru, Chile, Venezuela, Mexico, Colombia, Bolivia, Brazil.

Eight African countries: Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Angola, Central African Republic, Kenya, Congo-B, Congo-K, Uganda.

Six Arab countries: Syria, UAR, Algeria, Sudan, Libya, Southern Yemen.

Four Asian countries: North Viet Nam, Cambodia, Laos, Ceylon.

Groups: Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), Black Panther Party (BPP), Revolutionary Action Movement (RAM), Youth International Party (Yippies), from the United States; Radical Palestinian Movement from the Arab area; the Red Army of Japan; the Viet Cong, among others.

See, for an overview, "North Korea," a statement by Robert A. Scalapino before the Subcommittee on Southeast Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, Foreign Affairs Committee, June 10, 1971. Many such training centers were established in the 1950's and 1960's in communist-bloc countries: e.g., the World Trade Federation Union's school in Budapest; Fritz Heckert H.S. in Berlin; Institute for Foreign Students in Leipzig; 17th November University in Prague.

[57] Pridi had been leader of a Free Thai Movement during World War II while his chief opponent, Field Marshal Pibul Songkhram, was in the saddle as the wartime ally of Japan and head of the Thai government. It was Pibul who defeated Pridi's attempted coup in 1949. Thereafter, he retained the power and the office of Prime Minister until 1957.

FTM had a clandestine radio called the Voice of the People of Thailand and sought support from former Pridi followers in Thailand, particularly in the area adjacent to Yunnan. At the time, few in Thailand or elsewhere paid attention to this early attempt to create a communist insurrectionary base in the country.[58]

By the late 1950's reports began to appear in Bangkok of disruption in the northeastern provinces peopled by ethnic cousins of the Thai known as the Lao-Thai and by a sizeable (50,000) Vietnamese community, many of whom were rightly regarded as sympathetic to Hanoi. Basing itself on real grievances among these groups, the FTM gradually expanded its organizational network. By 1962, guerrilla activity existed in all of the Northeast's seventeen provinces, necessitating the implementation, with U.S. assistance, of one of the earliest counterinsurgency plans, "Operation Sunrise." In March of the same year the United States advised Thailand that under the terms of the SEATO treaty it would come to its assistance if requested by the Thai government.[59]

In October 1964 the outlawed Communist Party of Thailand (CPT), based in China, called for the formation of a "Patriotic Democratic United Front" against the Royal Thai government.[60] Almost immediately the Thailand Independence Movement (TIM) was formed in November 1964 and the Thailand Patriotic Front (TPF) in January 1965. In the following December, Peking reported that the two organizations had merged, the TIM deciding to affiliate itself with the TPF "as a member organization."[61]

A number of subsidiary front groups created at this time included the Thai Patriotic Teachers and Professional Group, the Thai Patriotic Workers Federation, the Thai Lawyers Group, and the Thai Patriotic Youth Organization. From time to time additional organizations whose reality — but not propaganda utility — may well be questioned, have been announced as being component elements in the TPF: the Self-Liberated Farmers and Planters Association, the Poor People's Group, the Southern Rubber Plantation Workers Group, and the Patriotic and Revolutionary Writers in Thailand.[62]

---

[58] An exception was the U.S. Ambassador to Thailand, Edwin Stanton, who wrote an article on the subject in 1954. See "Spotlight on Thailand," *Foreign Affairs*, October 1954, pp. 72-85.

[59] This was spelled out in the Rusk-Thanat Khoman understanding.

[60] New China News Agency (NCNA), October 1, 1964; cited in "Thailand," *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, 1966* (Stanford: The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University, 1967), p. 386. (The *Yearbooks* are hereafter referred to as *YICA*.)

[61] *Ibid.*

Insurgent military activity during this organization-building period was somewhat sporadic. There were six reported assassinations in the Northeast in the latter half of 1965. As the Thai government stepped up its counterinsurgency efforts, armed clashes with guerrilla units became more frequent. In southern Thailand, where Malayan Communist Party forces had recently created a front organization based on Thai Muslim separatist elements, government forces began to encounter large, well-fortified training camps, and roving guerrilla bands some three hundred miles north of the Thai-Malaysian border. Documentary evidence found in these camps indicated a linkage between communist groups in the Northeast and the South.[63]

The TPF escalated its military activities in 1966, announcing in January that the only way to win final victory was to "enlarge the armed struggle into a people's war."[64] According to Peking, the insurgency was "rapidly making headway in areas in the northeast, central, and southern parts of Thailand," and the "people's armed forces" had set up bases in Sakon Nakorn, Nakhon Phanom, Ubon and Udorn.[65] The estimated strength of communist forces was put at 1,000 armed men in the Northeast[66] and 700 in the South.[67]

Over the next several years, the insurgency both increased in size and accelerated in tempo. This is evident from Table I, which provides data on armed communist strength and level of insurgent-initiated violence for the years 1965-1972. Although it is somewhat difficult to measure the violence factor, it should be noted that both the TPF and the Thai government each year have claimed that the level of armed conflict has exceeded that of the previous year.[68]

Without minimizing the progress of the insurgency in the military sphere indicated by Table I, the rebellion in Thailand cannot yet be said to have developed much beyond stage one of the Maoist revolutionary model. Despite their growing numbers

---

[62] *YICA*, 1968, p. 567.

[63] Daniel D. Lovelace, *China and "People's War" in Thailand, 1964-1969* (Berkeley, Calif.: Center for Chinese Studies, 1971), pp. 46, 49.

[64] Voice of the People of Thailand (VPT), January 1, 1966; quoted in *YICA* 1966, p. 386.

[65] Radio Peking, January 17, 1966; quoted in *ibid.*

[66] *Straits Times*, January 25, 1966; cited in *ibid.*

[67] Lovelace, *op. cit.*, p. 49.

[68] These claims may be found in the annual assessments of Thai communist activity given in *YICA*, 1966 through 1973.

TABLE I

INSURGENCY IN THAILAND, 1965-1972

	Armed Communist Strength			
Year	*Northeast*	*South*	*Total*	*TPF-Initiated Violence*
1965	700	500	1200	24 assassinations of village leaders in the Northeast; armed clashes with guerrilla units in both the Northeast and the South.
1966	1000	500	1500	120 assassinations of government officials and sympathizers in the Northeast; insurgent bands in the South operating in units of 40-50 well-armed men.
1967	1500	500-700	2000-2200	269 "attacks" launched by insurgents in 28 of Thailand's 71 provinces; 138 "government supporters" (teachers, informers) and 78 "officials" (police, headmen, soldiers) killed.
1968	Not available		2500-3000	10 to 15 assassinations per month; ambushes of government patrols more frequent; first raid launched against an American military installation (U.S. Air Force base at Udornthani).
1969	2500	1000	3500	Formation of the Thai People's Liberation Armed Forces (TPLAF) announced on January 1, 1969. Thai government report indicates that 35 of the country's 71 provinces are now communist infiltrated. Increases in communist ambushes of government troops and security forces. Guerrillas reportedly using more sophisticated weaponry comparable *to that employed* by *top* North Vietnamese units fighting in South Viet Nam.

Table I (continued)

INSURGENCY IN THAILAND, 1965-1972

Year	*Armed Communist Strength* *Northeast*	 *South*	 *Total*	*TPF-Initiated Violence*
1970	Not available		3000-5000	Scale of terrorism has increased to the point that the Thai government claims the TPLAF has shifted from guerrilla tactics to conventional warfare. Insurgent military operations have shifted from the village to the district level. This new orientation is reflected in attacks by groups of 100 terrorists against government posts or tribal welfare settlements.
1971	1200-1800 *North* 1300-1900	1000-1400 *Center* 100-400	3600-5500	Guerrilla activity continued at a high level. Communist forces seized control of 100 villages in Nakae and Khamcha-E districts in Nakhon Phanom province, establishing "liberated areas" and setting up village infrastructure. A full-scale guerrilla war now being fought in the North.
1972	*Northeast* 1500 (plus hundreds of sympathizers) *North* 400 party cadres 2000-3000 tribesmen	*South* 600	6000-7700	Guerrilla activity continued in rural insurgencies in the southern, northern and northeastern provinces, especially in the sensitive border areas, though some lowering of it was anticipated as a result of the Viet Nam cease-fire. Greater effort is expected in the political field (organization, training, indoctrination) in the next few years, perhaps culminating in resumption of the big offensives. Though more activity was registered in the northern and southern border areas, the Northeast remains the dangerous sector.

Sources: YICA, 1966 through 1973; Lovelace, *op. cit.*, pp. 43-64; *Far Eastern Economic Review,* March 19, 1973.

and the increasing boldness and sophistication of their attacks, the guerrillas have been unable to shift the balance of forces in their favor. In Maoist terms, their tactics remain essentially "defensive"; their weakness vis-à-vis the government's forces does not yet permit them to prepare and launch a strategic counteroffensive (stages two and three, respectively, of the Maoist model). The emphasis at this point appears to be on the formation of base areas that can serve as sources of economic support and manpower for the Liberation Army, from which counteroffensive operations can later be launched when objective conditions permit.[69]

The mounting level of armed violence was paralleled by development of the insurgency in the political sphere as the Thai Patriotic Front gradually revealed both its Marxist orientation and its affinity with the People's Republic of China. Within two years of the TPF's formation, the Communist Party of Thailand emerged as the dominant organization in the revolutionary movement. In 1967 it was announced that

> The most important factor in the rapid development of the revolution in Thailand lies in the fact that the CPT, the core leading the revolution, has been holding aloft the great red banner of Marxism-Leninism, Mao Tse-tung's thought, and adhering to the revolutionary road of using the countryside to encircle the cities and seizing political power by armed force.[70]

The CPT's increasingly overt role in directing the insurgency reached a high point in January 1969 with the announcement that the Thai People's Liberation Armed Forces (TPLAF) had been formed under its "absolute" command.[71]

Concurrently, the CPT moved progressively closer to the Chinese Communist Party in the latter's ideological dispute with the Soviet Union, declaring in August 1968 that "the policy of armed struggle and the policy of peaceful coexistence are a clear demarcation line between Marxist ideology and revisionist ideology."[72] It left little doubt about where it stood on this issue: "The integration of Mao Tse-tung's thought — Marxism-Leninism at its highest level in the present era — with the practice of Thailand's revolution is the decisive factor for victory in our country."[73]

---

[69] In VPT broadcasts the TPLAF (Thai People's Liberation Armed Forces) are described as both a fighting organ and a production force: "With a gun in one hand and a spade in the other, they have courageously fought the U.S.-Thanom clique. . . . In achieving cooperation between the labor force and the armed forces, in holding that fighting and producing are of equal importance, and by using arms to protect this production, the liberation soldiers and other armed forces of the people have strengthened their militant spirit, are protecting the people's crops, and are encouraging production. They strengthened the already close unity between the people's soldiers and the people." (May 11, 1970 broadcast, quoted in *YICA* 1971, p. 673.) For more detailed treatment of recent Thai insurgent activities, see David Morell, "Thailand: Military Checkmate," *Asian Survey,* February 1972, pp. 156-167; and Justus M. van der Kroef, "Guerrilla Communism and Counterinsurgency in Thailand," in this Spring 1974 issue of ORBIS.

[70] NCNA, Peking, December 27, 1967; quoted in Lovelace, *op. cit.*, p. 56.

[71] VPT, January 1, 1969; cited in *ibid.*, p. 59.

Peking reciprocated the CPT's willingness to ally itself ideologically with the PRC by providing political, military and economic assistance to the Thai insurgency. At the propaganda level, Chinese backing has taken a variety of forms including endorsements of policy statements by the CPT and other Thai front groups, supportive articles and commentaries in the official Chinese press, declarations of encouragement and support by the CCP Central Committee, and regular radio broadcasts reporting alleged TPLAF military victories.[74]

Politically, the PRC has hosted a variety of Thai communist front groups and personalities in Peking with an eye toward creating an impression of political legitimacy for the TPF.[75] Liaison with such groups is maintained through the Chinese Committee for Afro-Asian Solidarity. In addition, the CPT maintains contact with the communist parties and national liberation movements of Asia, particularly those in Viet Nam and Laos from which Thai insurgents have received assistance in the form of training and weapons supply.[76]

The nature and extent of Chinese military aid to the Thai

---

[72] VPT, August 19, 1968; quoted in *YICA* 1969, p. 790.

[73] Statement of the Central Committee of the CPT, November 9, 1968; quoted in *ibid.*

[74] Lovelace, *op. cit.*, p. 67. Communist radio stations located in the USSR, Communist China and North Viet Nam have continued to beam to Thailand a large amount of propaganda items in the Thai language. The clandestine Voice of the People of Thailand, located probably in southern China, has aimed its effort largely at disaffected northern hill peoples, especially the Yao tribesmen. Radio Moscow usually does not directly attack the Royal Thai government; it has attempted to disrupt U.S.-Thai friendship and has confined its praise to the "People's Liberation Armed Forces" and their "operations" in Cambodia, Laos and Viet Nam. *Trends and Highlights*, published by the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, periodically summarizes the substance and targets of these broadcasts.

[75] Lovelace, *op. cit.*, p. 71. Shortly after the formation of the TPF and TIM, representatives of these groups took up residence in Peking: Mongkon Na Nakorn for the TIM and Lieutenant Colonel Phayom Chulanont for the TPF. (*YICA* 1966, p. 386.) Pridi, the founder of the Free Thai Movement, was dropped by the TPF in 1970. A number of CPT officials apparently reside in Peking, where the party is represented by CPT Central Committee member (Miss) Nit Phuongdaphet. *Ibid.*, 1971, p. 671.

[76] *Ibid.*, 1969, p. 791. The main training center for Thai insurgents is the Thai Communist Party Political and Military School, located in Hoa Binh province, North Viet Nam. *Ibid.*, 1968, p. 568.

Liberation Army is difficult to determine since all such assistance is covert. One student of the subject has suggested a division of labor between China and North Viet Nam in this regard, the Chinese primarily supplying propaganda and front support, the North Vietnamese military training and hardware.[77] Even so, many of the weapons used by the insurgents — whether funneled through North Viet Nam or the latter's satellite organization in Laos, the Pathet Lao — are manufactured in China.[78] There is evidence of direct Chinese military assistance in the form of training camps for Thai insurgents located in Yunnan province, some seventy-five miles from the Sino-Thai border.[79] Moreover, the Chinese road-building program that began in 1962-1963 in northern Laos (south from the Chinese border through Phongsaly province, then east and west) has brought a communist supply route for insurgency to a point less than a day's march from the Thai border (the Mekong River is no barrier).[80] Obviously the operation in Thailand is part of a larger plan that includes separate Soviet and Chinese support for Hanoi's war in the Indochinese states of Laos, Cambodia and South Viet Nam.

THE COMMUNIST GAME-PLAN FOR WARS OF NATIONAL LIBERATION

Earlier in this study it was pointed out that when Khrushchev came to power in the mid-1950's, Moscow's application of communist revolutionary warfare policy revealed a degree of sophistication beyond that of Peking. Khrushchev adopted, and Brezhnev has continued, what I have called a two-tier approach:

---

[77] Lovelace, *op. cit.*, p. 791.

[78] North Viet Nam has infiltrated men, supplies and Chinese-made small arms into Thailand via Pathet Lao-controlled areas of Laos. Meo tribesmen in Thailand have been trained in China and armed with Chinese- and Soviet-made weapons. Statement of Thai Prime Minister Thanom Kittikachorn, Bangkok Domestic Service, November 18, 1968; cited in *YICA* 1969, p. 784.

[79] *YICA* 1971, pp. 675-676.

[80] For details, see Lovelace, *op. cit.*, pp. 63-64. An assessment of Chinese support for the Thai insurgency was made by the Communist Party of Thailand in April 1969, when its Central Committee asserted that Communist China was the "most reliable rear, the base of revolution, and the powerful fortress which provides the strongest and most effective support for world revolution." *Peking Review*, April 18, 1969, quoted in *YICA* 1970, p. 683.

In mid-October 1973 a Thai "student uprising" brought about the displacement of the military-dominated regime. Its successor, a civilian government led by Prime Minister Sanya Dharmasakti, has announced it will "accelerate" diplomatic and economic overtures to Peking. The Thanom regime had cautiously embarked on such a policy partly because of anxieties aroused by the sudden shift in U.S.-PRC relations. The Sanya government apparently hopes that a marked improvement in Bangkok-Peking relations may persuade Peking to diminish, if not withdraw, its support for the China-based Thai insurgency.

correct, even friendly government-to-government relations with Third World countries including those classified as "national democracies"; and party or other subversive activity designed to displace these same (or other) noncommunist regimes. Soviet policy toward Burma following the Bulganin-Khrushchev visit in 1955 amply illustrates this strategy: economic "aid" and barter-trade initiated "friendly" governmental relations while simultaneously Moscow supported the major communist insurgency. Burma's public exposure of the Soviet game in 1960 led the Soviet Union to retain its two-tier strategy but apply it elsewhere in the Third World where the situation seemed more promising. As the Soviets shifted out of Burma, the Communist Chinese, independently of Moscow, initiated the same strategy and with the same results.[81]

After 1954 the Third World, embracing the newly independent countries in Asia and Africa and the developing countries in Latin America — which Lenin and Stalin had referred to as the "semi-independent and colonial" areas — became the major focus for Sino-Soviet revolutionary warfare. Both the Soviets and the Chinese, aligned during the 1950's and separately since the 1960's, have approached the Third World as an arena for "anti-imperialist" struggle and "wars of national liberation" — those interdependent and sometimes interchangeable concepts.

The post-World War II shift in Sino-Soviet policy emerged after the death of Stalin in 1953. Between 1946 and 1953-1954 the newly independent countries of Asia, with the exception of North Korea and North Viet Nam, were regarded as "capitalo-imperialist" pawns; their leaders were the usual "running dogs of capitalism." The new policy was obviously congenial to both the Soviet and Chinese leaderships. Khrushchev and Chou En-lai were its most effective salesmen, especially in Asia. Both communist countries welcomed the 1954 Third World initiatives of the Colombo Powers (Pakistan, India, Ceylon, Burma and Indonesia) and hailed the success of the 1955 Bandung Conference.

The USSR had begun its approach to the Third World through a selective economic and military aid program to a limited number of Asian countries. As the list was expanded, it came to include bloc support for regimes in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Communist economic aid to noncommunist Third World countries, since 1954-1955, reached approximately $10 billion by 1968. The Soviet bloc contributed about 90 per cent of this (divided 65-25, Soviet Union-satellites), Communist China the remaining 10 per cent. During this period the Middle East and South Asia were the chief areas of concentration, receiving approximately 70 per cent of all economic aid. African countries received 15 per cent, Southeast Asia 10 per cent, and Latin America 5 per cent.

---

[81] For a synoptic account of this combined strategy with respect to the USSR and Burma, see Frank N. Trager, "The Wars Going On in Southeast Asia," one of several conference papers in *Guerrilla Warfare in Asia* (The Hague: International Documentation and Information Centre, 1971), pp. 72-85. For China and Burma, see Trager, "Sino-Burmese Relations: The End of the Pauk Phaw Era," ORBIS, Winter 1968, pp. 1034-1054.

TABLE II

COMMUNIST ECONOMIC AID TO NONCOMMUNIST THIRD WORLD, 1954-1968
(in $ U.S. millions)

Total countries	*Total* *9,705*	*USSR* *6,296*	*Eastern Europe* *2,460*	*Comm. China* *949*
Africa	*1,502*	*858*	*348*	*296*
Algeria	304	232	22	50
Cameroon	8	8		
Central African Republic	4			4
Congo (Brazzaville)	34	9		25
Ethiopia	119	102	17	
Ghana	231	89	102	40
Guinea	123	73	25	25
Kenya	62	44		18
Mali	101	55	23	23
Mauritania	7	3		4
Morocco	79	44	35	
Nigeria	14	N.A.	14	
Senegal	7	7		
Sierra Leone	28	28		
Somali	94	66	6	22
Sudan	49	22	27	
Tanzania	79	20	6	53*
Tunisia	105	34	71	
Uganda	31	16		15
Zambia	23	6		17
Southeast Asia	*944*	*411*	*294*	*239*
Burma	124	14		**
Cambodia	80	25		N.A.
Indonesia	740	372		N.A.
Latin America	*443*	*187*	*256*	*0*
Argentina	54	45	9	
Brazil	312	85	227	
Chile	60	55	5	
Colombia	2	2		
Ecuador	5		5	
Uruguay	10		10	
Middle East and South Asia	*6,816*	*4,840*	*1,562*	*414*
Afghanistan	737	697	12	28
Ceylon	123	30	52	41

TABLE II (continued)
COMMUNIST ECONOMIC AID TO NONCOMMUNIST THIRD WORLD, 1954-1968
(in $ U.S. millions)

Total countries	*Total*	*USSR*	*Eastern Europe*	*Comm. China*
Greece	84	84		
India	1,948	1,593	355	
Iran	839	508	331	
Iraq	184	184		
Nepal	82	20		62
Pakistan	343	178	56	109
South Yemen	12			12
Syria	418	233	169	16
Turkey	218	210	8	
United Arab Republic	1,679	1,011	562	106
Yemen	149	92	17	40

*Does not include Chinese aid for the Tan-Zam railway complex.

**Does not include the $80 million, interest-free, ten-year loan, part of the border agreements of 1960. The loan was partially used between 1960 and 1967, then suspended during the GPCR period, and more recently (1972-1973) reinstated.

Source: U.S. Department of State, *Communist Governments and Developing Nations: Aid and Trade in 1968,* RSE-65, September 5, 1969.

Soviet-bloc military aid to many of these countries between 1955 and 1967 (before the big buildup following the 1967 Six-Day War) amounted to approximately $5.74 billion, roughly divided 66 per cent to the Middle East and South Asia, 24 per cent to Southeast Asia, and 10 per cent to Africa.

Data on Chinese military aid to noncommunist countries are largely missing. However, from time to time Peking's assistance assumes spectacular dimensions, as for example its grant to Pakistan in 1965 of approximately eighty MIG-19 fighters, some bombers and tanks.

The USSR's emphasis on Asia and the Middle East has not excluded other options in sub-Saharan Africa and Latin American countries. Bloc aid to Black Africa to 1967 amounted to $850 million, while Latin America, excluding Cuba, received $443 million in aid. In 1968 more than 16,000 nonmilitary Soviet-bloc technicians serviced such aid in recipient Third World countries, and almost that number of Third World students were given generously financed training in bloc countries. *Pravda* called our attention in 1969 to "the intensification of the national liberation struggle and the strong showing of the unity of the anti-imperialist

TABLE III

ESTIMATED SOVIET-BLOC MILITARY ASSISTANCE, 1955-1967
(in $ U.S. millions)

Country	*Military Aid*
Afghanistan	260
Algeria	200
Cambodia	5 to 10
Congo-Brazzaville	1
Congo-Kinshasa	1 to 2
Cyprus	28
Ghana	10 to 15
Guinea	at least 6
India	600 to 700
Indonesia	1,200
Iran	100
Iraq	at least 500
Laos	3 to 5
Mali	at least 3
Morocco	20
Nigeria	10 to 15
Pakistan	5 to 10
Somalia	35
Sudan	N.A.
Syria	at least 300
Tanzania	5 to 10
UAR (Egypt)	1,500
Uganda	N.A.
Yemen	100
TOTAL, up to	$5,740

Source: U.S. Department of State, *Communist Governments and Developing Nations: Aid and Trade in 1967,* RSE-120, August 14, 1968; Wynfred Joshua and Stephen P. Gibert, *Arms for the Third World, Soviet Military Aid Diplomacy* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1969), p. 102.

and anti-oligarchic forces" as a "great virtue of the Latin American Communist Parties" around which "even . . . masses of the people are uniting."[82] At the Twenty-fourth CPSU Congress in April 1971 Brezhnev could with propriety boast about the Soviet aid role while reaffirming the intention "categorically to support" the USSR's friends engaged in "revolutionary struggle."[83]

---

[82] Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), Special Russian Edition, May 16, 1969, p. A-32. See *ibid.*, May 26, 1969, pp. A-44-45, for a reference to the Soviet celebration of "African Liberation Day" and the "successes of the national liberation revolutions in Africa [that] eloquently confirm the depth and sagacity of Leninist ideas." It may be worth noting that both Moscow and Peking were represented at the Havana-held 1966 Tri-Continental Conference, attended by "512 representatives of national liberation movements of 82 nations and areas," and that both Moscow and Peking endorsed its resolutions. See "The Militant Spirit of Havana," a translation of a January 18, 1966 *Izvestia* report, and "The Tide of the People's Anti-Imperialist Revolutionary Struggle Is Irresistible," a translation of a *Jen-min Jih-pao* editorial of the same date, in *Global Digest* (Hong Kong), March 1966, pp. 89-101.

Both Moscow and Peking and their respective satellites utilize these concepts of people's war or wars of national liberation in two relatively distinct senses, either of which is capable of producing crisis situations. First, they seek separately, and for the time being competitively, to secure beachheads in various Third World countries so as to maximize their influence in these lands. In theory, such maximization by persuasion, propaganda, training, infiltration, and a variety of material supports may woo them away from a genuinely neutral stance or even from friendly relations with the West; may bring about their policy attachment to either the Soviet or Chinese power center; or may thoroughly subvert them. (Theoretically, the Soviets have allowed that "states of national democracy" could grow "into states of people's democracy, which ensures an irrevocable noncapitalist path of development." Allende's Chile was a possible Soviet case, as, earlier, Sukarno's Indonesia served similarly for the PRC.)[84] The means employed to bring about the communist gain may be peaceful, but peaceful means are almost never *solely* relied upon. They are inevitably supplemented by tactical measures involving cadre-building, party-building, infiltration, forms of subversion, and low-level forms of armed struggle or insurgency, all within the target country and designed to weight the scales of "peaceful" conversion in the direction desired by whichever communist power center happens to have ascendancy in the situation.

In the second sense, the beachhead is supported but otherwise encouraged to act independently. Its task is to enlist forces for a political-military assault on another vulnerable target area whose defeat is desired by both the big communist power and its Third World partner. The "partner" in this context may be the governing regime in the target area, or forces within the area that are encouraged to work for and if need be carry out the assault in question. The assault is always designed to vanquish the target and to tie the "partner" country or force more tightly to the big communist power.

---

[83] See Rubinstein, *op. cit.,* p. 111. He writes: "Moscow has courted three categories of developing countries: first, those that adhere to nonalignment and maintain friendly, even dependent, relations with the USSR, often with a tinge of anti-Westernism congenial to Moscow [e.g., Egypt-India]; second, the swing states [e.g., Indonesia] that are formally nonaligned but that have shifted . . . from an obviously pro-Soviet leaning to one more pleasing to the West, and which presumably can one day swing . . . back to Moscow; and third, those countries that are formally aligned to the West but whose alignment has weakened in ways assiduously encouraged by Moscow [e.g., Iran, Turkey, Pakistan]. Clearly, any Soviet leadership will strive to improve relations with the countries in the latter two categories in the hope of nudging them into the first category."

[84] See David C. Jordan, "Marxism in Chile: An Interim View of Its Implications for U.S. Latin American Policy," ORBIS, Spring 1971, pp. 315-337. Jordan points out (p. 334) that as early as 1965 one of Moscow's best Latin American diplomats, Aleksander Anikin, was sent to Chile. The Russian Ambassador had secured Soviet endorsement of and support for Allende by October of that year. Peking backed Sukarno's "New Emerging Forces" and Aidit's Communist Party but Peking's theoretical position on the "peaceful road" was more ambiguous than Moscow's.

With these two senses of wars of national liberation firmly in mind, any well-trained staff with reasonably adequate area research, intelligence services, and ability to decode the widely publicized Aesopian language used by all communist centers, can provide situation estimates complete with clear and present danger signals graded as to time, place and condition. The amount and kinds of effort being mounted by the communist power center at any given moment in these enterprises cannot be *fully* documented, but in the nature of the case it cannot be *fully* concealed. A jungle canopy may hide what passes along part of a supply route but it probably will not be able to do so for the route's entire length. Somewhere en route the trail — this term is used both literally and symbolically — will be open to a variety of inspection techniques. Such inspections must be aimed at uncovering support elements not only from Moscow and Peking but from their rural-positioned or urban-based allies and accomplices as well. In the latter groups Hanoi, Havana and Pyongyang stand out as examples that noncommunist countries must not ignore.

In many ways, Soviet — and Chinese — behavior in Africa reveals the operations of the communist two-tier policy cloaked in wars of national liberation language. Ghana, until Kwame Nkrumah was overthrown in 1966, offers a classic example. The Soviets expected to bring Ghana into the communist fold by playing on Nkrumah's pan-African ambitions and also by internal subversion. Nkrumah's replacement by a noncommunist National Liberation Council led to the discovery of "massive evidence of subversive activities by Communist countries." In short order, nearly 1,000 Russians and about 250 Chinese were required to leave the country. East Germany held "as hostages" 350 Ghanaian students then studying there until the Council agreed to release one of its most active and effective agents. The Cuban Embassy was closed and Cuban diplomats were declared *persona non grata* when they were discovered in a plot to return Nkrumah to power.[85]

Additional data about Soviet and bloc support for "national liberation wars" in relation to Africa emerge from the situations in Southern Africa. In October 1969 the Soviet Union sponsored at Alma-Ata a well-attended international symposium on Lenin. Its theme was "the Leninist teaching on National Liberation Revolutions and the present stage of social progress in the developing countries." Delegates from fifty Third World countries were present, including African delegates from Tanzania, Nigeria, Congo-Kinshasa, Mauritius, Sierra Leone and the Somali Democratic Republic. However, greatest prominence was given to the representatives of six African liberation movements linked to the Soviet Union: the Angolan People's Liberation Movement (MPLA), the African Independence Party of Portuguese Guinea (PAIGC), the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO), the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), the African National Congress of South Africa (ANC), and the Southwest African People's Organization (SWAPO).[86]

From time to time the Soviets announce that one or another of these movements, whether directed against Portugal[87] or against traditional if vulnerable Arab leadership such as the Sultan of

---

[85] Taken from B. Hutton-Williams, who supplied the Appendices to a well-documented piece by W.A.C. Adie, "The Communist Powers in Africa," in Brian Crozier, editor, *Conflict Studies No. 10* (London: Institute for the Study of Conflict, 1970), pp. 17-21. Note also the unusual step taken by Mexico in March 1971 in expelling five Soviet Embassy officials because they had been discovered in the process of selecting and training Mexican urban guerrillas who aimed at a takeover. See Jordan, *op. cit.*, p. 316.

[86] According to Hutton-Williams, outside communist support for these movements includes paramilitary training courses for African recruits in the Soviet Union, Communist China, North Korea and Cuba. Instruction covers not only weapons demolition and general sabotage, but also intelligence duties, broadcasting and photography. All courses are heavily interspersed with political economy sessions and may last from six months to two years or longer. Bruce Larkin indicates that in 1970 Chinese and Soviet assistance to African liberation movements tended to overlap, with both powers supplying aid to the African Independence Party of Portuguese Guinea and the Mozambique Liberation Front. In addition, he lists Peking as having supplied aid in 1970 to the following African movements: the South West African Union, the Pan African Congress (South Africa), the Zimbabwe African National Union (Rhodesia), the Revolutionary Committee of Mozambique, and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola. See Bruce D. Larkin, *China and Africa, 1949-1970* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), p. 188.

[87] "Mozambique Freedom Fighters," FBIS, September 24, 1970. According to the late Amilcar Cabral, Secretary General of the PAIGC, the Angolan movement's "principal support comes to us from the Socialist countries, mainly the Soviet Union which gives us almost all the war material, the arms and ammunition we use in our struggle." Statement at press conference in Havana, *Prensa Latina*, July 31, 1970, quoted by Hutton-Williams in "The Communist Powers in Africa," *op. cit.*

Oman, is on the "road to victory."[88] Not even in Indonesia, where hundreds of thousands of communists and their sympathizers were casualties, does Moscow stop trying to advance its strategic objectives in the now customary way.[89] In the final analysis the Soviets are correct in claiming that "all the world knows [should know] that the Soviet Union gives practical assistance to the just national liberation struggle, including armed struggle, and regards it as a sacred right of the peoples striving for independence."[90]

The Soviet game-plan has been stressed here primarily because the USSR is a more powerful adversary than the PRC and because the quantity of published material available on – and the strident revolutionary rhetoric of – the Chinese game-plan has focused attention on the latter at the expense of overlooking the former's more dangerous operations. The Chinese charge that the Soviets are "revisionists," meaning that they would sacrifice the external revolutionary national liberation movement merely for the sake of better relations with the capitalist West. This has always been a factional-fictional ploy in the Sino-Soviet conflict. The Soviets have rightly rejected it because they knew what they were doing to advance their cause throughout the world. On the other hand, their charge that the Chinese communists are "infantile leftists," "adventurists" or worse is a corresponding fictional ploy. Both types of ploys have retained disputatious adherents in the strife among Marxist and anarchist parties and factions ever since Marx and his friends organized the First International of Socialist and Labor Parties.[91] The task here is to look behind the rhetoric for the deed and avoid getting bogged down in either the semantics or the realities of the Sino-Soviet conflict.

---

[88] Oman has been under attack by the communist South Yemen group known as the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arab Gulf (Dhofar); FBIS, September 19, 1969.

[89] Refer to Moscow broadcast in Indonesian indicating that the now underground PKI "aims to unite peasants and workers . . . whose task is to make the national liberation revolution successful," FBIS, Special Russian Edition, July 1969. Nonetheless, Moscow has also agreed with Djakarta to reschedule and stretch out the huge $1.1 billion military debt incurred by Sukarno while once again seeking to use the aid route for a "peaceful" re-entry. See *New York Times*, August 25, 1971.

[90] FBIS, Special Russian Edition, December 3, 1969.

[91] Marx originally organized a short-lived international Communist League. It gave way in 1864 to what was called the International Federation of Working Men. This "First International" dissolved in the United States in 1876, in part disrupted by ideological organizational conflicts between Marxists and Bakuninists (anarchists). The Second International, organized in 1889 on the centenary of the capture of the Bastille, never recovered from "splits" over World War I and died in 1923. In the interim Lenin organized the Third International (Comintern) in March 1919. This was ended by Stalin in 1943, ostensibly in belated fulfillment of pre-World War II commitments to the United States at the time of "recognition" (1933). The Trotsky-Stalin feud brought the former's Fourth International into being in the late 1930's while earlier, in 1923, the "Two and a Half" or new Socialist and Labor International had been organized. The Comintern gave way to

Since 1954-1955 Peking, like Moscow, has selected certain countries for attention (see *supra,* Tables II and III). It should not be forgotten that it was Chou En-lai who launched the "Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence" in 1954 in a meeting with Prime Ministers Nehru and U Nu; and that Chou was the star diplomat at the Bandung Conference of twenty-nine Afro-Asian countries in April 1955. Peking acquired considerable government-to-government influence with many of the Afro-Asian countries represented in Table II. However, like the USSR, China coupled such interest with subversive intent and a functioning revolutionary apparatus. Burma, especially between 1955 and 1967,[92] Cambodia from 1955 to the present, and Indonesia from 1959 to 1965, received such combined attention from Peking in Asia. A captured Chinese army document, dated April 1961, somewhat exaggeratedly revealed that

> The center of anti-colonial struggle is Africa, the center of struggle between East and West is Africa. At present Africa is the central question of the world. . . .
>
> Some places in Africa are like our country at the time of the Boxer Rebellion, some at the stage of the 1911 revolution, some are at the period of the May 4th Movement [1919]. None have reached the period of the Northern Expedition [of 1927, in which Communists and Nationalists marched together against the warlords]; or the period of anti-Japanese resistance [1937]; and they are far from the 1949 era of China [when Mao Tse-tung set up the communist regime].
>
> What matters now in Africa is anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism. Anti-feudalism is not yet important, but it is time, not for social revolution, but for national revolution, time for a broad united front. In Africa there are many rightists, not many leftists in power, and the number of those in the center is not large. The rightists must lose their prestige and position; then the other people could come forward who can carry out the national revolution. We must explain the Chinese revolution . . . they must act for themselves, foreign assistance being secondary only. If there were one or

the Cominform in 1947; and in turn this gave way to meetings of the parties. Similar factional fights have frequently caused "splits," "purges" and other fractionating tendencies within national Marxist parties. Always the basis for such factions includes an alleged "right" vs. "left" set of charges. In the current Sino-Soviet rift, the Soviets are charged with being "rightist" and the Chinese with being "infantile leftists."

[92] See Trager, "Sino-Burmese Relations. . . . ," *op. cit.* Recently, in repairing some of the self-defeating international activities Peking engaged in during the GPCR, Chou En-lai brought about a renewal of official relations with Rangoon by inviting General Ne Win to revisit China. Before then Ne Win had been called a fascist or running dog. However, Peking as in the 1950's and 1960's still gives sanctuary, radio facilities, training and other assistance to the Burma Communist Party guerrillas and other ethnic guerrillas who continue armed struggle against Burma.

> two among the independent countries which would effect a real nationalist revolution . . . a revolutionary wave would roll up in the African continent.[93]

This is a fairly typical expression of the two stages of revolution in which the Chinese sought an important and perhaps dominant communist role. It was to advance this role that they adopted the two-tier approach in the mid-1950's. After Bandung, they initially pursued opportunities with the Muslims of Northern Africa and the Middle East, utilizing their own Muslim minorities "as a link." When they did not succeed in this area, they turned to Black Africa, especially Guinea, Ghana, Zanzibar and Congo-Brazzaville. The Chinese, as indicated above, suffered with the Russians when their exploits at subversion were uncovered in the aftermath of Nkrumah's fall. Also, the excesses of the GPCR alienated some of the black leaders who, not unaware that Peking had tried to foment a GPCR-type uprising in Burma in June-July 1967, wanted no such export to their countries. Since the end of the GPCR China has concentrated once again on specific African countries: Algeria, Congo-B, Guinea, Mauritania, and especially Tanzania *cum* Zambia. She is also cultivating the Somali Democratic Republic and in August 1970 signed aid agreements with the new President of the Sudan, General Nimeiry, during his visit to Peking.

The Tanzania-Zambia-Peking relationship revolves around the biggest communist-aided development project excepting the Aswan Dam. Peking has agreed to lend more than $400 million to Tanzania and Zambia, interest-free, for the Tan-Zam railway complex. In addition to the railroad itself, which will end Zambia's reliance on the route through Rhodesia for shipping her copper ores, the complex will include building up the harbor at Dar es Salaam, to which Chinese gunboats will have access. Chinese military aid to Tanzania has already displaced the Canadians both as trainers and suppliers.[94]

The Chinese government-to-government policy based on a "broad united front from above" is precisely comparable to that conducted by the Soviets. It differs somewhat in magnitude; after all the PRC is not as well off as the USSR, and therefore cannot afford so large an "aid" program. China both differs and competes with the USSR in the selection and conduct of operations in Third World countries. It scores the same types of "hits" and "errors" as does the Soviet Union in the application of policy.[95]

---

[93] From Adie, "The Communist Powers in Africa," *op. cit.*, pp. 8-9. Though this is a 1961 document, it is interesting to note that in 1971 Peking was redirecting party and PLA attention to the current applicability of Mao's December 1940 "internal party directive written on behalf of the Central Committee," known as "On Policy." This directive called for "a revolutionary dual policy" of "alliance and struggle" in order to "win over the many, oppose the few and crush our enemies one by one." See *Peking Review*, August 27, 1971.

[94] See *Christian Science Monitor*, May 17, 1971; *Daily Telegraph* (London), October 22, 1970; and Adie, *op. cit.*

An overall assessment of the number and distribution of active Third World liberation movements and their orientation toward the various communist power centers may be useful at this point. The data provided in Table IV indicate that in 1972 there were approximately sixty such movements operating — or trying to operate — in Asia, Africa and Latin America. As with any attempt at quantification, this one tends to obscure certain aspects of the phenomenon being studied, for subsumed under the category of "active" movements are a wide variety of revolutionary organizations. These range from Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN), whose armed challenge to the Bolivian government led to its defeat and the consequent expulsion, in April 1972, of forty-nine Soviet diplomats, to the Thai People's Liberation Armed Forces, which is waging full-scale guerrilla war against the Royal Thai government (including the present civilian regime).

With this qualifier in mind, it may be noted that the area having the heaviest concentration of revolutionary movements in 1972 was Latin America (approximately 20), followed by Southeast Asia (15), non-Arab Africa (13), and the Arab world and Southwest Asia (9). Among the more significant of these movements were those operating in the Portuguese overseas province of Guinea-Bissau, notably the African Independence Party of Portuguese Guinea and the Cape Verde Islands, whose leader, Amilcar Cabral, was assassinated by a dissident member of PAIGC in January 1973; also the Dhofar Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Gulf in Oman; the North Kalimantan People's Forces (Paraku); and the Sarawak People's Guerrilla Forces, a combination fighting in Sarawak and along East Malaysia's border with Indonesia.

---

[95] There is no doubt that Peking has given more verbal emphasis to its revolutionary fervor. Even a casual sampling of FBIS special China issues for the two-year period following the GPCR (1969-1971) places Peking well ahead of Moscow in this regard. "Hail-victory," "condemn-opposition" entries, as reported, for the most part concerned Southeast Asia, particularly mainland Southeast Asia. The Thai northern and northeast border areas and the Thai-Malaysian border merited approximately 55 entries; Indochina excluding Viet Nam, 53; Burma, the Philippines and central Southeast Asia, 19. There were 28 separate attacks on India and the rest of Asia. Items directed toward the Middle East, with stress on Peking's anti-Israel posture, totaled 37; those on Africa (chiefly anti-Portugal), 26; on Latin America, only 2.

By contrast, similar entries in FBIS reports on Soviet Russia during the same period can be tallied as follows: general support for wars of national liberation, 9; Middle East and Africa, 9; Asian and Latin American specifics, 3 each. The conclusion is inescapable: the Soviets have been more circumspect, the Chinese more overt in their separate approaches to propaganda. However, one should note that in this post-GPCR period marked by the gradual restoration of external PRC relationships, Peking may be softening its frequent revolutionary invective. Chou En-lai voiced this line at a party he gave for resident and visiting Americans. See *New York Times*, October 7, 1971.

In terms of their orientation toward the various communist power centers, the pro-Peking (18) and Castroite (9) movements easily outnumbered their pro-Moscow (7) counterparts, though at this time it may be correct to group the latter two together. Additionally, Hanoi carries some weight in mainland Southeast Asia. Almost all of the rest would classify themselves as "independent" Marxist movements with at least two of them avowedly Trotskyist.

Not surprisingly, most of those movements aligning themselves with China were located in Southeast Asia (8); Chinese activity, other than in the substantial program in Tanzania and Zambia, appeared to be slightest in non-Arab Africa (3).

Implications for U.S. Foreign and Military Policy

Obviously some students of communist theory and practice may add to or subtract from this analysis of communist wars of national liberation. None, it is contended, can refute the basic thrust and content of the data presented. Legitimate debate may be held on the implicit and explicit value judgments arising from the data and the relation of such judgments to U.S. security interests. That debate, both in the United States and in allied countries, can be narrowed to two sets (with gradations) of fundamental and opposite judgment about the future shape of "East-West" relations. These may be called the "convergence" and "adversary" theories. The choice between them should condition the adoption of pertinent security policy.

Convergence[96]

Under this theory political turbulence in the Third World is seen as part of the evolving post-World War II period and the end of Western colonialism. Ideologies and political systems, however rigid they appear, undergo changes over time or sometimes disappear entirely. The bipolar system of two contending nuclear superpowers, the United States and the USSR, is already giving way to a multipolar world that includes the United States,

[96] For Soviet views on the meanings and uses of convergence see Gouré, Kohler, Soll and Stiefbold, *Convergence of Communism and Capitalism: The Soviet View* (Coral Gables, Fla.: University of Miami, Center for Advanced International Studies, 1973).

TABLE IV

DISTRIBUTION OF ACTIVE NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENTS BY REGION AND ORIENTATION (1972)

	Number of Countries	*Number of Movements*	*Pro-Moscow*	*Castroite*	*Pro-Peking*	*Hanoi*	*Trotskyist*	*Independent Marxist*	*Other*
Latin America	10	21-22	1	8-9	4		2	3	3
Non-Arab Africa	8	13	4		3			6	
Arab and Southwest Asia	5	11	1		3			7	
South and Southeast Asia	9	15	1		8	3			3
	32	60-61	7	8-9	18	3	2	16	6

Source: Brian Crozier, editor, *Annual of Power and Conflict, 1972-73: A Survey of Political Violence and International Influence* (London: Institute for the Study of Conflict, 1972), Appendix III, pp. 162-174.

Western Europe, the USSR, the PRC and Japan. These power centers are entering or have entered a postindustrial revolution cycle in which their competitive and complementary economies grow without resort to armed warfare. In such development, based on assumptions of nuclear rationality and relative nuclear parity or sufficiency, peaceful rivalry continues but ideological and political-military hostilities are eliminated or substantially minimized through convergence of national systems. Détente, whether narrowly or broadly defined, is seen as both possible and probable. The turbulent problems of the Third World, despite present wars of national liberation, will gradually be accommodated in the deeper, relatively peaceful channels of the converging multipolar system. Hence, there is little if any reason to intervene – except as peacemakers – in the short-term battles *within* the Third World because its general welfare and security, like that of the United States itself, will rest on the supporting pillars of the converging systems in the multipolar world.

Adversary

The adversary concept sees deeply held ideologies – value systems whether secular or theological – as having appeared and disappeared on the stage of history. But ecumenicity, a long, slow, tortuous process at best, has rarely if ever been achieved in a short term by competing secular or theological value systems and their missionaries. Antibiosis, rather than symbiosis, has more frequently been the preferred route of adherents, although "acts of toleration" within a society or a state have been passed and even extended. Thus, a détente, narrowly defined as an easing of strained relations between states, is possible and should be sought. But *the logic and the practice* of those who hold deeply their ideologies, their value systems, call for triumphant survival at the expense of all competitors. In this sense, Moscow and Peking are judged as playing adversary roles against the noncommunist world. There is *no* evidence sustained over a reasonable time frame that there has been any substantial slackening of their political faith and practice. Rather, it appears that they have simply chosen a new arena for action and have reverted to an alternative strategy. The Third World is currently the scene for the forceful expansion of their systems. There, on the basis of "historical inevitability," they pursue Lenin's "push the situation forward" strategy, in a tricontinental flanking movement. Hence, even if this reading should be negated by future events, the security interests of the United States, Western Europe, Japan, Australia and the noncommunist Third World are jeopardized in the interim. Prudent men act accordingly.

Making a Prudent Choice

If U.S. foreign policy decision-makers were to conclude that the convergence judgment should be adopted as the wave of the future, there would be little reason to continue this inquiry about wars of national liberation and their implications for U.S. foreign policy and defense planning for the 1970's. For under a convergence projection such wars would in effect and at worst remain purely local affairs, their outcomes not affecting the balance between East and West. American security would derive from the assumed continuation of U.S.-USSR second-strike capability, from the emergence of a multipower world, and from the gradual resolution of tensions, including tensions arising out of great-power partisanship in such wars of national liberation as might continue to erupt.

In this context security policy, based on the assumption of parity or sufficiency in nuclear capacity, would be pleasantly doing what security policy is supposed to do: it would be defending the value system of our country, ensuring our physical survival, political independence and territorial integrity, and influencing others to emulate our peaceful path. It should be specifically noted, however, that adoption of the convergence judgment would require new and sustained evidence that convergence was indeed "working," especially in the Third World arena, for up to the present the nuclear balance of terror — Mutual Assured Destruction or MAD in Donald Brennan's acronym — has *not* been a deterrent to crises and wars in the Third World. On the contrary, it would be appropriate to say that MAD in the 1960's fostered communist advocacy of "just" wars of national liberation as the most useful strategy in pursuit of communist political goals, because communist policymakers rightfully assumed that we would not use nuclear power as a countermeasure.

If, alternatively, the adversary judgment is accepted by U.S. decision-makers, at least as a matter of prudence, security policy would have the same tasks as set forth above: defending the value system of our country, ensuring our physical survival, political independence and territorial integrity, and trying peacefully to influence others. This is true even though ensuring American security has been made more difficult because of the Soviet Union's presumed nuclear parity. In addition, our decision-makers will have to identify more accurately, rank more carefully, and prepare more thoroughly at home and abroad, the most advantageous ways to defend our vital interests, for our interests now extend — albeit unequally — to all parts of the globe, including the Third World.

In the adversary setting, the task of devising an adequate security policy is made still more difficult because of "Viet Nam." Disillusionment at home over that costly involvement; dissatisfaction that we did not "win" the war (though we have succeeded thus far in helping to defend the territorial integrity of a small Third World state and thus preventing another communist takeover); and favorable response in many places to Che Guevara's last call for "many Viet Nams" in order to waste our lives and resources in inconclusive political, military and economic battle — all these have added to an already formidable task.

It is in no small part due to Viet Nam that President Nixon is trying to reshape American policy toward wars of national liberation in the Third World. Because the phrase, "no more Viet Nams," may range in meaning from "no more direct American involvement in such local conflicts" to "effective involvement capable of producing a decisive, and hence possibly a deterrent victory," it is appropriate here to consider the current development of American security policy denoted by the Nixon Doctrine.

THE NIXON DOCTRINE, WARS OF NATIONAL LIBERATION AND GUIDELINES FOR U.S. POLICYMAKERS[97]

It has been made abundantly clear that President Nixon's foreign policy represents a break with that of the recent past. For him the post-World War II period in international relations "has ended." He has characterized that period as one in which the United States was the "only great power whose society and economy had escaped World War II's massive destruction";[98] when new nations emerged from their respective colonial pasts "often in turmoil and uncertainty"; when "we were confronted by a monolithic Communist world," while still possessing "a monopoly or overwhelming superiority of nuclear weapons." Our response to the difficulties of the era was based on the

---

[97] The material on the Nixon Doctrine is based in part on my articles, "Alternative Futures for Southeast Asia and United States Policy," ORBIS, Spring 1971, pp. 381-402, and "The Nixon Doctrine and Asian Policy," *Southeast Asian Perspectives*, June 1972, pp. 1-34.

[98] The quotations in this and the next two paragraphs are from *U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: A New Strategy for Peace,* A Report to the Congress by Richard Nixon, February 18, 1970 (Washington: GPO, 1970), pp. 2-7; and *U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: Building for Peace,* A Report by President Nixon to the Congress, February 25, 1971 (Washington: GPO, 1971), pp. 3-17. President Nixon might have referred to his own vigorous contribution to the era that "has ended" when he was Vice President.

> Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan offering American economic and military assistance to countries threatened by aggression. Our policy held that democracy and prosperity, buttressed by American military strength and organized in a worldwide network of American-led alliances, would insure stability and peace. . . . This impulse carried us through the 1960s. The United States conceived programs and ran them . . . devised strategies and proposed them to our allies . . . discerned dangers and acted directly to combat them.

Whether or not historians agree with the President's short summary of the 1945-1969 period, *he* says he subscribes to these views of the recent past and has set out to revise foreign policy *because* today the facts of international life have changed sufficiently to warrant a change in policy. To support his thesis he cites the economic and political recovery in Western Europe and Japan; the "new spirit and growing strength of independence" among the ex-colonial states; the "shattering" of the "monolithic Communist World"; the alterations in the nature of the military balance which no longer assure the United States of "superiority"; and the declining "vitality" of what he calls the "isms," the nineteenth-century "ideological accessories of the intellectual debate."

The "Nixon Doctrine," offered in this context, relies on partnership with friendly countries, military strength to protect our vital interests, and willingness to negotiate. Its central thesis, first enunciated on July 25, 1969 during Nixon's visit to Guam, is that "the United States will participate in the defense and development of its allies and friends," but that "America cannot — and will not — conceive *all* the plans, design *all* the programs, execute *all* the decisions and undertake *all* the defense of the free nations of the world." We will help where it makes a real difference and is considered in our interest. We will maintain our commitments but require "more responsible participation by our friends in their own defense." The President adds that "we shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security."

It would be uncharitable to fault the general thrust of this "Nixon Doctrine." At its best, it calls for a long-overdue re-examination of our recent foreign policy and states our willingness to work out a new set of relationships with allies, friends and erstwhile foes on the basis of perceived interests. Surely the "worldwide network of American-led alliances" fashioned in the wake of the Truman Doctrine requires major overhaul. Some like CENTO are decrepit; others like SEATO — a political sieve — have declined through the full or partial withdrawal of some member states. In still others, pre-eminently NATO, our allies have persistently failed to meet planned alliance force levels even though they were economically able to do so; and more recently, in the Yom Kippur war, they withheld the minimum cooperative efforts usually taken for granted in an alliance. Above all, the currently parlous state of the military balance, based on a parity which was deliberately sought by Secretary of Defense McNamara during the Kennedy-Johnson era, serves to underline President Nixon's references to the need for military strength to protect our vital interests in an "era of negotiation."

A closer examination of the Nixon documents[99] raises some serious questions for those who must plan our security. For example, let us grant that in one sense the "monolithic" Stalinist communist world no longer exists, if indeed it ever did. Does this mean that the adversary's threat has diminished because there are now two communist power centers with nuclear capability? Does not the division in the communist world possibly heighten rather than diminish the danger? Again, it is fashionable today in certain circles to proclaim that communist ideology is dead. Contrary to the President's belief, however, it may well be that the importance of ideology in the communist world has been substantially increased because of the Sino-Soviet rift.

The tendency implicit in prematurely sounding the death knell of ideology is to upgrade the role of *Realpolitik*, i.e., power relationships that presumably can be "balanced." Granted that it is more difficult to weigh and weight the imponderables in any value system, including the communist one with its ideological *impedimenta* so tenaciously put forth since the time of Lenin, we nonetheless ought to remember that most organized religions (i.e., value systems with or without God) do not just "fade away." They usually experience periods of vigorous assertion and desuetude. If an "outsider" attempts to take advantage of the ebb he runs the risk of being martyrized. Christian missionaries to nineteenth-century Burma and Viet Nam suffered accordingly because they underestimated the resurgence in the faith of those they could not or would not understand. Our difficulty with "ideological accessories" is compounded by the fact that for the most part American civilization has counted on absorbing into the mainstream of American values those who have come to our shores with other cultures and value systems. This process has limited our desire or inhibited our ability to come to grips with ideologies, philosophies or value systems external to us. Further, we have been particularly inept at understanding, or (except for the "transcendentalist" period) have been generally hostile to, ideologies derived from what is known as Hegelianism. Marx (and Marxism) contrived a system so derived, and communist ideologies are its current offspring.

---

[99] *U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's*, volumes for 1970 and 1971. In the Presidential Reports in this series issued in February 1972 and May 1973, the language varies but the content of the President's enunciated policy does not.

The President has given substance to his view that this is an "era of negotiation." In his 1972 visits to Peking and Moscow and in the return visit of Brezhnev to the United States in June 1973 *he has tried to achieve agreements that will lessen tensions and* decrease the number of world crises. He has also reaffirmed a U.S. commitment to NATO, and partially on the basis of the 1972 reversion of Okinawa to Japanese sovereignty, he has agreed to a continuation of the Japanese Security Treaty on a year-to-year basis. It is known that he is sufficiently worried about the potential or actual military imbalance to have taken some steps to repair our deficiencies.

There is no doubt that the Nixon Doctrine, from its Guam sketch in 1969 to the present, includes these essential elements: Vietnamization or turning over the fighting in Viet Nam to South Vietnamese forces while withdrawing our own troops;[100] assisting allied states under nonnuclear types of aggression provided they will take primary responsibility for their own defense and provided it is in our interest to do so; extending a shield if friendly or allied states are threatened by a nuclear power; maintaining our treaty commitments; and withdrawing or reducing American forces in the process so as to further the kind of partnerships and self-defense responsibilities the President seeks.

The Nixon Doctrine thus adds up to a lower profile in foreign and security policy. We are in effect to become *unum inter pares* rather than *primus inter pares* while adhering to our commitments. We are encouraging and requiring our allies and friends to do more to defend themselves as the price of our doing less — a curious kind of bargain. The President is not unaware of this contradiction. On a number of occasions he has indicated that in our "reductions," as applications of the Nixon Doctrine, "we cannot move too fast without sapping the . . . sense of confidence and security which it is our purpose to sustain and nurture. . . . Thus the decision to reduce our presence carries with it the obligation to help our allies create the capability to carry the responsibilities we are transferring."[101]

---

[100] In President Nixon's 1971 Report (*Building for Peace*) he draws up "the record of implementation" (pp. 17-20) to counter the charge that "the Nixon Doctrine [is] a formula for heedless withdrawal." If the qualification "heedless" is employed, the President easily justified his position. But even with that qualification, the policy of withdrawal from mainland Southeast Asia (Viet Nam, Laos, Cambodia and Thailand) remains open to critical inspection. By agreement with the Congress, our withdrawal from Viet Nam was completed by August 15, 1973 and will not be altered in the future except with the agreement of Congress. In the meantime the war in Viet Nam and Cambodia continues despite the January 1973 Paris agreements. In his May 1973 volume of *U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's*, the President updates the "record of implementation"; see pp. 49-57.

This is an exceedingly complicated and delicate task that will involve orchestrating the varying interests and energies of a supportive American public, the U.S. Congress, the countries allied with us by treaty commitment and many others with which we maintain indirect agreements, particularly in the vulnerable Third World. Moreover, all such orchestration must take place within the uncertain policy context of negotiating with our present adversaries: the USSR, the PRC, North Korea and North Viet Nam. One cannot assume that because we have reached what the President has designated as the "end of an era" for us, we have also reached the end of an era for them.[102] Nothing in either the immediate past or the present of each of these communist powers suggests that a genuine relaxation of tensions is imminent or that the subversion, infiltration, insurgency and war in the Middle East and Indochina (which are still supported from and approved by these communist capitals), and elsewhere in the Third World will cease tomorrow. The Cold War has for the past twenty-five years *never* been "cold" in the Third World.

As one begins to add up the Nixon Doctrine — and it may be said that it is too early to do so — or as one takes a current reading, it seems that the President is trying to put forth a judgment about the future that is based neither on "convergence" nor on "adversary" relationships as above described. Both he and Secretary of State Kissinger appear to believe that a "momentum of achievement" in matters susceptible to negotiation can change "the environment of emergencies to a more stable international system." They appear to believe in the possibility of a "third way" despite the fact that every Soviet and Chinese leader has said over and over again that there is no third way.

[101] *Ibid.*, 1971, p. 95; repeated in *ibid.*, 1973, pp. 9-10.

[102] See a brief and incisive article by Walter Laqueur, "Here Comes Mr. Brezhnev: A New Era — or Mostly Bubbles?," *New York Times Magazine*, June 17, 1973.

To seek the possible is both logical and laudable. The Administration may find that communist *words* about the inevitable struggle between the "two camps" cloak a cautious approach to a world order that would wind down the *deeds* inherent in a continuing adversary relationship. This article has adduced evidence for and has projected a contrary view, namely, of the unhappy and unwanted continuation of the adversary relationship, especially in the Third World. But even if this adversary projection is unacceptable to those who offer other predictions, it would be imprudent for the Administration to base short-term foreign and security policy on any other prospect. It might be useful for President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger to remember and heed the words of Metternich, about whom the latter wrote in *A World Restored.* Metternich understood and played the nonideological balance of power game. In the context of the Napoleonic world of 1807 he wrote:

> All nations have made the mistake to attach to a treaty with France the value of peace, without immediately preparing again for war. No peace is possible with a revolutionary system, whether with a Robespierre who declares war on chateaux or a Napoleon who declares war on powers.[103]

The Nixon Doctrine frequently alludes to the issue of "interests." We must recognize that all governments, including our own, identify, assign and shift priorities to numerous interests they determine to be important for national security. Such interests are generated by the political, economic, geographic, demographic, technological, military and psychological requirements for the maintenance of state power and security. Since they are in major part utilitarian and empirical, they are negotiable domestically and on occasion internationally. The ranking of interests, vital or otherwise, is thus an uncertain enterprise. Opportunity, capability, estimates of the responses of other regimes and the intentions of friend and foe, all play shifting roles in the making and rating of interests related to the security process.

The President, like most political theorists, distinguishes between vital and other interests. We are left in little doubt that he regards Europe as a vital American interest to which we have firm commitments. A vital interest is one that will, if necessary, be defended by arms. However, in the Presidential analysis of Asia — one of the loci of present and probably future wars of national liberation — our interests, though explicitly referred to, are apparently *not* of the same vital character as those in Europe. They seem at best to be of secondary order. New American security commitments to Asian regimes and in the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean areas can be expected, therefore, only when Washington recognizes that the perceived interests have become vital. We are left in more profound ignorance of our interests in Africa, and certainly there is little clarity about our Latin American interests. The question is, what would make an American interest become vital? And where are these interests located? Until we learn from the decision-makers something more than we have thus far learned, especially with respect to their judgments on "convergence," "adversary" or some third kind of relationship with the communist systems, we cannot efficiently order our interests and plan appropriately for their security.

---

[103] Henry A. Kissinger, *A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace, 1812-1822* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1957).

Parenthetically, it may be pointed out that there are difficulties respecting our vital interests even in Europe. The 1973 Middle East war uncovered wide variations between U.S. perceptions of vital interests and those of England, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Greece and Turkey, all of which with the exception of Spain are NATO "partners" in vital interests. What if the Northern Tier countries from Iceland to Finland were to declare themselves a neutral zone, withdraw such membership as they have in NATO, but still allow the USSR the continuing privileges it imposed on Finland in the 1939-1940 war? As yet we in the United States are unclear in defining our interests, as are our NATO, SEATO, ANZUS and Japanese allies.

In such an ambiguous context, what guidelines should be given to American policymakers concerned with wars of national liberation? On the basis of the President's exposition of his "doctrine," they probably can still ignore the implications and projections arising from the "convergence" hypothesis, that is, that wars of national liberation are or will become purely local affairs whose outcomes will not affect the détente and balance between "East" and "West."

The Nixon Doctrine does provide some thin clues. Force levels are to be reduced from their high point of the 1960's, which was based on the "2-1/2 war concept" requiring sufficient capability to fight two full-scale wars simultaneously – one initiated by the Soviets in Europe and one by the Chinese in Asia – and a minor war or action elsewhere. Now, Nixon says,

> In the effort to harmonize doctrine and capability, we chose what is best described as the "1-1/2 war" strategy. Under it we will maintain in peacetime general purpose forces adequate for simultaneously meeting a major communist attack in either Europe or Asia, assisting allies against

non-Chinese threats in Asia, and contending with a contingency elsewhere.[104]

He clearly indicated that the "1-1/2 war" principle was to include "provision" for meeting "future guerrilla and subversive threats." But such provision is to be limited to "economic and military assistance to supplement local efforts *where our interests are involved*." (Emphasis added.) Thus, the Nixon Doctrine throws the burden of defense on the threatened government: that government is to "preempt" such wars "through economic development and social reform and to control them with police, para-military and military action." That threatened Third World governments must carry such burdens is generally established and accepted; that they are normally prepared with resources and training to pre-empt and if necessary control such wars is *not* established on present evidence.

One possible implication of the Nixon Doctrine guidelines is that present security policy may contain the same error as the Truman Administration's policy in Asia between 1945 and 1950. We then also withdrew our general-purpose forces from mainland Asia. We hailed England's decolonial bent, tried to negotiate the Dutch out of Indonesia, washed our hands of "China" after the Marshall mission failed to bring about a "united front" between the Communists and Nationalists, and in 1950 belatedly offered some economic aid to the newly independent countries of the region. We then found ourselves somewhat unprepared for the communist invasion of South Korea in June 1950. Meanwhile we should remember that many regimes in the Third World are still friendly toward us — or would like to be.

Trying to live with the inadequacies of the Nixon Doctrine on the issue of "wars of national liberation" is made most difficult by the caveat that we will provide economic and military assistance only "where our interests are involved." This can only mean that we must consider a wide number of contingencies arising from the factoring and ranking of interests. What and whose crystal ball will the political decision-maker and military planner use in settling which ones will be lowered to the point of sacrifice and which raised to the height of "vitality"? The chance of error on our part and miscalculation on the part of adversaries is thus greatly increased.

There is a further complication arising from the doctrine's "1-

---

[104] *U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's*, 1970, pp. 127-129; 1971, pp. 177-179. In *ibid.*, 1973, the President omits direct reference to Chinese threats but essentially retains the 1-1/2 war principle; see pp. 186-187.

1/2 war" formula. Among other things this combination means that we have now placed declared limits on our willingness to use military force to oppose communist military expansion. It follows that we will have considerably less military force to deploy in the event that the guideline proposed by the President respecting wars of national liberation requires implementation because we discover at a future date that our interests *are* involved.

The adversary analysis and projection presented in this study calls for a different set of guidelines for U.S. policy on future wars of national liberation. If the adversary hypothesis were accepted, whether because it most probably conforms to future reality or simply because it is viewed as a prudent course for the short term, the task of policymaking and military force planning would become more rational and more manageable. Under the adversary concept we might limit planning to four major geographic areas involving different degrees and types of American and allied assistance and intervention: Southeast Asia, the Middle East, the Persian Gulf and Horn of Africa, and Latin America.

The selection of these areas is not whimsical. They are identifiable as loci for wars of national liberation by historical knowledge, intelligence estimates and strategic importance. If such yardsticks were employed in any global survey and if other endangered areas were thus discovered they should be added to the list. Latin America, already presenting a series of communist targets, is a historic U.S. concern, at least since the Monroe Doctrine. Though that doctrine may no longer be invoked, the strategic concern remains. The Middle East has more than once indirectly involved Moscow and Washington in a potential confrontation. Together with the Persian Gulf, it has oil resources still necessary for the economies of Western Europe and Japan (85 to 90 per cent of Japan's oil supply is imported from the Gulf area). If the Persian Gulf, the Horn of Africa and the eastern reaches of the Bay of Bengal — all present communist targets — were to come under communist sway, the Indian Ocean could become a communist "lake," in the same sense as it once was a British naval preserve, and the Southeast Asian rice bowl could be harnessed to supply China with needed food grains and *lebensraum*. These and related considerations such as the Soviet buildup in the Indian Ocean area more than justify the present and future concern of military policymakers with respect to wars of national liberation. And for these the Presidential guidelines are woefully inadequate.

If we have learned anything from the doleful Viet Nam experience, it is that effective planning for wars of national liberation should start to deal with the situation long before regular forces (either domestic or external) are engaged. The Nixon Doctrine holds that the "best means" of dealing with such wars is to "preempt them." Granted, but this means that elements of the threatened government must be supported, equipped and trained in time to pre-empt where possible and control when necessary. American policy planning cannot afford to await the *future* discovery of an American interest in some threatened area, as the President's guidelines imply. Planners should be set to work on existing and probable danger zones because U.S. interests are *now* already recognizable.

Finally — as we should have learned from the recent past — planners coping with wars of national liberation cannot be simply *military* planners. These wars begin in a political context and have as their goal a political revolution. The familiar patterns of pre-combat psychological warfare and subversion, violence, and finally armed conflict are their means. Planning therefore should be done by a multidisciplinary team. It requires inputs from *area specialists* in the politics, economics, languages and cultures of the affected countries as well as from the usual specialists in intelligence, communications, terrain, and the military arts.

Although military planning at a low level may be logistical and service-oriented, the *overall* military planning organization should conform to the organizational ideal inherent in the unified command concept authorized by the National Security Act of 1947. However, any unified military planning structure and planning group should also include relevant specialists from the Department of State, Agency for International Development, U.S. Information Agency, CIA and FBI. If our civilian and military bureaucracies cannot now provide genuine expertise for planning in any threatened area, they should hire it. In the interim, let us educate a generation of policymakers and planners who will become area specialists and who will have sufficient command of the relevant field data in vulnerable parts of the Third World to be able to plan how to forestall (if possible) or defeat new wars of national liberation. We certainly will have to help threatened Third World countries acquire the necessary human and material resources to cope with this ongoing strategy of the polycentric communist world. Ironically, the ultimate political goal of the communist world involves not so much the immediately threatened third country as it does ourselves — and that, of course, is our *vital* interest.

GUERRILLA COMMUNISM AND COUNTERINSURGENCY IN THAILAND

by Justus M. van der Kroef

ON January 30, 1974, in a Bangkok television broadcast, Thai Premier Sanya Dhamasakdi declared that "Communism will absolutely not be accepted in Thailand," and thereby confirmed that this remained his government's policy. But even as Sanya was speaking, disquieting reports continued to come in regarding stepped-up activity by communist guerrillas in Nakhon Phanom and Nong Khai provinces, including the burning of village defense camps and police posts, attacks on government patrols and harassment of hamlets. In at least one instance of an "attack" on a village in Nong Khai, however, it was discovered that village defense volunteers and local police had really been responsible for a small orgy of burning, looting and murder, thus strengthening public doubts about the extent and seriousness of the widely discussed communist danger in Thailand. Although provincial police headquarters reported that communist terrorist activity had increased in January, it added that the "overall situation is not very serious."[1]

In the aftermath of the October 14, 1973 overthrow of the Thanom Kittikachorn government, the necessity to take a new approach to the insurgent problem has been more widely articulated. One authoritative editorial comment on Sanya's January 30 broadcast said that while legalizing the Communist Party would be wrong now, "we cannot extend this opinion indefinitely into the future" and added that "Communism cannot be wished away any more than poverty and illiteracy can be wished away."[2] This changed attitude was also reflected in the announcement on January 5, 1974 that the eight-year-old *Kong Amnuaykarn Pongkarn Prabpram Khommunit* (Communist Suppression Operations Command — CSOC), which had been coordinating much of the government's counterinsurgency program, would be dissolved. CSOC's functions are presumably to be taken over by the army and police, under concurrent control of the Ministries of Defense and Interior. The dissolution is occurring but slowly, however, as CSOC Director, Lieutenant General Saiyud Kerdphol, meanwhile complained of the "indecisive attitude" of the Sanya government toward the communist problem.[3]

---

[1] *Bangkok Post,* January 31 and February 12, 1974; also Bangkok Radio, Domestic Service in Thai, January 29, 1974, 1300 GMT, and February 1, 1974, 0530 GMT (reported in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, hereafter cited as FBIS, January 31 and February 6, 1974, respectively).

[2] *Bangkok World,* February 4, 1974 (FBIS, February 7, 1974).

As discussions continue on an additional pullback of U.S. forces from Thailand, as Sino-Thai relations begin improving and hopes remain high that a less authoritarian structure of government than the kingdom has had in recent decades can become constitutionally viable, there is no denying the steady growth of the insurgency, now described by authoritative outside observers as "continual, gradual, worsening."[4] In 1967, some 1,700 guerrillas, aided by 15,000 "sympathizers," were operating in northeastern Thailand. By the end of 1972 they had reportedly grown to "about 7,700 full time armed guerrillas" (representing a 10 per cent increase over the previous year), plus "three or four times that many" supporters in the villages.[5] As recently as June 1973, another major upsurge in insurgent activity included clashes with government security forces, attacks on construction workers, and the killing of villagers in Udon Thani and Nakon Si Thammasat provinces.[6]

Taking cognizance of these developments that have focused new attention on the festering Thai problem, the following pages will seek to analyze the origin and scope of Thai guerrilla communism before considering the counterinsurgency program and finally examining some of the broader domestic and international aspects of the Thai insurgency.

I

The Communist Party of Thailand (CPT), according to its own leadership, considers December 1, 1942, the occasion of its first party congress, to be the date of its official founding. But the ideological and organizational roots of the party go back some twenty years before that.[7] After ineffective organizational efforts in the early 1920's by such Comintern agents as the Indonesian Tan Malaka and the Vietnamese Ho Chi Minh, the movement first crystallized in 1927 in the founding of the Communist Youth of Siam (CYS), which in 1932 grew into the Communist Party of Siam (CPS).

---

[3] *Ibid.*, January 12, 1974 (FBIS, January 14, 1974). By mid-February a reportedly embittered General Saiyud, charging that his authority had been "eroded of power," challenged anyone to take over his work. *The Nation* (Bangkok), February 14, 1974 (FBIS, February 15, 1974).

[4] David Morell, "Thailand," *Asian Survey*, February 1973, p. 170.

[5] The 1967 estimate is that of Peter Braestrup, "How the Guerrillas came to Koh Noi," *New York Times Magazine*, December 10, 1967, p. 50. The 1972 estimate appears in the *New York Times*, November 27, 1972. In an interview with the author at CSOC headquarters in Bangkok on May 28, 1973, General Saiyud set the total for the guerrilla force at about 6,000, double the size five years ago.

[6] Bangkok Radio, Domestic Service in Thai, June 23, 1973, 1300 GMT (FBIS, July 2, 1973).

Little is known of the CPS. Official Thai sources today assert that in the later 1930's the party had at most five or six branches with about a hundred members, though informal Thai Chinese supporters undoubtedly numbered additional hundreds, for communism in Thailand has always been heavily influenced by the political crosscurrents among the country's 2.9 million ethnic Chinese minority (about 8 per cent of the total population). When changes in the Thai power structure, following the coups d'état of 1932-1933, eventually brought avowed anti-communists to the fore in the government, only a small group of leftist intellectuals around Foreign Minister and later Premier Pridi Phanomyong continued to seek to give a more liberal (critics charged "Bolshevist") complexion to the evolving political system.

The Thai rapprochement with Japan during the Second World War discredited the anti-communist faction, and with the Pridi group in power during 1946-1947 it seemed as though the CPT might at last come into its own. Chinese communists in Thailand, with their own newspapers, retained operational independence, however. A ten-point program, entitled *Khommunit Thai cha Tham Arai nai Prachuban* (What Thai Communists Will Do Now), drafted in 1945 although not widely circulated until the next year, stressed the party's devotion to democratic principles and urged the vote for eighteen-year-olds and direct popular election of members of parliament.[8]

---

[7] Government of Thailand, Communist Suppression Operations Command, *Communist Insurgency in Thailand* (English edition, Bangkok, no publisher, 1957), p. 2. There is no comprehensive study of communism in Thailand. In addition to various official Thai sources, which I am not at liberty to identify, use has been made here of: Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, *The Communist Threat to Thailand* (SEATO Short Paper No. 44, Bangkok, 1967), especially pp. 44-56 (I have particularly relied on this useful chronology of CPT events in the following pages); David A. Wilson, "Thailand and Marxism," in Frank N. Trager, editor, *Marxism in Southeast Asia* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1959), pp. 58-101; Charles B. McLane, *Soviet Strategies in Southeast Asia: An Exploration of Eastern Policy Under Lenin and Stalin* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966), especially pp. 197-198, 338-345, 445-449; and J. H. Brimmell, *Communism in Southeast Asia, A Political Analysis* (London: Oxford University Press, 1959), pp. 111-115, 153-154, 240-245, 344-354.

These developments were soon undercut by a series of military-inspired coups and countercoups, and by intense jockeying for power among top army commanders and their civilian supporters, lasting through most of the 1950's.[9] Formal anti-communist policies, which intensified at the close of 1952 after passage of a new "Un-Thai Activities" Act, alternated with de facto recognition of nominally noncommunist, though CPT infiltrated, groups, including trade unions and political parties like the Socialist Front. After the October 1958 coup, however, in face of the political hegemony established by Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat, the remaining vestiges of overt left-wing or communist opposition disappeared.

In 1952, just before it was in effect driven underground again by the anti-communist legislation of that year, the CPT had been able to hold its second congress. Under a new Central Committee it had focused its proselytizing in the Northeast where, according to some Thai sources today, it immediately began laying the organizational groundwork for its subsequent guerrilla campaign and sending promising neophytes for training to China, Laos and North Viet Nam. Both Moscow and Peking influenced the CPT's developing confrontational ideology and tactics. According to Soviet writers, whose view remained virtually unchanged for two decades, as early as 1950 Thailand had mortgaged its future to American imperialist interests.[10] People's China, where Pridi Phanomyong had settled, began by radio broadcasts in 1954 and thereafter to urge the Thai populace to overthrow "American imperialism and its Thai government stooge," and quickly became the secure rear base for the CPT underground.

China's obvious role as haven and training ground for Thai revolutionaries, and as megaphone for their call to overthrow the Bangkok government, deepened official Thai suspicion of Peking's intentions. Suspicions had already been aroused by such events as Peking's creation of the "Thai People's Autonomous Region" in South Yunnan in January 1953, although on occasion conciliatory Thai gestures were made in the direction of the

---

[8] Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, *The Left Wing in Southeast Asia* (New York: William Sloan Associates, 1950), p. 57, and Wilson, *op. cit.*, pp. 92-93.

[9] See especially D. Insor, *Thailand: A Political, Social and Economic Analysis* (New York: Praeger, 1963), and David A. Wilson, *Politics in Thailand* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1962), pp. 25-34.

[10] See, e.g., McLane, *op. cit.*, pp. 446-447.

Chinese.[11] But the obvious and continuing interaction between Thai and Chinese communism made it increasingly easy for the dominant Thai military circles to brand all leftist opposition, including the non-Marxist variety, as an aspect of a single foreign conspiracy. On the other hand, one might question whether the threat perceived by the changing regimes in Bangkok in the 1950's was not unnecessarily magnified by persistently hostile Chinese policies that could hardly be undone by the Chinese show of good will at the 1955 African-Asian Nations Conference in Bandung.[12]

In any case, according to official Thai sources today, the CPT, aided by its Chinese and Vietnamese allies, marked out Nakhon Phanom, Sakhon Nakhon and Ubon Ratchathani provinces as the geographic focus of a systematic insurgency campaign. In May 1961 government spokesmen accused both Peking and Hanoi of organizing a movement to capture control of these and other areas

[11] On the "Thai People's Autonomous Region" in Yunnan see Edwin F. Stanton, "Spotlight on Thailand," *Foreign Affairs*, October 1954, pp. 77-79. Ambassador Stanton also noted how Chinese private schools and the Chinese Chamber of Commerce in Bangkok had fallen under Peking's influence, while, shortly before, additional Thai had identified themselves with the campaign for the 1952 Peking "peace conference." Yet, by June and July 1956, Thai government spokesmen announced that the Thai embargo on the export of rice and other nonstrategic goods to China would be lifted, granted permission to China to appoint a Thai bank as its official trading agency in Bangkok, commented on the "sincerity" of Chinese Premier Chou En-lai (though sidestepping the question of diplomatic relations), declared that the question of Taiwan was "China's family quarrel" in which the Thai government did not intend to interfere, and opened the possibility of Thais traveling to China in the future. Brimmell, *op. cit.*, p. 352.

[12] At the 1955 Bandung Conference, the Thai representative, Prince Wan Waithayakon, charged that the exiled Pridi Phanomyong was training Thai Chinese and ethnic Thai in China's Yunnan province "for purposes of infiltration and subversion in Thailand." He also expressed uncertainty as to Peking's attitude toward the citizenship status of the nearly three million Chinese in Thailand. Chou En-lai, in reply, expressed readiness to solve the citizenship status of overseas Chinese "with the governments of the countries concerned," denied that the new Thai autonomous region in Yunnan was a threat to Thailand, or that China had any intention of subverting the governments of its neighbors, and declared that Pridi was not in Yunnan organizing local Thai, but was instead in political exile in Peking. George McT. Kahin, *The Asian African Conference, Bandung, Indonesia, April 1955* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1956), pp. 13-15.

There is no indication that Thailand was satisfied with these Chinese assurances. As for Chou En-lai's assertion that the Peking government had no intention of subverting the governments of neighbors, it is of interest to note the statement of President Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines, that Premier Chou in conversations with Marcos' envoy, Governor Benjamin Romualdez, during the latter's secret mission to Peking in February 1972, admitted that certain "Lin Piao elements" in China had been training Philippine dissidents there, but that this would no longer continue. (*The Straits Times* [Kuala Lumpur and Singapore], May 26, 1973.) On February 16, 1974, Thai Defense Minister Dawee said after a Peking visit that the Chinese Premier had told him that China had stopped supporting communist insurgents in Thailand because Thailand was now "heading for democracy." (*The Nation,* February 17, 1974 [FBIS, February 19, 1974].) *The Nation* observed editorially that it would "take a long time" before it could be decided whether or not Dawee had had "the wool pulled over his eyes" by Chou.

of the Northeast. Whatever the validity of this charge, one must indicate also that a Lao-oriented secessionist movement, led by dissident, noncommunist Thai politicians in the northeastern provinces, had for the better part of a decade already been active — with communist Pathet Lao support — in attempting a merger of the Northeast with Laos.[13] By 1962 Thai recruits were being trained, along with neophytes from other Southeast Asian insurgent movements, in a guerrilla training camp at Hoa Binh, some forty miles southeast of Hanoi, and North Vietnamese (DRV) agents had intensified their burrowing among Thailand's 50,000 Vietnamese minority in the vulnerable Northeast.[14]

The 1961 CPT congress marked the beginning of a more intensified stage in Thai communist activity. Meeting "somewhere in Nakhon Phanom Province," according to Thai government sources, the 120 delegates, now said to be predominantly ethnic Thai (though delegates of the Chinese Communist Party of Thailand, and "visitors" from the People's Chinese and Democratic Viet Nam Republics, as well as from the Indonesian Communist Party and the Lao Patriotic Front or Neo Lao Hak Xat, were also reported to be in attendance) agreed on a three-point action program. First, the party formally committed itself to "revolutionary armed struggle" in the "national liberation" of Thailand, and mastery of the technique of "people's war"; second, the building of a broad-based multi-class united front, involving all "patriotic" elements in society opposed to "feudalism" and "imperialism," was to be accelerated; and, third, internal party organization was to be improved, particularly through better cadre training and more systematic recruitment. Congress resolutions professed to see a steadily improving revolutionary condition in Thailand. On March 2, 1962, the clandestine Voice of the People of Thailand (VPT), variously said to be located in China's Yunnan province or in Pathet Lao-held territory in northern Laos, began regular broadcasts.

By early 1962, also, in keeping with the resolution of the 1961 congress, CPT representatives in Peking had begun attempts to form the first in what was to be a number of overlapping would-be "mass" organizations. Not until the close of 1963, however, was the "Movement for an Independent, Neutral and Nationalist

---

[13] Theh Chongkhadikij in *Bangkok Post,* March 3 and 5, 1962; also cited in George Modelski, "The Viet Minh Complex," p. 200, in Cyril E. Black and Thomas P. Thornton, editors, *Communism and Revolution: The Strategic Uses of Political Violence* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1964).

[14] Donald Kirk, *Wider War — The Struggle for Cambodia, Thailand and Laos* (New York: Praeger, 1971), pp. 154-155.

Thailand" announced. VPT broadcasts relayed the "Movement's" demands for the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Thailand and for the formation of a "democratic" government in the kingdom. On December 8, 1964 the VPT and the underground paper *Ekharat* announced that a "Thailand Independence Movement" had been formed on the previous November 1; and on January 1, 1965, the DRV paper *Nhan Dhan* reported the establishment of another organization, the "Thailand Patriotic Front." In the early days of January 1965, yet another group calling itself the "Thai Coalition Front" disseminated pamphlets throughout Bangkok calling for the overthrow of the government.

The ideological complexion of all these organizations and the significance of their proliferation at this particular time are difficult to determine. Thai intelligence sources today assert that the appearance of the new opposition groups was designed to create the impression of a gradually accelerating upsurge of anti-government dissent coming from many different quarters, but that in fact the groups were paper organizations manipulated by the CPT. The relatively slow rate at which they appeared probably is not unrelated to the gradual, incremental buildup of the Thai insurgent movement generally, reflecting a common communist strategy met with elsewhere in Southeast Asia in the 1950's and 1960's, notably in Viet Nam and Malaysia.

On January 22, 1965, the VPT began urging the merger of all opposition elements into the Thailand Patriotic Front (TPF), stressing that the country was being sold out to unnamed foreign powers, that its citizens were being squeezed of their money and labor by a dictatorial regime, that peasants were facing bankruptcy because of high taxes and rents, that students upon graduation could not find suitable employment, and so on. A six-point TPF program announced the next day reiterated some of these themes demanding struggle for "a completely independent Thailand," "democratic rights" and the "overthrow" of the "present authorities," as well as for "peace and neutrality," an "independent national economy," improvement of "the living condition of the people" and granting of "land to the tillers," development of education and medical service, and liquidation of "the U.S. imperialists' corrupt culture." Another VPT broadcast that January addressed itself to Thailand's Buddhist leadership, accusing Thanom Kittikachorn's government of "trampling religion underfoot" and declaring that "We Thai priests must also lead the struggle against Kittikachorn . . . until the final victory."

On December 14, 1965, Peking's New China News Agency (NCNA) reported that the Thailand Independence Movement had merged with the TPF. As nothing now was being heard of the Thai Coalition Front, the TPF to all intents and purposes had become the CPT's only "mass" organization.[15]

Although VPT broadcasts, NCNA and Hanoi media reports, as well as frequent Thai government releases on the travels and activities of CPT leaders and on China's support for the Thai communists (on January 20, 1965, a Chinese bank in Hong Kong was reported to have provided some 20 million baht or U.S. $4 million "for use in subversion of Thailand by Communist agents"),[16] suggested a growing communist threat, CPT activity seemed to remain essentially organizational and agitational until the second half of 1965. It was not until August 7, 1965, at the village of Na Bua in Nakhon Phanom province that, according to the government's "white book" on the insurgency, the first brief armed clash between CPT guerrillas and government security forces occurred.[17] Later that month General Prapas Charusathira, Thai Army Commander and Deputy Premier, declared that recent incidents involving Cambodian communist guerrillas who had crossed the border in order to attack a Thai police post, were an indication that "Communists are beginning to start an underground war against Thailand."[18] General Pote Pekanand of the Thai police announced in Bangkok on November 26 that in the previous six months communist "killings, intimidation, clashes with the police and radio propaganda" had all been stepped up. Pote claimed that twenty-four police had been killed in recent weeks, that Chinese and Bulgarian arms as well as an insurgent camp in Ubon province had been seized, and that some forty "Communist agents" had been arrested, including two Chinese.[19]

---

[15] *Vietnam Courier* (Hanoi), February 14, 1965, No. 19, p. 8; "Is Thailand Communist China's Next Target?," *Sabah Times* (Kota Kinabalu), April 20, 1965; *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs 1966* (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution, Stanford University, 1967), p. 386; *The Straits Times*, January 30, 1965. On the Thailand Independence Movement and the Thailand Patriotic Front, see also Donald E. Weatherbee, *The United Front in Thailand, A Documentary Analysis* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1970), pp. 30-58.

[16] *The Communist Threat to Thailand*, SEATO paper, *op. cit.*, p. 50, and Denis Warner, "Thailand: Peking's New Front," *The Reporter*, June 17, 1965, pp. 32-34. Over the years Thai officials have categorically charged "Communist Chinese" and "Communist China" with supporting the insurgents (see statements of Premier Thanom Kittikachorn in the *Bangkok Post*, August 1, 1967 and June 17, 1971). Similar charges that Thai-born Chinese are joining the insurgents in ambushing government patrols (see *Bangkok World*, July 6, 1972) must be viewed in light of the fact that the principal Thai guerrilla leaders today — e.g., Song Nopphakun, who directs the insurgency in the North, and Charoen Wanngam and Udom Sisuwan, who operate in the Northeast — spent from five to eight years in China for training. (*Far Eastern Economic Review*, May 13, 1972, p. 18.) The involvement of Chinese Thais in the hill tribe insurgency in northern Thailand is also well established. (See Jeffrey Race, "The War in Northern Thailand," *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 8, 1974, pp. 96-97.)

In view of the problems of terrain, communication, and effective public administration that the Bangkok government faces in the insurgent areas, it is obvious that the limited, incremental assistance given by Peking and ethnic Chinese in Thailand to the guerrillas has an effect out of all proportion to the nature and quantity of that assistance. Observers who describe themselves as "struck by the restraint" shown by Peking in rendering assistance to the insurgents (e.g., Maynard Parker, "Untying Thailand," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1973, p. 331) appear unfamiliar with the tactical significance of incremental insurgent tactics — including the role of foreign assistance — which allow for a steady, gradual escalation that always remains just below the point of raising international alarm.

Common, too, in American academic circles is the proposition that Chinese assistance to the Thai insurgents did not begin until after the Tonkin Gulf incident in the middle of 1964, and that, in any case, it must be seen largely in the context of Thai involvement in the escalating U.S. participation in the Indochina war. (See Melvin Gurtov, "China's Policies in Southeast Asia: Three Studies," *Studies in Comparative Communism*, July-October 1970, p. 17, and Daniel D. Lovelace, *China and "People's War" in Thailand, 1964-1969* [Berkeley: University of California Center for Chinese Studies, 1971], p. 78.) This view not only overlooks the long historic interaction between Chinese and Thai communism, but forgets that as early as 1962 and 1963 the Chinese communists began denouncing the Thai government through the Voice of the People of Thailand and Chinese-trained agents began infiltrating northeastern Thailand in preparation for a steadily widening insurgency.

Additionally, in the 1950's Malayan communist guerrillas belonging to the Malayan People's Liberation Army had sought refuge in southern Thailand. In the 1960's these elements, too, began clashing more often with Thai police patrols, establishing camps, exacting tribute from Chinese rubber plantation workers, and indoctrinating local young Chinese Thais. By the end of 1965 liaison was reportedly established between the northeastern and southern insurgencies, while interaction between the southern border guerrillas and Indonesian infiltrators (implementing the late President Sukarno's "confrontation" policy against Malaysia) was also arousing concern among Malaysian officials.

Throughout 1966 the Bangkok government took new measures to combat the guerrilla problem by implementing operations of the CSOC (which had been established in December 1965), installing a special "political action headquarters" in Nakhon Phanom province, launching psychological warfare and economic development campaigns, and sending some of its air force pilots and artillerymen dressed in Laotian uniforms to fight with the Royal Lao forces against the communist Pathet Lao. On January 2, 1966, in a New Year's message, the VPT declared that a broadening of the armed struggle "into a people's war" had become necessary "in accordance with the method of fighting fire with fire." Thai officials stressed the growing danger. On July 4, 1966, Prime Minister Thanom asserted that his country was now threatened not only in the Northeast but also in the South, and by December of the same year an unnamed Thai official was quoted as saying: "It's worse than it was in July. The Communists are showing up in more places."[20]

---

[17] *Communist Insurgency in Thailand, op. cit.*, p. 5.
[18] *The Straits Times*, August 10, 1965.
[19] *New York Times*, November 27, 1965.

As clashes became more frequent (on November 11, 1966 a Thai police patrol was all but decimated in an ambush by some eighty guerrillas near Nakae district in Nakhon Phanom), more came to be known also about the size, organization and leadership of the northeastern insurgents:

> Police officials in Sakol Nakorn and Nakorn Panom provinces — the centre of the Communist effort — say that the Communist hard core consists of 1,000 armed men, 700 of whom are based on Nakorn Panom province and the remainder on Sakol Nakorn province.
>
> They are organised into platoons of 50 men and sections of 12, and are surrounded by a human curtain of spies and couriers.
>
> Three men have been identified as guerilla regional commanders — Yot Ti Sawat, 48; Joi Rajasittu, 37, and Keun Khampeuk, 30. All three are Thais, born in local villages but trained in guerilla techniques at Mahaxay in the Communist zone of Laos.
>
> The senior is Yot Ti Sawat who once managed a sugar cane co-operative in Nakorn Panom. He now directs the militant Communist organisation in Nakhae district, Nakorn Panom.
>
> With a force of 700 he is in a position to strike hard at the Government, which in this remote district is represented only by a handful of policemen.
>
> For the time being Sawat's guerillas limit themselves to the murder of police agents. He has recruited a network of spies in the villages, and the police admit that he has ample warning of their moves against him.
>
> On the other hand, the police receive little information about the Communists. The police in Nakhae frankly admit that many village headmen are terrified of the Communists and beg the police not to enter their homes for fear of provoking reprisals.[21]

The above analysis suggests the guerrillas' growing sophistication in organization and intelligence. Since the second half of the

---

[20] Warren Unna, "Why the Border Bandits Worry Thailand," *The Straits Times,* March 26, 1965; also *The Straits Times,* March 3, May 3, July 27, 1965; B. C. Ong, "Chin Peng and His Border Terrorists," *Sabah Times,* August 13, 1965; Reuter's dispatch, Bangkok, July 4, 1965; *New York Times,* February 4 and 23, and December 15 and 25, 1966.

[21] John Stirling, "The Red Signals on Thailand's Far Borders," *The Straits Times,* January 25, 1966. See also "Communists Organize Terrorism in Thailand," *Communist Affairs,* November-December 1966, p. 14.

1960's, official Thai sources have periodically noted the insurgent forces' readiness to experiment with highly mobile tactical units operating with relative autonomy. The guerrilla units' main purpose, however, has been not combat but back-up support for the communists' *political* presence in the countryside as a counter-government. Given the ethnic and regional diversity in the background of insurgent recruits, the concept of local strike force autonomy (there is some evidence that recruits, after training, are placed in units of common regional or ethnic background) appears to have served and to be serving the guerrillas well. It may also assist in explaining why the known leaders of the TPF and the "liberation" forces are essentially local figures; thus far no single, overall "national" commander has emerged – or has been permitted to emerge.

Although TPF spokesmen and VPT broadcasts sought to present the insurgents' operations as a struggle for "national salvation," the Maoist complexion of most of their pronouncements was unmistakable. On April 13, 1967 the official "Overseas Representative" of the TPF, Phayome Chulanon, in a radio address from Peking, linked "Soviet revisionist accomplices" with the "imperialists" and their "running dogs" against whom "peasants, workers, students and intellectuals" in Thailand were now waging war. He noted also that People's China, the "bastion of present world revolution," had achieved a great and "unprecedented victory" in its "proletarian cultural revolution."[22] If the Bangkok government is to be believed, however, the TPF's anti-Soviet blasts apparently did not affect Moscow's indirect assistance to the Thai insurgents. In July and October 1967, Premier Thanom alleged that Soviet-made helicopters had been bringing supplies and agents to the guerrillas in Nakhon Phanom and Sakhon Nakhon provinces from North Viet Nam and Laos.[23]

By October 1967 the TPF guerrillas in the Northeast were said to number "about 1,700 lightly armed" men, organized in "roving bands" that avoided "head-on combat" but stressed recruiting, organization and "sporadic" terrorism. Nearly simultaneously one might read in the Thai press that though the guerrillas were being hard hit by security forces, protection could not be extended to all villages being attacked. Moreover, CPT recruitment of Meo hill tribesmen – a growing problem in some northern provinces – was accelerating in hitherto lightly infiltrated or uninfiltrated areas, e.g., in Tak province. In October 1967 Thai security forces also intercepted a 100-horse caravan of Haws (the Chinese nomadic tribe that regularly crosses Thai territory as it moves between the mountain regions of Laos and Burma near the Chinese border), discovering Chinese communist soldiers in their ranks as well as supplies and Chinese communist propaganda.

---

[22] Peking Radio in Thai to Thailand, April 13, 1967, 1130 GMT (FBIS, April 18, 1973).

[23] Reuter's dispatches, Bangkok, July 10 and October 9, 1967; *The Times of Ceylon*, July 4, 1967.

Between January 1966 and October 1967, according to official sources, 263 guerrillas were killed, 2,600 were taken prisoner, and 2,200 surrendered. But reportedly only 411 weapons were seized, suggesting that while CPT and TPF cadres continued to be trained in North Viet Nam, neither Hanoi nor Peking appeared greatly interested as yet in augmenting the insurgents' firepower. How accurate such statistics are is difficult to say in view of overlapping periods of tabulation. On February 5, 1968, Premier Thanom said in a Bangkok press conference that between December 27, 1966 and February 1968 a total of 2,139 "terrorists" had surrendered, 251 had been killed, and 2,308 "have been captured." Whatever the effect of these presumed insurgent losses, clashes with guerrillas in all three operational areas (North, Northeast and South) had increased markedly by the end of 1967, and fighting had also erupted in Rajburi, Kanchanaburi, Petchburi and Prachaub provinces. According to Interior Minister Prapas, repeated clashes between hill tribesmen from China's Yunnan province and Thai security forces, and reports of an alleged Chinese troop concentration near the Thai border region (though China has no direct boundary with Thailand), led the Bangkok government in mid-October and again at the end of December 1967 to "rush" an indeterminate number of army units to the northern border provinces.[24]

---

[24] *Bangkok Post*, July 27 and 30, 1967; *The Straits Times*, February 28, June 20, and October 12 and 19, 1967; *The Sabah Times*, May 31 and August 24, 1967; *New York Times*, December 26, 1967; Associated Press dispatches, Bangkok, April 19 and December 28, 1967; Stanley Karnow, "The Looking Glass War," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, December 21, 1967, pp. 539-542; Seymour Freidin in *World Journal Tribune* (New York), January 15, 1967; and FBIS, February 7, 1968. According to a statement presented by U.S. Ambassador to Thailand Leonard Unger to the U.S. Security Subcommittee of the Senate's Committee on Foreign Relations in November 1969, the insurgency in Thailand's Northeast slowed down in 1967 and in 1969 the guerrillas began "to concentrate on selective recruiting, low level propaganda (different from large meetings) and strengthening their organization and support structure." The "incident rate" in 1969 was increasing, with "smaller scale activity" also in new areas, and terrorization of civilians and officials. Unger estimated armed guerrilla strength in the Northeast at 1,200 to 1,500, "down from a high of 2,000 in 1967." *U.S. Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad. Kingdom of Thailand* (Washington: GOP, 1970), Part 3, pp. 627-628.

Although in mid-January 1968 the *New York Times* quoted "a high ranking Thai official" as saying that "The Northeast has cooled off" and reported that TPF guerrilla activity had "declined sharply," in fact the reverse seemed to be the case. On February 19, 1968, Premier Thanom said that the "Communist threat" to Thailand had increased following fresh infiltration led by North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao cadres, as well as by Meo and Yao tribesmen. Meanwhile, Chinese media were claiming that insurgent "base areas are being built up in those parts of the countryside where conditions are ripe." Consolidation of the insurgents' power base went forward with the establishment of a combat "high command," announced by the VPT on January 1, 1969. The growth of various TPF "combat corps" was said to have required the formation of this new coordinating headquarters. The same broadcast asserted that political and guerrilla units of the TPF had now been organized in all parts of Thailand and that these "had fought more than one thousand battles with government troops."

Again and again Thai officials tended to echo such claims. Police General Parkarn Chatnilbnand declared in November 1969 that communist forces in northern Thailand, backed by China, North Viet Nam and the Pathet Lao, were building up their strength and increasing their attacks on government posts. New guerrilla units were composed not only of the Meo hill tribes, but also of Chinese, North Vietnamese and the Pathet Lao, he said. The rise in the level of insurgent activity (in one clash at Ban Dong Thong in Nakhon Phanom province on November 23, 1969 there were a dozen police casualties), amid VPT claims that in Phattalung province the "people's liberation" forces had "methodically and continuously" attacked the "enemy" and, "with strong support from the people," were scoring "splendid victories," led the Thai government to assign another contingent, this time composed of a thousand marines, to the Northeast to assist police. During 1970 the insurgents, according to the Chinese press, "wiped out more than 1,100 enemy men, downed or damaged more than 50 aircraft and took more than 20 strongholds."[25]

At the close of 1969 still more was becoming known about the structure of the insurgent operations. While tactics dictated variety in unit size, most "liberation armed forces" initially tended toward a highly mobile, fifty to sixty man, operational core, each led by two or three "people's commanders" (mostly graduates of the DRV training schools) apparently equal in rank, with one serving as an informal "political" officer and as liaison with TPF headquarters. These headquarters were reported at shifting locations in the Pu Pan foothills and mountain range across Sakhon Nakhon and Nakhon Phanom provinces. Southern insurgent units operating in Yala and Songgkhla provinces were said to be half this size, and were and are less mobile and more "base centered." In the North, where Pathet Lao and DRV military personnel led dissident units of Meos, a somewhat formal and hierarchical command structure, replete with uniforms and insignia, prevailed. After 1968, as gleaned from captured operations plans, a "liberation armed force" in the Northeast would typically be formed around a cadre core with DRV or Pathet Lao training, augmented by village "volunteers," and sometimes Thai Chinese mostly of student age, and would be assigned roving "liberation" and "enemy suppression" duties in a specific, two or three *amphoe* (district) area, usually for a period of four to six months. From the start the unit would have both political and military duties, with the former, by and large, outweighing the latter. Since a basic guerrilla rule is to avoid combat unless victory is virtually certain, the unit would, especially in view of the intensification of Thai counterinsurgency programs, spend much time in avoiding clashes.

---

[25] *Bangkok Post*, November 25, 1969; Voice of the People of Thailand, December 31, 1968, and November 24, 1969 (FBIS, January 2 and November 25, 1969); *Peking Review*, April 5, 1968, pp. 22-23 and January 22, 1971, p. 18; Reuter's dispatches, Bangkok, January 23, February 19 and 26, 1968, and November 27, 1969; *New York Times*, January 15, 1968.

Backed by such mobile units, the establishment of guerrilla political control in a hamlet usually has passed through the following stages:[26]

(1) Preliminary contact with a village is made by one or at most two TPF infiltrators, who claim to be visiting friends or relatives. Their host is intimidated into cooperating, or may have been previously contacted or have been a sympathizer for some time. Available evidence suggests the care and close intelligence work devoted to selecting the initial host. In the Northeast, with its long tradition of leftist political opposition, ethnic secessionism, and sense of central government neglect, it has not been difficult to find sympathizers. Nor, for that matter, has it been hard in the North, where the economic problems of the hill tribes have provided fertile ground for skillful agitprop work; in the South, Muslim Thais have felt similarly neglected.

(2) The initial visit drags on into a semi-permanent stay, as the in-

---

[26] The description is based on an official Thai counterinsurgency handbook and other intelligence sources.

filtrators turn to rice cultivation on available land, trade, or display of desired skills, from healing to tool repair, charcoal making and soothsaying. Usually during this process two other things happen gradually and concurrently: (a) the village teacher (who often doubles as local police constable or as all-purpose agent for the central government) or headman begins to suspect that the newcomers are not all they appear to be, and (b) a "squad" of the roving local "liberation" force pays the village one or more visits, not concealing their TPF identity but making a point both of their nearby presence and their presumably helpful interest in village affairs. The latter may be expressed in assistance at the harvest, or repair or construction of public facilities (a well or a road). Communist assistance tactics may be dependent on their effectiveness relative to more coercive techniques of winning support. Thus, in the *Bangkok Post* of August 18, 1973, the Thai army commander operating in Nakhon Phanom province claimed that, because of effective counterinsurgency efforts in the Nakae district, communist guerrillas had gone underground; but he said that "in their new role as the people's benefactors" they were sending "into villages people who claim to be doctors." The visits by insurgent units are relatively brief, cautious and primarily psychological in purpose. Nonetheless, their intimidatory effect is quite powerful, enough in many cases to overcome a villager's urge to seek police assistance in force. Teachers and headmen are usually among the first to be made examples of via guerrilla "justice."

(3) As soon as possible the initial infiltrators seek to create a small core group of sympathizers. Among these, preferably, are one or two notable personages in the community or larger area — e.g., prominent farmers, retired officials or Buddhist clergy. The future local action cadre is not composed of such notables, however. The landless and relatively destitute, the petty criminal element, and especially the unemployed youth are preferred for this purpose, augmented, if necessary, by political activists from the nearby roving "liberation" force. The core group's immediate purpose is to articulate and amplify real or alleged local grievances, and to establish itself as a de facto local counter-government. The formal structure of the group is a "progressive" or "patriotic" "masses" organization, in effect the local branch of the TPF. Sometimes such front organizations are permitted to proliferate and develop a special interest focus (a women's or youth section, for example).

(4) From the core group or groups a "village committee" is established as the principal new power in the community, and with its creation the original TPF infiltrators customarily pass from the scene. The local committee not only governs and transforms the village, but one of its chief functions is to provide (preferably youthful) recruits to the TPF. Some of the recruits, later having become disenchanted, have left records of their experiences. One of these, the autobiography of Bunkong Toemsuk, a peasant lad from Ubon province who was assured by a TPF infiltrator in his village that his dreams of becoming a doctor could be realized if he were willing to study medicine in a country "far away," and who early in 1965 traveled to the Hoa Binh guerrilla camp near Hanoi, where his training was rather different from what he had expected, has been given

considerable publicity by the Thai government.[27] Since 1965 an estimated 3,000 Thai have been recruited, most of them receiving training in North Viet Nam, communist-controlled Laos, or People's China. From 1970 onward there have been frequent insurgent claims that "liberated" areas, presumably involving contiguous villages or townships, have come into existence, and despite public denials by top Thai officials, the Bangkok press has from time to time carried reports of such a communist-controlled "zone."[28]

(5) At the close of 1972, captured TPF and CPT documents suggested, according to the Thai government, that insurgent organization was proceeding beyond the village level. *Changwat* (province), *amphoe* (district) and *tambon* (township) "committees" were being established by the CPT, headed by an experienced party secretary. In Nakhon Phanom and some of this province's districts, the local committee executive structure has been expanded so as to include agitprop and special liaison cadres. The latter are charged with coordinating local "progressive" or "patriotic" fronts, and with supervising the *Noi Tahan Prajam Ban* or *Norjobol* (communist village defense force) and units of the original "liberation" forces in the mountains and inaccessible rural regions of a given district — units now often called *Noi Tahan Prajam Thin* or *Norpatol*. *Norjobol* and *Norpatol* seem to be recent and still relatively uncommon groups, but their appearance suggests that CPT and TPF tactics are focusing, where appropriate, on a localization of the guerrilla strike force. *Norjobol* in effect serves as a kind of bodyguard for the village core group (see phase 3, above). Meanwhile, the smuggling of arms from Laos to the insurgents in Thailand has continued virtually unabated. Knowledgeable officials admit that for every weapon seized "between five and ten," including carbines, grenade launchers and hand grenades, find their way to the communists.[29]

The phased infiltration process described is especially applicable to the Northeast. But CPT tactical flexibility is also noted in Thailand's North, in the party's dealings with the 260,000 or so hill-tribe population, among whom nearly 50,000 Meos form the most important group.[30] Because of initial official uncertainty about their citizenship rights, the Meos, like other hill tribes, found it almost impossible to acquire legal title to their land or enter public service. The destructive effects of their swidden agriculture, with its constantly shifting cultivation sites and slashing and burning of upland forest; their alleged encroachment on what the Thai government considers national forest preserve; their recruitment and indoctrination, first by the Pathet Lao in the late 1950's, and since 1962 by the Thai Communist Party; and above all their opium production, sometimes in connivance with corrupt Thai officials, have led to suspicion and serious tensions between government and tribesmen. The situation has been aggravated further by the Thai military's punitive overreaction, including repeated and indiscriminate napalm attacks on Meo villages.[31]

---

[27] Bunkong Toemsuk, *Why I Left the Terrorists* (Bangkok: Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, n.d.).

[28] See, e.g., *Bangkok World*, May 23, 1973, and *Bangkok Post*, May 25, 1973.

[29] See David Jenkins, "The 'Hit-Run' Government," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, July 23, 1973, p. 26, and Seah Chiang Nee, "Thailand Moves to Stop Gun-Running for Communists," *The Asian* (Hong Kong), July 2-8, 1972, p. 2.

[30] On the northern Thai hill tribes see, e.g., John E. deYoung, *Village Life in Modern Thailand* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1955); Gordon Young, *The Hill Tribes of Northern Thailand* (Bangkok: USOM, 1962); Peter Kunstadter, *Southeast Asian Tribes, Minorities and Nations* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1967).

As quarrels over land use intensified in the early 1960's, particularly in Chiangrai and Tak provinces, "little bands of agents" kept filtering down "the precipitous valleys from Laos and even China. They jog along the tracks, satchels of pamphlets and medicines on their backs, spreading the usual layer of Communist promises."[32] Even foreign observers sympathetic to the Meos' plight have conceded that there is "strong evidence" that People's China supplied help to the hill insurgents.[33] Chinese AK-47 rifles and other modern weaponry, including mortars, have been extensively used, while the growing sophistication of Meo guerrilla tactics was demonstrated in their attack on Huai Satai and neighboring areas in November 1968. By this time communist appeals and promises to the Meo dissidents had become culture-specific: the hill tribes would be free to cultivate their opium poppies and live in their own way in their own country to be proclaimed as autonomous by their CPT, Lao and Chinese allies.

The latter appeal compares with CPT encouragement of the Lao-oriented secessionist movement in the Northeast, and with communist accentuation of the ethnic and religious differences of Thai Muslims in Yala and other southern provinces. Thai officials have stressed the separatist appeal as a continuous CPT and TPF tactic, alleging, for example, that representatives of the CPT in the Northeast have attempted to ally themselves with the northern hill-tribe insurgents in order to promote the secession of the country's northern provinces.[34]

---

[31] On the hill tribes' problems see Race, *op. cit.* For an instance of official overreaction against the hill tribes see John R. Thomson, "The Burning Mountain," *Far Eastern Economic Review,* April 25, 1968, pp. 218-220. On the opium poppy economy see especially F.C.B. Keen, *Upland Tenure and Land Use in North Thailand* (Bangkok: SEATO, 1972), pp. 36-53.

[32] Garry Barber, "Battle for Hearts in Thailand's Mountains," *The Straits Times,* August 29, 1967. See also Saiyud Kerdphol, *The Struggle for Thailand, Section II. A Solution for the North* (Bangkok: Communist Suppression Operations Command, n.d.), pp. 1-4.

[33] Hans U. Luther, "Thailand — Counterinsurgency or Rural Development?," *Asia Research Bulletin,* October 1-31, 1972, p. 1296.

The security problem in the northern hill country is complicated by the involvement of elements of erstwhile Chinese Kuomintang forces in the opium trade in the Burma-Thai-Laotian border region, and by Peking-supported Burmese communist guerrillas in northeastern Burma. There are also some 40,000 Vietnamese in northeastern Thailand, perhaps a third of them born in the kingdom, the remainder refugees of the generation-long fighting in their own country.[35] Political loyalties among the Vietnamese are divided and Thai attitudes toward them are ambivalent and most often hostile. The governor of Sakhon Nakhon province has claimed that the 4,000 Vietnamese residing there are prospering in Thailand and wish not to repatriate but to become Thai citizens – yet he adds that the Vietnamese are helping the communists and really "contribute nothing to Thailand."[36] Until Thai-DRV relations improve, there is little likelihood of an effective repatriation program, though Thai officials consistently advance this as the only real solution to the Vietnamese problem. Meanwhile, whether in north or south, among Vietnamese, Meos or Muslim and Malaicized Thai, ethnic differentiation and frustration will continue to provide a fertile seedbed for communist appeals.

In articulating such appeals the CPT-TPF-"liberation" forces complex can count on a gradually accelerating momentum. Whereas in the 1960's clashes with the insurgents rarely involved security forces of a score or more, from 1970 onward units of a hundred or more have tended to become engaged. In March 1972 at Hin Longgkla, a guerrilla mountain stronghold near Lom Sak, a communist insurgent band estimated at several hundred seasoned guerrillas fought some 10,000 Thai troops.[37] In January 1973, more than 3,000 Thai troops, supported by fighter bombers and heavy artillery, were arrayed against a guerrilla force of 1,000 in the South, concentrated in the mountains of Trang province.[38] "Several battalions" of the Thai Second Army were said to have been involved in anti-insurgent drives in Kalasin province, also in early January 1973, and intensification of communist recruitment and "frequent ambushes" reportedly compelled a new "major offensive" by the government in Nakhon Si Thammarat and Surat Thani provinces.[39] In the course of 1973 there were attacks on military air bases where U.S. planes are stationed, besides stepped-up terrorist and intimidatory acts, marked by the beheading of senior police officials, the kidnaping of policemen's wives,[40] and the killing of unwilling villagers, and infiltration of restive Thai university student groups. All these suggested a sharpening of the confrontation in a widening insurgency now seen by Thai officials to be affecting two-thirds of the country's seventy-two provinces in various degrees.[41]

---

[34] *Bangkok Post*, November 9, 1970.

[35] On the Thai Vietnamese see Peter Poole, *The Vietnamese in Thailand* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1971).

[36] David Jenkins, "Thailand's Enduring Dilemma," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, April 30, 1973, p. 27.

[37] *New York Times*, March 18, 1972.

[38] Reuter's dispatch, Bangkok, January 18, 1973.

II

The counterinsurgency program was slow in being organized and the exigencies of domestic Thai politics have continuously interfered with its implementation. Not until December 1965 did the Communist Suppression Operations Command (CSOC) come into existence. Formally replaced by the Communist Prevention and Suppression Directorate, CSOC's purpose, though not its previous organizational and command structure, continued. The following discussion will focus on CSOC in view of its eight-year existence at the center of the Thai effort to counter guerrilla communism, but this in no way implies that counterinsurgency efforts in Thailand could be approached only through this agency.

CSOC's mission, explained and elaborated over the years in various Thai documents and public statements, and in analyses by a number of non-Thai (but friendly) research agencies to which the present writer has had access, may be summarized as follows:[42] (1) To coordinate and direct appropriate units of the Royal Thai armed forces, including the police, in a systematic campaign to prevent and combat all forms of communist insurgency. (2) To engage in psychological warfare tactics, control over frontiers (in conjunction with the border police) and other operations so as to prevent extension of external assistance to insurgents in the kingdom. (3) To enhance the security of the Thai citizenry by promoting public welfare services, with the aim of strengthening loyalty to the government.

---

[39] *Bangkok Post*, January 8 and 15, 1973.

[40] *Ibid.*, March 5 and May 28, 1973.

[41] In mid-February 1973 some 200 communist Lao and Thai guerrillas, armed with U.S.-made M-79 grenade launchers and automatic weapons, overran a government post in Nong Khai province, near the Laotian border. The attack, the biggest display of insurgent strength thus far in the region, had been staged from the safety of a camp just across the border in Laotian territory. (Reuter's dispatch, Bangkok, February 14, 1973.) In a single week in June 1973, according to a spokesman for the Thai Premier's office, communist insurgents had taken to extorting money from or killing road construction workers in Loei and Tak provinces. (Bangkok Radio, Domestic Service in Thai, June 23, 1973, 1300 GMT; FBIS, July 2, 1973.)

[42] In this analysis of the purpose and operations of CSOC I have drawn also on my "Organizing Counter-Insurgency: The Thai Experience," *Southeast Asian Spectrum* (SEATO, Bangkok), January 1974, pp. 45-53.

CSOC's command structure changed over the years. Initially the CSOC Commander was the Deputy Premier and concurrently Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Thai Army. His three deputies were a Deputy Army Commander-in-Chief, representing the Ministry of Defense, the Director General of the Thai National Police (who functions under the Interior Ministry), and an Under Secretary of State, also representing various departments within the Interior Ministry. A top-ranking army officer was in charge of CSOC's Operations Division. By early 1966 the agency had a formal Director, although the Office of the Prime Minister retained ultimate jurisdiction, and a force of nearly 8,000 civilians, military and police of its own, operating out of the offices of the provincial governors and directing various in-the-field counterinsurgency programs. In October 1967, however, the army was given direct anti-insurgency operational responsibilities in the Northeast. CSOC's power was clipped and it became essentially a planning and coordinating body, leaving military operations to the separate army units stationed in the country's logistical regions.

A related aspect of the change in overall CSOC powers has been the increased participation of other government ministries in counterinsurgency. A number of intragovernmental programs, some dating from before 1967 and some short-lived, have contributed to the slowly developing national counterinsurgency posture. Thus the Interior Ministry expanded its Community Development Program (designed to provide administrative training and leadership experience to village headmen and other lower-level officials, as well as to construct public facilities such as schools and village meeting halls), and in the later 1960's experimented with a Developing Democracy Program, basically a form of popular political education including light dosages of Thai history and culture, complete with comic books and films, for villagers in the Northeast. The Ministry of Public Health expanded an integrated rural health improvement campaign with emphasis on rural water supplies and potable water projects, an anti-malaria drive, and instruction in prenatal and infant care, and most of these operations still flourish, though in more self-contained form. The Prime Minister's Office in 1964 initiated an Accelerated Rural Development Program that has concentrated on road building, well digging and other projects to improve the village economic infrastructure.[43]

Both at the provincial and district levels the CSOC command units, headed by governors and district officers, have acted as a general coordinating agency for local counterinsurgency activities. Yet there were wide local differences in the extent to which other agencies and officials accepted CSOC's coordinating role. The principal in-the-field CSOC unit was the District Operation and Coordination Center, which among other things supervised the Village Security Teams, to be discussed presently. Also there has been considerable variety in the quality of lower-level CSOC's, depending on the policy of local governors, district officers and military commanders.

As indicated, in October 1967 actual military operations against the insurgents in the Northeast were left with the Second Army, and by the end of the same year anti-guerrilla action in the northern hill-tribe country was left to the Third Army. Relations between CSOC staff personnel and army field commanders have not always been of the best, and interservice rivalries and personal conflicts, amplified by the complex interlocking of family, professional and bureaucratic interest groups in the Thai political culture, were too often reflected at operational levels in the provinces and districts. Although it was officially averred, from time to time, that CSOC had "operational responsibility" along with the army units engaged in counterinsurgency, such responsibility was usually nominal unless an emergency required close coordination. The operative term preferred by army commanders in dealing with CSOC has been "cooperation." Fears in leading military and civil bureaucratic circles that CSOC, because of its mission, might become "an army within the army," indeed a "state within the state," have been genuine — but so is the impression of outside observers, as well as of interested parties like CSOC Director Lieutenant General Saiyud Kerdphol, that "CSOC needs more authority."[44] Now, with the presumed future phasing out of CSOC, the question may have become academic.

---

[43] *U.S. Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad. Kingdom of Thailand, op. cit.,* p. 630.

[44] David Jenkins, "Changing Tune," *Far Eastern Economic Review,* March 19, 1973, p. 26.

Problems of coordination in CSOC decision-making have been aggravated by a tendency toward excessive administrative subdivision, presumed specialization, and overlapping. The Operations and Coordinating Center — CSOC headquarters in Bangkok — has had six divisions, for Personnel, Intelligence, Operations, Psychological Warfare, Services and Support, and Civil Operations. Additionally, combined advisory committees, sometimes drawing on personnel from other government departments (Intelligence, Logistics, Communications, Publications and "Counter-Operations," Psychological Warfare, Propaganda and Civil Operations), provided liaison staff and bureau conduits. A central Interrogation Center, headed by the Commander of the Special Branch (Political) of the national police's Criminal Investigation Department, was also divided and subdivided into sections (e.g., its Operations Section had three subsections on Information, Interrogations and Reporting). But while the Interrogation Center's linkages with provincial and district CSOC commands were formally assumed to exist, the reality was often different. Captured or surrendered insurgents were more apt to be questioned first by the field intelligence units or local army commands; the CSOC Interrogation Center, through its lower-level agencies, was sometimes bypassed or the last to enter the prisoner interrogation process. The interrogation problem, again, reflects the larger question of agency coordination. Though chaired by the provincial governor, the provincial CSOC has functioned largely under the regional army headquarters, and as often as not the coordination of civil, police and military activities — which provincial CSOC's presumably must provide — has been dependent on the whim of local army commanders.

Basic to all CSOC tactics, at least in theory, has been the so-called CPM principle, referring to cooperation among civil, police and military services. At the village level it was put in practice both in the paramilitary organization of civilians and in the development of "civic mission" programs for the military. Since 1967, however, with the military's assumption of greater operational independence, this principle has not always been applied. Over the years CSOC and Thai counterinsurgency specialists generally have experimented with a number of local defense and security forces. A Volunteer Defense Corps (originally created in 1954), People's Assistance Teams (formed in 1966 and modeled on the Vietnamese experience), and, in Ubon province at one time, Village

Protection Teams, have attempted to enlist the rural population in strengthening their own security. These forces were developed with U.S. assistance. Sometimes under formal Thai army and police supervision, and with CIA advice, then again under the gentle prodding of village and district officials, rural society was (and is) expected to mobilize for self-defense, intelligence gathering, and — implicitly — socio-political integration with the Bangkok political establishment and its interests. The last objective was sought, for example, by the earlier-noted Developing Democracy Program, and by the Interior Ministry's Census Aspiration campaign, which directed extensive but informal inquiries by special officials into the hopes and grievances of villagers. Though designed to demonstrate that "Bangkok cares," the Census Aspiration campaign ran against the reefs of peasant reserve and self-protective deference, and its results have never been made public.

For the past three years the Village Security Team (VST), a ten-man squad of unpaid volunteers led by two policemen, has been the nearest thing to CSOC's in-the-field tactical arm. CSOC headquarters in 1973 claimed that some 600 VST's were operational, about half of these in Nakhon Phanom and adjacent provinces. But various sources, including senior CSOC and army counterinsurgency personnel, assert that perhaps no more than a hundred such teams were regularly on patrol in their village areas. In some places the less than enthusiastic attitude of local civil and military officials curtailed their development. The volunteer nature of the VST (earlier village defense teams were paid, especially if operating regularly in tandem with the army) has also been a deterrent, as has the quality of the participants. In January 1974, for instance, it was discovered that a terrorist attack on the village of Ban Na Sai, in Nong Khai province, in which twenty villagers died, had been perpetrated not by communists but by village defense militia. The incident became a political football, some critics of the counterinsurgency program describing it as Thailand's "My Lai," and defenders arguing that Ban Na Sai had indeed been an insurgent stronghold. Confrontation with the insurgents' roving *Norpatol* has become more frequent in the past year, and although the United States, early in 1973, agreed in a new five-year plan to supply weapons, communications equipment and vehicles to the village defense program,[45] the VST's, as a rule, are no match for the better trained and supplied insurgent units. Plans to develop the VST's into a broad-based, integrated, popular militia, comparable to that organized in South Viet Nam and involving systematic recruitment of up to 15,000 villagers, are supposedly under way.

---

[45] *The Nation* (Bangkok), May 23, 1973.

Within the fluid Thai counterinsurgency program there are few tacks that have not been tried at one time or another. Scanning the relevant documents or conversing with administrative participants and foreign specialists who have assisted in or analyzed the program gives one the impression that the Thais have tried, often halfheartedly, a bewildering array of organizational mechanisms, plans and management innovations, none of which appears to have contributed to a defined and generally understood body of tactical experience. Why some promising counterinsurgency programs lose official approval, few can or will tell.

The army's Mobile Defense Units (MDU's), initiated as early as 1962 in the Northeast, are a case in point. With rare exceptions, all whom the present writer queried had high praise for the MDU. Neither reports from foreign analysts, who are not inclined to mince words, nor Thai sources, usually more circumspect yet often subtly revealing about other aspects of the counterinsurgency program, offer serious criticism.[46] Yet there is now controversy even as to the existence of the MDU program, some authoritative sources claiming that it continues and others maintaining that it is being phased out.

Initially aided by U.S. Army engineer and advisory detachments and operating under the Thai Ministry of Defense, the MDU is basically an army construction unit of about 100 to 120 men, sent on a loyalty-winning propaganda and community-service mission into a specific rural region, especially but not exclusively in the troubled Northeast. Establishing a "main development base" in one village, the unit might send smaller groups to adjacent areas to set up "sub-development bases" and would then engage in a variety of civic mission or civic action projects, similar to those carried on by the military in other developing countries.[47] Projects embraced the construction of roads, bridges, community halls, school buildings, electric generators, wells and water storage facilities; the vaccination of humans and livestock; provision of agricultural information and improvement services, including pest control and the distribution of seeds and farm implements; the scheduling of lectures and films, and the dissemination of printed materials on Thai culture and government. The average stay of an MDU unit in a village or district was about six to eight months, during which time its personnel were on their best behavior in attempting to ingratiate themselves with the peasantry.

---

[46] For one critical glimpse of a supposedly "showcase" MDU village which nevertheless was "full of Communists," see Braestrup, *op. cit.*, p. 62.

[47] On "civic" programs of the Indonesian army see, e.g., Brig. Gen. S. Sokawati, *T.N.I. Dan Civic Mission. Suatu Aspek Pembinaan Wilajah* (Djakarta: Department of Information, Republic of Indonesia, 1963), and Gen. Abdul H. Nasution, *Toward a People's Army* (Djakarta: C. V. Delegasi, 1964), pp. 122-126.

With the assistance of external agencies, from SEATO to the United States Information Service, CSOC has also been engaged along with the Public Relations Office of the Thai National Security Command in various "psywar" (psychological warfare and propaganda) projects. Mobile Information Teams under the direction of the provincial governor's office, and coordinated by CSOC in most areas, have been useful in establishing official contact with dissident areas and in demonstrating government readiness to assist with various public services. Some of the "psywar" tactics, such as tours and informal talks to target villagers by defectors from guerrilla ranks, or film showings and political education meetings under the Community Development Program, have been routine. Others have been more imaginative. Thus, in early 1970 CSOC began distributing some 70,000 bars of soap in the Northeast and North. Some of these, composed of several layers, revealed, as the bar was washed down, brief exhortations to maintain freedom or to report all communists and any suspicious activity. Other bars, in attractive colors, carried a single greeting from the government or the armed forces, or else announced that "soldiers are friends of the people."[48] Brightly colored calendars depicting Thailand's king and his family, maps of Thailand similarly adorned with pictures of the king and queen, and comic books describing the prowess of the Thai military, have also been distributed by CSOC. But while the soap bars have been popular, not much thought appears to have been given by CSOC "psywar" specialists and their U.S. advisers to making an objective and systematic assessment of such propaganda appeals. Given the paternalistic patterns of relationship between government officials and citizenry, the pervasive sense of awe (*kreng*) with which the latter regards the former, and the delicate interplay of status and face-preserving mechanisms in the Thai

[48] David Jenkins, "Thailand — The New Frontier," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, June 4, 1973, p. 25.

system of political values generally, objective assessments admittedly would be difficult to make.[49]

Thai paternalism has affected other dimensions of CSOC operations, particularly in the resettlement or "de-communization" of the northern hill tribes. CSOC officials are not unfamiliar with the political-cultural mainsprings of Meo resistance to Thai authority, and with the nature of communist appeals to the hill folk. But they usually attribute the resistance to the disrupting presence of communist insurgents, not to dissatisfaction resulting from inability to acquire land titles or to government policies preventing the opium trade, stopping deforestation, or habituating the roving tribes to a lowland and more sedentary existence. The hill people, according to CSOC, "being ethnic minorities and preferring freedom and isolation," simply desire "to remain in existence," but the communist insurgency "has disrupted" the Meos' "traditional way of life." With the hardship and even fear of "starvation" this disruption allegedly has brought in its wake, "the side which can provide the necessary security and welfare" is the one that "will be successful in rallying the support of the hill tribes to its cause." The communist insurgents are deceiving the hill tribes into believing that they can provide them with "protection and security."[50]

This reading of the hill tribes' tale of sorrows is accompanied these days by another official Thai perception, i.e., a disparagement of the recommendations made by non-Thai anthropologists called upon in the early 1960's to lend assistance in developing policy toward the hill people. The noncoercive policy of "open-ended integration" or even "nonintegration" advised by these experts would have left the relationship between the tribal communities and "the mainstream of Thai society" largely as it was. An "overemphasis" on anthropological field work, an underestimation of "the human ability to adapt and accommodate to new environmental conditions, physical, psychological or social," and an allegedly widely scattered, unfocused and ineffective welfare policy among the Meos were responsible, in the current Thai view, for the fact that by 1968 "the spread and intensity of insurgency" among the hill tribes had reached the point where a completely different policy became necessary.[51]

---

[49] On these paternalistic patterns see Herbert Rubin, *Will and Awe: The Local Thai Official and Rural Development* (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Mass., 1972), and N. Jacobs, *Modernization Without Development: Thailand as an Asian Case Study* (New York: Praeger, 1971).

[50] *Communist Insurgency in Thailand, op. cit.*, p. 25.

The new policy, avowedly paternalistic and coercive, compelled the hill tribes, and particularly the refugees from the conflict between government security forces and insurgents, to resettle and submit to a government-controlled rehabilitation and "accelerated integration" program, designed to transform them, via carefully supervised stages of readjustment, into "normal" Thai village societies. By 1969 CSOC, operating through the Hill Tribe Division of the Department of Public Welfare and cooperating civil government agencies, had assumed considerable responsibility for the new program. The rationale for it asserts that so long as the hill tribes remain an ethnically distinct element in Thai society they will be targets of communist blandishments, and at the same time takes note that they are increasingly expressing an interest in getting some of the benefits accruing to other Thai citizens from participation in the developing Thai social economy. Their rapid absorption into the agricultural cash economy and marketing and distributive trade systems of the country — by virtue of "the human ability to adapt" — hence is viewed today as the essential first step in neutralizing communist appeals. By the middle of 1973 hundreds of acres in Tak province were reported to be under cultivation by resettled Meos; other hill folks, located in "new" villages, were said to be growing affluent by producing cash crops like corn.[52]

The integration of refugees under CSOC's "accelerated" program has been described as follows:

> . . . once the refugees arrive at the temporary living quarters, they are relocated to a reception centre as quickly as possible to reduce unnecessary hardship and suffering. At these quarters and reception centres the refugees are provided with their essential needs. Then they are given permanent homestead and farm plots in a refugee village. They are supplied with building materials, tools, seeds and fertilizers. In the refugee village, the tribesmen are assisted to become self-sufficient in food production and to earn cash incomes. *They are also treated as full Thai citizens, being given ownership of their plots* and provided with those standard welfare, educational, agricultural and medical services enjoyed by all lowland Thais. The refugee village is declared a normal Thai village and is under the jurisdiction of the local administration. Social and occupational contacts between the different tribes and between the tribesmen and lowland Thais are encouraged.[53]

---

[51] Krachang Bhanthumnavin, "Overcoming the Problems of Resettling Hill Tribes," *Southeast Asian Spectrum*, October 1972, pp. 23-34.

[52] *Bangkok Post*, May 30, 1973; Krachang, *op. cit.*, pp. 30-31.

[53] Krachang, *op. cit.*, p. 30. (Emphasis added.)

But complications remain. Insurgent infiltration and recruitment have not diminished in the northern hills despite — and to an unknown degree perhaps even because of — the new CSOC program.[54] For all the intensified military action, government control remains spotty. The coercive adjustment policy has not eradicated the hill tribes' interest in opium production, while in some resettled areas there have been Meo outbursts against alleged government pressures to change dress or living styles, adopt schooling, and submit to other aspects of "Thaisation." Above all, persisting official attitudes of superiority and suspicion toward the Meos perpetuate a "pacification" context in which the Bangkok government stands in a kind of "colonial" relationship toward a quarter of a million inhabitants on its own national territory. There is little indication as yet that Meos feel more fully integrated because of being offered the benefits of the national socio-economy; to all intents and purposes, they continue to live in a separate (if not counter) political culture of their own.

From 1965 onward the CSOC staff prepared at least eight (and possibly ten — there is some disagreement among the officials concerned) "operational concepts." These were long-term policy plans addressed to specific aspects of the overall counterinsurgency program such as the hill tribe problem, the future of the Vietnamese refugees, the need for new ways to cement relationships between local government and the rural citizenry, the development of village defense systems, and so on. Most of the plans were quite elaborate, and betrayed the helping hand of non-Thai counterinsurgency specialists. But except for the recommendations regarding hill-tribe integration and development of village security forces there are few signs of direct implementation, and queries about the fate of advisories in the plans addressed to other departments of government, particularly in the Interior Ministry, remain sadly unproductive. From many civilian bureaucrats one gets the impression that while developing "operational concepts" is necessary, serious discussion concerning their implementation must await some fundamental and still postponed decisions at the highest level of the government. These decisions involve the degree of purpose with which CSOC or its successor counterinsurgency program should proceed in the changed domestic political climate and in light of changing U.S. relations with People's China and Southeast Asia.

---

[54] Thomas A. Marks, "The Meo Hill Tribe Problem in North Thailand," *Asian Survey*, October 1973, pp. 933, 938 and 941, notes that despite Thai counterinsurgency efforts "the guerrilla movement in the North is estimated to have grown by 15-20% in the last year," and now numbers some 3,000 Meos led by Thai and ethnic Chinese Thai.

III

The fall of the decade-long regime of Premier Thanom Kittikachorn on October 14, 1973, in the aftermath of a wave of student demonstrations and bloody clashes, and the subsequent assumption of office by Premier Sanya Dhamasakdi, seemed to herald meaningful new approaches to the domestic insurgency problem.[55] The change of government also lent emphasis to the need for a different perspective on Thailand's relationship with the United States and China, and on her future regional security interests. Within weeks, however, as strikes, labor unrest and student unruliness engulfed the new government, and as Premier Sanya began intimating that he might have to resign in the face of legislative opposition to his tax measures, the bright promise of a new constitution and elections, and of a more democratic political system generally, seemed to fade. By mid-February 1974 fears of a return to military rule were deepening, while Thai Communist Party statements and Voice of the People of Thailand broadcasts kept attacking the Sanya government for being but "another group from the reactionary ruling class."[56] Although, clearly, the communist insurgency was not abating — indeed, police sources claimed that in the Northeast it was increasing[57] — there was little clarity on the counterinsurgency format following the National Security Council's decision, on January 4, 1974, to dissolve CSOC. Just how the separate army and police units engaged in the formal military aspects of counterinsurgency will mesh their operations with civil technical and rural development efforts and with plans of the National Security Council, which presumably will merge with CSOC, remains to be worked out.

Meanwhile, the government's future anti-insurgency stance is likely to be influenced by its improving relations with Peking, and by the interaction of big-power concerns in the Southeast Asian region. It is well to note that even during the days of deepening Thai dependence on the United States and the development of SEATO, Thailand's policy never precluded the possibility of friendly relations with its communist neighbors. The community of Thai dissidents in Peking has for two decades functioned as an informal conduit between Bangkok and the Chinese government that has never been fully investigated. During the 1960's and early 1970's conciliatory Thai pronouncements directed toward Peking continued to be heard. In June 1966, for example, Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman insisted that his government was not anti-Chinese, and in April 1971 Premier Thanom, while deploring what was alleged to be Chinese-assisted subversion in Thailand, said that if Peking's leaders "stop giving us trouble we can be friends."[58]

---

[55] For details see Justus M. van der Kroef, "Thailand — Loosening the Linchpin," *Art International/The Lugano Review*, May 1974, and "Thailand After Thanom," *Asian Affairs*, January-February 1974, pp. 170-183.

[56] Voice of the People of Thailand in Thai to Thailand, October 21, 1973, 1000 GMT, and November 22, 1973, 1000 GMT (FBIS, October 24 and November 29, 1973); *Far Eastern Economic Review*, February 25, 1974, p. 11. On February 24, 1974 (see FBIS, March 1, 1974), the VPT attacked the Sanya regime's use of local village volunteers to fight the insurgents.

[57] Bangkok Radio, Domestic Service in Thai, February 1, 1974, 0530 GMT (FBIS, February 6, 1974). See also *New York Times*, December 28, 1973. During February 1974 there were frequent clashes with the terrorists (FBIS, March 12, 1974).

Despite hostile exchanges and mutual recriminations in the Thai and Chinese media, a desire for improved if informal contacts between the two countries seemed to be growing. By October 1972, after Thai Vice Premier Prapas Charusathira had observed that the embassy of the (Nationalist) Republic of China in Bangkok was "of no use" to local Chinese, a Thai spokesman admitted that Prapas' remark signified a change in Thai policy toward China, "although it may not be a major one." In the wake of the Kissinger-Le Duc Tho peace talks on Viet Nam, the Thanom government's softening toward its communist neighbors seemed to be accelerating: in January 1973, (1) Premier Thanom announced that Thai diplomats abroad had been given permission to establish "unlimited contacts" with Chinese and other communist delegations; (2) Deputy Premier Prapas said that Peking "can start trading with Thailand as of now," since the communist insurgency in Thailand had been contained; and (3) Thanom's influential son, Colonel Narong Kittikachorn, was even reported to be seeking negotiations with the Thai insurgents. On June 20, 1973, in one of his last major foreign policy statements before his overthrow, Premier Thanom expressed pleasure that Thai relations with China were improving, and added that "time, stability and mutual understanding" would solve remaining problems between the two countries.[59]

---

[58] Likhit Dhiravegin, "Thailand's Foreign Policy Determination," *Journal of the Historical Society* (University of Singapore), December 1971, pp. 66-68, and *Bangkok Post*, April 17, 1971. See also Henry Kamm, "Thailand Cites Own China Moves," *New York Times*, May 16, 1971. At the close of November 1971, during a reception given by the Chinese delegation to which he had been invited, the Thai Ambassador to the UN, Anand Panyarachun, was reported to have been "Thailand's first official to talk personally to Peking's representative." *The Nation*, December 1, 1971 (FBIS, December 1, 1971).

With the advent of the Sanya government the Sino-Thai thaw continued, although in February 1974 Foreign Minister Charunphan Itsarangkun na Ayutthaya declared that the moment had "not yet" arrived for formal diplomatic exchanges and that, at the present stage, improvements in trade should have priority. China had made it known, even before the fall of the Thanom regime, that it approved of the intended "neutralization" of Southeast Asia as envisaged by the so-called Kuala Lumpur Declaration of November 27, 1971, issued by ASEAN (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, which includes Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines and Indonesia).[60]

These warming trends in Sino-Thai relations, along with current Chinese assurances that Peking will refrain from supporting the Thai insurgency, may not sit well with the Thai Communist Party, which has continued to denounce members of Sanya's cabinet. Yet they will undoubtedly influence future Thai perceptions of the country's guerrilla problem, and a more flexible, less militantly anti-communist, even "neutralist" official position could well be of benefit to the insurgents. In a far-reaching address on Thai diplomatic relations, Foreign Minister Charunphan on January 16, 1974 said that the major powers, notably the United States and the USSR, could play a constructive role in the Southeast Asian region. Relations with America would have to be "adjusted," he said, and move away from the "overemphasis" on military cooperation. Relations with Moscow afforded "ample room" for improvement, and the Soviets were "in a strong position" to contribute to the restoration of peace in the Indochina area.[61] Bangkok thus seems to be committing itself to a policy, not unlike that already advocated by Singapore's Premier Lee Kuan Yew, of accepting the inevitability of the major powers' presence and using it to the region's balanced strategic advantage.[62]

Bangkok's overtures to the USSR are remarkable. For more than a generation since the two states established diplomatic ties,

---

[59] *The Asian Student*, October 28, 1972; *Bangkok World*, January 26, 1973; *The Nation*, January 11, 1973; *Bangkok Post*, January 23, 1973; *New York Times*, January 28, 1973; FBIS, January 11 and 23, 1973; *Asia Research Bulletin*, June 1-30, 1973, p. 1916.

[60] Bangkok Radio, Domestic Service in Thai, February 12, 1974, 0000 GMT (FBIS, February 12, 1974); *Asia Research Bulletin*, June 1-30, 1973, p. 1910.

[61] *The Nation*, January 17, 1974 (FBIS, January 17, 1974).

[62] See J.M. van der Kroef, "ASEAN's Security Needs and Interests," *Pacific Affairs*, Summer 1974 (forthcoming).

Soviet-Thai relations have been minimal and cool, but even before the government crisis of last October there were unconfirmed reports of "open Russian activity in Bangkok student circles," and these were followed by news of the formation in southern Thailand of a clandestine pro-Moscow Thai Communist Party.[63] At the close of January 1974, the Bangkok press reported that Soviet Embassy officials were appearing on Thai university campuses and establishing contact with student leaders.[64] Rumors of covert arms shipments into Bangkok (said to be of Chinese or Soviet origin), and perhaps more important, a reported new Soviet survey of "every inch" of Thai coastal lands in preparation for the future presence of a Soviet "blue water fleet"[65] nearby, have all underscored public awareness of the Soviet Union's growing diplomatic and strategic interest in Thailand at the very time that Sino-Thai relations are improving and U.S.-Thai relations are supposed to become less "military." Discussions considering a new and comprehensive Sino-Thai trade agreement have been under way, and in coming months Thailand's contacts with the East European governments are likely to broaden.

The more flexible, wider ranging diplomacy that Bangkok now seems inclined to pursue, especially with respect to the communist powers, remains circumscribed, however, by the importance of the U.S. relationship, both to the domestic Thai economy and to Thailand's security. Calculations about economic inputs must remain speculative, owing to the paucity of hard data and the fact that estimates do not agree. But as early as 1967 U.S. military spending was estimated to represent over 8.5 per cent of the Thai GNP, and in the guerrilla-infested Northeast, no less than one-third of the Gross Domestic Product has been attributable to U.S. military spending in that area.[66] Between 1949 and 1969 total U.S. military assistance and military expenditures amounted to $1,598.5 million (economic assistance in the same period, including loans and grants, totaled $592.4 million), and by May 1973, U.S. Ambassador Leonard Unger was estimating the contribution of the U.S. "military presence" to the Thai economy to be $200 million a year, "outside of American economic and military aid."[67]

---

[63] Frank Mount, "The October Riots in Thailand," *News-Weekly* (Melbourne), January 16, 1974, p. 14.

[64] *Bangkok Post*, January 31, 1974.

[65] *The Nation*, January 19, 1974 (FBIS, January 22, 1974).

[66] *The Asia Magazine*, February 9, 1969, p. 9, and George J. Viksnins, "United States Military Spending and the Economy of Thailand," *Asian Survey*, May 1973, p. 446.

The exact range of U.S. military manpower assistance to the Thais in all types of services, including counterinsurgency programs, remains classified, but over the years there have been significant fluctuations – e.g., from 48,000 in early 1969, to 37,000 early in 1972, to over 40,000 later that same year, to about 33,000 in March 1974. In September 1973, Deputy Foreign Minister Chartchai Chunhawan indicated that some 32,000 U.S. forces would remain after the current "stop-go" withdrawal program is completed and "until the North Vietnamese forces invading Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam return home."[68] During 1973 Thai military and civil officials had alternately emphasized that only "real peace in Indochina" could obviate the necessity for the further presence of U.S. forces and that Thai policy was now "the same as that of American congressmen who want their troops recalled."

Since the Sanya government assumed office, press criticism of the U.S. military presence has become stronger. Reports that a CIA agent sent a spurious letter to Premier Sanya offering a cease-fire to the Thai government in the name of the guerrillas, allegations about illegal activities of Air America, said to be a CIA operation, and the involvement of a CIA unit in CSOC headquarters' intelligence work have spurred the renewed outcry against U.S. "meddling" in Thailand. On the other hand, the alleged "interference" from the Soviet KGB and the "Red China backed Thai communist movement" are also decried, and in light of the political radicalization of Thai university campuses, some segments of the press have expressed concern that an artful cabal may be operating to undermine U.S. influence.[69]

Still, the net effect of all these developments has been to call into question the existing policy and tactical decision-making structure of the Thai counterinsurgency program. There is no certainty regarding an alternative structure or needed new policy initiatives. The resignation of the Sanya government on May 21, 1974, amid mounting public restiveness, labor disputes and continued student agitation, has compounded the uncertainty. At the same time Thai officials, as in Deputy Premier Sukich Nimmanhaeminda's comments on the rising level of insurgent activity, perceived a well-coordinated communist guerrilla attempt to test the country's new regime.[70] Thailand's counterinsurgency record to date does not inspire confidence that she will be able to meet this test.

---

[67] *U.S. Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad. Kingdom of Thailand, op. cit.*, p. 748, and *Bangkok Post*, May 23, 1973.

[68] *Asia Research Bulletin*, September 1-30, 1973, p. 2155.

[69] Editorial, *Prachathipatai* (Bangkok), February 11, 1974 (FBIS, February 14, 1974).

---

[70] *Asia Research Bulletin,* February 28, 1974, p. 2492.

TAIWAN AND NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION*

by George H. Quester

THE Republic of China, governed by the Chinese Nationalists (KMT) on Taiwan, signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty on the first day it was offered, July 1, 1968, and ratified it on January 27, 1970. In the years since then, the world's interest in things Chinese has been focused mainly on the seating of the People's Republic of China (the Communist regime in Peking) at the United Nations in place of the Nationalists, and on the wave of nations switching their diplomatic recognition to the Peking government.[1] Yet the legal gymnastics that have burdened the China-recognition problem may now complicate any effort to keep nuclear weapons from coming into the hands of the Taiwan regime — and the KMT may now have reasons to seek such weapons.

In 1968, immediately after the NPT was offered for signature, one heard Chinese Nationalist diplomats commenting that they had no objections to the treaty, since "it allows us to have the bomb." This might have seemed the purest whimsey at the time, an example of imaginative international lawyers playing their games. Yet the position may indeed have been legally correct, at least vis-à-vis any state that recognized the KMT regime as the government of China in 1968. Neither the Communists nor the Nationalists have ever accepted a diplomatic recognition tendered to the government of less than *all* of China. For the legal purposes of the NPT, countries, not regimes, retain or renounce nuclear weapons prerogatives. If "China" thus has the right to nuclear weapons because it already possessed them in 1967, the only Chinese government that the United States and Canada and the United Nations and its agencies recognized at the time was the one temporarily based in Taipei. True enough, all of "China's" nuclear weapons were then under the control of some Communist rebels on the mainland, but insubordination of this sort might oc-

*This article is a product of conversations the author had with colleagues in the Cornell University Peace Studies Program. A number of the impressions were garnered from interviews in New York and elsewhere, subject to the understanding that there would be no attribution to the public officials or private persons interviewed.

[1] A discussion of the author's views on the rapid pace of developments in Peking-Washington relations can be found in "Some Alternative Explanations of Sino-American Detente," *International Journal*, Spring 1973.

cur in other nuclear-weapons states also, without compromising the recognized government's claim to the weapons.

The United States' recognition of the Taipei-based KMT regime continues as a matter of law. Some big U.S.-produced nuclear reactors are under construction in Taiwan, but under agreements requiring that the plutonium produced be reserved for peaceful purposes, and that this be certified under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspection. If IAEA safeguards should be terminated, the agreement further provides that the reactors revert to supervision by U.S. inspection safeguards. The plutonium production would not be trivial, since plans call for as much as 180 kilograms annually by 1975 when the plants begin to operate, or enough for fifteen or more Hiroshima-sized bombs a year.

Various states have already supplied other, smaller, research reactors to Taiwan, with capacities for a much lower production of plutonium, but nonetheless conceivably applicable to bomb production. A Canadian research reactor constructed in the last two years, for example, will probably produce almost enough plutonium for a bomb a year. Most significantly, however, Canada in the interim has recognized the Peking regime and severed government-to-government relations with Taipei, which will make it somewhat difficult for Ottawa to maintain restrictions on the Nationalist regime with respect to the use of the plutonium produced. The initial Canadian agreement with Taipei requires only IAEA inspection, with no fall-back to Canadian inspection should IAEA safeguards be terminated.

In the wake of the seating of the People's Republic in the United Nations, moreover, similar ousters of the Nationalist representatives have occurred in one after another of the specialized agencies. Most relevant to the present discussion is the expulsion of Nationalist China from the IAEA itself in 1972, over the vocal protests of the United States. Can the KMT regime now consider itself bound by commitments to an IAEA which does not acknowledge the regime's existence? Can it be bound to "peaceful use" agreements with Canada, when Canada recognizes Peking as the regime in authority?

The Chinese Communists have not yet assumed their seat in the IAEA, perhaps in accord with their deliberate and cautious approach to all the international organizations into which they have now been invited. Yet more than deliberation may be at stake, for paradoxically the Peking regime is now insisting on the prior removal of the IAEA inspectors who still watch over U.S. and other reactors on Taiwan. This might easily be explained in that the IAEA presence seems a violation of Peking's claims to sovereignty over the island, but the inspectors' removal would surely complicate the task of keeping the KMT from applying these reactors to the manufacture of a "second Chinese atomic bomb."

II

Should the Nationalist Chinese nuclear weapons capability be dismissed, because the world and the Chinese Communists really have nothing to be concerned about? The answer is no. The capacity of the reactors in Taiwan will soon be sufficient to produce some bombs of Hiroshima size each year. There are more than enough competent physicists and nuclear engineers on Taiwan to handle a bomb project. We have been impressed by the U.S.-trained Chinese physicists who returned to the mainland, and those who remain in the United States, but an impressive group also has gone to Taiwan. Construction of a plutonium processing plant will be a prerequisite, of course, but this is becoming easier year by year, and more and more nations around the world have made the investment; in any event, no large, cumbersome or especially visible facility is required. Assembling reprocessed plutonium into a bomb is not child's play, but it is also something that qualified physicists can learn to do.[2]

If the Nationalist Chinese team had difficulty handling the task by itself, this would still not settle the issue. Cooperation with other states could be arranged easily enough on the basis of commerce or conspiracy. Some states might wish to sell components for a reprocessing plant in order to recover the costs of their own ventures. Other states which themselves are isolated diplomatically might wish to cooperate with isolated Taiwan in securing bomb options. It is not impossible for Israeli physicists to visit Taiwan, or Brazilians or South Africans, or citizens of any other state that has not politically estranged itself from the Nationalist regime.

Are the Chinese Communists thus being foolhardy in insisting on IAEA withdrawal from Taiwan, and in letting the Rumanians make such demands on their behalf from within the processes of the IAEA? Could it be that they still take too seriously their earlier propaganda downplaying the threats of nuclear proliferation, when they not only refused to sign the NPT, but attacked it as a vicious Soviet-American plot? Peking at times in the past has hinted that it would be desirable if many countries around the world, even noncommunist countries, acquired their own atomic bombs, but would this also apply to dissident parts of countries, e.g., to Taiwan seeking to remain a "second China"? Might it even be that the Communists could take secret pride in the ability of their Taiwan-based kinsmen to manufacture nuclear weapons, much as KMT officials expressed pride in the defeats Communist armies inflicted on the United States in Korea in 1950 and on the Indian army in the Himalayas in 1962, and gratification with the Chinese Communists' first nuclear detonation in 1964.

---

[2] A detailed and thoroughly alarming account of the ease of bomb assembly can be found in the three-part article by John McPhee, "Profiles (Theodore B. Taylor)," *The New Yorker*, December 3, 10, 17, 1973.

Yet there are better reasons why the Peking regime has had to resist the maintenance of IAEA inspection on Taiwan. The Communists have a continuing problem in trying to draw Taiwan back into a unified China under their control, for it is by no means certain that the détente with the United States since the Kissinger and Nixon visits assures them of this acquisition. If Chiang's successors in power, either mainlanders or Taiwanese, wished to join the People's Republic, probably nothing could prevent reunion. But if these successors opt for continued autonomy and independence, it is less clear that Peking will be able to overrule them. Moreover, time may not be on Peking's side in this respect.

If the détente with Washington means that American troops will be withdrawn from Taiwan, it also has meant that the Chinese Communists have ever so subtly acquiesced in an understanding that any settlement of the Taiwan question must be by peaceful means — "as the tension in the area diminishes," in the words of the Shanghai communiqué. Whatever their capability of overcoming Taiwan's defenses militarily, they can hardly do this without so much violence and uproar as to violate this condition.

If the Americans valued détente enough, Peking might be able to get away with mobilizing sufficient military force to pressure Taiwan into submission to its rule. This might be rendered easier if most countries soon recognize Peking legally as the *sole* government of all of China, with the United States perhaps following suit. Yet such diplomatic momentum might nevertheless be inadequate to force a reunification, and if the Taiwan regime still survived, and was still attractive as a trading partner, the world might find that it merited some form of "recognition," much as in the case of East Germany. What is more, Taiwan's conventional defenses are now substantial, and the Taiwan Strait is not a trivial moat, even if the U.S. Navy is withdrawn; the U.S. naval presence for some time has involved only the token deployment of a single destroyer.

III

Against this background, Peking has to be especially troubled by how to handle a threat of nuclear proliferation from Taiwan. Were the KMT regime to acquire its own nuclear weapons, it could probably deter any Communist invasion of the island. A "Republic of China bomb" would certainly reinforce an image around the world that the Republic of China had re-established its independence and gained political stature as Nuclear Power Number 7 (instead of 5B).

Even rumors of Nationalist nuclear weapons projects or aspirations will have some of this effect. Yet here lies the dilemma for the Peking government. Although IAEA safeguards may prevent nuclear weapons production, they also are an institutionalized reminder to the world that such production is possible, that Taiwan remains independent. For the IAEA to be present on the island, or even for U.S. or Canadian inspectors to be present, is to enhance the independent status of Taiwan and/or the Republic of China, to the detriment of the claim of the mainland People's Republic. In short, a nationalist atomic bomb might end Peking's dreams of the recapture of Taiwan; an IAEA presence might prevent the development of such a bomb; yet the IAEA presence might itself stand in the way of the absorption of Taiwan by reminding the world of its nuclear weapons potential, or at least by treating Taiwan as a separate political entity to be policed in accordance with the international agreements it has initialed.

Communist China thus has to take a chance that the KMT will not acquire the bomb in the short run when foreign safeguards are terminated. Ideally for Peking, the Canadians would pack up their reactor and take it home with them as part of the new deference to Peking's authority, but this is probably already physically impossible. Canada, like other countries switching their recognition from one "China" to the other, will not wish to lose commercial advantages through an overly rigorous or precipitate reading of international law. The temptation will be strong to carry on with nuclear cooperation as before, with or without a blanket of IAEA inspection, at least until the Nationalist Chinese begin blatantly exploiting that cooperation for military purposes. But no matter what the Ottawa government decides to do, the Chinese on Taiwan will soon be independent of Canadian cooperation and able to operate the facilities for their own purposes.

The Communist ideal would similarly be for the United States to prevent the bigger reactors from being completed, by withdrawing necessary nuclear equipment and expertise (including any IAEA and/or American inspectors) along with the 8,000 military personnel that are slated to be withdrawn from Taiwan. This is also most unlikely, however, in part because of the commercial interests of General Electric and in part for political reasons to be discussed. There are some serious longer-term risks, therefore, that an unsafeguarded Taiwan nuclear industry might offer a bomb option to the KMT. Yet Peking may still have to take its chances with the short run, since its hopes for reunification over the longer term do not look promising. If Taiwan has not merged with Communist China for political or military reasons by 1979, it may never merge.

All of this may conversely make it attractive for any Taiwan-based regime — KMT or even Taiwan Independence — to seek to acquire at least a nominal nuclear weapon as directly as possible. But what could be a meaningful deterrent threat in this case? Could Chiang cold-bloodedly destroy Peking or Shanghai, killing millions of the Chinese he professes to want to liberate from communism? The same kind of inhibition has presumably precluded Peking from threatening to drop H-bombs on Taipei to force a reunification. Aside from Peking's announced policy of never using nuclear weapons first, what kind of a country would atom-bomb a dissident province into submission? Similar considerations have ruled out nuclear threats against the Nationalist positions on Quemoy and Matsu, small islands basing a large fraction of Chiang's conventional forces; there is no question, at the moment, of these forces plausibly threatening to storm ashore on the mainland and topple the Communist government.

Nevertheless, the intra-Chinese deterrent potential of a Taiwan atomic bomb, even a crude plutonium bomb, cannot be dismissed easily. Chiang could assuredly not use such bombs to force the mainland to accept KMT rule again, yet they would be tactically useful against Communist amphibious invasions, since amphibious forces classically have had to be concentrated to fight their way ashore. If a nuclear device promised to be effective in defending against such an attack, it might *ipso facto* deter such an attack. Also, a Nationalist retaliatory stroke could be aimed at some "prestige target" on the mainland, an industrial complex or dam that had become a showpiece of Maoist achievement, or perhaps Yenan, the legendary "secure rear area" of Mao's revolution. Finally, no one could exclude the possibility that, in the last moment of a losing battle, a Taipei regime would simply destroy as many Chinese mainland cities as it could reach. This might be especially credible if a Taiwanese independence regime had in the meantime taken root, emphasizing its ethnic differences from the mainland — but it could not even be ruled out as a last gasp of spoilsport revenge from a Chinese KMT ruler such as Chiang himself.

Already there are rumors abroad that the Taipei regime has been soliciting bids in Europe for help on a plutonium reprocessing plant, whose function would be to prepare plutonium for use in bombs. Rumors of this type are sometimes spurred by the propaganda mills of states trying to blacken the reputation of other states, but what government has an interest in hinting falsely that Nationalist China is reaching for the A-bomb? While Moscow perhaps could profit by accusing Israel of cooperating with South Africa on nuclear weapons work, the Soviets do not have a similar interest these days in attacking the Taiwan regime politically. It is also not to Peking's interest to call attention to the KMT's nuclear weapons options, as we have noted. The point is, whether or not the rumors are true, it will not be as difficult for the Chinese Nationalists to solve the plutonium reprocessing and bomb assembly problems as many of us might have supposed.

Moreover, once IAEA safeguards come to seem inoperative, such rumors are likely to circulate no matter what the Nationalists do, no matter what Moscow or Peking would like us to believe. It is not clear that the Taipei regime would regret this, because even hints of a Chinese Nationalist nuclear capability can augment the political standing of Chiang's government. This was illustrated immediately after Nixon's visit to the mainland, when a member of the Taipei Parliament made news by proposing that the Republic of China now move to acquire nuclear weapons,[3] for a proposal of this type probably could not have been offered without the permission of the government. The Nationalists may not have to go so far as to assemble and detonate nuclear weapons, if rumors and trial balloons work to keep a Communist take-over of Taiwan from being seen as a likely prospect. But if Taiwan had

[3] *Mainichi Daily News* (Tokyo), March 3, 1972.

to produce atomic bombs in fact, and perhaps detonate one as a demonstration, this would not pose any great difficulties.

Peking's quandary regarding the nuclear proliferation question thus remains acute where Taiwan is concerned. Two "Chinese nuclear stockpiles" would probably forever guarantee "two Chinas," unless communism became attractive for both the people and the regime on Taiwan. Indeed, even the *risk* of two nuclear stockpiles tends to support two Chinas; and concrete steps addressed to limiting this risk, such as IAEA safeguards, have the same effect.

IV

What about American attitudes at this point: Is the Nixon Administration in a similar quandary? The Republican administration has not been enthusiastic about pressing forward with the NPT, to be sure, but it is bound by the treaty, and its sales of reactors to the Republic of China have all included bans on military use. Plans for the redeployment of stockpiled American nuclear weapons from Okinawa to Taiwan late in 1971 were apparently canceled as a gesture to Peking;[4] and two nuclear-equipped F-4's were withdrawn from Taiwan just before the Nixon visit to China in February of 1972.[5] These weapons would have been fairly reliably under American control, but their deployment on Taiwan might have muddied the waters nonetheless.

There is nothing legally to prevent the Nixon Administration from acquiescing in the KMT's legal rationalization noted earlier: "China" is entitled to nuclear weapons under the NPT, so the United States would not be violating the treaty by supplying or tolerating such weapons for the "China" it recognizes. However, granting that the Nixon Administration would not tolerate weapons produced via American-supplied reactors, would it intervene firmly to prevent the military use of plutonium from Canadian reactors no longer legally subject to inspection by anyone? If a single bomb could be put together on the basis of Canadian-supplied facilities, this might be enough to get Taiwan into the "club," with American and other resistance to bomb production fading thereafter.

In some ways, the American quandary regarding Taiwan is similar to that involved in the U.S. relationship with Israel. The

---

[4] *New York Times*, July 20, 1971.
[5] *Ibid.*, February 29, 1972.

Nixon Administration probably does not want either country to acquire nuclear weapons, but it also wants neither to be overwhelmed militarily or stigmatized politically. It can be argued that the United States has long had "two Chinas" as its goal, with Chiang's talk of reconquering the mainland merely serving as rhetoric to bolster the KMT regime. Washington has to realize that nuclear weapons would solve some of the security and independence problems for Israel and Taiwan but that nuclear proliferation in general would be difficult to contain thereafter. More immediately, it has reason to be reluctant to criticize or pressure either regime openly on the nuclear proliferation issue, lest this damage the existing political relationships, as the Arabs and Peking respectively desire. A few Americans might thus privately welcome a Taiwan atomic bomb as ensuring "two Chinas" once and for all. On the assumption that it could be rationalized as not constituting a violation of the NPT, it *might* not lead to the development of nuclear weapons programs in other countries, although Japan surely would be provoked. Most American officials would regret Taiwan's acquiring a bomb, but they would probably be reluctant to do everything required to stop it.

Actually, because of Washington's changes in policy since 1970, there is less that the United States can do now to force the KMT to stay away from nuclear weapons. It forfeited a great deal of good will in Taipei by opening relations with Peking. Moreover, the retaliatory options open to the KMT have probably been underrated. Manufacturing atomic bombs could be one way of responding to Washington's dealings with Peking, partially in retaliation, but also as a necessary measure of insurance. Many observers were wrong in assuming that the Nationalist government would fade away once it was deprived of total American support. In a paradoxical way, the termination of full U.S. support for the Nationalists may after a time give their regime a little more standing internationally, for Taipei no longer seems simply a creature of U.S. foreign policy when it occasionally acts in defiance of U.S. wishes. A decision to produce atomic bombs would proclaim this change of role to the world.

The American opening to Peking has induced many commentators to suggest that Taiwan inevitably must fall under some tight or loose mainland suzerainty. If analogy with the outside world is allowed, the cultural, historical and geopolitical arguments for this outcome are subject to challenge. The Taiwanese, to be sure, are culturally Chinese, but so are the majority of Singapore's residents. Austrians are culturally German, as are the residents of the German Democratic Republic. Is Bonn to be allowed the same prerogatives that must follow from Peking's *"Anschluss"* of Taiwan? If Taiwan could now defend itself militarily against Peking's occupation, there would be virtually no thought of a merger resulting simply from its loss of UN membership, or even from an American recognition of Peking as the government of all of "China."

There is a remote chance of the world being so alarmed and angry at the further proliferation caused by a Chinese Nationalist A-bomb that it would insist on the speedy unification of the two Chinas and their two nuclear forces into one China with one force — by violence and military pressure if necessary, with the United States enjoined from interfering. Yet the risk for Taiwan is not likely to be greater than the one India took in exploding her first nuclear device. Regrettably, were Israel, or Brazil, or Taiwan to affront the world with a nuclear detonation, they would probably be accorded as much enhanced respect as censure — a pattern evidenced in the recent Indian case.

For the moment, the United States can attempt to have its cake and eat it by firmly resisting efforts to withdraw the IAEA from Taiwan. This might serve two American purposes: compromising Peking's claims to sovereignty, and simultaneously making it more difficult for Taipei to divert material to bomb production. The outcome of this kind of blocking move is not assured, however, since most members of the United Nations have been in the mood to appease Peking on all conditions of membership. If other states become frightened enough of the threat of a KMT bomb, this may yet reverse the decision processes of the International Atomic Energy Agency, but the tendency now seems to be to heed Peking's demands.

V

The Taiwan issue may be most fascinating in the end for the mixture of European and Oriental diplomatic traditions it illustrates. The European practice manifest in the above reference to West German tolerance for Austrian or East German independence dominates the diplomacy of most of the globe. Yet the Chinese tradition of tolerance for differing degrees of local autonomy within a nominal subordination also may be relevant here. Does China lay claim to Hong Kong and Macao? Peking succeeds in leaving this question muddied by Western standards, but in ways that may ultimately allow it to reclaim the two areas without violence or fuss. Accordingly, is Peking intent on clarifying its sovereignty over Taiwan, or will it be content to muddy this issue also, in a way designed to make a unified China inevitable? The varying phraseology in statements tendering foreign diplomatic recognition to Peking has made them hard to classify on the basis of European diplomatic protocol, but in the Chinese Communist view they might be all that was required to pave the way to the termination of Taiwan's independence.

All of this assumes that Peking can mobilize real political attractions and psychological pressures to bring Taiwan's rulers and population home without violence. The Western view is skeptical that such attractions and pressures exist. If Peking's optimism on this score were justified, however, its tolerance of nuclear weapons for Taiwan could make perfect sense. What better way to remind the world that Taiwan is part of China than to have it share in the Chinese nuclear birthright? Should Taiwan diplomats or others rationalize a KMT nuclear weapon — *despite* the KMT signature on the NPT in this case — on the grounds that there is only one China, Peking could enthusiastically agree to the premise. But assuredly such a prognosis is too sanguine from Peking's point of view. A Nationalist atomic bomb may invalidate the "one China" premise much more than proving it.

PEKING AND WASHINGTON IN A NEW BALANCE OF POWER*

by T. C. Rhee

SKEPTICISM about the seemingly rapid development of relations between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the United States still persists. The repeated visits of Dr. Kissinger to Peking, the spectacular news surrounding President Nixon's summit in China, and the subsequent "agreements" reached by the two governments — both announced and subtly implied — have failed to convince many people, including major political figures in both countries, that these activities represent a fundamental, long-term improvement in relations. Senator Goldwater states in all seriousness that he never heard President Nixon mention "détente" in reference to Sino-American relations, and that in case of a war between the Soviet Union and China the United States could be embroiled on the Soviet side;[1] meanwhile, in China mysterious and enigmatic attacks on Confucius, Lin Piao and Beethoven have led some Western observers to fear that the new moderation in Peking's foreign policy might be short-lived.

Numerous questions are being posed concerning Peking-Washington relations, even as Kissinger assures Peking that the newly forged friendship with the Chinese will continue regardless of the particular occupant of the White House.[2] On the other hand, while Peking is presumed to have made pledges to abstain from military solutions to disputes, suddenly a military conflict erupts over the Paracels in the South China Sea. Although acknowledging American ties, the PRC fulminates over "imperialism and social imperialism" and a superpower conspiracy to dominate the world.

Censorship of the Watergate affair is still strict in Moscow and in Peking. The issues surrounding Solzhenitsyn, *The Gulag Archipelago*, Jewish emigration, wheat deals, Sakharov, and most-favored-nation treatment are debated acrimoniously in Washington. En route to Cuba, Brezhnev cables a message of peace and détente to Washington while simultaneously chiding

---

*This is a revised and expanded version of a paper originally presented at the Twelfth Working Session of the Centre d'Etude du Sud-Est Asiatique et de l'Extreme-Orient held in Waterloo, Belgium, in May 1973.

[1] *U.S. News & World Report*, February 11, 1974, p. 42.

[2] *Peking Review* (hereafter cited as *PR*), November 16, 1973, p. 7.

Castro against the exportation of revolutions. Utterly confusing as these events seem amid the rapid "secularization" of global political conditions (apparently devoid of ideological determinism),[3] a thread of consistency can still be discerned in the tantalizing relations between the Chinese and the Americans.

Although only a few weeks separated the Paris cease-fire agreement on Viet Nam and Kissinger's tête-à-tête with Mao in Peking in February 1973, the PRC, to the surprise of many, made good her earlier promise to substantiate ties with the United States — first cultivated in dramatic fashion by the visit of President Nixon to China. While the 1972 Shanghai Communiqué was vague, the Chinese leadership had made emphatically clear the limitations it placed on burgeoning relations with the United States. Peking had warned that unless and until the United States completely abrogated her remaining diplomatic and military ties with Taipei and fully and unequivocally acknowledged the PRC's legal position as the sole government for all of China, full diplomatic relations would not be contemplated.

The long and tortuous conflict in Viet Nam had reached the point where the overt American military role could cease. However, between the Paris agreement and Kissinger's visit to Peking, no clear picture had emerged to indicate how the complex machinery of peace would actually function and what kind of political conditions would evolve in the post-agreement period. Nonetheless, Peking viewed the agreement as justification for expanding the détente with the United States into an almost formal entente.

Of particular significance is the fact that the agreement to open liaison offices in Peking and Washington and the various trade agreements were reached in spite of America's continuing ties, although tenuous and dwindling, with Taiwan and the absence of U.S. diplomatic recognition of the PRC. Furthermore, there has been a growing indication that the discussions during Kissinger's visit involved subjects beyond those officially announced by the two sides and produced understandings bordering on a political and military commitment, to wit: (1) A preliminary understanding that the United States would provide minimal, if not guaranteed, military assistance to China in the event of a Soviet military attack. Such an arrangement has since been at least partially confirmed, for Kissinger's November 1973 visit to China allegedly involved negotiations on Peking's purchase of heavy military hardware from the United States.[4] (2) A mutual understanding that the United States would render assistance, presumably diplomatic efforts, to deter or prevent such an attack. (3) Enlarged economic relations, involving expanded trade ties and various forms of cooperation in developing China's resources including offshore oil deposits — an enterprise potentially upsetting to the global economic and political balance of power. The spectacular increase in American trade with China to well over $1 billion in 1973 could be an indicator of things to expect in the future. (4) An agreement to assist Chinese projects for agricultural progress.[5]

---

[3] See Vernon D. Aspaturian, "Soviet Union, USA, China in the Seventies," *Survey*, Spring 1973, pp. 103-122.

With the brief interruptions of the Brezhnev visit to the United States in June and the October war in the Middle East, the process of consolidating relations between the United States and China continued through 1973. Kissinger's November visit to Peking not only confirmed the existing ties but further expanded the areas of agreement.[6] The wide-ranging accord included an agreement on cultural and scientific exchanges, various trade pacts and a "flow of information" agreement, and a significant expansion of the role of the liaison offices to embrace functions normally conducted by embassies. In addition, the two parties reportedly discussed the Chinese desire to purchase American weapons.

The unexpected major agreements in February and November 1973 certainly constituted an important turnabout in Peking's stance and a demonstration by both parties, at least for the time being, of an unusual degree of realism.[7] How should one interpret such a turn of events?

Primarily, it must be assumed that Peking and Washington are keenly aware of the precarious and uncertain fluctuations in the world balance of power and have decided to coordinate their efforts to ensure reasonable equilibrium and stability on regional and global levels. At least in public statements, they seem to be determined to resist great-power attempts to establish "hegemonic" control (presumably meaning the Soviet Union and possibly Japan) over vital regions of the world. Unquestionably, both Peking and Washington are concerned with Soviet aims in Europe, the Middle East, Southeast Asia and the Far East; with growing Soviet military strength, particularly the increasing naval penetrations into the Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean;[8] and (especially China) with the prospect of Brezhnev's proposal for an Asian collective security system.

---

[4] It was reported that Kissinger's visit to Peking after the October 1973 Middle East war "touched on a surprising subject" of arms purchase negotiations — involving tanks, armored personnel carriers, transport helicopters, and the like. See *Newsweek*, December 23, 1973.

[5] See, for example, Joseph Alsop, "Thoughts out of China — I: Go versus No-Go," *New York Times Magazine*, March 11, 1973.

[6] For the full text of the communiqué, see *PR*, November 16, 1973, p. 10.

[7] The November communiqué denoted a curious Chinese position, possibly signaling a change. The statement read in part: "The Chinese side reiterated that the normalization of relations . . . can be realized only on the basis of confirming the principle of one China." No mention was made about the residual American presence in Taiwan. In response to this Chinese position, Kissinger assured Peking that the progress made thus far between the two countries would continue through succeeding administrations in Washington.

In Asia the PRC and the United States, aware that the dangerous and unpredictable stalemate in Indochina is a matter of concern to all the great powers, are seeking jointly to ensure regional stability and block the intrusions of other powers (such as Japan and the Soviet Union) that would prove detrimental to both.[9] Clearly, the hostilities in the area — in spite of the cease-fire agreement — will continue for a prolonged period and could entangle a number of powers in a new struggle. If this were to happen, the conflict would be an entirely different one, because of the revolutionary changes that have occurred in global alignments.[10] Washington and Peking realize that such a new situation in Indochina could not fail to be a catalyst reordering regional and global lineups.

The two key factors affecting regional developments are (1) the evolution of complex relations among the United States, the Soviet Union, China and Japan, with the Sino-Soviet conflict playing a pivotal role; and (2) the course of the Sino-American détente/entente.

China in particular has made several major foreign policy adjustments. First, in a striking departure from its traditional stance, Peking on several occasions has recognized the need for the

---

[8] For the PRC's treatment of the subject, see "Soviet Navy: Why in the Sea of Japan?," *PR*, July 6, 1973; "Soviet Naval Ships in Chittagong," *ibid.*, June 22, 1973; "Every Inch a Hegemonic Sea Power," *ibid.*, October 12, 1973; "New Tsars, Old Dream: Social Imperialism's Expansion in South Asia and Indian Ocean," *ibid.*, December 7, 1973.

[9] Hoping that the situation in Southeast Asia "will not be exacerbated by actions of any outside country," Kissinger stated on November 21, 1973 that the United States placed "primary emphasis" on the "substance" rather than the "form" of communications and consultations with the PRC, and that "both sides had an obligation to do their utmost" to bring about "a general condition of stability and tranquility" in Asia. Press Conference, Department of State News Release, November 21, 1973, p. 3.

[10] Undoubtedly, the oil crisis caused by the Arab embargo and increased prices could further complicate the global alignment, particularly as to the West European nations and Japan. See Flora Lewis, "Gromyko's Talks in Paris Signal Warmer Relations," *New York Times*, February 17, 1974.

American-Japanese security treaty and has stressed the importance of the American military presence from Japan to Thailand as a counterweight to the USSR.[11] Second, the Chinese leadership apparently has endorsed Japan's defense buildup provided it does not involve the revival of militarism and the manufacture of nuclear weapons, and has even contemplated (without elaboration) possible Chinese military assistance to Japan in case of a Soviet attack in East Asia aimed at Japan. Peking has also hinted at the possibility of an undefined coordination of military efforts by Japan, the United States and the PRC against the Soviet Union.[12] Third, Peking has renewed its support of Japan's territorial claims against Moscow, abandoned Chou En-lai's "Four Principles of Trade," originally aimed against Japan, and at least for the moment acquiesced in the Japanese presence on Taiwan. Fourth, the PRC has increased her efforts to complete a limited nuclear capability – offensive and defensive – that would comprise major launching sites (reportedly in Yunnan and Szechuan provinces), large-scale underground urban shelters, an anti-missile early warning system, and data processing equipment.[13]

---

[11] In the latest statement to this effect, Peking's Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei told Nakazue Eiichi (of Japan's Democratic Socialist Party), a member of a Diet delegation to Peking in October 1973, that the PRC did not expect Japanese militarism to be revived and that it was not realistic to abolish the Japanese-American security arrangement at this time due to the Soviet military threat. See *Hankook Ilbo* (Seoul), December 18, 1973; "Thai Aide Reports China's Assurance on Red Insurgents," *New York Times*, February 17, 1974.

For Soviet comments, see: V. Kudryavtsev, "Problems and Opinions: Wandering in Search of New Path," *Izvestia*, November 2, 1972, p. 4, reprinted in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (hereafter cited as *CDSP*), November 29, 1972, pp. 1-3; I. Aleksandrov, "On Certain Tactical Features of the Peking Leadership's Current Policy," *Pravda*, September 5, 1972, pp. 4-5, in *CDSP*, October 4, 1972, pp. 1-5; Tomas Kolesnichenko, "Forces Left Behind," *Pravda*, October 9, 1973, p. 5, in *CDSP*, November 7, 1973, p. 16.

[12] Chou En-lai has referred to the subject on several occasions, as reported after Tanaka's visit in September 1972. In October, Chi Peng-fei repeated the theme. In a related move, it was reported in April 1973 that Japan was planning to send within the year several military attachés to her Peking embassy. (See *Dong-A Ilbo* [Seoul], April 30, 1973. For the Soviet report, see Boris Krymov, "Behind the Scenes of Events: A New Guardian?," *Literaturnaya gazeta*, January 1, 1973, in *CDSP*, February 14, 1973, pp. 10-11.) According to Moscow, quoting *Kyodo Tsushin*, Chou stated that China welcomed "reasonable growth" of Japan's military strength as a counterweight to the USSR's "aggressive designs" on Asia. Chou also stated that China would join Japan in fighting against Moscow, "even alongside the forces of the United States."

[13] See T. C. Rhee, "Sino-Soviet Military Conflict and the Global Balance of Power," *The World Today*, January 1970, pp. 29-37. The New China News Agency (NCNA) reported on November 20, 1973 that the PRC had developed laser-guided missiles and conducted related research in other weapons fields. (See *Hankook Ilbo*, November 21, 1973.) In this context, the recent military clashes over the Paracels may involve, besides oil, Peking's attempts to pre-empt a Soviet naval presence in the area.

The United States, too, despite earlier speculations about the Nixon Doctrine, is engaged now in erecting a new line of defense both in the Pacific and along the coastal regions of East, Southeast and South Asia and shows renewed determination to maintain a strong presence in Asia. Recognizing the strategic importance of the region, Washington has decided to deploy in the Pacific by around 1977-1978 a fleet of Trident submarines, each equipped with two dozen MIRV'ed ICBM's with a range of close to 4,600 miles, capable of striking any Soviet target — an unmistakable deterrent to Soviet ambitions in East Asia.[14] Furthermore, the generally negative impact of the Middle East war on the Soviet-American détente; Moscow's heavy emphasis on weapons development, including its successful tests of MIRV warheads and advanced naval buildup and deployments;[15] political pressures on the Arabs to maintain the oil embargo; slow and tortuous progress in SALT II and MBFR talks; and various trade problems complicated by the effects of "Watergate" have generated a more cautious American approach toward negotiations with Moscow. The apparent reappraisal of American nuclear strategy as shown in Defense Secretary James Schlesinger's statement on retargeting American missiles against the Soviets, the development of MARV warheads, General Andrew Goodpaster's Senate testimony urging the tactical use of smaller nuclear weapons for ground combat in Europe,[16] and the increased military budget requests for FY 1974 seem to hint of a growing skepticism in Washington about the durability of a détente with Moscow. U.S. policy might have to be geared to deter further Soviet advances in the global arena.[17]

---

[14] *New York Times*, February 17, 1973.

[15] See Neville Brown, "The Myth of an Asian Diversion," *Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies*, September 1973.

[16] *New York Times*, January 27 and February 5, 1974.

[17] For the limited value of the détente, see Walter Laqueur, "Here Comes Mr. Brezhnev: A New Era — or Mostly Bubbles?," *New York Times Magazine*, June 17, 1973; "Détente: Western and Soviet Interpretations," *Survey*, Summer 1973, pp. 74-87; and "Détente: What's Left of It?," *New York Times Magazine*, December 16, 1973; also, Leslie Gelb, "Arms Parley Splits Nixon Administration," *New York Times*, December 9, 1973. For the PRC's views, see "Détente: Smokescreen Cannot Cover Up Military Ambitions in Europe," *PR*, December 21, 1973, pp. 4-5. For Soviet views, see F. Ryzhenko, *Pravda*, August 22, 1973, in *CDSP*, September 19, 1973, pp. 5-6. He wrote in part: "The peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems does not in the least mean any recognition of the permanence of capitalism. . . . The Soviet Union and other socialist countries, in fighting for a lasting peace, do not forget that forces hostile to peace have not laid down their arms. Our party calls attention to the need for constant vigilance and readiness to administer a rebuff to the intrigues of the aggressive circles of imperialism. . . ."

SINO-SOVIET CONFLICT

The transformation of the Peking-Moscow ideological split of the 1950's and 1960's into a potential military conflict has produced a series of diplomatic revolutions. First, there was the gradual détente and then a rapid entente between Washington and Peking as a counterweight to Soviet designs in Asia and elsewhere. Second, increasing differences arose between the United States and Japan over relatively minor matters, soon followed by more fundamental discords produced by the "Nixon shocks" over trade and China policy, and by the embargo on, and higher cost of, petroleum after October 1973. Third, various Kremlin countermeasures to nullify the development of potentially anti-Soviet alignments created a climate of instability. For one thing, Moscow's continued military buildup along the Chinese borders probably indicated that the Soviets were developing several levels of options vis-à-vis China. Given the obvious dangers of a pre-emptive attack on China, the Soviets might simply have been trying to moderate Peking's anti-Soviet stance by posing the *threat* of a military solution; or they may have sought to retard the pace of the Sino-American détente by lending encouragement to Chinese factions more favorable toward the USSR in the PRC's decision-making machinery. It is also conceivable that the Soviet Union may have been using military threats more ambitiously; for instance, to effect fundamental shifts in Chinese political leadership — even the collapse of the Mao-Chou line — so that leaders more conciliatory toward Moscow might gain strength and reverse the trend toward more friendly Sino-American relations.

In this context, Brezhnev's proposal for an Asian collective security arrangement and his nebulous doctrine on the limited sovereignty of socialist states[18] might have been designed not for actual implementation but rather for applying psychological constraints on Peking's anti-Soviet policies.[19] Other measures taken by Moscow with the aim of containing China included: (1) efforts to improve relations with Tokyo, apparently to detach Japan from the United States and to prevent a Tokyo-Peking alignment, which would by nature be anti-Soviet; (2) consolidation of ties with India — through an ill-defined and open-ended treaty — and Bangladesh; (3) continued support of North Viet Nam's hard-line policies in Indochina through reconfirmation of economic and military assistance as a means of drawing Hanoi closer to Moscow's orbit and of embroiling China and the United States in a paralyzing situation, which would ultimately frustrate their efforts to improve relations; (4) belated but significant recognition of Sihanouk as head of the Cambodian regime; and (5) initiation of yet ill-defined contacts with South Korea, generally aimed at complicating the major powers' relations with respect to the Korean peninsula.[20]

---

[18] For Peking's views on this, see *PR*, July 27 and August 24, 1973.

[19] For views in part similar to this, see Brown, *op. cit.* In general, the Soviet Union views the European security conference as providing the eventual multilateral acknowledgment of postwar boundaries in Europe, which in turn would strengthen the Soviet position against Chinese irredentism in Siberia. The Soviets hope that the proposed Asian security system will accomplish the same in Asia — Asian multilateral safeguards for national boundaries.

In a countermove, the PRC has made serious and systematic efforts to erode Soviet influence in key areas: Western Europe, the Middle East, Japan, Latin America and Africa.[21] Chinese efforts in Europe have gradually broadened from supporting the dissident communist states' autonomy against Moscow to cultivating more flexible ties with the EEC members (including West Germany, obviously to influence the nature of her *Ostpolitik*), encouraging a tougher and more unified Western stand against the Soviet Union on security issues, and especially supporting the continued military presence of the United States.[22] Undoubtedly, Peking has taken these measures, as well as dangling the growing lure of expanded trade with China, in order to curtail Soviet freedom in Asia.

---

[20] Following South Korea's offer to negotiate with "non-hostile" communist states, Seoul attempted a diplomatic approach to the Soviet Union. South Korea's participation in Moscow's Universiad games and conscious efforts to establish diplomatic contacts with Moscow through Tokyo, Brussels, New Delhi, and lately Helsinki resulted in the Kim (Dong Jo)-Dobrynin meetings in Washington in 1973. Of particular interest is Seoul's agreement with India to elevate their diplomatic ties to embassy level. The visit to India by General Chung Il Kwon, the speaker of the ROK National Assembly and Premier Kim Jong Pil's statement of "official interest" in "Asian collective security" are to be construed as Seoul's desire to enter into diplomatic ties with Moscow. On the other hand, it was reported that the Soviet Union had approached South Korea for an understanding to facilitate the passage of the Soviet fleet through the Korea Strait. Moreover, the Soviets have charged that the PRC is the main obstacle to solving the Korean problem, and their preference is for the simultaneous admission of the two Koreas into the United Nations — a policy diametrically opposed to Peking's and Pyongyang's. *Far Eastern Economic Review* (hereafter cited as *FEER*), September 24, 1973, p. 20; *Christian Science Monitor*, September 7, 1973.

[21] On Western Europe, see "Superpower Rivalry in Middle East Expedites West European Unity," *PR*, December 7, 1973, pp. 13-14. On Latin America, see William E. Ratliff, "Communist China and Latin America, 1949-1972," *Asian Survey*, October 1972, pp. 846-863. On the possible visit of Perón to China, see *U.S. News & World Report*, June 4, 1973. On Africa, see George T. Yu, "Peking's African Diplomacy," *Problems of Communism*, March-April 1972, pp. 16-24. Concerning the Tan-Zam railway and the reported Chinese naval base construction at Dar es Salaam, see *U.S. News & World Report*, August 21, 1972, p. 3.

[22] See Giovanni Bressi, "China and Western Europe," *Asian Survey*, October 1972, pp. 819-845. For the Brezhnev Doctrine, see R. Judson Mitchell, "The Brezhnev Doctrine and Communist Ideology," *The Review of Politics*, April 1972, pp. 190-209. See also *New York Times*, August 27, 1972. Although Pompidou's

Peking has also been hard at work trying to dislodge entrenched Soviet influence among the Arab states — at one time by supporting the radical wing of the Palestinian movement, but now largely by exposing the double-edged Soviet policies. Huang Hua, PRC ambassador at the United Nations, strongly denounced the Soviets for "deliberately maintaining a period of no-war, no-peace" in the region through policies designed to widen the Soviet sphere of influence.[23] He further charged that Moscow's policy of simultaneously supplying weapons to Arabs and releasing Jewish manpower to Israel by liberalizing Soviet emigration regulations had created in the Middle East a stalemate, fundamentally *detrimental to the Arabs, which Moscow exploits for its own goal* of regional domination.[24]

Although frustrated by the October War in their attempts to play an active role in the area, the Chinese have since adopted a stance that is designed to limit Moscow's freedom in the Middle East and is, incidentally, beneficial to the United States. Indeed, Peking's general support of the U.S. position during the war became apparent in spite of its verbal criticism of the "condominium of two superpowers." The vitriolic exchanges between the Chinese and Soviet delegates during the Security Council debate, and Chinese support for American opposition to the introduction of great-power military forces into the region, bore evidence of growing Sino-American accord and a worsening rift between the two communist states.

After years of concentrated attacks on former Prime Minister Sato and the Liberal Democratic Party's policy in Asia, Peking has thus far extended to Tanaka's government a series of surprisingly generous concessions, enabling the unexpectedly swift normalization of diplomatic ties with Japan. Designed to prevent a possible

China visit revealed the different approaches of France and the PRC, the foreign policy of Pompidou-Jobert seemed at least in general harmony with Chinese goals. For instance, the Kissinger-Jobert discord at the Brussels NATO Council meeting indicated French apprehension regarding American policy vis-à-vis Moscow.

[23] "Two Superpowers Reimpose 'No War, No Peace' Situation in Middle East," *PR*, November 7, 1973, pp. 15-17.

[24] Yi Chun, "Soviet Revisionism: Manpower Shipments to Israel," *ibid.*, November 2, 1973, pp. 11-12; also *ibid.*, October 19, 1973, p. 21. See "Soviet Revisionists: Expansion in Third World," *ibid.*, April 6, 1973, p. 20, concerning the stand of *Kayhan International* (Iran) against Soviet oil imperialism. Further see "Social-Imperialist Expansion in Middle East: The True Face of a False Friend," *PR*, September 14, 1973, pp. 17, 22; "Soviet Expansion in Western Asia," *ibid.*, September 28, 1973, pp. 16-17.

détente/entente between Tokyo and Moscow,[25] these concessions include: (1) the waiver of Japan's huge reparation and indemnity payment to China, controversial obstacle to all past efforts at normalization; (2) acquiescence, at least for the moment, in Japan's rising economic domination of Asia under the continuing protection of the United States (i.e., the security pact); (3) tacit tolerance of Tokyo's present ties with Taiwan; (4) the sudden muting of charges of resurgent Japanese militarism; (5) conclusion of various trade agreements, including possible joint economic ventures involving oil exploration;[26] and (6) reiterated Chinese support for Japan's territorial claims on the "northern islands," despite the potentially complicated issues of Tiao-yu-tai (the Senkakus) and the continental shelf.[27]

That the Chinese have succeeded in retarding and complicating efforts by Tokyo and Moscow to expand their ties seems indisputable, although it is uncertain how long this diplomatic "wait and see" game will last. Moscow's hardening toward Japan since Tanaka's China summit is evident in (1) a sudden reluctance — even a determined resistance — to negotiate the issue of the Kuriles, in contrast to its earlier more accommodating attitude; (2) an apparent stalemate over the issue of a Japanese-Soviet peace treaty; (3) the lack of progress in negotiations with Japan on Siberian economic development — in such areas as natural gas exploration, pipelines, and a new rail line and Nakhodka port construction — caused by Moscow's use of stalling tactics, since the Arab oil embargo, to extract maximum concessions from Japan; and (4) an increasingly harsh treatment of Japan's military buildup and insidious allusions to the pan-Asian "yellow peril" — implying Soviet fears of possible collusion between the PRC and Japan.[28] This negative Soviet stance was evident during Tanaka's unsuccessful visit to Moscow in October 1973.[79]

---

[25] Liao Cheng-chi, the leader of an important "friendship" mission to Japan in April 1973, declared that if Japan materially aided Moscow in the construction of pipelines (from the Tyumen oil fields), the Chinese would harbor "bitter feelings" against Japan. *Yomiuri Shimbun*, March 12, 1973.

[26] In January 1973, Nakasone (Ministry of International Trade and Industry) and Chou En-lai signed an agreement, by which China undertook to export 200,000 tons of low sulphur crude oil to Japan. China also promised to consider a Japanese proposal to buy more crude oil and to participate in undersea oil development in China. Koji Nakamura, "Oil-China: 'Political Deal'," *FEER*, January 29, 1973, pp. 33, 34. For Soviet attacks on China, see the *New York Times*, January 14 and 22, 1974.

[27] The Paracel affair could be interpreted as a Chinese preventive measure against Japan's penetration of oil-rich territories. (*New York Times*, February 17, 1974. For the Chinese treatment of the subject, see *PR*, July 13, 1973.) Some observers have speculated that China's hard line against Japan toward the end of 1973 was in part motivated by Peking's apprehension that Fukuda would succeed Tanaka.

The crescendo of recriminations has severely strained Moscow-Peking relations, attesting unmistakably to the vast and unbridgeable rift between the two erstwhile ideological allies.[30] To justify the changes in China's posture, Mao Tse-tung clearly stated that "Any ideology — even the very best, even Marxism-Leninism itself — is ineffective unless it is linked with objective realities, meets objectively existing needs and has been grasped by the masses of the people."[31]

In August 1972, the CCP's main theoretical journal, *Red Flag*, stated in an article ("Grasping the Law of Class Struggle of the Socialist Stage") that "imperialism and social imperialism [i.e., the Soviet Union] invariably seek their agents within our party" and came close to naming the Soviet Union as the prime link to Lin Piao's "conspiratorial activities" against the Chinese party.[32]

Following a summer lull in propaganda attacks in 1972, Moscow countered the Chinese insinuations by blasting Peking's publication of a "world atlas" that listed some 1.5 million square kilometers of present Soviet territory as the target of Chinese irredentist claims.[33] Again, in an apparent attempt to bolster the Soviets' legal position on the issue, Moscow published on November 18 the documentary evidence of the seventeenth-century demarcation treaty with China (Treaty of Nerchinsk,

---

[28] Hedrick Smith, "Soviet Toughens Its Line on Japan: Says 'Militarism' Subverts Europeans' Peace Efforts," *New York Times*, January 14, 1973, also see note 12.

[29] For the joint communiqué, see *CDSP*, November 7, 1973, pp. 4-6.

[30] The recent (January 1974) expulsion of each other's diplomats for espionage seems important.

[31] Cheng Huan, "Foreign Policy: A Consistent Zigzag," *FEER*, September 30, 1972, pp. 3-4; Hung Yuan, "Grasp the General Trend of Historical Development — Notes on Studying 'On the Chungking Negotiations'," *PR*, July 28, 1972, pp. 5-8.

[32] See Cheng Huan, "The Russian Link," *FEER*, August 26, 1972, pp. 13-14; Lo Wan-sheng, "Internal Politics: Post-mortem on Lin Piao," *ibid.*, September 30, 1972, pp. 5-6. Lo's article discusses *Chung Fa* No. 12, a secret circular distributed to party cadres in March 1972, exposing Lin's anti-party conspiracy. On related subjects, see *New York Times*, August 13, 1972; on *Red Flag*'s article on Lin, "Peking Strips Lin of Soldier Image," *New York Times*, August 27, 1972; Bernard Gwertzman, "Peking Document Details Anti-Mao Plots," *ibid.*, July 23, 1972; *ibid.*, December 17, 1972; Chien Tieh, "A Study of a Document Concerning the Lin Piao Incident," Parts I, II, III, IV, *Issues and Studies*, June, July, August, September 1972; Li Tien-min, "On Lin Piao's 'Illicit Relations with Foreign Countries'," *ibid.*, March 1973, pp. 24-34.

[33] G. Alpin, "Maoist-Style Geography," *Izvestia*, August 8, 1972, p. 3, in *CDSP*, September 6, 1972, pp. 1-4. See also G. Ratiani, "Joseph Alsop's Hallucinations," *Pravda*, September 23, 1972, p. 4, in *CDSP*, October 18, 1972, p. 25.

1689).[34] In January 1973, Moscow changed all the Chinese sounding names of Siberian towns into new Russian ones, showing its determination to block any further Chinese attempts to revise existing boundaries.[35] Moreover, the Soviet policy of massive internal migration is generally viewed as a measure to consolidate Moscow's claims over the borderlands.[36]

The bitterest of the recriminations was initiated in the fall of 1972. Apparently representing the Politburo's views, I. Aleksandrov wrote in *Pravda* on September 5, 1972:

> Peking's great-power approach toward the "third world" countries was manifested very obviously in its attitude toward the struggle of the East Bengali people for their rights and in Peking's veto of Bangladesh's request for admission to the U.N. . . .
>
> The Peking leaders are still hoping to slap together an anti-Soviet bloc of small and medium-sized states, including capitalist states, in order to use them in carrying out Peking's great-power course. Counting on using this basis to establish Peking as a world political center, Maoist propaganda is forcefully trying to prove that the "two superpowers" are supposedly "on the decline," and that their place . . . is to be taken by China.
>
> [Peking] is seeking to spread its influence and strengthen its international positions [through] the buildup of [military-industrial potential, including nuclear-missile power] . . . [by drawing] on the scientific, technical and technological experience of the U.S.A.[37]

In January 1973 Andrei P. Kirilenko, a Politburo member and a national party secretary, declared at a conference of scientific and engineering societies that "Peking's foreign policy actions have been increasingly converging with the policy of the aggressive and reactionary circles of imperialism [i.e., the United States]." This statement precisely echoed Brezhnev's earlier attacks against the PRC in December 1972, on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the Soviet Union,[38] when he denounced the Chinese for their "malicious slander of the Soviet political system and foreign policy"; "absurd claims to Soviet territory"; "sabotage of efforts for disarmament"; "continuous attempts to split the socialist camp"; activities to "foment discord" among "national liberation movements"; and attempts "to range the developing countries against the Soviet Union."[39]

---

[34] *New York Times*, November 19, 1972.

[35] *Ibid.*, January 28, 1973. *Peking Review* (March 16, 1973, pp. 9-10) ridiculed the name changes, pointing out that this was done "to honour and to glorify the tsarist Russian aggression" and showed "fanatical great-power chauvinism."

[36] The regions mainly involved in this attempt are Kazakhstan, Chita province, Amur region and the Khabarovsk and Maritime areas. (*New York Times*, August 5, 1973.) For Moscow's claim that China has been historically wrong in border conflicts, and that the Chinese have been xenophobic and expansionist, see S. L. Tikhvinsky, editor, *Novoya istoria Kitaya* (Moscow: Science Publishing House, 1972) as reported in A. Meliksetov, "New Book on Chinese History," *Pravda*, October 10, 1973, p. 5, in *CDSP*, November 7, 1973, p. 16.

[37] The title of the article was "On Certain Tactical Features of the Peking Leadership's Current Policy," in *CDSP*, October 4, 1972, pp. 1-5.

[38] *New York Times*, January 28, 1973. In this regard, see also S. Sergeichuk, *The U.S.A. and China* (Moscow: International Relations Publishing House, 1973); cited in *CDSP*, September 5, 1973, p. 14.

Zeroing in on the repeated Chinese offer of military assistance to Japan in case of Soviet attack, Brezhnev and other commentators in the Soviet Union accused Peking of setting itself "the task of preventing Japan from showing a desire for a mutually acceptable understanding with the USSR" and pointedly warned:

> In whose interests is it to aggravate tension in this region? Tension in relations between Japan and the USSR could only play into the hands of the great-power, hegemonic designs of the Peking leaders and their anti-Soviet policy. It could also play into the hands of the imperialist forces of the USA, which are striving to preserve tension in the Far East and to retain the possibility of intervention and expansion.[40]

The clash between the two communist giants was continued at the Tokyo meeting of the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) and on the occasion of Lenin's birthday celebration in Moscow, where the Chinese chargé d'affaires walked out of the Kremlin Palace of Congresses as Dmitry F. Ustinov, a candidate member of the Politburo, called Chinese politics "strange and monstrous" and "imbued with anti-Sovietism and a splitting spirit in regard to Communist and national liberation movements, that . . . in reality coincides with the activities of ardent enemies of communism."[41]

The intensity of these verbal assaults increased, and more and more they were conducted in public — particularly during the Middle East war debates in the Security Council.[42] Most of the Soviet attacks through 1973 were directed against the "hegemonic" designs of Peking's foreign policy and its opposition to détente in general — apparently for the purpose of driving a wedge between the PRC and the United States. In this respect, Brezhnev's policy seemed to resemble Khrushchev's early attempts to discredit China by portraying the Chinese as insane, irrational and a general threat to world peace, in contrast to Moscow's role as a responsible peacemaker.[43]

---

[39] *Pravda* and *Izvestia*, December 22, 1972, in *CDSP*, January 17, 1973, pp. 3-20. See also "Soviet Disarmament Proposal Is a Fraud," *PR*, November 17, 1972, pp. 5-6.

[40] Boris Krymov, "Behind the Scenes of Events: A New Guardian?," *Literaturnaya gazeta*, January 1, 1973, p. 9, in *CDSP*, February 14, 1973, pp. 10-11.

[41] For An Chih-yuan's attack on the Soviet Union for proposing an "Asian collective security system," see *PR*, April 20, 1973, pp. 13-15. For a similar Chinese attack, see Shen Wei-liang's remarks at the UN Sea-Bed Committee meeting, *ibid.*, April 13, 1973, pp. 13-16. See also *New York Times*, April 21, 1973.

[42] For an example of China's scathing attack against the Soviets in the UN, see Chia Kuan-hua's speech at the General Assembly, *PR*, October 5, 1973, pp. 10-17, and October 26, 1973, p. 9ff. For the Malik-Huang Hua confrontation at the Security Council, *ibid.*, November 2, 1973, p. 4ff.

These ominous Soviet charges closely coincided with extraordinary efforts to expand the military buildup against China,[44] indicating that the Kremlin intended to apply maximum pressures to influence Chinese foreign policy. In escalating the threat, Moscow was counting on the serious erosion of American credibility in Peking's eyes and a move by Chinese leaders to reappraise the entire range of contacts with the United States in light of the Soviet danger.

G. Apalin, writing in *Izvestia* in June 1973, asserted that China harbored designs for major changes on the international scene for her own interest and accused her of aspiring to great-power chauvinism and hegemony.[45] In August, immediately after the conclusion of an agreement with the United States for the prevention of nuclear war, Moscow again charged that the PRC was intent on becoming a new nuclear superpower with the aim of dominating all of Asia. On August 15, speaking before the ceremonial session of the Kazakhstan Communist Party Central Committee, Brezhnev emphasized the importance of the Asian collective security system plan and charged the Chinese leadership with "shameless anti-Sovietism and subversive activity against the socialist countries."[46]

In a general survey of Chinese foreign policy, I. Aleksandrov made a scathing attack on Peking in *Pravda* on August 26, 1973. Criticizing the basic nature of the PRC's foreign policy, he stated that the Chinese leadership had fundamentally broken with "class, Marxist-Leninist positions" and that Maoists viewed the Soviet Union as the "principal obstacle" to their hegemonic aims. Aleksandrov further stated:

---

[43] The worst of the Soviet attacks against the PRC were bared in December 1972, when TASS alleged that China earned at least $12 to $15 billion a year from her opium trade abroad, including huge sales to the United States. On January 8, 1973, NCNA denied the Soviet accusation and charged Moscow with revisionism and vicious anti-Chinese slander: "In order to deceive the people, the Soviet revisionists have spread again and again the most preposterous rumors from their arsenal of lies, firstly vilifying China for 'corrupting' the African people with opium, and then for 'opening up an important market for the sale of [opium] in Europe'."

[44] Admiral Moorer reported that the Soviet Union had deployed some 500,000 troops along the border region with an added air strength of some 1,200 warplanes. A. H. S. Candlin, writing in the British *Army Quarterly* in February 1974, stated that the Soviet military around Manchuria and Mongolia "have been placed in deployment patterns strongly indicative of offensive intentions." See *U.S. News & World Report*, February 18, 1974.

[45] G. Apalin, "Concerning Certain Concepts of China's Maoist Leadership," *Izvestia*, June 2, 1973, in *CDSP*, June 27, 1973, pp. 1-4.

[46] *CDSP*, September 12, 1973, pp. 1-5.

> Peking is not squeamish in selecting its means, hoping to kindle nationalist sentiments [in socialist countries to pit one against another]. . . . Maoists are cooperating with emigre riffraff who pin their hopes on the restoration of capitalism . . . established ties with extreme nationalist circles in [West Germany] . . . and entered into contacts with the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe. . . .
>
> Peking is trying to depict itself as the "defender" of the interests of "small and medium-sized countries," to become the leader of the "third world". . . . To do this, the Chinese leaders are even ready to cast aspersions on the social and economic gains of the Chinese working people, claiming that China is a developing state that belongs not to the socialist world but to the "third world."
>
> . . . the [Maoists are] openly forming political blocs with the most reactionary forces of imperialism, which hold positions of bellicose anti-Sovietism, pursue an aggressive, revanchist policy, oppose the forces of progress and [favor "cold war"].

In addition, he accused China of opposing the European security conference; approving the continued presence of American forces in Europe in support of NATO; providing "moral and political support" for Israel against Arabs; abetting "brazen revanchist" circles in Japan against the Soviet Union; raising obstacles against the progress of détente; and fabricating the "fictitious threat from the North."[47]

In similar vein, K. Brutents wrote in *Pravda* on August 30, 1973 that the Peking leadership was intriguing against world peace and the "security of peoples" for its "hegemonic" aims.[48] Again in October, Brezhnev spoke before the World Congress of Peace Forces held in Moscow:

> . . . the Soviet Union stands for the consolidation of peace on the Asian continent. . . . [The] allegation that the idea of creating and ensuring security in Asia by collective efforts is directed against China and even claims that its effect is the insidious aim of "surrounding" or "isolating" China . . . indicate either a morbid suspiciousness or an unwillingness to reckon with the facts. . . . No one has ever raised the question of China's non-participation or, much less, any kind of "isolation". . . . [However, for] reasons known only to them, China's leaders refuse to abandon their attempts to poison the international atmosphere and increase international tension. They continue to make absurd territorial claims against the Soviet Union. . . . They stubbornly reiterate the . . . fabrica-

---

[47] "On Certain Principles of the Chinese Leadership's Foreign Policy Course," pp. 3-5, in *CDSP*, September 19, 1973, pp. 1-4.

[48] *CDSP*, September 26, 1973, pp. 8-9.

tions of anticommunist propaganda about "the Soviet menace," harp on "the threat from the north" and [oppose] all sensible proposals for . . . a nonaggression treaty, [and keep] their people in an artificially created atmosphere of feverish military preparations. . . .[49]

In December the Soviet Union expanded its attacks against Peking: Moscow charged China with deliberate provocation and "frank" expansionism against the smaller neighboring states — an obvious attempt to discredit her with the Third World;[50] acknowledged the existence of "two Chinas," thus recognizing the political entity of Taiwan as a potential participant in the "Asian collective security system";[51] and organized intrabloc strategy meetings in Moscow to "excommunicate" China from the community of socialist states.[52]

In response to the increasingly strident Soviet polemics, the PRC at last officially identified the Soviet Union as the most dangerous enemy of the Chinese people. On October 1, 1972, on the occasion of the twenty-third anniversary of the PRC's establishment, the three major organs — *People's Daily, Red Flag* and the *Army Daily* — in a joint editorial lashed out against the Soviets. The editorial stated that the "Soviet revisionist renegade clique" is greedily "reaching out its hand everywhere" and is "even more deceitful than the old line imperialist and therefore more dangerous." It further denounced Moscow for its "neocolonialism . . . in Asia, Africa and Latin America," and for its "military expansion," "war preparation," and occupation of certain East European states against their will. In an obvious attempt to justify recent Chinese foreign policy changes, the editorial elaborated seven major points: (1) the Soviet Union is China's most vicious enemy; (2) the détente between the Soviet Union and the United States is superficial; (3) in opposing the two superpowers, China relies not only on the developing nations but also on certain capitalist states; (4) in carrying out such a policy, China will take a flexible posture; (5) a policy of peaceful coexistence is not contradictory to world revolution; (6) people's revolutions in the world must first of all depend on their own efforts; and (7) the policy of anti-Chinese containment and isolation has failed.[53]

---

[49] *Pravda,* October 27, 1973, in *CDSP,* November 21, 1973, pp. 1-6. For Peking's counterattack, see *PR,* December 28, 1973, pp. 7-9.

[50] "Soviet Widens Its Charges of Chinese Expansionism," *New York Times,* December 9, 1973.

[51] *Christian Science Monitor,* December 7, 1973, quoting the October article of the Novosti Press Agency (APN). *Le Monde* (December 1, 1973) reported that the Soviet Union seemed to hope for the continuation of "two Chinas" and wanted to establish diplomatic ties with Taiwan. For Peking's reference to the subject, see *PR,* December 21, 1973, p. 21.

[52] *New York Times,* December 20, 1973. For related Soviet attacks, see *ibid.,* November 8 and 14 and December 29, 1973. See also Christopher S. Wren, "Soviet Says China Eases on Taiwan: Accuses Peking of Trying to Gain Favor with U.S.," *ibid.,* January 3, 1974.

As Moscow's accusations mounted through the latter half of 1973, so did those of Peking. Marking the fifth anniversary of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, *Peking Review* stated that the Soviet revisionist clique was "vigorously pursuing hegemonism and power politics" in order to maintain its "colonial system."[54] Chang Chien wrote in September that Soviet revisionism, by distorting Marxism-Leninism, had made possible the "rise to power of the bourgeoisie."

> With the usurped state apparatus . . . the Soviet . . . renegade clique has turned the socialist state ownership into state monopoly capitalist ownership. . . . A bureaucrat-monopoly-capitalist class of a new type has rapidly grown up by bleeding the people white with taxes and levies, and this has become the base of the rule of the Soviet revisionist[s]. . . .
>
> Leading a life of luxury and indulgence . . . [they made] the Soviet people . . . endure savage exploitation and worsening impoverishment. Imposing an all-round bourgeois dictatorship in the sphere of ideology, they crack down on proletarian ideas and culture. . . . [They] constantly intensify their fascist dictatorship and turn the Soviet Union into a prison for the people of all nationalities.[55]

In a direct attack against Soviet "imperialism" in October 1973, a NCNA correspondent branded the Soviet Union "an imperialist superpower" and warned that Moscow

> is stationing scores of divisions . . . in Eastern Europe so as to control this area and threaten Western Europe. It has sent troops to occupy Mongolia, posing a threat to China and other Asian countries. It has sent large numbers of military "advisers" to lord it over these countries and reckon without the host. [This is] the behaviour of imperialism and superpower pure and simple. . . . Soviet military and economic "aid" is not only their important tool for infiltration and expansion abroad, but also a major means of their plunder and exploitation of other nations. . . . Through so-called "economic assistance," they sell out-of-date machinery to the Third World nations at a high price and buy agricultural products and natural resources . . . at a low price. . . . The Soviet revisionists want the Asian, African, and Latin American countries to provide the Soviet Union with cotton, wool [and so forth]. . . . The Soviet[s]

---

[53] *PR*, October 6, 1972, pp. 9-11. For similar attacks on Moscow, see *New York Times*, November 12, 1972.

[54] "The Longer the Occupation, the Tighter the Noose," *PR*, August 24, 1973, pp. 14-15.

[55] "Imperialism Is the Eve of the Social Revolution of the Proletariat," *ibid.*, September 28, 1973, pp. 6-10.

> euphemistically call all this "international division of labor" and "co-operation in production," but actually this is a neo-colonialist policy of plunder nakedly pursued. . . .[56]

An article in *Red Flag* excoriated the USSR with even greater vehemence. Published in *Peking Review* on November 30, 1973, Wu Chun's "Hegemony Cannot Decide Destiny of World History" dwelt on the theme that "the hegemonists' logic is that of ceaseless aggression and expansion till self-destruction."

> The Soviet revisionist social-imperialists have inherited the cause of the hegemonists in history. They are engaged in imperialist crimes under the golden signboard of "socialism" and "internationalism." Picking up the mantle of the old tsars, they entertain even wilder ambitions than the former.[57]

However, the most important criticism of the Soviet Union was made by Chou En-lai during the CCP's Tenth National Congress. Although Chou's attack was directed against the two superpowers, the main target, judging from the context and the general tone, was unmistakably the Soviet Union. Quoting from Lenin that "an essential feature of imperialism is the rivalry between several Great Powers in the striving for hegemony," Chou leveled charges against the superpowers, struggling for hegemony, and touched upon a new theme:

> While hawking disarmament, they are actually expanding their armaments every day. Their purpose is to contend for world hegemony. They contend as well as collude with each other. Their collusion serves the purpose of more intensified contention. *Contention is absolute and protracted, whereas collusion is relative and temporary. . . . The West always wants to urge the Soviet revisionists eastward to divert the peril towards China, and it would be fine so long as all is quiet in the West. China is an attractive piece of meat coveted by all.* But this piece of meat is very tough, and for years no one has been able to bite into it. . . . At present, the Soviet revisionists are "making a feint to the east while attacking in the west," and stepping up their contention in Europe and their expansion in the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean and every place their hands can reach. . . . Over the last two decades, the Soviet [regime], from Khrushchev to Brezhnev, has made a socialist country degenerate into a social-imperialist country. Internally, it has restored capitalism, enforced a fascist dictatorship and enslaved the people . . . thus deepening the political and economic contradictions. . . . Externally, it has invaded . . . Czechoslovakia, massed its troops along the Chinese border, sent troops into [Mongolia], supported [Lon Nol], suppressed the Polish [workers], intervened in Egypt . . . dismembered Pakistan and

---

[56] "Soviet Union — Imperialism and Superpower: Concoction or Fact," *PR*, October 19, 1973, pp. 18-19, 23. For a similar attack, see *PR*, November 9, 1973, pp. 13-15.

[57] Pp. 4-6. See also *PR*, December 7, 1973, p. 6.

> carried out subversive activities in . . . Asian and African countries. This series of facts has profoundly exposed its ugly features as the new Czar and its reactionary nature, namely, "socialism in words, imperialism in deeds."[58]

No abatement in these mutual recriminations was detectable in early 1974; rather, relations between the two states continued to deteriorate. In January, Peking hurled major espionage charges against Moscow, which immediately reciprocated, although at a moderate level.[59] Symbolic of the near total break between the two — since the summer of 1973 there have been several long recesses in the border negotiations — were the serious and unprecedented attacks leveled by *Peking Review* (January 25, 1974) against the Soviet "revisionist fascist dictatorship."

> The Soviet [revisionists], the new tsars, [are] sitting on a volcano. In recent years, [the leadership] has brazenly reinforced its fascist dictatorship in suppressing the people who have put up sustained and mounting resistance to the reactionary rule. . . . The Soviet Union today is by no means "stable" and "harmonious" as Brezhnev . . . describe[s] it.

While charging the Soviets with police-state rule and the use of "special labor camps," the article continued:

> The Brezhnev clique also makes use of "mental hospitals" to torture those opposed to the dark rule. . . . Those who show discontent with [fascist rule] . . . are arbitrarily declared "lunatics," "mentally disordered," "schizophrenic" and . . . thrown into "mental hospitals" controlled by the "state security committee" and the "ministry of the interior."[60]

PROBLEMS OF THE SINO-AMERICAN DÉTENTE/ENTENTE

The conditions of extreme hostility between Moscow and Peking, the rapid transformations and fluctuations of relations among the major powers, and a host of other sensitive issues (e.g., oil supplies, security, arms control talks, trade and détente) could sooner or later strain the Sino-American rapprochement. How serious and enduring these problems will be is difficult to assess. What is clear, however, is that improved Sino-American relations could easily be set back by Washington's overconfidence regarding China's imperative need for an American counterbalancing force or by its tactless callousness toward China's various dilemmas; or by the ruthless exploitation of Chinese weaknesses by the Soviet Union and/or Japan. On the other hand, serious erosion of credibility on either side (due to China's excessive and debilitating ideological debates and the U.S. Watergate affair) could critically hamper further improvement of Sino-American ties.

---

[58] *PR*, September 7, 1973, pp. 22-23. (Emphasis added.) The joint editorial for the New Year by *People's Daily, Red Flag* and the *Army Daily* repeated the theme of Chou's speech. See *PR*, January 4, 1974, pp. 6-8. See also Chung Chih-ping, "The World Advances Amidst Turbulence," *ibid.*, pp. 20-24; Yang Ying, "Out-and-Out Merchant of Death," *ibid.*, January 11, 1974, pp. 17, 23.

[59] *PR*, January 25, February 1, 1974.

[60] Pp. 12-14.

What are some of the major problems that will have impact on Peking-Washington ties in the context of Moscow's and Tokyo's postures?

Indochina

A prolonged stalemate in Cambodia will pose a serious dilemma for the Chinese, provided the United States remains adamant in upholding the extremely precarious Lon Nol government. China's primary objectives in Southeast Asia are to secure conditions in which the neighboring states would become ideally pro-Chinese or at least not openly hostile to her interests. In this framework, Peking may be expected to try to prevent Sihanouk (and other political elements opposed to Lon Nol) and Hanoi from straying into the Soviet sphere of influence, or, for that matter, into other spheres of influence (such as the Japanese) that would be detrimental to Peking. Enhancement of Soviet[61] and/or Japanese[62] influences in the region will have a destabilizing effect on regional affairs and could intensify the dangers along the

[61] The increasing role of the Soviet Union in Laos and Moscow's belated recognition of Sihanouk are indications of Moscow's designs in the region. Together with Brezhnev's proposed Asian collective security system, they should be carefully watched. Other signs of Moscow's policy include repeated promises of all-out support for Hanoi; reported efforts of Soviet embassy personnel to penetrate the Thai student movement in recent months; and Soviet reactions to the Paracel affair. See *Bangkok Post*, January 31, 1974; "China Absent as Hanoi Opens Parley Attended by Russians," *New York Times*, February 12, 1974; *Washington Post*, October 11, 1973.

[62] On Japan's interest in the area, see T. C. Rhee, "Implications of the Sino-American Détente," ORBIS, Summer 1972, pp. 500-519; *New York Times*, February 25, 1972; *Japan Times*, March 10, 1972. For a series of contacts made by the Japanese Foreign Office with Hanoi, see *Dong-A Ilbo*, April 13, 1973. For Japan's angry reactions to the Paris conference on the Viet Nam war, see *U.S. News & World Report*, December 25, 1972; *ibid.*, February 19, 1973; *Dong-A Ilbo*, February 8 and 21, 1973.

For Japanese views on pan-Asianism and in support of Viet Nam against the United States, see Saito Takashi, "Peace and the People — The Things Which the Vietnam Cease-fire Suggests," *Sekai*, March 1973; Oda Makoto, "The Shadow of Vietnam," *Chuo Koron*, March 1973; Maruyama Shizuo, "The Vietnam War — An Evaluation," *Japan Quarterly*, April-June 1973, pp. 151-158; Matsumoto Shunichi, "My Advice on Japan's Diplomacy After Vietnam," *Chuo Koron*, April 1973; Miyake Wasuke, "It was a Long Way to Hanoi," *Bungei Shunju*, June 1973. See also *The Pacific Rivals* (by the staff of *Asahi Shimbun*) (New York: Weatherhill, 1972). For Hanoi's request for Japanese economic aid, see *Yomiuri Shimbun*, December 25, 1973; *FEER*, October 1, 1973, p. 17.

Sino-Soviet border as well as complicate already difficult Sino-Indian relations.

Hanoi's apparent insistence on a military solution in Cambodia so it can set up a stable military staging area against South Viet Nam, and Sihanouk's inability to defy Hanoi and the more radical elements in the anti-Lon Nol groups, assuredly constrict Chinese options. The PRC, if it seeks to shut out negative Soviet influences in the region, would be compelled to offer the necessary assistance, however reluctantly and no matter how minimal, in dismantling the Lon Nol government. Peking would almost have to adopt this policy, despite its seemingly widening differences with Hanoi. However, as it would certainly impinge on American interests — imagined or real — this policy would be a painful development for Sino-American relations. The only favorable element in this situation would be the fact that Sihanouk seems better disposed toward Peking and unquestionably wary of North Viet Nam's basic intentions in Cambodia. Thus, a certain amount of leverage would accrue to China. However, this element should not be overestimated for two basic reasons: (1) Sihanouk's own position in the Cambodian movement seems precarious and he might not be able to influence events in China's favor; and (2) Moscow's recognition of Sihanouk, the rift between Hanoi and Peking, and closer ties between Moscow and North Viet Nam might neutralize Sihanouk's pro-Chinese stance.

Under the circumstances, in the immediate cease-fire period it was expected that Peking would try to commit North Viet Nam to a period of peaceful economic recovery while maintaining a politico-military stalemate in Indochina. Peking might have hoped to accomplish this by channeling outside resources and support so as to benefit Hanoi and strengthen China's general posture in Indochina. China certainly would have preferred American and other Western assistance to help from the USSR or Japan. Kissinger seemed to support this approach when he stated in effect that the United States would not be averse to peaceful and evolutionary changes in Indochina and even Hanoi's gradual replacement of the Thieu regime within the agreed framework of the "cease-fire." However, it has become clear since January 1973 that this approach was doomed from the beginning. Hanoi's basic aggressiveness has not been changed, as evidenced by the serious violations of the agreement in all its vital aspects.

Accordingly, the present situation in Indochina indicates rather clearly that there are great differences between Hanoi and the

PRC concerning their general assessment of post-agreement conditions in the region; their estimate of possible American responses to the evolving military and political situations; and the projected roles of the Soviet Union and other major powers in case of the resumption of hostilities. Based on the prevailing conditions, one can judge that while the Chinese welcomed the Paris agreement with a sense of relief, North Viet Nam might have concluded differently — fearing that a stalemate at this point might consolidate Thieu's power base and indefinitely postpone Vietnamese unification on DRV terms.

Were such an assessment correct, Peking's position would indeed be difficult: an impossible choice between (1) continued improvement in relations with Washington as an indispensable counterweight to Moscow, but at the risk of an inevitable increase in Soviet control on China's southern flank; and (2) risking a period of uncomfortable tension with the United States through the renewed support of Hanoi's military efforts, in the hope of reducing Soviet influence in North Viet Nam. It is conceivable that, in the latter case, the Soviet Union would exploit the opportunity to improve relations with the United States, Japan and Western Europe at the expense of China. But even if Peking supported Hanoi's military goals, North Viet Nam's dependence on Moscow would be greater than on Peking — as has been the case throughout the conflict — because of her need for sophisticated military hardware.

China's ultimate decision on Indochina, in the face of Hanoi's total intransigence, would most certainly be determined by her perception of the Soviet threat. Specifically, the PRC's response to Hanoi would depend on the status of Soviet-Japanese and Soviet-American relations, the evolution of the politico-military balance in Europe, the Sino-Soviet border dispute, and Peking's appraisal of Japan's position in Korea (particularly in the South),[63] Indochina and the rest of Southeast Asia. Since China's primary emphasis must be placed on cultivating a counterbalance to the escalating Soviet threat, and as the need for the American connection becomes more and more important, Chinese leaders (provided those currently in power are not seriously weakened by the new ideological campaign) might not vigorously challenge American countermeasures against Hanoi. Although this non-action could have a deleterious effect on China's "revolutionary" image in the Third World, no *fundamental* shift in her recent "external-realism" can be expected.

---

[63] The increased Chinese criticism of South Korea and strengthened support of Pyongyang toward the end of 1973 and especially since the Kim Dae Jung affair (see note 68) seem to be significant developments.

However, the Chinese military action against the Paracels could have been motivated by several important political objectives: Peking's desire (1) to establish a naval base to control Soviet naval incursions into the area; (2) to issue warnings to Japan regarding the fate of the Senkaku Islands, and to South Korea over the disputed Yellow Sea continental shelf exploration; and (3) to caution the United States to be wary of cooperating too closely with the Soviet Union over such problems as the Middle East. Additionally, it could be interpreted as an attempt by China to refurbish its own image vis-à-vis the Third World as a militant revisionist power – somewhat tarnished as a result of rapprochement with the United States and other states in recent years.

The United States, too, sensing China's growing need for a counterweight against Moscow, may regard Chinese passivity in Indochina as complete acquiescence or incapacity, and re-escalate the hostilities in retaliation for Hanoi's blatant violations of the Paris accord. In this regard, it is conceivable that the United States could expect a degree of self-restraint on Moscow's part now that the Soviet Union keenly appreciates the perils of policies that drive China and America into each other's arms.

Although publicly "unconcerned" (as indicated by Chou En-lai lately), the Chinese regime's apprehensions would multiply if Moscow and Washington were to overcome the temporary setbacks in their current negotiations and proceed toward agreements of major significance. China is naturally nervous about the linkage between successful agreements on European questions and Moscow's expansionist moves in non-European regions. Should the Sino-Soviet confrontation be further aggravated, while Soviet-American accords noticeably diminish American ties to China, then one should expect rather rapid and basic changes in Chinese leadership and policies. In fact, Chou En-lai referred to such a possibility during the Tenth National Congress when he spoke of Western encouragement of the Soviet version of *Drang nach Osten*.

Clearly, in the short term China could suffer a series of setbacks, given the present conditions regarding Indochina and related external problems. Peking faces many difficult decisions and dilemmas, and the domestic political situation is beset with a myriad of unresolved problems born of the Cultural Revolution. The upshot could be a new round of unsettling factional debate on foreign policy – touching on the sensitive subjects of Sino-American détente and the dispute with Moscow, the flexible Mao-Chou diplomacy, and even the question of succession. An accommodation with the Soviet Union, no matter how unlikely it may appear at present, cannot be completely ruled out.

The many questions concerning the enhanced status of Wang Hung-wen, Yao Wen-yuan and the radical "Shanghai" faction within the CCP, the recent major reshuffling of key military region commanders, and the ongoing debate on Confucius, Lin Piao, Beethoven *et al.* suggest that the power struggle in post-Lin Piao China remains unresolved and, therefore, long-term policy directions have not been determined.[64] The resulting political instability and uncertain domestic and international stances have encouraged the Soviets to apply military pressures along the border in order to orient the CCP's intraparty debates in Moscow's favor.

If the U.S. government capitalizes on China's dilemmas by the dogged pursuit of ventures as worthless as Cambodia, it might force such drastic changes in the Chinese leadership as to scuttle the remarkable gains made so far in its relations with the communist regime. Faced with domestic and external difficulties, the Mao-Chou-Yeh (Chien-ying) ruling faction might come under severe attack with unexpected consequences, or might undergo severe strains as a result of political maneuvers and lose the flexibility to continue policies of moderation. Already, a certain degree of radicalization of Peking's stance is detectable. Until and unless the Indochinese situation is clarified to Peking's satisfaction, serious complications between the United States and the PRC may be unavoidable.

In summary, American inertia, Hanoi's hard line and Peking's dilemma could substantially promote Soviet interests in Southeast Asia. Were this to happen, India, Bangladesh and Japan would reap benefits, the Sino-American counterbalance in Asia would be eroded, and critical shifts in the balance of power would occur in the Middle East and in Europe.

Taiwan

Although the Sino-American joint communiqué of February 1972 alluded to the reduction of the American military-political presence in Taiwan, Washington's financial and economic commitment to the island has remained virtually intact. This rather strange development must be viewed alongside the huge residual Japanese economic, financial and cultural infrastructure still present in Taiwan despite the Tokyo-Peking normalization.[65]

---

[64] See Henry S. Bradsher, "China: The Radical Offensive," *Asian Survey*, November 1973, pp. 989-1009; and, in contrast, Robert A. Scalapino, "China and the Balance of Power," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1974, pp. 349-385.

No matter how unpalatable to the Peking regime, the lingering American presence in Taiwan may have the "strange" approval of the PRC. Peking — and perhaps Washington — may fear that unchecked Japanese involvement in Taiwan at a time when Japan's long-term policy in Asia remains largely amorphous and ambivalent could produce political tensions incompatible with the fragile equilibrium in East Asia. Given the current Sino-Soviet hostility and global political maneuvering, the possibility of Soviet penetration is not impossible either.

In this context, although presently inconclusive and somewhat unclear as to motives, the sudden relaxation of PRC pressures on both Tokyo and Taipei seems noteworthy. First, Peking's offers to negotiate with Taipei appeared to be timed to coincide not only with the fragile Indochinese situation but more significantly with the ongoing negotiations between Moscow and Tokyo. Second, an abrupt cooling of Peking-Tokyo relations so soon after the Tanaka visit suggests lingering Chinese fears about Japan's next moves — toward the Soviet Union, Taiwan and Korea. The 1973 ECAFE meeting had already demonstrated that Peking had reservations about Japan, but the protracted negotiations on the Sino-Japanese aviation agreement revived the Taiwan question as a crucial test of faith and mutual trust.[66]

It is conceivable that, in light of Taiwan's political and strategic importance to China and the United States, the two governments considered it beneficial to maintain the status quo on the island at this time in order to prevent additional complications arising from Soviet and Japanese policies in East Asia.

Korea

Until the virtual rupture of negotiations between Seoul and

---

[65] Besides the two most important pro-Taiwan lobbies in Japan (Association for East Asian Relations and Diet Members Association for Japanese-Chinese [Taiwan] Relations), the newly established (December 1, 1972) Koryu Kyokai has important official ties with the LDP's ruling conservatives and is staffed by former members of the embassy and consulate general in Taiwan. These groups clearly indicate Japan's determination to stay in the island. See *Dong-A Ilbo,* March 27, 1973; *Mainichi Daily News,* December 2, 1972.

[66] Fox Butterfield, "Tokyo Expects Aviation Agreement With Peking Soon," *New York Times,* February 10, 1974. Japan is planning to set up a dummy company to handle airline operations in Taiwan and thus skirt the thorny issues with Peking.

Pyongyang in mid-1973, the progress of the political contacts between the two Koreas was a matter of some concern to the Chinese and from a certain perspective to the United States as well.

It is generally assumed that the two Koreas initiated the Red Cross and political talks because of their common apprehension over the possible impact of the great powers' détentes on their own positions. However, what concerned the PRC (and the United States) was not the parley itself, for which each had repeatedly expressed support, but the future direction of the talks and the possible foreign policy changes North and South Korea might have to make during the course of the negotiations which could be inimical to Chinese and American interests. Specifically, Peking was fearful lest Pyongyang drift toward the Soviet or even the Japanese orbit, while Washington was wary of growing South Korean dependence on Japan.

North Korea's general position toward the Sino-Soviet conflict and to a lesser extent toward Japan's prospective role in Korea has never been clarified to China's satisfaction. Pyongyang's record of quasi-neutrality in the Sino-Soviet rift indicates that its independent assessment of foreign policy requirements might cause North Korea to adopt a potentially anti-Chinese stance. Moreover, North Korea's uncompromising harshness toward Seoul and its ultimate goal of unification, through military means if necessary, could impinge on China's major objectives in the region (1) by creating explosive tensions on the peninsula which would effectively compromise Peking's desire for regional calm, crucially important for its continued attention to economic progress and to the Soviet threat from the north; and (2) by increasing South Korean dependence on Japan for survival, thus providing Tokyo with enhanced opportunities to establish a predominant influence over South Korea's economy, politics, military forces and foreign policies.

The heightening of tensions between the two Koreas could pull North Korea back into the Soviet orbit mainly because of its need of major weapons supplies, or draw Pyongyang closer to Japan as a source of economic assistance. Given recent Japanese approaches to Pyongyang, the latter possibility cannot be dismissed. Increasing ties between Japanese economic and financial circles and North Korea have been achieved despite the LDP's repeated denials that its policy is one of "equidistance" toward the two Koreas and in spite of strong South Korean protests.

The decreasing credibility of American guarantees, Seoul's increasing wariness of China's growing stature in regional affairs, and Peking's unchanged hostility to South Korea have inevitably pushed the ROK government to reappraise its foreign policy. South Korea has been seeking, through various channels, new diplomatic ties with Eastern Europe and particularly with the Soviet Union. The diplomatic contacts between Ambassador Kim Dong Jo, Seoul's Foreign Minister, and USSR Ambassador Dobrynin in Washington last year were accompanied by the establishment of embassy-level ties with India and the issuance of various official statements indicating keen interest in Brezhnev's Asian collective security system.[67]

Even more serious, since the Sino-Japanese normalization and particularly since Nixon's China visit, Japan's hold on South Korea has become much stronger. This is especially true in the economic sphere, although it was true also in political affairs from October 1972 until the Kim Dae Jung affair and a series of recent student demonstrations against the Park regime made for complications with Tokyo.[68] Moreover, although it is still publicly pro-American, the Park Chung Hee regime has in fact de-emphasized its ties with the United States in favor of establishing "flexible" relations with other states — Japan, India and the Soviet Union. One can note increasing signs of this trend both in the semi-official statements of high officials close to Park's inner circle (including the present South Korean Ambassador to Washington) and in some South Korean academic and journalistic quarters.

In sum, one can safely say that the normalization between Peking and Tokyo has not solved any of the major issues. The uncertainty and deliberate ambivalence of Japanese policies — both domestic and foreign — remain the central source of deep-seated friction and misunderstanding between the two states.[69]

[67] *Hankook Ilbo*, December 25, 1973. Also see note 20.

[68] See T. C. Rhee, "South Korea's Economic Development and Its Socio-Political Impact," *Asian Survey,* July 1973, pp. 677-690; Bernard Wideman, "Japan: Expensive Silence," *FEER,* November 12, 1973, p. 13. For the Japanese ultra-right-wing support of the Park regime, see *Hankook Ilbo*, December 26, 1973.

Kim Dae Jung is the former South Korean opposition leader who was abducted by the Korean CIA on August 8, 1973 in Tokyo, where he was residing and speaking out against the Park regime. He was spirited to Seoul and released on August 13. The incident embarrassed and infuriated the Japanese government and led Tokyo to postpone an economic aid conference scheduled for September 7. Some Japanese officials threatened cancellation of all economic assistance to South Korea if subsequent developments showed the ROK government to have been involved in the affair. In November, Premier Kim Jong Pil apologized to Prime Minister Tanaka for the abduction, and the economic aid talks were rescheduled.

[69] See T. C. Rhee, "Historical and Psychological Obstacles to Japan's Rap-

CONCLUSION

The commonalty of interests and goals shared by the United States and the PRC is based on clear assumptions that a war between China and the USSR would constitute an unmitigated catastrophe for world peace and that, unchecked, Japan might in the long run create serious problems for global stability. The rapid and often astounding developments since 1971 demonstrate that Peking and Washington are determined to create and maintain the essential conditions for peace. In this endeavor, neither the Chinese nor the Americans have allowed their deep ideological and institutional differences to distract them from their central objective. Despite current domestic difficulties, the PRC leadership may be expected to continue its attitude of realism toward foreign policy matters.

Given these assumptions, it is likely that Peking and Washington will concentrate their efforts on creating a strong Western Europe, coordinating their activities in the Middle East to keep the Soviets in check, containing Japan through diplomatic means, preventing a major breakdown of the "cease-fire" structure in Indochina, and giving each other subtle but effective assistance in various areas so that each may help to bring about the global equilibrium they both desire, with a minimal amount of fanfare and rhetoric.

prochement with China," Paper delivered at the Thirteenth Working Session of the Centre d'Etude du Sud-Est Asiatique et de l'Extreme-Orient, held in Waterloo, Belgium, in December 1973.

DISMEMBERMENT OF PAKISTAN, 1971: ITS INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS

by G. W. Choudhury

CHANGES in the boundaries of states and the emergence of new states seldom take place without outside intervention or war. A small country, confronted by an unfriendly if not hostile big neighbor backed by a major power, is often exposed to external threats and can hardly enjoy the freedom from fear that is a basic requirement for a country's stability, progress and viability. The December 1971 breakup of Pakistan, the United States' "most allied ally" in Asia in the mid-1950's and subsequently China's most friendly and informal ally, was no doubt largely due to internal socio-economic and political developments. Yet it cannot be denied that outside influences and factors were present in the dismemberment. It is the purpose of this article to examine the external forces connected with the civil war in Bangladesh and the third Indo-Pakistani war of 1971 and to assess their impact on the emerging balance of power in South Asia.

The tragic happenings in Pakistan, which began as a civil war between the two wings of the country on March 25, 1971 and ended with the triumphant entry of the Indian army into Dacca, the capital of Bangladesh, on December 16, 1971, had aroused so emotional a feeling of compassion for the suffering of 75,000,000 Bengalis that there was little scope for a proper assessment of the external forces behind the tragedy. The Western press rendered a great service to humanity by giving wide publicity to the atrocities committed by the Pakistani army in East Bengal. The result was an upsurge of sympathy for the Bangladesh cause; but the news focus also camouflaged the attempt of some countries to further their narrow national interests by exploiting the tragic situation and taking advantage of the internal conflict plaguing a smaller power.

What was the Soviet Union's role during the 1971 crisis in the subcontinent? Was it interested *only* in "success in solving in a democratic manner the complex problems that face the country [Pakistan]?" Were the Kremlin leaders "guided by generally recognized humanitarian principles" as claimed by President N.

Podgorny in his letter to President Yahya Khan on April 2, 1971?[1] Or was the Soviet attitude determined by the growing Sino-Soviet conflict in the area and Pakistan's refusal to be involved in it? Were the Soviets displeased because Pakistan failed to second the political and economic suggestions emanating from Moscow, such as Kosygin's seemingly innocuous plan for a regional economic grouping comprising Afghanistan, India, Iran, Pakistan and the USSR and Brezhnev's deliberately vague Asian Collective Security Plan (though the security plan was not so vague when presented to countries like Pakistan)? Were not the Soviet Union's moves also linked with its close ties with India? Surely it was not a coincidence that these ties were formally institutionalized in the Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation signed between Moscow and New Delhi in the midst of the civil war in Pakistan, although an accord had been lying ready since 1969 when Indian Foreign Minister Dinesh Singh went to Moscow to discuss the Soviet security plan for Asia and asserted that "India welcomes the proposal by the Soviet Union on the creation of a system of collective security in Asia. . . ."[2]

Similarly, did India have *only* a humanitarian interest in the independence aspirations of the Bengalis? India claimed that her involvement in the Bangladesh crisis was due to the influx of ten million refugees. But the most pertinent issue is what justification she could have had for extending not only moral support, which might have been understandable, but active military support to an armed uprising in a neighboring country. Her intervention in the Bangladesh crisis within forty-eight hours of its inception on March 25, 1971, when not a single refugee had by that time fled to India, could hardly be described as a mere desire to restore the "democratic rights" of the Bengalis. As soon as a federated unit of another country made a unilateral declaration of independence, India allowed that rebel group to form an exile government on her soil and aided that government to function by providing all facilities including a clandestine broadcasting station, as well as arms for its so-called liberation army, Mukti-Bahini. How would India react if either China or Pakistan extended such facilities to a federated unit of the Indian union, say Assam or Nagaland, which had made a unilateral declaration of independence? Would not the Indian government and press call this an "aggression" against the country?

---

[1] See the text of the letter in *Pravda*, April 3, 1971.
[2] *Pravda*, September 21, 1969.

Now that the emotions aroused by the Pakistani army's excesses while trying to suppress the secession movement in East Bengal have subsided, the tragic happenings of 1971 can be seen in their true perspective. The Bangladesh crisis was not merely a conflict between Pakistani nationalism and Bengali subnationalism. Linguistic, cultural and racial differences and tensions are not uncommon in the new Afro-Asian countries. The social order in these countries is characterized by lack of integration due to "ethnic, religious, racial and cultural pluralism."[3] But if a powerful neighbor backed by a great power intended to take advantage of such internal tensions, the stability and territorial integrity of many Afro-Asian countries would be endangered. As an American scholar pointed out while commenting on India's role during the Bangladesh movement: "In 1971, justifiable humanitarian concern became confused with analysis of a difficult political situation. Yet at no time in recent history have the internal affairs of one country been used to justify the invasion and dismemberment of another."[4]

On the Soviet role, an Indian scholar trying to justify it had to admit that the Soviet "objective must have been to facilitate Indian military action in East Pakistan." One might ask why the Soviet Union was interested in such military action. The Indian author provides the answer: Pakistan had "become an undependable ally of any power which wants to pursue the policy of containing Chinese influence in this part of the world." Then he bluntly observes: "Kosygin supported the Bangladesh movement despite its legal and theoretical snags because he must have thought that he . . . [was] backing a winning horse."[5]

The Bangladesh crisis was interlinked with Sino-Soviet rivalry in South and Southeast Asia. It also had a bearing on the strategic and global competition between the superpowers in the Third World, in spite of recent attempts to introduce détente into American-Soviet relations. To quote again from the Indian source, "The operation for Bangladesh was also a part of the operation for the Indian Ocean in Kosygin's global plan and he seemed to have made a clean sweep in this respect over his rivals, President Nixon and Chou En-lai, on the Bangladesh issue."[6]

---

[3] See R. M. MacIver, *The Ramparts We Guard* (New York, 1950), p. 10.

[4] Thomas B. Manton, "China, India and Pakistan: New Relationship." Paper submitted at the annual meeting of the Association for Asian Studies in Chicago, Illinois, March 30-31, 1971, p. 3.

[5] J. A. Naik, *India, Russia, China and Bangla Desh* (New Delhi: S. Chand and Company Ltd., 1972), pp. 47-53.

[6] *Ibid.*

REALPOLITIK IN SOUTH ASIA

Let us look at the patterns of alignment in South Asia on the eve of the 1971 crisis. The most unfortunate aspect of relations affecting the subcontinent has been the constant antagonism between the two regional powers. India and Pakistan have always moved in diametrically opposite directions: if one turned to Washington, the other tried to move toward Moscow/Peking or Peking. Their rivalry and corrosive quarrels, and consequent preoccupation with security, led them to seek major-power friendships and at the same time greatly complicated major-power interests in the area. On the whole, South Asia has not been what is termed a "primary tension area" or "big-power zone";[7] but there have been a few exceptional situations.

The first one occurred during the Sino-Indian border conflict of 1962 when Nehru, faced with a military debacle, made an "urgent open appeal for the intervention of the United States with bomber and fighter squadrons to go into action against the Chinese" on the night of November 20.[8] This posed a grave risk of general war involving the great powers, but thanks to the dramatic unilateral cease-fire declared by the Chinese on November 21, a major crisis was averted.

The second danger point came during the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war, when Peking issued an ultimatum to New Delhi on September 16, threatening that unless the Indian government dismantled within three days "all the military works for aggression" on the Chinese side of the China-Sikkim boundary or the boundary itself, it must bear full responsibility for all the grave consequences.[9] The Chinese ultimatum was not a "paper" one as it was interpreted. I had the opportunity to read the confidential Sino-Pakistani messages during the war, and also the minutes of Ayub Khan's dialogues with Mao, Chou En-lai and other top Chinese leaders during the Pakistan President's top-secret visit to China in the midst of the hostilities, and can vouch that China "meant business." It was Ayub's unwillingness or inability to carry on a prolonged military campaign which prevented general war in the subcontinent.[10]

---

[7] Felix Gross, *World Politics and Tension Areas* (London: University of London Press, 1966), p. 41.

[8] Neville Maxwell, *India's China War* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1970), p. 410.

[9] See the text of the Chinese note in *Peking Review*, September 24, 1965.

[10] For a fuller account, see G. W. Choudhury, *The Major Powers and the Indian Subcontinent* (forthcoming). (To be published under the auspices of the Foreign Policy Research Institute, Philadelphia.)

The latest occasion when the subcontinent threatened to become a "primary tension area" was during the third Indo-Pakistani war in 1971 in Bangladesh. A task force of the U.S. Seventh Fleet, including the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, *Enterprise*, was in a rather mystifying way moving into the Bay of Bengal while Indian troops were advancing toward Dacca, and the Soviets were reported to have assured the Indians of countermeasures against any move from the U.S. fleet.

Though South Asia has, with the exceptions noted above, remained apart from great-power conflicts, it has been an area of active diplomatic competition between the two superpowers, and the rise of China as a major power has further complicated this situation. Thanks to the intensified Sino-Soviet dispute, the region, heretofore politically important, has now also acquired military significance to Moscow and Peking. Within the South Asian state system, given the global policies of the United States, the USSR and China and the regional tensions and conflicts between India and Pakistan, the five most populous countries in the world are — to use Norman Palmer's words — "jockeying and jostling" each other in a confused pattern of interrelationships.[11]

The presence of outside powers in South Asia has been a big factor in regional conflicts between India and Pakistan, and this was again the case when the Bangladesh crisis turned into another incendiary issue in their unending feud. The Bangladesh movement no doubt originated from Pakistan's failure to achieve national integration and find a viable political order in which the people of two geographically separated units could live together in a true federal or even confederal union. But external factors served to complicate the issue.

The United States, by the time Richard Nixon came to the White House in January 1969, decided to lower its profile in Asia. During his round-the-world tour in August 1969, when he visited five Asian countries including India and Pakistan, President Nixon gave expression to his policy by defining the American role. He explained that while the United States would assuredly honor its treaty commitments, it must avoid making Asian countries so dependent on the United States that the latter would be dragged into conflicts such as the Vietnamese war. Nixon admitted that this was a difficult policy to follow but he believed it was one that could be developed with proper planning. He recalled some advice he had received in 1964 from the former Pakistani President, Ayub Khan: that the role of the United States in countries like Viet Nam, the Philippines and Thailand – or any Asian country experiencing internal subversion – was to help them fight the war but not to fight the war for them. Nixon thought it was a good principle.[12]

---

[11] Norman D. Palmer, *Recent Soviet and Chinese Penetration in India and Pakistan: Guidelines for Political-Military Policy* (McLean, Va.: Research Analysis Corporation, 1970), p. 43.

The new policy under the Nixon Doctrine was to maintain a low U.S. profile. Washington had already begun a process of disengagement from the affairs of the subcontinent. Following the ruinous Indo-Pakistan war of 1965, military aid to both India and Pakistan was stopped, and the economic aid that continued was marked by declining volume. But while South Asia had become a low-priority area as compared with Southeast Asia or the Middle East, the United States did not wish to leave the initiatives in the subcontinent entirely to the Soviet Union and China. Explaining the new U.S. policy toward South Asia, James H. Noyes, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Near Eastern, African and South Asian Affairs, said: "No critical U.S. security interests are involved in South Asia. . . . Those interests the United States does have in the subcontinent are primarily political. . . . They include a basic interest in peace and stability of the region and in insuring that no outside power achieves dominance over any of the regional nations."[13]

But the Soviet Union, in keen awareness of its growing conflict with China, seemed to have embarked on expansionist designs in accordance with traditional Russian interests as visualized by Lord Curzon in the early 1900's and disclosed in Soviet-Nazi documents captured by the U.S. government after World War II, which showed that "the Soviet government shared the old Czarist interests in the Persian-Indian Ocean area."[14] Throughout 1969 and 1970 Kremlin leaders were assiduously working for some economic, political and military grouping with the object of containing China. The main objective of new Soviet initiatives such as Brezhnev's Asian Collective Security Plan seemed to be to isolate and contain China while serving the USSR's own great-power aspirations in the region. The Soviet-Chinese rivalry was increasingly reflected in Moscow's diplomatic efforts in this period. After preaching against military pacts for more than fifteen years, Soviet leaders now found virtues in the concept and resorted to "Dullesism" because it suited their national interests vis-à-vis China.

---

[12] See "The Nixon Doctrine" in *Documents on American Foreign Relations* (New York: Harper & Row, for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1968), pp. 329-334.

[13] See U.S. House of Representatives, *Hearings* Before the Subcommittee on the Near East and South Asia of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, March 12, 15, 20 and 27, 1973 (Washington: GPO, 1973), p. 82.

[14] See *Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-41*: *Documents from the Archives of the German Foreign Office* (Washington: Department of State, 1948), p. 257; cited in William J. Barnds, *India, Pakistan and the Great Powers* (New York: Praeger, 1972), p. 366.

Pakistan had special difficulties and dilemmas in responding to the new Soviet moves. She realized that both Kosygin's proposal for a regional economic grouping and Brezhnev's Asian Collective Security Plan were directed against her closest friend, China, which since the U.S. embargo on military supplies to India and Pakistan had become her principal supplier of arms. Hence, Moscow had a sizeable task in seeking to expand its ties with Pakistan at China's expense. When the Pakistan government finally expressed its inability to join the Soviet moves against China, the brief interval of "friendly relations" between Moscow and Islamabad came to an end. The Soviet press and propaganda media began attacks against Pakistan similar to those she had experienced in the 1950's when she had joined SEATO and CENTO. Then, she had been a "stooge of imperialist powers." After Ayub's first state visit to the USSR in 1965 she suddenly attained status as the Soviets' "respected southern neighbor."[15] But by the beginning of 1970 the Soviet vilification campaign was being renewed.

New Times, for instance, on February 7, 1970 printed a lengthy article on Pakistan full of critical and hostile comments at a time when the Yahya Khan government was engaged in serious political negotiations with Bengali leader Mujibur Rahman designed to head off a confrontation between East and West Pakistan. The *New Times* article reflected a hardening Soviet attitude, which Pakistan's Ambassador in Moscow also noted in 1970 in reporting on "increasing [Soviet] pressures." This position taken toward Pakistan on the eve of the Bangladesh crisis should provide the real clues to understanding Soviet "concern" for "suffering humanity" in Bangladesh. It would be naive to think that Kremlin leaders were moved solely by humanitarian sentiments in these circumstances; one has only to recall Soviet atrocities in Hungary in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968, not to speak of Stalin's ruthless suppression in the Central Asian republics of the Soviet Union.

[15] See *Central Asian Review*, Vol. 14, No. 3, 1966.

Pakistan's relations with China began to grow friendlier and closer following the boundary agreement between the two countries in 1963, and reached their zenith during the 1965 Indo-Pakistani war. Subsequently the relationship was affected somewhat by Ayub's acceptance of the Soviet mediatory role at the Tashkent Conference in 1966 and his moving closer to Moscow in 1967 and 1968 in order to acquire Soviet arms.[16] Also, China was by then in the midst of the Cultural Revolution, and this created some fears in Ayub's mind about Chinese help. But China continued to send arms supplies to Pakistan in 1967-1968 notwithstanding the dislocation and disturbances caused by the Cultural Revolution. Then in 1969, when Yahya Khan began the grand assignment given him by President Nixon to act as "courier" between Washington and Peking, Pakistan's relations with China again became closer and more intimate. (Yahya's role also improved Pakistan's links with Washington, particularly since Nixon was noted for a better appreciation of the dynamics in the subcontinent than his predecessors had shown.) When Yahya visited Peking in November 1970, Chou En-lai warned him of "outside factors" working in East Pakistan to encourage a secessionist movement.[17] Reports from the Pakistani intelligence services, both civil and military, also spoke of "outside forces" operating in East Pakistan in 1970 when Pakistan was seeking a viable political order to remove the East-West tensions troubling the country.

This was the picture of South Asia and the three background powers on the eve of the Bangladesh crisis. The Soviet Union was hostile toward Pakistan for its refusal to join "the Soviet version of SEATO" or support other anti-China moves. Pakistan-China and Pakistan-United States relations were cordial and improving in the context of Nixon's new China policy in which the Pakistani President was playing a significant role.[18] India's relationship with Moscow, based on fifteen years of friendly ties, was growing closer and friendlier, motivated by their common objective of containing China. India was also suspicious of President Nixon's alleged "pro-Pakistan" attitude and what it might do to worsen U.S.-Indian relations.

When the civil war on the Bangladesh issue began on March 25,

---

[16] Based on personal interviews and research in Islamabad during 1969-1971.

[17] I was a member of President Yahya Khan's entourage to Peking, and this information was given to me by Yahya himself.

[18] See G. W. Choudhury, "U.S. Policy Towards the Subcontinent," *Pacific Community*, October 1973.

1971, the picture presented in the world press seemed to be that the Soviet Union and India were on the side of justice, democracy and humanitarian principles, while the United States and China were supporting a military junta in Pakistan against a national liberation movement based on the democratic aspirations of the Bengalis. But the situation was not that elementary. The *Realpolitik* prevailing in the area had to be considered. Patently the great powers gave priority to diplomatic considerations over ideological factors in reacting to the crisis, as is always the case in an international crisis. The war in Bangladesh in 1971 provides an example of how the major powers wage their "multifaceted struggle" in the Third World through proxies as well as how the Third World might become a "tinder box" that could consume the major powers' hopes for a détente.[19] The latest example is, of course, the current war in the Middle East.

India and the Bangladesh Crisis

New Delhi's interest and involvement in political developments in East Pakistan during 1969-1970 were the outgrowth of the antagonism persisting between India and Pakistan. As UN Secretary-General U Thant pointed out in his Annual Report of 1971: "The relations between the Government of India and Pakistan are also a major component of the problem [the Bangladesh crisis]. . . . The crisis is unfolding in the context of the long-standing and unresolved difficulties which gave rise to open warfare only six years ago," i.e., in 1965.[20] From the inception of the crisis, Pakistan complained of India's involvement and her calculated desire to dismember Pakistan. These fears were confirmed by the views expressed at a symposium organized by the Indian Council of World Affairs on March 31, 1971 – within six days of the outbreak of the revolt in East Pakistan – where K. Subrahmanyam, Director of the Indian Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis, said candidly: "What India must realize is the fact that the break-up of Pakistan is in our interest, an opportunity the like of which will never come again."[21] It was further stated at the same symposium that the Bangladesh crisis provided India with the "opportunity of the century" to destroy her enemy number one, Pakistan.[22] Throughout 1970 the official All-India Radio had been broadcasting a program every evening entitled "Apper Bangla and Opper Bangla" (this side and the other side of Bengal) openly encouraging the secession movement in East Pakistan.

---

[19] See Alvin Z. Rubinstein, "Red Stars in the Third World: Soviet and Chinese Influence as a Problem in Foreign Policy Analysis." Paper submitted at the Fifth Anspach Conference, University of Pennsylvania, October 25-26, 1973.

[20] Extracts from the Secretary-General's introduction to the *Annual Report on the Work of the U.N. Organization Relating to the Situation in East Bengal*, September 17, 1971.

[21] *Hindustan Times* (New Delhi), April 1, 1971.

Even more significant, however, was the immediate reaction of the Indian government to the crisis. In less than forty-eight hours after the Pakistan army action, Mrs. Gandhi said in the Lok Sabha: "We are deeply conscious of the historic importance of this movement. . . . I would like to assure the honorable members who asked whether decisions would be taken *on time*, that obviously is the most important thing to do. There is no point in taking a decision when the time for it is over."[23] The "honorable members" were pressing for a decision for Indian intervention and Mrs. Gandhi's answer was self-evident. In her statement in the Rajya Sabha on the same date, she added: "We are interested in the matter for many reasons. Firstly, as one member has said, Sri Mujibur Rahman has stood for the values which we ourselves cherish. . . ."[24] Then on March 31, 1971 the Indian Parliament passed a resolution introduced by Mrs. Gandhi pledging full support to the rebel group: "This House expresses its profound sympathy for and solidarity with the people of East Bengal in their struggle. . . . This House records its profound conviction that the historic upsurge of the 75 million people of East Bengal will triumph. The House wishes to assure them that their struggle and sacrifices will receive the wholehearted sympathy and support of the people of India."[25]

What justification, if any, did India have for assuring "support" to a federated unit that was rebelling against the national government in a neighboring country? Was this not contrary to the UN Charter and also the bilateral agreements between India and Pakistan as of 1950 and 1966, pledging not to interfere in each other's internal affairs? As pointed out earlier, India's support for the armed uprising in East Pakistan — from government, press and public — was made obvious long before her economy or society was burdened with the influx of a single refugee.

[22] *Ibid.*

[23] See the text of Indira Gandhi's speech in the Lok Sabha on March 27, 1971, in *Bangladesh Documents*, Vol. I (New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs, n.d.), p. 669. (Emphasis added.)

[24] *Ibid.*, p. 670.

[25] *Ibid.*, p. 672.

India never tires of preaching mediation, conciliation, good offices and other peaceful methods of settling disputes to other nations, particularly to Western countries. But when her own national interests are involved in any matter, whether it be Kashmir or Goa or the Himalayan kingdoms of Bhutan, Sikkim and Nepal, she has consistently refused the counsel of mediation by the United Nations or any third party. She behaved accordingly in the Bangladesh crisis. On October 20, 1971 U Thant addressed letters to Mrs. Gandhi and President Yahya Khan offering his good offices in the settlement of the crisis. The Pakistani President's reply, made on the same day, was immediate and unqualified acceptance of the U Thant offer: "I fully agree with your appreciation of the gravity of the situation which is worsening rapidly on the Indo-Pakistani borders. . . . It is a pity that the Indian Prime Minister has summarily rejected the proposal for withdrawal of forces of both countries from the borders. . . . I recommend that the U.N. observers on both sides should observe the withdrawal and supervise the maintenance of peace. . . . I also welcome the offer you have made for making your good offices available."[26] However, it took about a month for Mrs. Gandhi to reply to U Thant. She wrote on November 16, evading the Secretary-General's offer of good offices; on the contrary, she accused the UN of "the present attempt to save the military regime," and of trying to "sidetrack this main problem and convert it into an Indo-Pakistani dispute." She further told U Thant: "If you are prepared to view the problem in perspective, you will have our support in your initiatives."[27]

The Secretary-General, in his response of November 22, expressed surprise at Mrs. Gandhi's remarks: "I am puzzled by the reference in paragraph 5 of your Excellency's letter to 'the present attempt to save the military regime of Pakistan' and by the statement that [the intention is] to 'sidetrack this main problem and convert it into an Indo-Pakistan dispute.'. . . I am also puzzled by the statement in paragraph 8 that if 'I am prepared to view the problem in perspective' I shall have the support of the Indian Government."[28]

Given India's record at the United Nations whenever a matter involving her interests was taken up, this response should not have "puzzled" anyone. While in this case she made a great hue and cry about her "terrible burden" as a result of the influx of millions of refugees, she repeatedly refused to allow UN observers to facilitate the refugees' return to their homeland. The Indian government insisted that only *after* a political settlement — which must entail the dismemberment of Pakistan and the creation of a new country — could the refugees return. It was an extraordinary demand.

---

[26] *Ibid.*, Vol. II, pp. 322-323.
[27] *Ibid.*, p. 324.
[28] *Ibid.*, pp. 328-329.

On November 23, 1971, Yahya appealed to U Thant saying: "I am addressing this message to you with a deep sense of urgency in view of the grave situation which has arisen in my country as a result of unprovoked and large-scale attacks by Indian armed forces on various parts of Pakistan."[29] On November 22, Indian troops had begun to cross the international boundary in the eastern region of Pakistan on pleas of "self-interest" or "self-defense" — a dangerous doctrine when applied in international relations. Its acceptance could endanger the territorial integrity of any smaller country and negate all the principles and premises of the UN Charter. It is a great pity that the same liberals in Western countries who were most opposed to the United States' continuous involvement in the Vietnamese war were not appalled by the Indian invasion of East Pakistan. For even those scholars content with a charitable interpretation of the Indian role concede that India invaded East Pakistan. Thus Norman Brown, in his assessment of the Bangladesh crisis, candidly states: "The victory of the forces for independence was achieved through aid India rendered the East Pakistanis. This turned out to be of two kinds: one was arming of the guerrilla force known as Mukti-Bahini, 'the liberation Army'; the other was the *invasion* of East Pakistan by the Indian army."[30]

THE SOVIET UNION, CHINA, THE UNITED STATES AND THE CRISIS

The Soviet Union

As Bangladesh developed into another important issue in the Indo-Pakistan relationship, Moscow's support of India's position was almost certain in light of the Soviet hardening toward Pakistan in the preceding two years (1969-1970).

The Soviet Union's overriding strategic interest in the subcontinent has been to maintain close relations with India with the twin objectives of protecting her southern flank and maintaining pressure on China. Her reaction to the crisis was expressed

[29] *Ibid.*

[30] W. Norman Brown, *The United States and India, Pakistan, Bangladesh* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972), p. 218. (Emphasis added.)

promptly in President Podgorny's letter to Yahya Khan on April 2, 1971, less than ten days after the outbreak of the civil war. The tone and content of the Podgorny letter revealed that the USSR's posture of neutrality in Indo-Pakistani disputes, which she had adopted in April 1965 and which had enabled her to play the role of peacemaker at the Tashkent Conference in 1966, had been sacrificed "in the hope that in the long run it will pay political dividends." The Soviets were also conscious, above all, "of the inroads made by China in Pakistan and this had a great impact on their policy alternatives in the area because of the geo-political proximity of Pakistan to the Soviet Union."[31] Moscow seemed to have made the choice between a stable and friendly India under Mrs. Gandhi (whose electoral victory in 1971 was hailed in the USSR) and a "tottering Pakistan increasingly under the sway of Peking."[32]

Then came the dramatic announcement of President Nixon's trip to Peking and Pakistan's role in improving Sino-American relations. The "couriership" of Yahya Khan greatly offended Kremlin leaders and gave them a special reason to bring India closer to Moscow under a "Treaty of Friendship" signed in August 1971. As Robert H. Donaldson commented:

> . . . the visit of the American President to the capital of India's "adversary number two" had been facilitated through the co-operation of her "enemy number one" — a fact of some concern to Mrs. Gandhi as she faced the prospect of yet another war with Pakistan. . . . it seemed as though the apparent convergence of interest of the two superpowers in the 1960's in supporting India as a bulwark against Chinese ambitions was being outdistanced by the events of the 1970's.
>
> The Soviets, no less concerned over the prospect of Sino-American rapprochement, saw the Indian dilemma as an opportunity to gain influence in New Delhi. . . .[33]

With the signing of the Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation, Indo-Soviet collaboration on the Bangladesh crisis became palpable. The Soviet government began to adopt a partisan attitude in contrast to its neutral stance during the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war. There were exchanges of visits between the Soviet and Indian foreign ministers, and Mrs. Gandhi went to Moscow in September 1971. The flow of Soviet arms to India increased. India was assured of Soviet help should China intervene in any Indo-Pakistani armed conflict.

---

[31] See Bernard Gwertzman, "The Big Powers," in the *New York Times*, December 2, 1971.

[32] See *The Observer Foreign News Service* (London), April 5, 1971.

[33] Robert H. Donaldson, "Soviet Political Aims in South Asia." Paper submitted to the Twenty-fifth Annual Meeting of the Association for Asian Studies, Chicago, Illinois, March 30-April 1, 1973, p. 8.

The Soviet press, in tune with official policy, joined in a chorus condemning Pakistan. An article in *Izvestia* on November 15, when Indian troops had already begun to violate the boundary in East Pakistan, demonstrated the swing of official Soviet sentiment in India's favor by putting the entire blame on Pakistan. When the full-fledged Indo-Pakistan war began on December 3, Moscow warned Pakistan of her "grave responsibility" and said that it could not "remain indifferent to the developments in the subcontinent, as they affected [the USSR's] own security. . . . Other powers were firmly told to stay out of the conflict."[34] The Chinese queried whether the Soviets were contemplating military intervention in Pakistan's affairs similar to that taken against Czechoslovakia, where developments had also been regarded by Kremlin leaders as affecting Soviet security. China remarked that "the present sudden invasion of Pakistan by India with the support of the Soviet Union is precisely a repetition on the South Asian subcontinent of the 1968 Soviet invasion and occupation of Czechoslovakia."[35]

The USSR, however, did not have to resort to direct military intervention. Her Security Council vetoes stymied all efforts to obtain a cease-fire until Indian forces occupied Dacca. A cease-fire resolution was adopted by the UN General Assembly by an overwhelming majority of 104 to 11, but this was only a moral victory for Pakistan; Soviet vetoes gave the Indians time to carry out the Bangladesh operation. The Chinese government declared: "The Soviet Government has played a shameful role in this war of aggression launched by India against Pakistan. The whole world has seen clearly that it was the backstage manager of the Indian expansionists."[36] The American President later observed: "Soviet policy, I regret to say, seemed to show the same tendency as we witnessed before in the 1967 Middle East war and the 1970 Jordanian crisis – to allow events to boil up towards crisis in the hope of political gain."[37]

---

[34] *Daily Telegraph* (London), December 6, 1971.

[35] See the text of the statement by the government of China issued by its delegation at the UN on December 16, 1971, in the *New York Times*, December 17, 1971.

[36] *Ibid.*

[37] *U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: The Emerging Structure of Peace.* A Report to the Congress by Richard Nixon, President of the United States, February 9, 1972 (Washington: GPO, 1972), pp. 50-51.

China

Just as China condemned the Soviet role in the crisis, the Soviet government and its press attacked the Chinese policy and role. *Pravda* charged on December 9 that China was provoking war between India and Pakistan "to further its chauvinist great-power line in Asia," while *Red Star* stated on December 14 that China's foreign policy was based on ideas "dug from the garbage pit of history among obsolete geo-political doctrines which in their days fed Nazism." Though such recriminations were nothing new in Sino-Soviet relations, the debate on the Bangladesh war in the Security Council and the General Assembly carried the polemical exchanges into the world forum. Another phenomenon in the United Nations was the identity of Sino-American views. The Bangladesh voting provided the first example of cooperation at the UN between the United States and China, the first demonstration of relaxed Sino-American relations.

Was Chinese policy opposed to the legitimate hopes and aspirations of the Bengalis? Did China's actions and votes at the UN reflect her conflicts with the Soviet Union and India more than any real opposition to the creation of Bangladesh? Was there a dichotomy between the Chinese ideology relating to national liberation movements and Peking's actual role during the crisis?

As regards ideology, Chinese views on national liberation struggles as interpreted in the Maoist doctrine are clear.[38] According to the Chinese interpretation, the Bangladesh movement was not truly in the "national liberation" category; it had the potential of meeting requirements if the liberation war continued for a long time and its leadership passed to the real representatives of the "have nots" in East Bengal. But the movement as it had started, with Indian and Soviet support for a bourgeois party, the Awami League, was not strictly national liberation in character. Its leader Mujib was a bourgeois leader supported by the Bengali industrialists and businessmen, supplemented by the resources of their counterparts in West Bengal (India). From Peking's standpoint the conflict was between two bourgeois elites — one in West Pakistan and the other in East Bengal. Obviously China preferred the legal government, which had supported her faithfully in the Sino-Soviet rivalry in the area.

But leaving ideology aside, it was futile for Mujib to expect any sympathy from Peking. In fact, he never sought it. His single-track devotion to New Delhi blinded him to Peking, and he was most critical of what he used to describe as the "provocative friendship" between Pakistan and China. When Chou En-lai addressed letters to Mujib and Bhutto after the 1970 elections in Pakistan, urging both to work for a political settlement between East and West Pakistan, Mujib gave a cool reception to the Chinese Ambassador who carried Chou's letter and paid no attention to the Chinese counsel of restraint and moderation. He seemed to have decided to put all his eggs in one basket.

---

[38] See Peter Van Ness, *Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy: Peking's Support for Wars of National Liberation* (London, 1971).

China was criticized for a lack of sympathy for the Bengali cause and for supporting a military regime. But those who knew the inside story of the political developments in Pakistan (as I did) can vouch that she never opposed the rights and demands of the neglected people of East Bengal. Like any other friend of Pakistan, she wished well for the people of both wings of the country. The Chinese were greatly dismayed by the tragic happenings in East Bengal in March 1971, and behind the scenes advised the Pakistan government to seek a political settlement of the conflict. In various statements of *verbal* support to Pakistan they did not approve of the Pakistani army's policy of repression, nor did China oppose the demands for genuine regional autonomy.

However, Peking could not be expected to support an emerging regime in Bangladesh which was vitally dependent on India, and via New Delhi on Moscow also. One of India's prime considerations in taking quick military action in East Bengal, with the Soviet Union's support, was the possibility that the secessionist movement might be transformed into a real people's war. Neither the Soviet Union nor India wanted a genuine Bengali revolution that would have great impact on other parts of the subcontinent.

China's help to the Pakistan government was far less than her pledged role in the 1965 war, for this was a suicidal civil war among the peoples of Pakistan, whose friendship Peking valued. It is also inaccurate to say that China "provoked" the Indo-Pakistani war of 1971. Since the serious border clashes with the Soviet Union in 1969, she has been worried about a pre-emptive strike by the USSR on her frontiers, where forty-five Soviet divisions mount a constant threat to her security. Given the present military balance of power, she would think twice about encouraging a war in the subcontinent and thereby incurring the risk of an intensified Soviet threat, particularly after the signing of the Indo-Soviet treaty of 1971 — which notwithstanding its high-sounding nomenclature was in reality a military pact.

China is mainly interested in checking Soviet influence in the area, and as the Bangladesh movement was nursed by India directly and had Moscow's indirect blessing, she could hardly look upon it with favor. No great power would support a movement that had the blessings of its adversaries and threatened to weaken a friendly neighbor. This would be contrary to general practices of international politics. China's policies in the Bangladesh crisis were similar to those any power would have adopted in such circumstances. I read the Chinese messages to Yahya Khan and can report that they were all pleas for restraint and not for war. In fact, when Bhutto went to Peking as Yahya's emissary to secure Chinese support in the imminent confrontation with India, the Chinese Foreign Minister publicly told him that Pakistan should try to find a "rational" solution to the crisis — which implied a condemnation of the policy of Pakistan's military regime.

In the same vein, a careful analysis of the Chinese stand at the UN when the Indo-Pakistani war broke out in December 1971 reveals that China's wrath was turned against the Soviet Union and India rather than against emerging Bangladesh.

The United States

The U.S. government's policy during the crisis drew sharp criticism from American intellectuals and the press. This was partly because of a lack of understanding regarding the genesis of the conflict and the self-serving Indo-Soviet role in complicating the issue. The prevailing mood among the so-called liberal forces in the United States depicted U.S. policy as supporting a military regime against a democratic movement: "The emotionalism which surrounded the American public understanding . . . portrayed Pakistan as a complete villain and India as a knight in shining armor."[39] President Nixon's policies were roundly condemned in the main because his critics misunderstood them. He never condoned the Pakistan army's action in East Bengal. In fact, he put urgent pressures on Yahya to reach a political settlement and give up the path of repression and suppression. During my two private visits to Pakistan in May and September 1971, I had lengthy conversations with Yahya, and he showed me the contents of Nixon's letters to him. I can aver that the American President did his best to bring about a political solution of the crisis. The efforts he sponsored could have averted the Indo-Pakistani war which so severely damaged the Bengalis' economic infrastructure and social fabric, while affording them political independence.

---

[39] Manton, *op. cit.*

As regards American economic aid to Pakistan in 1971, it may be pointed out that the bulk of it went to East Bengal, where the people were facing a major famine. It did not help the Pakistani army; it was utilized in humanitarian relief operations for the Bengalis – both those inside East Bengal and those who later fled to the refugee camps in West Bengal. The U.S. government, as disclosed by President Nixon in his Report to the Congress in February 1972, stopped sending military supplies to Pakistan as soon as the civil war began.[40]

At the time the Indo-Pakistani war finally broke out on December 3, 1971, Nixon believed he was "in sight of a political settlement" between Yahya Khan's regime and the exile government of Bangladesh in India. U.S. efforts for a political settlement had been discussed fully with Mrs. Gandhi when she visited Washington shortly before the war began, and the two heads of state were reported to have agreed that "a little time" was necessary to achieve a negotiated settlement. Less than ten days later, Mrs. Gandhi sent her troops across the border in East Pakistan. Under these circumstances, it was understandable that Ambassador George Bush, Permanent U.S. Representative to the United Nations, should say on December 5, when the matter came up before the Security Council, that India was clearly "the major aggressor." Washington had proposed to both India and Pakistan that there should be an immediate cease-fire and mutual withdrawal of troops. The government of Pakistan accepted the U.S. proposal without any reservation and publicly. The Indian government rejected it publicly, and following that rejection India escalated the fighting on the subcontinent.[41] As a White House spokesman said: "The White House believes that what started as a tragedy in Bengal has now become an attempt to dismember a sovereign state which is a member of the United Nations."[42]

Senator Edward Kennedy, denouncing Nixon's attitude toward the war, raised the question in the Senate: "Are we so insensitive as to what our country stands for that our government can actually support as well as apologize for a military regime's brutal suppression of democracy?"[43] But President Nixon neither approved the military regime's policy of suppression nor Mrs. Gandhi's attempt to solve the problem by dismembering a smaller neighbor with the military and diplomatic support of a superpower. Dubbed a "tilt" in favor of Pakistan, the Nixon policy was in reality "a tilt toward peace and to . . . help achieve the kind of peace and stability which we think is in the interest of all countries in the area as well as the major powers who have an interest in the area," as explained by Joseph S. Sisco, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs.[44]

---

[40] See *U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's*, *op. cit.*, pp. 48-51.

[41] See the statement of Charles Bray, State Department spokesman, on December 7, 1971, in *New York Times,* December 8, 1971.

[42] Statement of USIS White House correspondent, Alexander M. Sullivan, on December 8, 1971.

THE NEW BALANCE OF POWER IN SOUTH ASIA AND ITS IMPLICATIONS

India's military success in the third Indo-Pakistani war was *almost a foregone conclusion: a demoralized Pakistani army, sur*rounded by a hostile local population and lacking aircover, could easily be defeated. Moreover, India had the full backing of a superpower; Pakistan got moral and diplomatic support from Washington and Peking but no effective military help. So the Indian victory was achieved without much cost or difficulty. Though it cannot be depicted as a decisive Indian military achievement, it greatly boosted the morale of the Indian forces after their humiliation at the hands of the Chinese in 1962 and the indecisive result of the 1965 war with Pakistan, and it was of even more significance politically and psychologically: India at last was able to dismember her enemy number one (Pakistan) and inflict a major diplomatic defeat on her adversary number two (China).

In the flush of victory India began to claim a hegemonic role in the affairs of the subcontinent. The state of Bangladesh was treated like a client state, much as were Bhutan, Sikkim and Nepal. Ceylon and Burma were expected to be impressed by India's new military and political stature as *the* dominant power in the region. Pakistan was dismissed as a "lost rival," both in military and diplomatic competition. Indians began to talk in terms of a "confederation" or a "larger union" — a theme they have never forgotten since the "tragic mistake" of partition or "vivisection" of their motherland in 1947. The Indian Foreign Secretary, T. N. Kaul, expressed the view that "in the new era of peace, a union between India, Pakistan and Bangladesh could

[43] *The Observer Foreign News Service,* December 8, 1971.

[44] *Hearings* Before the Subcommittee on the Near East and South Asia, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

subsequently be extended to cover countries like Nepal which badly wanted transit facilities as well as other countries of the region."[45] The *Hindustan Times* (New Delhi) expressed the hope that the countries of South Asia could "in time assume the attributes of a confederation or commonwealth."[46]

But after about two years, India's hegemonic role seemed less auspicious than Indians had at first thought. Pakistan has not proved to be a "lost cause," either economically or militarily. Her armed forces were reported to have made adequate compensation for the losses of 1971 as Chinese arms and military equipment, including MIG 19's and tanks, continued to pour in. According to some reliable estimates, the total extent of Chinese military supplies to Pakistan from 1966 to the present day roughly matches what Washington provided during the previous decade (1954-1965).[47] Furthermore, the Pakistan-Iran military collaboration and the latter country's huge military buildup have caused some doubts about India's absolute supremacy over Pakistan. "The Shah of Iran's interest in Pakistan deserves a careful watch," cautions one Indian research report.[48] Perhaps the most disappointing political development for the Indian government in the new era is the rise of anti-Indian feelings in Bangladesh.[49] India's economic situation also impairs a hegemonic role.

THE MAJOR POWERS AND THE NEW BALANCE IN SOUTH ASIA

The Soviet Union was quick to embellish her role as a "liberator" of the seventy-five million people of Bangladesh and tried to penetrate all spheres of Bangladesh life under the garb of an "economic-cultural relationship." She also provided the new country with some MIG's which are, however, stationed in Calcutta, India. The Soviet contribution to the UN relief operations in Bangladesh in 1971-1972 was only about $137 million or 10.7 per cent of the total fund, as compared with the U.S. contribution of about $347 million or 27.2 per cent. Yet the Soviets gave a lot of publicity to their "concern" for the suffering Bengalis.

Moscow's diplomatic objective in Bangladesh seems to be to include the new state under the Brezhnev umbrella of collective Asian security. At present, Bangladesh is covered indirectly by the Soviet plan through New Delhi's Treaty of Friendship with Dacca, which is similar to the Indian-Soviet treaty of 1971. The Soviets have intensified their campaign for the Asian security plan through nongovernmental channels. Their claim that this scheme is attracting great interest in Asia is now shored up with references to "speeches at conferences and symposia" and proposals of various parties and organizations.[50] These include the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization (AAPSO) executive committee meeting in Aden in February 1973, and peace conventions in India and Nepal in 1972. A leading role in this campaign is being played by the World Peace Council, whose "conference on Asian Security and Cooperation" in Dacca from May 23 to 26, 1973 was among the preliminaries to a World Congress of Peace Forces in Moscow in October 1973.[51]

---

[45] Quoted in *Far Eastern Economic Review*, February 12, 1972, p. 19.

[46] Cited in *ibid*.

[47] See Howard Wriggins, "One Year Later: India, Pakistan and Bangladesh," *World View*, May 1973.

[48] See the Report of the Indian Economic and Scientific Research Foundation on National Security in *Overseas Hindustan Times*, January 25, 1973.

[49] For details see *India-Bangladesh Tangle*, published by the Research and Documentation Centre, London, n.d., and *The Statesman Weekly* (Calcutta), August 25, 1973.

The attitude of the Soviet Union toward the "new" Pakistan continues unfriendly. When Prime Minister Bhutto visited Moscow in March 1972, he was told bluntly by his hosts: "If history were to repeat itself we would again take the same position [referring to the Soviet role in the dismemberment of Pakistan] because we are convinced that it was correct."[52] This was a clear warning to Pakistan in the context of the turbulence developing in Baluchistan and the Northwest Frontier Province of the truncated country. The alleged role of the USSR in the current political unrest in the "Wild West" of Pakistan was dramatized by the seizure of Soviet arms smuggled into the area through the Iraqi embassy in Islamabad. Baghdad Radio's broadcasts for a "greater Baluchistan" and Kabul Radio's propaganda for Paktoonistan are viewed as other portents that Moscow is interested in the further fragmentation of Pakistan. The recent coup in Afghanistan, which was thought to have Soviet blessing, and the new Afghan rulers' threats to revive the old Paktoonistan issue are regarded by Pakistan as Soviet pressures to browbeat her into the Asian Collective Security Plan. The creation of Soviet client states in "greater Baluchistan" and "Paktoonistan" would fulfill the old Czarist ambition for a "warm-water" port in the South via the Arabian Sea. If this were to happen, Soviet expansionist designs in the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf would threaten not only

---

[50] "Asia and Russian Security Plan," *Opinion* (Bombay), August 21, 1973, p. 3.

[51] See *Pravda*, April 26, 1973.

[52] *Ibid.*, March 18, 1972.

Pakistan but also Iran. Bhutto has warned an unnamed foreign power "to keep her hands off the warm waters of the Arabian sea on the Baluchistan Coast"[53] – an obvious reference to the Soviet Union.

China, though having suffered a diplomatic setback in 1971, is not likely to tolerate passively "a Soviet-Indian axis." Chou En-lai observed that the fall of Dacca to the Indian army was "not the end of the problems but just the start of them."[54] He expressed similar views in talking to the British author, Neville Maxwell, predicting that "India would in the end taste the bitter fruit of its own making. And from then on there would be no tranquility on the subcontinent."[55]

The United States is still committed to showing a low profile in South Asia. There have been suggestions that Washington should "no longer have any doubt about Indian hegemony within the subcontinent and therefore about the need for . . . a 'North American solution'" (referring to the strategic accommodation between the United States and Canada and Mexico).[56] In view of Soviet expansionist designs and Indo-Soviet collaboration, however, it is encouraging to note that President Nixon told Prime Minister Bhutto that U.S. objectives in South Asia include the maintenance of Pakistan's territorial integrity. As Dr. William R. Kintner pointed out, in discussing balance-of-power politics, "it is desirable to prevent domination of Asia by one power." Pakistan's viability and territorial integrity should remain "a fundamental goal of American policy" if the developing world is an area in which the United States "intends to be a participant and not simply a bystander."[57]

---

[53] *The Times* (London), September 10, 1973.

[54] Manton, *op. cit.*

[55] Neville Maxwell, "Midnight Thoughts of Premier Chou," *The Sunday Times* (London), December 5, 1971.

[56] *Hearings* Before the Subcommittee on the Near East and South Asia, *op. cit.*, p. 125. (Statement of Dr. John P. Lewis, Dean, the Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University.)

[57] William R. Kintner, *The Impact of President Nixon's Visit to Peking on International Politics* (Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1972), pp. 42-46.

THE SOVIET UNION AND THE EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE*

by Mojmir Povolny

SINCE the end of the Second World War the Soviet Union has pursued three main goals in her relations with Western Europe. First, from Potsdam through the fateful year of the Czechoslovak coup d'état and the Berlin blockade, to Khrushchev's threats to conclude a separate peace treaty with East Germany and his renewed pressure on West Berlin, to the conclusion of the nonaggression pact with the Federal Republic of Germany and the proposals for a European security conference, the Soviet regime has sought maintenance of the status quo and Western legitimization of its supremacy in Eastern Europe.

Second, the Soviets have never accepted their exclusion from Western Europe. Their early support for, and manipulation of, the West European communist parties and fellow-traveling movements, their diplomacy in Paris, London, and eventually in Bonn, their fight against West European integration, and their promise of a bright and stable future for Western Europe should it open up to the East on their conditions, bear witness to an active *Westpolitik* in search of the extension of Soviet influence.

Third, the Soviets have understood that the American presence in Western Europe has severely circumscribed their freedom of maneuver in pursuit of the first two goals. Consequently, their battle against the Marshall Plan and NATO, the 1954 proposal for a European system of collective security, the persistent pressure for an all-European conference, and all the lesser moves in between have aimed at excluding the United States from playing a role in Europe.

In the second half of the 1960's all these threads were woven into the single scheme for a European security conference. The time appeared to be propitious for such a move. On the one hand, not only was NATO's twenty-year term coming up in 1969, but the alliance was approaching it in the shadow of French disaffection and disengagement and was uncertain of its continuing purpose.

---

*This study was undertaken with the financial support of Lawrence University, for which the author wishes to express his sincere appreciation. He is also indebted to Misses Mary Brauer and Linda Stieve for their valuable research assistance.

Moreover, the deeper the United States became involved in Indochina, the less influence it had in Europe. On the other hand, the Soviets began to experience new difficulties in holding the East European bloc under their customary control, and the future course of their rivalry with China was unpredictable. Moscow tried, therefore, to engage the West at the moment of its weakness in order to gain its sanction of the Soviet solution in Central and Eastern Europe, to open the West European door to Soviet influence, to promote American disengagement from Europe, and to free Soviet resources for other places and objectives. Postwar Soviet conduct in Europe intimates that this would have been the essence of the concessions expected from a peace treaty with Germany. This essay will argue that in proposing a European security conference the Soviet Union has been promoting a substitute for a peace conference on Germany, the latter, in its traditional form, having been outdated by the course of postwar developments.

PRELIMINARY FORMULATION

The theme of a European security conference in its present form surfaced first in Warsaw at the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact in January 1965. It was attached, as a call for a "conference of European states to discuss measures for ensuring collective security in Europe," to a communiqué that violently opposed NATO's consideration of a NATO multilateral force or an Atlantic nuclear force.[1] The 1965 appeal echoed the arguments and purposes of a series of previous Soviet proposals. At the Berlin meeting of the Big Four foreign ministers in February 1954, Molotov had proposed a general treaty on collective security in Europe. Article 9 of the Warsaw Treaty, which also was concluded in 1954, opened the treaty to accession by other than the founding states "irrespective of their social and state systems," and Article 11 offered the disbanding of the Warsaw alliance in the event that an all-European security system was established. At the end of the same year, Moscow sponsored a "conference of European countries on safeguarding European peace and security."

---

[1] *Pravda*, January 22, 1965, translated in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (hereafter cited as *CDSP*), February 10, 1965, pp. 14-15. See also Y. Novoseltsev, "European Security and World Peace," *International Affairs* (Moscow), February 1965, pp. 3-8. For an early analysis of the plans for a European security conference, see Andrzej Korbonski, "The Warsaw Pact," *International Conciliation*, May 1969, pp. 25-28; also, Timothy W. Stanley and Darnell M. Whitt, *Détente Diplomacy: United States and European Security in the 1970's* (New York: Dunellen, 1970); Josef Korbel, *Détente in Europe: Real or Imaginary?* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972); Robert Hunter, *Security in Europe*, 2nd edition (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1972).

In the summer of 1955, at the Geneva summit meeting, Khrushchev continued to promote the Soviet plan for collective security in Europe, and the heads of state instructed their foreign ministers to consider various proposals on this issue. The Rapacki Plan for an atom-free zone in Central Europe was first advanced in 1957. In 1958 the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact proposed the conclusion of a nonaggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization and of a treaty of friendship and cooperation among European states. With some modifications and vacillation the proposal for a nonaggression pact combined with some version of the Rapacki Plan was repeated annually until it was transformed into the 1965 plan for a general conference on European security and cooperation.[2]

Throughout 1965 Moscow waged a relentless propaganda campaign against West Germany and hammered alarmingly on the danger of Bonn's access to nuclear weapons in any form. Finally, on March 24, 1966, the new West German government responded with the following offer: an exchange of bilateral nonaggression pacts with the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and any other East European state; reduction of nuclear weapons maintained in Europe by the United States, Great Britain and France; renunciation of nuclear arms by nonnuclear nations; and agreement to control by the International Atomic Energy Commission of nuclear materials supplied to nonnuclear nations by the nuclear powers. No mention was made, however, of the existing boundaries in Europe.

Soviet and Polish reactions to the West German memorandum specified harshly what the Eastern bloc expected from Bonn in the interest of European security. At that point, especially for the Soviets, the West German proposal was no longer an acceptable alternative to their larger scheme of a security conference. In his report to the Twenty-third Congress of the CPSU held at the end of March 1966, Brezhnev outlined the purposes for which he wished such a conference to be convened:

> To discuss the existing proposals of the socialist and other states of Europe concerning a military détente and the reduction of armaments in Europe and the development of peaceful, mutually advantageous ties among all European states. . . . To continue to seek ways for solving one

---

[2] For a Soviet review of all the plans, see Y. Zhukov, "The Problems of European Peace and Security," *International Affairs* (Moscow), June 1965, pp. 3-9.

> of the cardinal tasks of European security — the peaceful settlement of the German question with a view to eliminating completely the vestiges of World War II in Europe on the basis of recognition of the now existing European frontiers, including those of the two German states.[3]

The Polish reply called the West German initiative an act of "political hypocrisy" and demanded that the FRG prove its sincere interest in European security by repudiating territorial claims against Poland, accepting the Oder-Neisse boundary, annulling the Munich Agreement, and recognizing East Germany. Kosygin endorsed the Polish claim in no less explicit terms: "Europe has no unsolved frontier questions . . . there are two German states in Europe . . . and West Germany must accept existing postwar reality as the starting point."[4] In Soviet pronouncements, however, the theme of a European security conference began to gain as much significance as the more specific solution of the German issue. Its emphasis was on Europe's independence. Kosygin went further than Gromyko at the Twenty-third Congress when he urged that the Europeans themselves should solve the continent's security problems and that foreign troops should be evacuated from Europe.

Through these appeals the USSR accomplished a number of immediate objectives. First, she seized the initiative over an issue of such magnitude that all her minor moves in Europe in the future could be presented as its integral part and charged with its moral weight. The West was simultaneously placed in the position of the reacting party who would ignore the Soviet proposal for a while, whittle it down, but never escape from its framework. Second, the Soviets defined the issue by combining the politically painful and specific problem of German settlement with the emotionally appealing and general theme of European security. Europe was invited to participate in a bookkeeping operation registering and sanctioning transactions that had been carried out long before. Furthermore, through their attempt to limit participation in the proposed conference to Europeans only, the Soviet leaders tried to align themselves with those in Western Europe who hankered after a lesser American influence, to discourage others from renewing their NATO membership when it was due to expire in 1969, and in the end to appear reasonable and conciliatory and exact a price for their obliging stance when the United States would have to be taken in.

[3] *Pravda,* March 30, 1966, translated in *CDSP,* April 13, 1966, p. 13.
[4] *New York Times,* June 18, 1966.

The Development of Terms

Following this preliminary formulation of how to deal with the increasingly fluid situation in Europe, the Soviet Union had to ensure public support for her approach from the East European states and minimize their autonomous rapprochement with the West. Weight could be added to her proposal only if the Eastern bloc spoke with a single voice and if the European security conference did not appear merely as a Soviet scheme. For that purpose the foreign ministers of the WTO nations met in Moscow in June 1966 and, except for Rumania, lined up behind the Soviet Union.

The Rumanians were apparently unwilling to adhere to three basic ingredients of the Soviet plan: the accusation of West Germany for creating and perpetuating political problems in Central Europe at the moment when they were establishing diplomatic relations with Bonn; the charge of the United States with sole responsibility for the insecurity arising from opposing military blocs in Europe; and the need for an all-European conference to ensure progress on security problems. Where the Soviet Union looked for a European sanction of her control in the East, Rumania looked for emancipation from it and beyond.

Ceausescu, therefore, sent his foreign minister to Moscow with a message that had been heard from Rumania before at the Geneva disarmament conference:

> We hold that peoples can live in peace in Europe. The military blocs are an obstacle to cooperation among peoples.
>
> Therefore it is time to abolish the NATO aggressive pact and, as a consequence, also the Warsaw Treaty, so that relations on a new basis can be established between the European countries.[5]

TASS omitted the call for abolition of both military blocs in reporting on Ceausescu's appeal, and Brezhnev reportedly "described the desire to dissolve military alliances as naive and unrealistic as long as the Atlantic Alliance existed."[6] At the Moscow meeting Rumanian Foreign Minister Cornel Manescu refused to agree to a joint declaration condemning West Germany as a troublemaker and was reported to have told Brezhnev "that Rumania would agree only to bilateral talks between Warsaw Pact and North Atlantic countries."[7] On the other hand, the prospect of a settlement with West Germany on their terms, which kept escaping them in bilateral approaches, overshadowed any reserva-

[5] *Ibid.*, June 12, 1966.
[6] *Ibid.*
[7] *Ibid.*, June 16, 1966.

tions Czechoslovakia, East Germany and Poland might have shared with Rumania, and their support for the Soviet initiative was at the outset publicly unequivocal.

The WTO foreign ministers' meeting was almost immediately followed by a conference of the pact's Political Consultative Committee in Bucharest in July 1966. This was the first in a series of major meetings of communist leaders substantially devoted to promoting the security conference idea. It is likely that the Rumanian hosts, having successfully resisted Soviet attempts at strengthening the Warsaw Pact military command structure on the one hand and condemnation of West Germany on the other, found it possible now to support a joint declaration on the subject.[8]

The principal objective of the suggested conference was set forth as an all-European commitment to cooperation for the purpose of maintaining and strengthening security in Europe. This security was to ensure the sovereignty, equality, independence, noninterference in domestic affairs, and territorial integrity of all European states. It was to be based on renunciation of the threat of force or use of force. International disputes were to be solved only through peaceful means. In specific terms, the Bucharest Declaration emphasized recognition of the existing European boundaries, exclusion of West Germany from access to nuclear weapons, replacement of military alliances with a new security system once the NATO countries have agreed to liquidate their organization, and promotion of economic, scientific and technical cooperation.

The last topic was a new item introduced into the consideration of European security to make up, as *Izvestia* explained later, for American disruption of East-West trade during the Cold War, which "strove to weaken not only the socialist countries" but America's European partners as well.[9] In addition, the Declaration contained a package of suggestions on the regulation of armaments in Europe, which included most of the main themes of previous disarmament proposals: liquidation of military bases on foreign territory; withdrawal of all foreign troops from other countries' territory to within their national frontiers; reduction of the armed forces of the two German states; creation of denuclearized zones; and the banning from European skies of foreign aircraft carrying nuclear weapons and from European ports of foreign vessels with nuclear weapons on board.

---

[8] *Pravda,* July 9, 1966, translated in *CDSP,* July 27, 1966, pp. 3-7.
[9] *Izvestia,* September 13, 1966.

The speeches, commentaries and articles surrounding the Bucharest Declaration indicated that the Soviets were at that moment preoccupied with making it impossible for West Germany to have access to nuclear weapons. On the question of participation in the proposed conference the Declaration was ambiguous. It called for an "all-European conference" but added that any agreement reached by the conference "should be open for all interested states to join," and that the Warsaw Pact nations would make "no exceptions" as to the participants. Rumania, however, was quick to assume that the United States would be allowed to participate. Later, when Poland jointly with Belgium supported the proposal for a security conference, it also said nothing about limiting participation to European states only. Nevertheless, *Izvestia,* in urging "the representatives of all European countries to gather at a round table," implied the exclusion of the United States and supported this in the following manner:

> The essence of the problem is not that anyone wants to force the USA out of Europe. It is not the Europeans who are depriving the USA of the right to participate in the solution of problems of European security and the establishment of peaceful cooperation; on the contrary, Washington wants to deprive the Europeans of this right.[10]

The Soviets must have understood that they could not bring the American allies in Western Europe to a conference table on European security from which the United States was excluded. But an ambivalent formulation of their own attitude toward American participation could test the solidarity of the West Europeans on this question and play on some of the residual anti-Americanism on the continent. More importantly, the Soviets may have anticipated that, by conceding American participation later, they could demand an equivalent American concession of their right to a role and influence in some other part of the world from which they had so far been barred.

After Bucharest the Soviets began a relentless diplomatic offensive in the noncommunist European states in support of the idea of the security conference. Kosygin, Podgorny and Gromyko traveled the circuit of West European capitals trying to promote the Soviet proposal.

In early 1967 the West European communist parties endorsed the Bucharest Declaration at their meeting in Vienna, and in April a full-fledged conference of all European communist parties, from the West as well as the East, was held for the same purpose in

---

[10] *Ibid.*

Karlovy Vary. After approving the Declaration, the assembled parties established their version of a German solution as the principal target of the proposed conference: recognition of West Germany, East Germany and West Berlin as three independent political units and normalization of relations among them as well as between all states and East Germany.[11] Thus the Berlin issue was introduced into the security conference plan.

Compared with these new concrete proposals, the appeal from Karlovy Vary to all nations to prevent renewal of the NATO pact in 1969 was only an echo of the previous demand that military alliances be replaced with a new security system. Brezhnev asked also for the liquidation of foreign radio stations and espionage centers in Europe and for the withdrawal of the Sixth Fleet from the Mediterranean Sea. In its commentary on the Karlovy Vary meeting *Pravda* appealed to the European working class, socialist and social democratic parties, believers of all faiths, the intelligentsia, the younger generation, and all peace-loving forces — the standard targets of Soviet front-organization efforts — to support the idea of the European security conference against the danger created by "the collusion of American and West German imperialisms."[12]

The emphasis on a specific solution of the German question obviously came in response to what the Soviets must have read into the Western debate about moves toward Eastern Europe: an attempt at isolating East Germany from the other East European states in order to obtain a solution in Central Europe on Western terms. It was supported by a warning to Western Europe against the dangerous automatism of its NATO obligations, its vulnerability in case of war, and the growing cost of military spending. On the positive side, the new system of European security was painted to the West Europeans as a defense against American scientific and technological domination, the brain drain, and the invasion by U.S. capital of the key sectors of their economy.[13] Taking the wind from the anticipated Chinese argument against any rapprochement with the West, Brezhnev reiterated the post-Stalinist thesis that relaxed international relations tended to aid the cause of communism. Experience has taught the communists, he said, that

---

[11] *Pravda,* April 25, 1967, translated in *CDSP,* May 17, 1967, pp. 5-11.

[12] *Ibid.,* April 27, 1967, translated in *CDSP,* May 17, 1967, p. 17. See also Y. Shvedkov, "West European Political Forces and European Security," *International Affairs* (Moscow), March 1968, pp. 8-13.

[13] Y. Rakhmaninov, "Alternative to a Divided Europe," *International Affairs* (Moscow), April 1967, pp. 41-47.

> the "cold war" setting, the confrontations of military blocs and the atmosphere of war threats encumber the activities of revolutionary, democratic forces. In conditions of international tension, reactionary elements in bourgeois countries become active, the military rears its head, antidemocratic tendencies and anticommunism intensify.
>
> And conversely, recent years have shown especially clearly that in conditions of relaxed international tension the arrow of the political barometer moves to the left.[14]

Applying the general thesis to the European situation, Brezhnev saw the independent policies of some West European nations as an opportunity united communists could exploit.

Yet the absence of the Rumanian Communist Party from Karlovy Vary – not to speak of the absence of the Albanians and Yugoslavs – told more about dissension in the communist bloc than did Brezhnev's analysis of disunity among the Western nations. The Rumanians continued pressing for the dissolution of both NATO and the WTO on every occasion – at press conferences at home, in the United Nations and at the disarmament conference in Geneva – calling at the same time for the withdrawal of all troops stationed on the territory of other states and opposing interference in the internal affairs of other peoples. The emerging crisis over Czechoslovakia gave their proposals special urgency and their thrust a concrete target.

Czechoslovakia during 1968 proved that Moscow's capacity to handle foreign policy issues could be overtaxed. The communiqué issued from the Political Consultative Committee's meeting in Sofia in March 1968 did not even mention the European security conference. As the Soviet Union concentrated on saving the integrity of her domain, which eventually required the presence and deployment of her troops, she was not receptive to NATO's first official interest in mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR) in Europe, nor was she prepared to tackle the issue of American participation in the security conference when Austria endorsed it in April 1968. Under the circumstances, the best Soviet policy was to stick to denying the United States the right to take part in the establishment of a new order in Europe.

Once the Czechoslovak crisis was settled, however, in a way most favorable to Soviet long-term objectives in Central Europe, the USSR had a twofold interest in the renewed urgency with which she advocated a "system of collective security in Europe," as Kosygin called it in his 1969 New Year's message: to slow down

---

[14] *Pravda,* April 25, 1967, translated in *CDSP,* May 17, 1967, p. 11.

"the stepped-up activity" of NATO resulting from her invasion of Czechoslovakia and to insulate Eastern Europe behind the recognized boundaries and under the umbrella of the Brezhnev Doctrine.[15]

In order to obtain a more attentive hearing in the West, which had so far largely ignored the communist promotion of a European security conference, Moscow made three noticeable but gratuitous concessions at the Political Consultative Committee's meeting in Budapest in March 1969. First, the Budapest Message did not suggest replacing NATO and the Warsaw Pact with a new system of European security. Evidently the Soviets saw nobody deserting NATO in 1969 and in their own sphere, in the aftermath of the Czechoslovak crisis, felt just the opposite need for strengthening the WTO command. In reviewing the Budapest document, the CPSU Politburo and the USSR Council of Ministers noted that agreements of that conference, "aimed at further perfecting the structure and administrative bodies of the Warsaw Pact defense organization," were "of great importance in connection with the evident increase in the activity of the aggressive imperialist NATO bloc."[16]

Second, the old prerequisites for convening the conference — unconditional recognition of the existing boundaries in Central Europe and of West Germany, East Germany and West Berlin as separate political entities — were transformed into mere preconditions for safeguarding European security. At that time the Soviet Union was already seriously engaged with Bonn in considering a nonaggression pact and expected to obtain bilaterally what she was surrendering, to East Germany's chagrin, as a *sine qua non* to multilateral negotiations. But she understood that should West Germany, however tentatively and indirectly, accept these prerequisites as an integral part of the nonaggression pact, nobody in the West would either desire, or be in a position, to challenge them effectively.

Where the Soviets aimed at a specific and obtainable objective, East Germany would have preferred the absolutism of the original hard line. In the end, however, the reluctant Ulbricht accepted the Soviet approach, at least temporarily, and following his visit to Moscow shortly after the Budapest conference, the East German Politburo "issued a declaration that the security conference should be organized 'without preconditions' to be fulfilled by either German state."[17]

---

[15] *New York Times,* January 4, 1969. For a thoughtful analysis, see Josef Korbel, "West Germany's Ostpolitik: II, A Policy toward the Soviet Allies," ORBIS, Summer 1970, p. 337.

[16] *Pravda,* March 18, 1969, translated in *CDSP,* April 2, 1969, p. 11.

Third, the obstacle of Soviet ambivalence toward the role of the United States in any future arrangements in Europe was removed. Even though the appeal for early multilateral consultations went from Budapest to all *European* states, Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin reportedly told Under Secretary of State Richardson that Moscow had no objection to U.S. participation in the conference. This change in the Soviet attitude was also reported by Willy Spueler, the Swiss Foreign Minister, after he learned during a visit to Rumania that Moscow had changed its position because of the emphasis "some European countries" had placed on American participation. Because there could be no conference on European security without the United States, this Soviet concession was a gesture; nevertheless it strengthened the hand of those NATO members which had for some time been in favor of the Soviet approach to relations between East and West.

The indirect and cautious response to the Budapest Message, made by the NATO foreign ministers at their anniversary meeting in Washington on April 11, 1969, finally opened the dialogue the Soviets had hoped for. But the West established a negotiating position far apart from that taken and developed by the East. Against the Soviet Union's sweeping scheme NATO laid out its policy of small steps. (1) Instead of a multilateral conference, which the Americans tended to suspect as a pure propaganda forum, the West favored prolonged bilateral negotiations. (2) Solution of the long-intractable problem of access to West Berlin and progress on the issue of German unity were declared to be NATO's criteria for successful détente in Europe. (3) The North Atlantic Council was asked to draw up a list of critical issues that "best lend themselves to fruitful negotiation and early resolution," and it was agreed to discuss these in bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union.[18]

The effect of the NATO declaration was twofold. On the one hand, it acknowledged the Soviet initiative, and henceforth every move between Eastern and Western Europe would be related to the Soviet idea of European security. On the other hand, it put a damper on the propaganda aspects of the Soviet proposal, encouraged diversity in the Soviet bloc, and forced the Soviet Union to retreat from her original grandiose plan.

[17] *New York Times,* November 14, 1969.
[18] *Ibid.,* April 13, 1969, Section IV, p. 4.

Three developments in the spring and summer of 1969 confirm this conclusion. First, as the Soviets encouraged Finnish President Urho Kekkonen to make an official and public offer to serve in 1970 as host for the security conference and any preparatory meetings, they raised no objection to the Finnish plan to seat the United States and Canada. The only concern they expressed was about getting East and West Germany to sit at the same table. Second, the *New York Times* reported that while in their initial comments individual East European states had clung to the conference scheme, their diplomats claimed that their governments were much more flexible and primarily interested in détente and expansion of contacts with the West.[19] Third, in late July 1969 Soviet leaders told visiting Belgian Foreign Minister Pierre Harmel that they would "agree to a European security conference with a limited agenda, leaving out the thorny German problem and concentrating on points that offer hope for agreement."[20] Gromyko was also reported to have agreed that the conference should be prepared through "more frequent bilateral and multilateral contacts."[21]

These suggestions marked a significant departure from the original Soviet position. In the Western press they were explained mainly as a reflection of Soviet concern for the threatening attitude of Communist China: a more secure position in Europe would strengthen the posture in the Far East. A cartoon in *Der Spiegel* showed Soviet Ambassador to Bonn Tsarapkin kissing Chancellor Kiesinger, with Foreign Minister Brandt saying "The way the Russian Ambassador has been greeting us lately, something must be brewing on the Chinese border."[22] The Soviets were, however, already engaged in a separate approach to the German problem and the need for its overall solution had become less pressing. Moreover, their flexibility was to encourage the smaller West European states, by now sympathizing with the Soviet approach, to press for greater flexibility on the part of the West in its reactions to Soviet proposals. This, combined with what V. Matveyev in *Izvestia* called "the mobilization of public opinion" — the Soviet conference proposal was endorsed by the International Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties in Moscow in June, the World Peace Assembly in Berlin also in

---

[19] *Ibid.*, April 24, 1969.
[20] *Ibid.*, July 30, 1969.
[21] *Ibid.*
[22] *Ibid.*, July 29, 1969.

June, the International Conference of Journalists in Warsaw in September 1969, and the meeting of twenty-eight European communist parties in Moscow in January 1970 — was to speed the conference's convocation.[23]

The next meeting of the WTO foreign ministers, held in Prague on October 30-31, 1969, formalized the modifications in the Soviet proposal made during the spring and summer contacts between East and West. Coming two days after Chancellor Brandt had publicly acknowledged the existence of two German states, it could the more easily remove the German question from the suggested agenda and recommend the following priorities for the conference: mutual security guarantees including renunciation of the threat and use of force, and agreements to widen economic, scientific and technical cooperation among all European states.[24]

East Germany went along with this new version of the plan but its Foreign Minister, Otto Winzer, in an article published in *Neues Deutschland* on November 4, 1969, cautioned that "it would be false to view bilateral treaties as a necessary stage on the way to a security conference."[25] Obviously the East German government continued to worry about its cause being sacrificed to a series of bilateral rapprochements between West Germany and the several East European states. The Rumanians, on the other hand, concerned lest the proposed conference freeze the status quo and especially the Brezhnev Doctrine, renewed their advocacy of the withdrawal of foreign troops and the elimination of foreign military bases.

A *New York Times* editorial commented on the new approach of the Prague declaration: "The vague idea previously advanced by Moscow that a comprehensive new security system in Europe replace NATO and Warsaw Pact is no longer in the forefront of Eastern proposals . . . priority is given to a network of bilateral East-West treaties renouncing force and the threat of force."[26] But behind this change the *New York Times* continued to see the same central objective of Soviet policy in Europe: confirmation of the status quo, including the division of Germany, and recognition of Eastern Europe as an exclusive Soviet sphere of influence.

---

[23] *Izvestia*, September 18, 1969. See also V. Matveyev, "Lessons of History and European Security," *International Affairs* (Moscow), June 1970, pp. 9-14. In the spring of 1968, representatives of scholarly institutions from the Warsaw Pact countries and Yugoslavia held a seminar on European security in Moscow, which was reported in detail in *International Affairs*, June 1968, pp. 68-76, and July 1968, pp. 68-75. The editorial board of this monthly journal published its own discussion of the issue in November 1971, pp. 64-88.

[24] *Pravda*, November 1, 1969, translated in *CDSP*, November 19, 1969, pp. 18-19.

[25] *New York Times*, November 14, 1969.

[26] *Ibid.*, November 12, 1969.

Although the lowered sights of the Prague communiqué evoked a generally positive unofficial Western reaction, NATO, at its meeting immediately following the WTO conference, was not so receptive. It was reported from the NATO meeting that "the United States view . . . was decisive in establishing a negative, if temporary, stance toward the Warsaw Pact proposal."[27] To the United States the Prague proposal still seemed ambiguous regarding the American and Canadian status at the conference and too fuzzy on the nature of security steps the Warsaw Pact would be willing to take. "Why not, the Americans said, get down to cases and ask the other side where it stood on balanced and mutual force reduction in Europe?"[28] Despite some dissension from a few smaller NATO members like Belgium, Denmark, Norway, and also Italy, it was the U.S. call for discussion of MBFR between NATO and the Warsaw Pact that carried the meeting. This was an area where American participation was of the essence, the American hand strongest, and the benefits and burdens of anticipated results balanced. Thus a year and a half after Reykjavik, where Brandt had pressed NATO to negotiate with the USSR on mutual arms reductions in Europe, MBFR began to emerge as the West's central alternative to the Soviet approach.

The Soviets were displeased with NATO's refusal to commit its members to a multilateral conference in 1970, blaming the United States and the "Atlanticists" in Bonn and London for sabotaging the Warsaw Pact proposal. At the December 1969 meeting of WTO leaders in Moscow, however, the communist countries implied their willingness to engage in bilateral negotiations with all countries, including West Germany, when they proclaimed that they were "fully determined to develop their relations with other European states that wish to cooperate on the basis" of the principles of equality, noninterference in internal affairs, and respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity and the inviolability of existing frontiers.[29] At the same time, the Soviet Union was directly and indirectly assuring the United States of her favorable attitude toward American participation in the all-European conference.

---

[27] *Ibid.,* November 6, 1969.

[28] *Ibid.,* November 9, 1969, Section IV, p. 6.

[29] *Pravda,* December 5, 1969, translated in *CDSP,* December 24, 1969, pp. 24-25. For a wave of articles critical of NATO's position, see *International Affairs* (Moscow), January 1970, February-March 1970 and May 1970.

The NATO reply to the Moscow communiqué, issued almost immediately, was described as both "receptive" and "a hesitant step, hedged with conditions, toward any meeting with the Soviet bloc powers."[30] It stressed again the need for guarantees of free access to West Berlin, establishment of a working agreement between East and West Germany, and mutual and balanced force reductions under conditions of adequate verification and control.

THE EXPLORATORY PHASE

These exchanges of late 1969 brought to a close the preliminary consideration of the European security conference. It had begun with a sweeping Soviet-bloc suggestion in 1966 and ended more than three years later with a modest scheme significantly influenced by the West. This shift was accomplished through an interchange of public declarations by the Warsaw Pact and NATO, with the minimum support of traditional diplomacy and maximum help from developments especially in Germany. In February 1970, *Pravda* could claim editorially that twenty-four European states had expressed themselves in favor of the conference.[31]

In 1970, however, the opposing alliances entered the more difficult exploratory phase during which a common understanding of the defined issue had to be established. At its foreign ministers' meeting in May 1970, NATO was first to invite the Soviet bloc to engage in "multilateral exploratory" talks to discuss the possibilities of MBFR in Central Europe as well as the convening of a conference or a series of conferences on European security.

The immediate Soviet and East European reaction was a mixture of denunciation and cautious consideration. TASS suspected the Western suggestion of being "full of reservations intended to confuse the clear-cut problem and to drown in endless procedural questions the urgent proposal that meets the most vital interests of the peoples of Europe."[32] *Neues Deutschland* rejected it more flatly as "pure demagoguery." On the other hand, Hungarian Foreign Minister Janos Peter reportedly wished the Warsaw Pact nations to take the NATO proposal into consideration.[33]

More important was the collective response of the WTO foreign ministers who met in Budapest on June 21-22, 1970. In their

[30] *New York Times,* December 6, 1969.
[31] *Pravda,* February 2, 1970, translated in *CDSP,* March 3, 1970, pp. 16-17.
[32] *Ibid.,* May 22, 1970, translated in *CDSP,* June 23, 1970, p. 16.
[33] *New York Times,* May 30, 1970.

memorandum, which they asked the Hungarian government to transmit to the governments of those states that would possibly take part in the conference and that for the first time explicitly included Canada and the United States, they enlarged the Prague agenda by extending the original proposal for cooperation to the fields of culture and environment and by proposing the creation at the conference of a permanent organ for questions of security and cooperation in Europe. They also authorized Hungarian representatives in various NATO capitals to indicate a new willingness on the part of the Soviet bloc to discuss reduction of military forces in Europe.[34]

This apparent breakthrough, along with the signing of the nonaggression treaty between the Soviet Union and West Germany in August 1970, led authoritative sources in NATO to regard a European security conference as "quite likely in 1971."

A *New York Times* comment, however, correctly appraised the remaining obstacles to convening the conference. First, the removal of "foreign troops" from European soil was subject to varying interpretations not only between West and East, but among the communist countries themselves:

> One East European government considers that "foreign troops" means all troops in other countries: Russians in East Germany, Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, as well as Americans, Canadians and British in West Germany.
>
> Other Communist countries regard the phrase as applying only to American and Canadian forces.[35]

This long-standing difference of opinion between what obviously was Rumania and the other Warsaw Pact countries "appeared to American sources to demand a more definitive statement before preparations for a conference can be discussed," while the Soviet Union appeared "to want to hold a conference first and then discuss force reductions."[36] A second barrier to agreement on convening the conference was identified as American insistence on including the Brezhnev Doctrine in its agenda. The Soviets were expected to refuse to take part in any meeting in which this subject would come up for discussion.

Between the spring and winter 1970 meetings of the Warsaw Pact and of NATO, first the Soviet Union and then Poland signed a nonaggression pact with West Germany. The treaties, which these two East European powers had for so long considered inadequate substitutes for an overall settlement, now brought them the first tangible victory in their approach to the West: Bonn's recognition in international law of their western frontiers and an implicit acknowledgment of the existence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of East Germany. They marked a long stride toward what the Warsaw Pact had hoped to obtain in a general peace treaty, and subsequently from an all-European security conference. They also set in motion a new consideration of the German question concentrating on the unfinished business of German-Czechoslovak relations, the position of West Berlin and the status of East Germany.

---

[34] *Pravda*, June 27, 1970, translated in *CDSP*, July 28, 1970, p. 27. See also the editorial, "New Stage in Preparation for All-European Conference," *International Affairs* (Moscow), September 1970, pp. 3-6.

[35] *New York Times*, August 19, 1970.

[36] *Ibid.*

In 1970, the Political Consultative Committee of the WTO met first in Moscow in August to hear the Soviet report on the Soviet-German nonaggression treaty and endorse it as a further step toward the security conference. More important, however, was its second meeting, held characteristically in East Berlin in the first week of December, which raised the three issues explicitly and with renewed urgency. The Committee gave its support to the Czechoslovak demand that West Germany recognize the Munich Agreement as invalid *ab initio*; left the question of West Berlin for the four great powers to handle, but not without an admonition; and attached the greatest import to the cause of East Germany. Not since the Karlovy Vary meeting in the spring of 1967 had the Warsaw Pact put this last argument forward with so much emphasis. The Committee expressed its unanimous solidarity "with the peace-loving policy of the German Democratic Republic," urged the establishment of equal relations between East and West Germany, called for East Germany's admission to the United Nations, and warned that without East German participation it would be impossible to build "the edifice of lasting peace" in Central Europe. Procedurally, preparations for the security conference were to be hastened through bilateral and multilateral talks, especially since the Warsaw Pact countries assumed that the conference agenda had already been "largely outlined."[37]

What the "largely outlined" agenda was, however, was not quite clear to the Western powers. If it was to be the one suggested in Budapest half a year before — a general nonaggression pact, wider economic, scientific, technical and cultural cooperation, and the establishment of a security council for Europe, they were not prepared to commit themselves on that scale and in the abstract before some of their preconditions had been met. Instead, at the Brussels meeting of NATO foreign ministers the West asked for a Berlin settlement before even the first steps toward an East-West security conference could be taken. A satisfactory solution meant unhindered access to West Berlin, improved circulation between the two parts of the city, and recognition of the existing ties between West Berlin and West Germany. Furthermore, some progress had to be made in East-West German discussions and in the arms limitation talks, if the NATO countries were to go ahead with preparations for a security conference. To top its conditions, NATO injected into the agenda the request that all participants recognize the sovereign equality, political independence and territorial integrity of every European country and the right of self-determination free of outside constraint — a euphemism for the abrogation of the Brezhnev Doctrine.

---

[37] *Pravda*, December 3, 1970, translated in *CDSP*, January 5, 1971, pp. 1-3.

The Soviets condemned the Brussels meeting as having been "dominated by 'hawks' led by the U.S.," with the Americans trying to "revive dangerous cold war methods" and creating "artificial obstacles to an improving atmosphere in Europe."[38] These arguments were then embraced in Bucharest by another Warsaw Pact meeting in February 1971. Repeating the substantive proposals of the preceding meeting in East Berlin, the Bucharest communiqué denounced what the East European bloc interpreted as an intensification of opposition to the security conference that "manifests itself in the setting of various preliminary conditions in order to complicate the preparatory work and to link the question of convening the conference with other problems."[39]

To counteract the Western approach, the WTO ministers reaffirmed the importance of transferring exploratory talks from the bilateral to the multilateral level and their interest in holding a preparatory meeting — without knowing, however, how to bring the West to Helsinki with them. Through a procedural maneuver they sought a larger sanction of their partial settlement with Bonn and its extension. Since the Western powers were not prepared to grant either without substantive compensation from the East, the West found itself in control of a proposal it had not initiated, but which it now generally accepted and wished only to make suit its interests.

---

[38] *New York Times*, December 5, 1970.
[39] *Pravda*, February 20, 1971, translated in *CDSP*, March 23, 1971, p. 19.

In Lisbon in June 1971, NATO said no more about the security conference than it had said in Brussels the preceding December. Yet subsequent reactions from the Soviet Union showed that the West was now in the driver's seat. Solution of the Berlin question remained NATO's precondition for the conference, while its interest was focused on MBFR. Senator Mansfield's call for a unilateral cut in American forces in Europe compelled the United States and NATO to give force reductions top priority, and for the first time the Soviets reacted positively to this new and specific version of a proposal about which they had forgotten after the invasion of Czechoslovakia. In his electoral speech on June 10, 1971, Podgorny would have preferred that all European issues "be solved simultaneously, parallel with each other, and not wound together into one knot" – in other words, no preconditions for the security conference – but he conceded that on the question of troop and armaments reductions in Central Europe it was "necessary to start negotiations in order to define the volume and nature of possible agreements and to test the intentions of sides concerning these issues."[40] On the following day Brezhnev declared that MBFR was a "big and independent question" and that the Soviet Union was prepared to discuss both national and foreign armed forces in Central Europe.

This NATO-Moscow exchange laid down two tracks that would be followed by the Soviets in the next, preparatory phase of the European conference. On the one hand, the idea of a general conference was to be pursued, as Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Tsarapkin's visit to Denmark, Norway and Great Britain, shortly after Lisbon, indicated. On the other hand, through her embassy in Washington, allegedly acting on behalf of the entire Warsaw Pact, the Soviet Union began exploring with the American Secretary of State the possibility of East-West negotiations on a mutual reduction of forces in Europe.

Nevertheless, the focus remained on the security conference, and the Soviets tried characteristically to turn their government's preoccupation into a popular issue. In June 1971 an array of Soviet organizations – trade unions, youth, women, scientists, cultural workers, parliamentarians – decided to establish a Soviet

---

[40] *New York Times*, June 11, 1971. An editorial in the same issue of the *New York Times* suggested that Gromyko told Ambassador Beam in May "the Soviet Union was ready for specific talks on troop cuts without waiting for the security conference."

Committee for European Security "to facilitate the coordination of their activities in the struggle to implement" the government's proposal.[41] By the fall the Committee had established contact with corresponding front organizations in several European countries and was getting ready for "an assembly of European public forces" that had declared themselves in favor of European security and cooperation. But when this assembly met in Brussels in early June 1972 it disappointed Moscow on three counts: it failed to attract any politically significant West European organizations or individuals; even those who came failed to agree among themselves to support unconditionally the Soviet analysis of the situation in Europe and promotion of a security conference; and the impact of the assembly on the West European public and governments was negligible.[42] On issues of this complexity, it appeared, the day of the front organization was passing and only the road of diplomacy could be relied on.

In President Nixon's view, the quadripartite agreement on Berlin, reached on September 3, 1971, removed the most important obstacle in the way of the European conference. Although it did not restore West Berlin to the status it had enjoyed before the erection of the wall in 1961, it improved its condition considerably. The Soviets, assuming the Berlin agreement had a favorable psychological impact in the West, began almost immediately to intensify their drive for the conference. When Chancellor Brandt visited Brezhnev at Yalta in the wake of the Berlin agreement, he promised to help accelerate the holding of the conference. In Paris Brezhnev secured as complete an endorsement of his plan from a Western power as he could have hoped for. The Franco-Soviet Declaration of October 30, 1971, issued at the conclusion of his visit, pledged France not only to the security and cooperation aspects of the proposed conference but also to the support of its multilateral preparation in Helsinki so that it could be held in 1972.

Conspicuous in this part of the Declaration was its emphasis on "respect for the principles of territorial integrity of states, noninterference in their internal affairs, equality and independence of all states" as a condition of European security and the absence of any reference to MBFR.[43] Although the first statement smacked of opposition to the Brezhnev Doctrine, the Soviets may have been inclined to interpret it as a bar to any Western concern for East Germany and to assume that their freedom in Eastern Europe would remain unimpaired. Since they never liked the link between the security conference and the reduction of forces in Europe, they may have tacitly welcomed France's strong reservations on this score and gladly endorsed this issue's exclusion from the Declaration.

---

[41] *Pravda*, June 3, 1971, translated in *CDSP*, June 29, 1971, p. 15.

[42] Sh. Sanakoyev, "Lasting Peace, Effective Security for Europe," *International Affairs* (Moscow), August 1972, pp. 9-13.

[43] Ambassade de France, Service de Presse et d'Information, *French-Soviet Declaration, October 30, 1971* (mimeo.), pp. 2-3. See also *Le Monde: Sélection Hebdomadaire,* No. 132, October 1971.

This interpretation is reinforced by two subsequent developments. First, at a meeting in Bracciano of foreign ministers from the ten states that would make up the enlarged European Economic Community, French Foreign Minister Maurice Schumann argued that the security conference should not deal with the question of MBFR because it would work only to the West's prejudice. Second, although a special NATO meeting chose former Secretary-General Manlio Brosio to represent it in exploratory talks with the Soviet Union on mutual troop withdrawals in Europe as early as October 6, 1971, so that he might report to a NATO ministers' meeting in December, the Soviet government never replied to NATO's request that Brosio be received in Moscow.

It was argued that the refusal of Brosio's mission was due to Moscow's opposition to the discussion of force reductions between the blocs and its desire that countries outside the two military alliances be included in the consideration of this issue. However, at their December 1971 meeting the Warsaw Pact foreign ministers also avoided the MBFR issue, called only for "preliminary consultations of 'all interested parties' to establish the framework of a European security conference," and decided to appoint representatives for "multilateral consultations."[44] A week later, at the Sixth Congress of the Polish United Workers' Party, Brezhnev reiterated this position. Although he also acknowledged that reductions in armed forces were necessary for an improvement of the political atmosphere in Europe, he did not tie them to his pressure for the conference. Kosygin, during his visit to Denmark and Norway, suggested that the issue of force reductions be handled by a subcommittee of the proposed security conference.

The emerging Soviet strategy of a multilateral approach to the conference and of playing down MBFR was to meet with expected opposition from the majority of the NATO powers led by

[44] *Pravda*, December 3, 1971, translated in *CDSP*, December 28, 1971, p. 21.

the United States. Multilateralism meant fragmentation of the West, while, with the possible exception of Rumania, the Soviet Union could trust the discipline of the members of her bloc. Downgrading the issue of the size and deployment of military forces in Europe removed the only incentive the West might have had for the conference. Therefore, at the NATO Council meeting which followed immediately after the Warsaw Pact session, Secretary of State Rogers put the weight of the United States behind a bloc-to-bloc approach to the conference when he urged his Western allies to prepare a common line, and NATO's Secretary-General, Dr. Joseph M. A. Luns, warned the Soviet Union that without her agreement "to talks on force reductions, either at the conference or at a separate meeting, no East-West discussions would have great significance."[45]

Izvestia naturally objected to these conditions as American and British obstacles to the conference,[46] but a month later the leaders of the seven Warsaw Pact powers, meeting in Prague, made a concession on one of the two issues. While continuing to object to bloc-to-bloc negotiations, in their Declaration on Peace, Security and Cooperation in Europe they specified for the first time that the agreement to reduce forces on the continent should include national armies as well as foreign troops and, using the Brezhnev-Brandt Yalta formula, also suggested that no reductions should work "to the detriment of the countries taking part" — the Soviet equivalent to NATO's formula of mutual and balanced force reductions.[47]

Soviet pressure supported by a certain degree of accommodation to the stance of the West, and American interest in improved relations with the Soviet Union, finally produced what had so far eluded the conference planners: the seal of American approval. At the end of his visit to Moscow in May 1972, President Nixon endorsed multilateral preparation of the conference and its convocation "without undue delay" as well as separation from the security conference of the issue of reciprocal reduction of armed forces and armaments.

This separation of the two issues was not a simple concession to the Soviet Union. The Nixon Administration's original linkage between the conference and arms cuts had already served its purpose by defusing Senator Mansfield's pressure for unilateral reduction of the American military presence in Europe. Moreover, the United States could not ignore that, in the eyes of the NATO allies, even if force reductions could be truly mutual and balanced and not merely symbolic — applied to military bands, as Brandt once remarked caustically — the program carried with it a threat of military and political destabilization. Finally, like all preceding attempts at a multilateral modification of the existing distribution of military power, the more the MBFR plan had to be formulated in terms of specific measures rather than general principles, the more complicated and intractable it appeared.[48]

---

[45] *New York Times*, December 4, 1971.

[46] *Izvestia* December 12, 1971.

[47] *Ibid.*, January 27, 1972. For the translation of the Prague Declaration, see *CDSP*, February 23, 1972, pp. 8-10.

The NATO Council meeting, immediately following the American President's visit to the Soviet Union, embraced the *Brezhnev-Nixon formula unexceptionally. It approved* "multilateral conversations concerned with preparations for a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe" (CSCE) on the one hand, and on the other hand merely appealed to the Soviet Union "that multilateral explorations on mutual and balanced force reductions be undertaken as soon as practicable, either before or in parallel with multilateral preparatory talks on a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe."[49] But the Council added that the conference should also concern itself with the freedom of movement of people, ideas and information in Europe.

To this demand the Soviets reacted with verbal violence characteristic of their opposition to any relaxation of communist states' control over the lives of individual citizens. *Pravda* labeled it an "impudent and defiant 'list of concessions' " designed "to interfere in the internal affairs of the socialist countries."[50] In *International Affairs* Sh. Sanakoyev refused it as not connected with international relations, but belonging "to the sphere of ideological struggle in the world arena."[51] The conference was to deal with *interstate* relations, not the problems of individual citizens. The citizens, however, were expected to make their contribution to the conference's success by their massive support.[52]

---

[48] *New York Times,* February 20, 1972. See also Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., "NATO and European Security: Prospects for the 1970's," ORBIS, Spring 1971, pp. 154-177.

[49] *New York Times*, June 1, 1972.

[50] *Pravda,* October 10, 1972.

[51] Sanakoyev, *op. cit.*, pp. 10-11.

[52] A. Gorokhov, "Practical Preparations for an All-European Conference," *International Affairs* (Moscow), November 1972, pp. 3-6.

While protecting themselves against a breach in the wall separating the East European peoples from the West — or, as Sanakoyev said, in "the barriers standing in [the] way of imperialism,"[53] the Soviets had no consolation for the West: "It is absolutely impossible," wrote Sanakoyev in a later article, "to offer [the advocates of Atlantic solidarity] guarantees against any social upheavals likely to be caused in the future by the inner workings of capitalist society and by the aggravation of its social and economic contradictions."[54] In this manner the Soviet Union reiterated the conception of peaceful coexistence on the European continent she wanted sanctioned by the security conference: guaranteed untouchability of her own sphere in the East and an open field for political penetration in the West.

HELSINKI

These exchanges, however, could no longer close the door to multilateral preparatory consultations opened by the United States' approval of the European security conference and by Moscow's agreement to take part in a separate conference on MBFR. Thus the developments of 1971 and 1972 gave the USSR two significant victories. (1) In order to secure Western endorsement of the conference, the Soviets agreed to include in its agenda consideration of MBFR but in the end succeeded in extricating themselves from this linkage because the Western powers, its original advocates, failed to hold to it. (2) The Western powers accepted multilateral consultations as the approach to the conference — a procedure advocated by the Soviets from the beginning.

The purpose of consultations among the thirty-four participating countries, which commenced in Helsinki on November 22, 1972, was to determine the agenda and decide when and where the conference should be held. The Soviets indicated that they would like it to convene in Helsinki in June 1973. What they offered in the early consultations on the agenda was as limited and general as their final proposals in the diplomatic campaign that led to Helsinki: security guarantees, extension of commercial, scientific, technological, cultural and ecological cooperation, and establishment of a European agency to supervise peace and cooperation on the continent. Nevertheless, in order to secure con-

[53] Sanakoyev, *op. cit.*

[54] Sh. Sanakoyev, "Peace in Europe and the Confrontation of the Two Systems," *International Affairs* (Moscow), November 1972, pp. 8-15.

vocation of the conference, they had to make a number of concessions to the West, whose views were most effectively advocated by the united diplomacy of the Common Market countries.

In the section of the agenda relating to security in Europe the Soviet Union agreed that each participating state was to respect and apply a long list of standard principles of international conduct in its relations with all other states, "irrespective of their political, economic, and social systems." During the early stages of the preliminary consultations the Soviet delegation viewed the last clause as completely unnecessary, regarding it as an obvious barrier against the Brezhnev Doctrine, then offered a compromise replacement — "irrespective of the differences between their political, economic, and social systems" — which would have narrowed application of the accepted principles to relations between East and West, but gave way in the end. The West also succeeded in including among the security principles the right of self-determination, which the Soviets had for so long resisted as applicable only in colonial situations.

During these consultations the need for concrete measures that would create mutual confidence and lead to a reduction of tensions was generally recognized, but the Soviet delegation hesitated to be specific about them. However, when an agreement was finally reached on the agenda to be submitted to the conference of foreign ministers, the Soviet Union approved of including in it consideration of such confidence-building measures as the prior notification of, and exchange of military observers for, major military maneuvers and the quite controversial "prior notification of major military movements."[55]

While the section on economic, scientific, technological and ecological cooperation remained relatively noncontroversial, "cooperation in humanitarian and other fields" proved to be the most difficult issue confronted in Helsinki. Restating the Western position developed in the NATO Council, the United States proposed that the agenda should address the removal of "some of the real impediments of free contact" among the peoples of the participating countries and the increased flow of information and ideas.[56] This proposal became the principal subject of protracted negotiations. After their initial hard-line resistance to such a liberalization of human contacts, because they saw in it an instrument of ideological subversion, the Soviets modified their opposition and proposed their own version of this point: expansion of cultural cooperation, of contacts among organizations and people, of collective and individual tourism, of youth exchanges, of meetings between professional people, and of dissemination of information, provided that such an expansion contributes to peace and understanding, does not spread an "anticulture" including "pornography, racism, fascism, the cult of violence, hostility among peoples," and the elastic "false slanderous propaganda," and is conducted "on the basis of respect for the sovereignty, laws and customs of each country."[57]

---

[55] *New York Times*, June 23, 1973; *The Times* (London), July 2, 1973.
[56] *New York Times*, December 5, 1972.

This version, reinforced by Soviet opposition to any reference to the free flow of ideas and free access to information, advanced a principle of selectivity in the area of humanitarian cooperation over which the USSR and her communist partners would have had sovereign control; as Richard Davy wrote in the London *Times*, "it would have allowed them to select and reject as they pleased."[58] Western rejection of such a shackling of human contacts and of the sanctioning of a revised Iron Curtain induced Soviet negotiators to concede the formula specifying respect to "the sovereignty, laws and customs of each country" and the subjective qualification excluding fascist, pornographic and warmongering literature from exchanges among the involved states. The final agenda did not, however, contain reference to a freer flow of ideas.

The Soviet proposal for creation of a permanent organ to continue the work of the conference by dealing with questions of European security and cooperation, first put forward in Budapest in 1970, would have bound the West to establishing an institution before any agreement on its specific function had been reached. The West compromised by allowing the coordinating committee to be charged only to consider "such measures as may be required to give further effect to the decisions of the conference and to further the process of improving security and developing cooperation in Europe."[59]

THE FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING

What the Soviet Union had given away in order to bring the preparatory consultations to a close, she tried immediately to reclaim during the first phase of the conference itself when the thirty-five foreign ministers met in Helsinki between July 3 and 6, 1973. In his speech Gromyko brought back the clause, "strict observance of the laws, customs, and traditions in all contacts among the European states and peoples."[60] Moreover, the Eastern bloc surprised the assembly by presenting it with several detailed draft declarations and projects obviously designed to define the specific terms of the conference's second phase, to be held in Geneva in the fall.

---

[57] *The Times* (London), January 23, 1973 and July 3, 1973.
[58] *Ibid.*, July 3, 1973.
[59] *Ibid.*

The Soviets' draft of a general declaration on the foundations of European security and the principles governing relations between European states amounted to a request for ratification and regulation of Moscow's concept of coexistence.[61] When a correspondent asked the Soviet spokesman whether the Soviet draft provision concerning "nonintervention in internal affairs of other states" would prevent recurrence of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, he was told that "assistance was granted . . . on the request of the Czech government"; "there was no interference in Czech internal affairs and this should continue to be so in the future."[62] No wonder a West German delegate found this new Soviet position about the same as it had been at the beginning of the preparatory talks and, therefore, "unacceptable and too general for a final resolution."[63] In other Western responses, Dutch Foreign Minister Max van der Stoel insisted that people of every state had the right "to change political, economic, social and cultural systems," and Sir Alec Douglas-Home warned, "If we do not improve the life of ordinary people at this conference, we shall be asked, and with justice, what all our fine words and diplomatic phrases have achieved."[64]

East Germany and Hungary produced an elaborate document on economic, scientific, technological and environmental cooperation. Poland and Bulgaria covered the project of cultural relations and exchange of information. Finally, the Czechoslovakian draft reintroduced the proposal for the establishment of a permanent consultative committee.[65] Thus the ground already covered during the preparatory consultations was to be retraced and struggled over again in Geneva.

---

[60] *Izvestia*, July 5, 1973.
[61] *Ibid.*
[62] *New York Times*, July 5, 1973.
[63] *Ibid.*
[64] *Ibid.*, July 6, 1973.
[65] *Izvestia*, July 7, 1973.

CONCLUSION

Moscow's long and successful campaign to convoke an all-European conference has again cast the Soviet Union as the promoter of international peace and security. While her performance may have tarnished her image on both counts, to a divided Europe the call for cooperation has placed the Soviets in an unassailable position of great moral value. It would be a mistake, however, to think that Moscow has been interested only in scoring propagandistic, symbolic and moral points. If our hypothesis is correct — and the history of the Soviet proposal for a European security conference does not deny it — the Soviets have *already* accomplished most of what could have been their tangible objectives at a peace conference with Germany. What remained, after the first stage in Helsinki, was for Europe, the United States and Canada collectively to ratify these gains: to sanction Soviet acquisition of former Czechoslovak, German and Polish lands in addition to the already approved annexation of Finnish and Rumanian territories; to approve a status for Berlin which, in terms of the Berliners' own interests, is worse than it was before the 1948-1949 blockade; and to guarantee the Soviet Union access to the economic, scientific and technological resources of the Western world. The long-term consequences of the conference — the psychological effect on the East Europeans of the petrification of the status quo, the moral disarmament of Western Europe, and the encouragement of the American propensity toward a reduced commitment on the continent — may be more incalculable but no less real.

The counterproposals made by the West featured three elements that were supposed to compensate it for Soviet gains. One was purely symbolic and had as much practical value as the Yalta Declaration: the commitment to respect sovereign equality, political independence, territorial integrity, and the right of self-determination free of outside constraint. Even in this traditional and legalistic statement of principles supposedly governing relations among nations at least since the days of the League of Nations Covenant, the Soviet Union tried, finally in vain, to replace the last clause, which came from the December 1970 NATO statement, with the weaker and vague "noninterference in internal affairs" to be found originally in the Bucharest Declaration of 1966, and later in the Nixon-Brezhnev communiqué of May 30, 1972. Moreover, the Soviet Union has already concluded treaties with some East European states — Czechoslovakia, for example — that provide for close cooperation between her and her partner for the purpose of maintaining "the economic and social gains of the two peoples" and that are nothing more than a license for Soviet intervention in the partner's internal affairs. In the Soviet view, such treaties outrank even the Charter of the United Nations; they will certainly eclipse the provisions of any European security pact, and through their mechanism will safeguard the new security system of the Soviet sphere of control and any extension thereof.

The second Western counterproposal that emerged from the Helsinki consultations demanded the freer movement of people, ideas and information in Europe. This was the only feasible approach toward greater unity and, therefore, toward a new structure of peace and security on the continent. On this issue the West should make no concessions, because the principal source of Europe's malady lies not in relations between East and West, but in the lack of fundamental freedoms in the East and in the denial of free contact between the Eastern and Western peoples that, as the *Economist* pointed out, "breeds fear, misunderstanding, suspicion and hence insecurity."[66] Soviet reaction to this form of rapprochement was ominous. While the Soviet delegation made some concessions in Helsinki, hedging them in ambivalent generalities and flexible qualifications, inside the USSR the position remained categorical: the ideological struggle will grow relentlessly and steadily sharper, and cooperation with the West will be allowed to erode neither its inspiration nor its goals.[67] A conference that evades this issue will bury Eastern Europe under a twentieth-century version of the Peace of Westphalia's *cuius regio eius religio,* perpetuate the continent's unnatural division, and leave the world charged with incessant ideological confrontation generating its own explosive consequences. An editorial in *The Times* of London told the European communist states bluntly that if they were not ready for human contacts, they had "no business to be talking about cooperation and coexistence."[68]

The third element in the Western negotiating position is MBFR, which the Soviet Union has always tried — and finally managed — to separate from the security conference as an issue to be handled on its own merit. Yet it is the only item in the entire package where a certain degree of reciprocity obtains. Moreover, if in a specified period of time the implementation of this counterproposal were to lead to a permanent withdrawal of Soviet forces to their own territory, it could reduce, if not eliminate, Moscow's pressure on internal developments in the East European states and allow for their autonomy in harmony with the acknowledged principle of self-determination.

---

[66] December 9, 1972, p. 33.

[67] V. Kudinov and V. Pletnikov, "Ideological Confrontation of the Two Systems," *International Affairs* (Moscow), December 1972, pp. 57-64.

[68] July 3, 1973.

It is unlikely that an agreement on MBFR can be reached to coincide with the outcome of the CSCE. The Western powers have correctly established a link between the political problems of the security conference and the reduction of armaments and armed forces in Europe, but they have been wrong about the order of business in wishing to settle the arms cuts first. Once they conceded to the Soviets that there was a political issue for the CSCE to handle, they were trapped by the age-old maxim that political accommodation must come before any armaments regulation. Since the security conference is also a conference on cooperation, however, the West may still have a final trump in its hands. It can and should refuse to carry out any political, economic, scientific, technological and cultural cooperative arrangements as long as the Soviet Union refuses to pay fairly for her gains and security. More is required of her than a verbal guarantee of the independence and security of all other European states while she waits, hoping that eventually domestic developments in the United States and on the continent will force America out of Europe and make the whole of Europe dependent on Moscow's good will.

THE MEDITERRANEAN: A EUROPEAN MARE NOSTRUM?*

by Wolfgang Hager

LIKE any emerging political entity, the European Community must go through a process of defining its geographical limits and establishing a mode of relations with neighbors. Nowhere on its periphery has the process been as accidental as it has been toward the south. To the extent that conscious criteria guided the Community a decade ago — when most of the legal and economic decisions which remain in effect today were taken — these have in part become dated, in part been overtaken by events, and in part been replaced by new criteria stressing the Community's wider responsibilities.

The geographical limits were drawn, seemingly sharply, by the Rome Treaty's Article 237 limiting membership to European states, and the de facto condition that such states be parliamentary democracies. The first test cases, Greece and Turkey, revealed the need to introduce a third criterion: a level of economic development similar to that obtaining in the Community. Accordingly, Greece was, in 1961, offered the halfway house of association, and Turkey two years later was granted a "pre-association" status which in 1970 became an association scheduled to lead to membership in twenty-two years. The Greek association was "frozen" after the colonels' coup; de facto economic rapprochement continued. Turkey, perhaps judged by less stringent standards of democratic probity, continued to enjoy the benefits of association, while dragging its feet on economic liberalization toward the Community. Spain, which carries on three times as much trade with EC members as either of the other two, has only a commercial treaty with the Community. The more realistic the prospect of full membership, it seems, the stricter are the political criteria.

If relations with neighbors on the northern shore of the Mediterranean are thus more ambiguous than a look at the legal statutes would lead one to suppose, those with the other states

---

*This article is a revised version of a chapter in Wolfgang Hager and Max Kohnstamm, *A Nation Writ Large?* (New York: Halsted [London: Macmillan], 1973).

bordering the Mediterranean – with which this essay is mainly concerned – are only at this moment entering a period of sharper definition. Until now, two association treaties, with Morocco and Tunisia (little more than commercial treaties), have coexisted with a whole network of trade agreements with the rest of the littoral states. If a proposal submitted by the EEC Commission to the Council in the autumn of 1972 is put into practice, the entire sweep of states from Lebanon to Spain would be linked to the Community in a free trade area, with financial and technical assistance provided for the developing countries among them.

The implementation of such a project could well represent a turning point for all parties concerned. It would give definite direction to the future evolution of a relationship that until now has remained fluid, consisting essentially of pragmatic solutions to economic problems. For the Community, the imprecise definition of its southern limits could become a permanent characteristic; the economic and political development of the southern neighbors would become even more intimately linked with Europe's.

This, to a large extent, is nothing more than accepting the consequences of the near-symbiosis already existing between the Community and the other coastal states of the Mediterranean. Economic exchanges cover a wide range: trade in goods, substantial capital flows, workers, oil, tourism. Common ecological problems, in an area that has experienced ecological disaster for two thousand years, form a further bond.

But if by symbiosis we mean a state of interdependence, the term does not really describe the situation. Rather, we find two kinds of dependence, so different in character that the precondition of interdependence – equality of the partners – is lacking. Europe has a substantial security interest in the Mediterranean area, yet does not depend on it economically except for part of its oil supply. The Mediterranean partners, on the other hand, depend heavily on the Community economically, but the Community has remained largely irrelevant to their security: it is neither a threat nor a prospective protector. In the following pages, the aim is to define, however tentatively, a political model that takes account of both of these factors, security and the economic relationship.

EUROPEAN SECURITY AND THE MEDITERRANEAN

Back in the days of *Pax Americana* the Sixth Fleet spared Europe the need to think about what – as a sign of changing times

– is now referred to as the southern flank. In 1956, the American fleet firmly opposed the actions taken by two formerly great European powers to carry out a last ill-judged initiative in the area. The Suez crisis marked the end of the European and the beginning of the Soviet presence in the crucial Eastern Mediterranean – a development that was scarcely recognized as important by Europeans at the time, though they continued to observe with sympathetic interest the growing difficulties of Israel and the United States. Only slowly did it become apparent that the Mediterranean region was permanently affected by two interacting weaknesses that greatly furthered Soviet penetration. By then the stationing of a strong Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean had led to a qualitative change in Europe's security position.

What were these weaknesses? One, patently, was the international polarization of the Middle East around the conflict with Israel. America, in its role of guarantor of international order (which it played, e.g., in the Cyprus conflict), was committed to the status quo. The Arabs were revisionist. Soviet aid allowed them to continue what otherwise might have been seen as a sterile and self-defeating policy, and in return, from Syria to Algeria, the Soviets were increasingly accepted as allies and friends.

This process was helped by, and indeed contributed to, the second endemic weakness of the area: the instability of its political regimes. The emergence of military regimes, half leading and half led by popular mass parties mobilized toward a single issue, Israel, using arguments of war economy together with a selective socialism, and sharply limiting the role of independent politico-economic forces that might have exercised a "civilian" restraint, did not engender moderation in either internal or external politics. As long as force remains the main political currency, the area is vulnerable to outside intervention. While its nations live in a state of mutual distrust (Jordan/Egypt, Libya/Morocco, for example), cooperative relationships based on civilian values of welfare for the population will be difficult to establish.

In security terms, Europe is affected by these developments in several ways. First, there is the risk of a direct clash between the superpowers as demonstrated by the latest Middle East war. Though both powers seem to be aware of this danger, it has become clear that their capacity for conflict management in the volatile Eastern Mediterranean merits less confidence than their position regarding Central Europe. The fact that the Soviet Union chooses to accept this risk points to the strategic importance

Moscow accords to the region; the United States has far less choice in the matter, since it is tied by long-standing treaty to Europe's defense and is morally committed to the defense of Israel.

European preoccupation with the Mediterranean relates precisely to this strategic interest on the part of the USSR. There are multiple reasons for the Soviet naval presence. One is defensive: planes from the Sixth Fleet and missiles from French submarines can reach targets in the Soviet Union. Another Soviet motivation, growing out of the Arab-Israeli conflict, is to neutralize the threat of a potential intervention by the United States, which might be launched to forestall an Israeli defeat. This same neutralizing effect has given countries not allied to the United States more room for maneuver,[1] and only Egypt (and now Syria?), beholden to the USSR because of the large-scale military support it has received, seems for a time in the early 1970's to have lost much of its independence to the Soviets.

In general, however, as Curt Gasteyger points out,[2] the Soviet presence has created that rare situation: a Mediterranean not dominated by a single power. If this allows the neutrals to be more neutral, it forces the allies of the West on the northern littoral to move a few steps in the same direction. Greece and Turkey, in particular, are worried, not least because most of their trade is done by sea. Greece's fairly successful efforts to come to terms with its Balkan neighbors,[3] and Turkish eagerness for good relations with the Soviet Union are evidence of this shift, as are similar moves by Spain, including the granting of supply facilities to the Soviet navy. Partially, this is due to skillful Soviet diplomacy whereby support of the Turkish claim in Cyprus, the Cypriot claim against the British, and the Spanish claim to Gibraltar is coupled with commercial approaches. But the point is that such Soviet support is increasingly worth having. Furthermore, certain regimes that felt secure because of the American guarantee now prefer to negotiate a reinsurance with Moscow which deprives their internal opposition of Soviet support. These moves are instructive rather than vital as regards peripheral countries of Europe: they are quite limited and merely help to soften the confrontation. Of greater concern to NATO is the potential or actual

[1] Curt Gasteyger, "Stabilité intérieure et sécurité extérieure dans la Méditerrannée," Paper presented to the conference on Europe and Mediterranean Africa, organized by the Atlantic Institute and the Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome, October 28-30, 1971.

[2] *Ibid.*

[3] F.-W. Fernau, "Griechenland zwischen Balkan und Mittelmeer," *Europa Archiv,* October 19, 1971, pp. 673-683.

loss of Western bases such as Wheelus, Cyprus, Malta or Mers el Kebir, as host regimes are emboldened to exercise their sovereign rights. While in itself the loss of bases makes little difference to the West, their loss to the Soviets would dramatically alter the military (air cover) and political climate in the region.

One real danger, in the short run, comes from possible reactions of the Community's member states. Italian fears of, say, a Soviet-supported communist coup in the Romagna may be fanciful, but the growing feasibility of such a move can influence external policy by inducing Italy either to seek insurance from the Soviets through policies of accommodation, or to satisfy internal opposition through "neutralist" moves, or both. A vital element of future Community security would be endangered were one member country to experience a Soviet threat specific to itself and not shared (perceived) to the same extent by its partners; in that case the chances of a common foreign policy for the Community could be seriously at risk. Political accommodation toward the East and/or increased dependence on America for Western Europe's security would be the result of a fragmented Community approach.

The size of the Soviet naval presence is largely independent of bases in the area. Since the fleet can be easily reinforced and supplied from its headquarters in the nearby Black Sea, permanent naval bases in the Mediterranean are a convenience rather than a necessity. Its effectiveness, however, depends in part on the acquisition of air bases from which it can be given cover. At the moment the U.S. Sixth Fleet, most of whose ships are over fifteen years old, more than matches the smaller but faster and newer Soviet fleet, even with the latter's superior missiles, by virtue of an overwhelming air superiority. Expanded base facilities for the Soviets like those at one time granted by Egypt would alter the military balance. But Moscow's acquisition of any kind of base, be it only a radar station, would have a strong psychological impact on the region, for it would be recognized as yet another manifestation of Soviet influence.

Actually, obtaining naval bases or the right to use facilities, which the Soviets may consider more relevant to their purposes, has little effect on the military balance. As in nuclear matters, variations within this stalemate situation are more a barometer of intentions — one could almost say of will — than significant in battle terms. Indeed, precisely because they are floating nuclear triggers, the Soviet and U.S. navies are in some ways less operational than others in the area.

The likelihood of a Soviet presence, in whatever form, being accepted by the Mediterranean countries depends to a large extent on the political tension and instability obtaining in the region. A reversal of the general trend of newly independent countries toward nonalignment is a desperate act. It is only taken by a government, such as Egypt, for which the necessities of war outweigh all other considerations, or by a government needing an outside guarantee against internal "counter-revolutionary" opposition — as yet a hypothetical but not unlikely case. Ideally, the European Community should be able to contribute to a lessening of tensions so that its southern neighbors do not reach the point of desperation. It will be argued here, however, that the Community may, on the contrary, be laying the basis for future tensions, which would make the Soviet Union a permanently needed element in the region.

Economic Interests

The central fact in this situation, both politically and economically, is the economic dependence of the countries of the Mediterranean littoral on the Community. The Community often accounts for half their trade, and in some cases for two-thirds. Trade in turn represents an unusually high percentage in the total GNP of the developing countries of the region, proof of its vital importance for economic development.

But aggregate trade figures tell only half the tale. Other countries on the periphery of the Community, e.g., Austria or Sweden, show an equally high trade dependence on the EC. The difference lies in the high specialization of the export structure of the Mediterranean countries for the European market, especially in all-important agricultural products. Here we must distinguish between the northern and the southern littoral. For while it is true that all countries of the region, including Southern Italy and France, produce similar agricultural products — citrus fruit, olives, wine and vegetables, to mention the most important ones — the history and the effect of this production differ. In the South, and notably in the Maghreb, this specialization was a deliberate creation by Europeans. Because it was oriented exclusively toward the European (French) export markets, the development of modern agriculture occurred without much regard for local needs. From this resulted a secondary dependence, less well known, on *imports* of agricultural products, i.e., those actually needed for local consumption, such as cereals and sugar.[4] While Morocco still exports twice as much agricultural produce as it imports, Tunisia covers less than two-thirds of its imports, and Algeria is also running a negative balance. But even countries less marked by colonial experience share in the predicament of having to rely on the agricultural sector for much of their national income. And, unlike more favored countries in the North (and Israel), they have neither the skills nor the capital resources to allow rapid diversification to other sectors of economic activity.

Dependence on agriculture is a major hurdle for development in the countries concerned. Increased productivity in this sector is both difficult to achieve (grape and vegetable growing are inherently labor-intensive) and often undesirable, if this means using labor-saving techniques that increase unemployment. At the same time, a population growth of 2 per cent and even 3 per cent annually means rising food consumption, hence increased imports from countries of the temperate zone. These imports will have to be paid for by exports of citrus fruit and other produce for which there is a low demand elasticity in only one important market – Europe – and which are hard pressed by American, and in some cases Community, competition.

From a technical point of view – and this underlies present Brussels thinking on the unity of the Mediterranean – all countries of the area share the predicament of having to rely on a limited market for a narrow range of products. For the poorer countries of the South, however, as pointed out above, the resultant economic dependence on the Community is intensified because of the proportion of national wealth and labor force involved and the unavailability of alternatives.

Most of the European countries of the area which are not EC members will probably choose to see increasingly closer ties with the Community in their future. Given the long-term prospect of membership and a basic commitment to follow Western patterns of political and economic development, dependence on the Community and the limited possibilities of influencing its decisions count less. For the countries of the South – and Turkey may well represent a borderline case – the desire to determine their economic fate, and hence their political independence, will increase, not decrease. Algeria's fairly radical break with the division of labor imposed by Europe is an example for the future, rendered possible by a relative abundance of cadres and by revenues from oil and gas. Other states will follow suit. The question is not whether change will come, but whether it will be evolutionary or revolutionary. For the Community the decision is whether to impose its own pattern of relations on the area — at the risk of seeing agreements repudiated by future leaders.

---

[4] M. D. Pépy, of IRAT, Paris, drew attention to this phenomenon at the aforementioned conference held by the IAI and the Atlantic Institute in Rome in October 1971.

There is, of course, another aspect to dependence, often referred to by leaders on both shores of the Mediterranean Sea: domination by the superpowers. Relations with Europe, it is thought, might provide a counterweight, an alternative, to dependence, especially on the Soviet Union. This may be true as regards economic dependence, which plays a role in Egypt's ties to Moscow through markets for cotton and investment projects. But the argument cuts both ways: excessive dependence on the Community may necessitate, for reasons of prudence or national pride or the gain of bargaining power, a permanent counterbalancing role for the Soviet Union. As to the Community's ability to act as a third and neutralizing force against the strategic domination by the superpowers, this supposition overestimates its capacities as a power in the traditional sense, and fails to understand that it can have effective influence only as a "civilian" power. This, however, means establishing relationships that are equitable and beneficent to its partners, and that will continue to be seen as such.

Community Policy

In the autumn of 1972 the Commission of the European Community presented a proposal for a comprehensive Mediterranean policy to the Council of Ministers. Before discussing its implications, a brief look at the past will be useful.

It can be argued that until now the Community has had no Mediterranean policy, and that its already impressive network of special agreements with virtually all states of the littoral was brought about by the need to find pragmatic solutions to pressing trade problems. But this is not all the story. A number of political decisions provided the dynamics of the process. The first such decision was a reference to special relations with the Maghreb annexed to the Rome Treaty at the insistence of France. The second was the Greek association of 1961, born of the competition between the then nascent EEC and EFTA groupings and an

American desire to provide a second anchor for a peripheral NATO country. Lastly, in the mid-1960's, Dutch and German concern for Israel and French protection of Spanish interests gave a further impetus to Community policy.

From these political beginnings, Community policy took on a life of its own. Thus, the Greek agreement led to a Turkish association, and with it the notion that one could plan for a customs union with what was (and is) in fact a developing country. On the other hand, the Greek agreement led Italy to demand Community guarantees (high prices and preference) for its competing agricultural produce. This not only increased Italy's production and reduced the market for traditional suppliers, but meant that these suppliers had to be fitted into the complicated and uneven protective system of the Community. Since these suppliers were dealt with one at a time, there followed a seesaw of bargaining, with every successive negotiation trying to restore the equitable treatment the preceding one had put in question.

The traditional MFN-based system of international trade quickly proved inadequate to the task of safeguarding essential export markets for the Community's neighbors. While initially the use of the association device — including a timetable for a complete free trade and even customs union — satisfied at least the letter of GATT, political reasons prevented such a solution for Israel and Spain. When the kind of preferential agreement they were granted became the pattern, it aroused U.S. displeasure. U.S. criticism came from two sources, the citrus lobby, and the internationalist friends of Europe in the United States who saw the Community destroying the legal framework (GATT rules) on which they relied in their own domestic battle against always present U.S. protectionist pressures. The Community noted and understood only the first of these complaints. Concern for the sanctity of MFN was dismissed as hypocritical. Had not the Americans asked for a waiver on GATT rules in agricultural trade when it suited them? Were not the acute difficulties that the poor economies of the littoral would experience in unequal competition with highly mechanized U.S. agriculture more important a consideration than those of giant corporations in Florida?

The dispute prevented rather than encouraged serious debate both within Europe and between the Community and its partners. Member states that opposed the new agreements did so primarily with reference to the damage they would do to relations with the United States. A thoughtful debate on the merits of the agreements as such was thus short-circuited from the beginning. Similarly, the Community failed to make the extra intellectual effort to press for an orderly revision of the "constitution" of the international economic system, preferring to devise ever more subtle legal arguments to prove that its actions conformed to GATT rules. In the wake of the commodity crisis, however, such revision seems all but inevitable.

The Community argued that reverse preferences – i.e., privileged market access for Community exporters to those countries to which the EC had granted special terms – gave the agreements an element of reciprocity, hence of equality. Others saw only a self-seeking attempt to secure markets for Community exporters. The equality argument became untenable when the Community accepted UNCTAD recommendations for *unilateral* preference schemes for LDC's on a global scale in the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP).

The 1972 proposals of the Commission, approved in principle though with modifications by successive meetings of the Council of Ministers in 1973, can be seen not so much as a break with past practice, but rather as a pursuit of the same policy with expanded means and on firmer political and legal foundations.

In order to reduce the diversity of past trade agreements, the plan is to create free trade zones by 1977, with various periods of grace for certain countries and products until 1985 or 1990.[5] (The date, 1977, is taken by a kind of bureaucratic logic from a totally different context, that of the Community's preferential agreements with the remaining EFTA states.) The timetable element also fulfills an important requirement of GATT legality. To make attractive what are in fact considerable concessions to Community exporters on manufactured products, the range of agricultural concessions offered by the Community is to increase from 50 per cent of products covered to 85 per cent. Moreover, though amounts are unspecified, technical and perhaps financial assistance is to be added to the range of economic cooperation, as are comprehensive agreements on migrant labor.

EVALUATION OF PRESENT POLICIES

The new term created to describe the Community's relations with its southern neighbors is "sphere of association." This is to distinguish between a "sphere of influence" policy, and the new reality of organized regional interdependence. Obviously, the Community is not about to engage in a sphere of influence policy of the kind pursued by the superpowers, embracing large-scale aid, especially military aid, to reward political loyalty; advisers in many government ministries; and external and internal security guarantees. But an intensive, if "civilian" and on the face of it apolitical, cooperation is more ambiguous than would appear at first sight.

---

[5] The Community would abolish all its tariffs by 1977. Partner countries are to be granted additional time to liberalize the 5 to 10 per cent of their imports which are most sensitive—Israel, Spain, Cyprus and Malta until 1985, and Egypt, Lebanon and the Maghreb until 1990.

For one thing, if economic relations are close, a strong partner influences the weaker one virtually every time it makes a domestic or foreign economic policy decision. Canada's relations with the United States are an example among many. In addition to this unintended, unconscious, often absent-minded form of exercising influence, one can point to instances of deliberate bargaining between partners of unequal strength. Lastly, the capacity for exercising *political* influence increases as economic links proliferate. At least some proponents of the policy think in these terms. If one looks in greater detail at the implications of the policy of cooperation as presently proposed, he begins to ask himself if it is not both difficult and dangerous and potentially counterproductive as well.

Even assuming that close cooperation as envisaged in current plans would bring substantial economic benefits to the Community's partners, the attempt could well be politically counterproductive. One recalls that France, in the 1960's, sought to maintain a privileged relationship with Algeria, *inter alia* by buying its oil at prices substantially above the world level, by effecting massive financial transfers (far beyond anything the Community is likely to practice in the area as a whole), and by instituting an ambitious technical assistance program. At the same time Algeria enjoyed liberal access to French markets, and its workers were welcomed in large numbers. Yet this relationship ended in a protracted crisis. The division of labor that was, in a sense, written into the Franco-Algerian cooperation agreements did not satisfy the Algerian leaders' desire for independent industrialization; they hoped by sowing oil to reap industry, as one minister put it. The Community's relations with the developing countries of the Mediterranean may not become quite as close as that. But the political concept held by the proponents of an ambitious Mediterranean policy is reminiscent of this earlier bilateral experiment in cooperation.

Second, close ties with the Community are unlikely to provide sufficient economic benefits to make them tolerable in the long run. Thus, as regards the most pressing problem, that of agricultural exports, the Community is not apt — given the internal political bargains involved and the time needed to implement any policy — to alter present arrangements radically in the sense of a better division of labor based on comparative advantages. A rise in the relative share of imports would necessitate profound changes in the agricultural policy. Such changes may come. But they are more likely to occur in sectors like cereals and sugar (where international pressure is heaviest) than in the socially more sensitive sectors that provide employment in some of the poorest regions of the Community itself. Indeed, it took the Community the better part of 1973 to agree on an agricultural mandate, which was promptly rejected as totally inadequate by the five countries involved in the first round of negotiations.

Chances are, therefore, that the Community will prefer to give economic benefits in the form of high prices. This, however, would not provide badly needed employment; it would make the beneficiary countries permanently dependent on the vagaries of the Community market for a part of their budgetary receipts (export taxes which they undertake to levy) ; and it would reinforce the tendency toward surpluses in the region. Furthermore, these outside suppliers would not benefit from the market guarantee given to the farmers of the Community. As marginal suppliers, they already carry the full risk of harvest variations. This risk could be reduced if the Community allocated minimum annual quotas. But the resultant bargaining constellation — all countries of the region competing with each other for the Community's favors — would not be conducive to intraregional harmony.

Dependence on Community markets and receipts, together with the need to feed a growing population, hence to import, leads to a structural dependence in agriculture. The best way to reduce it is to encourage a shift toward growing foodstuffs for domestic consumption. This is already declared policy in the Maghreb countries, which can point to some initial successes. But the local production of cereal and sugar — especially under the labor-intensive conditions desirable to reduce unemployment — cannot compete with subsidized production from the temperate zone. Seen against this need, the Commission proposal's call for concessions for the Community's agricultural exports appears disquieting. For the countries of the region, a high-price policy for fluctuating exports, combined with artificially cheap imports, would mean a perpetuation of dependence. Uneconomic solutions to the social problems of underdevelopment could mean the need for perpetual economic intervention by the Community. Furthermore, solutions that create welfare clients for the Community may in time lead to political conflicts.

The sums that may be spent on consolidating the present agricultural division of labor might therefore better be spent on a program of diversification which would lessen dependence on the Community. It is often claimed that this is technically impossible. No such conclusion should be accepted before a serious attempt has been made to prove the contrary through research into new grains, new techniques, investment in irrigation, and, most important, the elimination of present distortions in the price structure by way of subsidies for both European exports and Mediterranean imports.

What are the likely benefits for the Mediterranean partners from being linked to the Community in nascent free trade areas for industrial goods? The margin of preference duty-free access to the Community would bring depends on the level of the common external tariff in the late 1970's. This may well be reduced from the present 8 or 9 per cent average to below 5 per cent. The granting of zero-tariff access to other countries — present and future Yaoundé associates, and the beneficiaries of the Generalized System of Preferences — already seriously erodes the special advantages of duty-free access to the Community market. Furthermore, Mediterranean industrial exports in such sensitive sectors as transformed agricultural goods, textiles and transformed petroleum products are likely even in the future to be hedged by safeguard clauses, quotas and "voluntary" observance of market discipline.

Such a pessimistic forecast seems justified not only by past performance and the language of present proposals, but also by the bargaining context of the proposed negotiations. As in past negotiations on preferential agreements, the real bargain is not between concessions on industrial goods on both sides, but between privileged access for Community manufactures (and investments) on the one hand, and incorporation into the Community's agricultural arrangements, plus financial assistance, on the other. Many of the obligations that partner governments may be led to accept concern sectors of the economy which do not yet exist — infant industries as yet unborn — but which may soon become important through the rapid diffusion of technology. Perhaps the Community would be willing to trade a tolerant attitude regarding already existing infant industries against an equally tolerant attitude toward its own, often identical "senile" industries (textiles, for example).

The establishment of a free trade area among partners of unequal economic and political strength thus risks limiting considerably the freedom of economic choice of future governments, and is likely to perpetuate the present division of labor between the European North and the Mediterranean South. The Commission argues that a lowering of tariffs by the partner countries is a good thing. But the lowering of economic barriers may occur too fast, go too far, and be too exclusive. Like the Yaoundé Convention, the Mediterranean agreements will allow partner countries to extend concessions to third parties, and permit intra-regional customs unions to discriminate against the Community. But neither is encouraged: each of the countries will practice free trade only with the Community, not with its regional partners.

The EFTA agreement offers an example for an alternative approach. In order to gain access to the British market, the Scandinavian countries gave up their long-standing reluctance to practice free trade among themselves. Through the industrial integration that resulted, their economies were able to meet the requirements of modern production: specialization and large production units. A lowering of economic barriers among the Mediterranean partners at least as rapidly as toward the Community would seem a precondition for their independent industrial development and the promotion of a wider than North-South integration in the region.

Also relevant in this context is the manner in which Community aid is going to be distributed. Present plans suggest the granting of hard and soft loans by the European Investment Bank, and some concessional aid. Creation of a "regional development organ" (including funds from partner countries, presumably the oil producers) is not ruled out for the future, but is not included now. Such "realism" risks complicating the future development of regional cooperation, since some countries will always prefer to deal with the Community bilaterally, rather than to sit down with often distant cousins to solve common problems. It is hard to see how the Community will avoid imposing its view of economic priorities unless the North-South, donor-receiver relationship is avoided from the beginning in favor of a multilateral approach.

To think of regional blocs only in relation to trade flows would be to underestimate the growing importance of capital flows in shaping economic and political relations among nations. The notion of special investment guarantees for Community firms as part of the total cooperation agreement therefore has intraregional and global implications. Both the U.S. experience in Latin America and the Japanese experience in Southeast Asia show that investments from a single source, above a certain threshold, become politically intolerable to host countries. Preferential investment links thus might not only introduce future sources of conflict within the Mediterranean region, but also hinder the efforts of the rest of the world to diversify economic links.

It must be recognized, however, that even under conditions of equal access, Community investments in the area will and should rise considerably. Such a development is the precondition for reversing the present policy of importing labor — with all this means in terms of social hardship for migrant workers, congestion in industrial regions, and maintenance of uneconomic, labor-intensive industries within the Community. The new policy would export capital, and, where possible, managerial and technological know-how, without insistence on majority ownership by Community firms.

In the above analysis, alternatives to the present and possible future policy of the Community have often been implied rather than stated. The aim has not been to present detailed technical solutions to the problems of dependence or interdependence in the Mediterranean area, but to question the direction of present policy on political as much as on economic grounds.

An arms-length relationship, a reduction of dependence, the active encouragement of a diversification of economic links with the Community's partners, does not mean turning away from their problems. On the contrary, considerable efforts need to be made by the Community in a number of areas with the partners in mind: e.g., opening its borders to the products of the region, with a minimum of exceptions; undertaking a structural adjustment in its own industry and agriculture; planning the transfer of real resources to eliminate past distortions and provide aid so as to allow more equal participation in the international division of labor for countries which so desire.

It is important, however, that in assuming its responsibilities the Community does not confuse a seeming short-term interest in acquiring safe market and investment opportunities with either its own or its partners' long-term economic and political interests.

Nor should it fall victim to the mystique that the millennial unity of the Mediterranean can be re-established through ever closer cooperation — which is reminiscent of the "Manifest Destiny" and "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" conceptions of earlier region-builders.

One should not overestimate the practical effects of public policy. In the short run, neither a lessening of dependence nor the seeking of closer ties will do much to change the unequal distribution of wealth and power in the area. But the direction in which evolution occurs, as the Community has learned from its own experience, can be as important as the practical changes evolution brings about.

THE MEDITERRANEAN AND EUROPE'S OIL SUPPLIES

One of the driving forces behind the EEC's Mediterranean policy is without doubt Europe's concern for its oil supplies. While the area is of only limited importance when measured by the size of hydrocarbon reserves in the Persian Gulf states, and Saudi Arabia in particular, Algerian and Libyan supplies are not negligible under present circumstances; moreover, the Mediterranean plays a key role in the transport of oil, through pipelines and tankers.

But the Community's Mediterranean policy regarding oil has broader objectives. The Southern Mediterranean is part of the Arab world. Good EC relations with this part, it can be argued, will improve relations with the rest. Obviously, the much more intensive economic cooperation envisaged in current Commission proposals could provide incentives for moderation on the part of the Arabs. The treatment of migrant workers, the variations in a quota for cotton or oranges, the granting of technical assistance — these cannot be turned off and on like oil. But the Community can reward its friends in the long and complex negotiations, both regional and global, that will span the better part of the next five years. It is instructive, in this respect, to recall the final paragraph of the famous pro-Arab "Declaration of the Nine" of November 6, 1973, wherein reference to "the multiple links which unite [the Community governments] with the southern and eastern shore of the Mediterranean" included a pointed reminder of the coming negotiations.

Furthermore, to judge by the Commission's proposals regarding the energy crisis,[6] the language and instruments of the Mediterranean policy merge imperceptibly with less ambitious but similar approaches to oil-producing countries in general. There is talk of "establishing relations of confidence" through "economic cooperation," whereby the Community would "make available technical and financial assistance, as well as open its markets for the industrial and agricultural products of these countries," and both parties would undertake "to observe certain rules for commercial transactions and industrial investments."

---

[6] "Notwendige Fortschritte auf dem Gebiet der Gemeinschaftlichen Energiepolitik," *Bulletin der Europäischen Gemeinschaften,* November 1972, pp. 16-17.

Before the 1973 Yom Kippur war and the subsequent Arab strategy of putting pressure on the United States via its vulnerable allies in Europe and Japan, it was not unreasonable to foresee some advantage from establishing a political relationship that could serve as a safety net if and when Europe's primary oil suppliers, the international companies, became compromised through U.S. support of Israel. Whether or not the argument is still valid, there seems to be no alternative short of total solidarity with the United States — a most unlikely policy choice.

The long and acrimonious debate between Americans and Europeans on Mediterranean policy, which seemed for a while to have abated somewhat, bids fair to gain a sharper tone. It is one thing to damage marginal citrus exports on one hand and the MFN doctrine on the other. It is quite another thing to engage in a policy affecting major interests of the United States, the position of the oil companies, and — as implied in proposals for "technical cooperation" — competition for the limited Arab market for goods and services in which all consumers will try to offset at least a part of their immense oil-related balance-of-payments outflows.

SECURITY POLICY

We began this analysis, and now terminate our reflections on policy, by looking at the Mediterranean region as it affects the Community's security. Within our chosen time-span — decisions by mid-decade for the contingencies of 1980 — the Community is doubtlessly going to act increasingly as a collectivity in security matters.

How can Europe safeguard its security interests in the Mediterranean? The traditional and still partially valid answer is through the alliance with the United States. Because American diplomacy is constrained by the Middle East conflict, American naval power can do little to prevent the spread of the Soviet presence, yet it remains the only effective protection from the military consequences of such a spread. When, during trade talks with the United States in January 1972, the Community pleaded for recognition of its special responsibility for the area in order to justify discrimination against U.S. citrus exports, the American representative is reported to have brushed this aside with the remark: "The responsibility is ours. We have a few ships down there." That statement misses an important point, namely, the necessary sterility of the American presence. It can preserve the strategic status quo — no small matter — but it cannot transform the economic and political status quo that makes the area so vulnerable.

Should Europe assume a greater share of the defense effort in the region? When the Soviet navy first appeared in strength in the Mediterranean, France reacted by taking her fleet out to the Atlantic. At first thought quixotic, this move had something to commend it. It removed the temptation of countries in the Eastern Mediterranean to seek protection from the Soviet Union against a residual French interventionary threat. Mers el Kebir has not become a Soviet base. As the Soviet presence increased, France gave up any short-term hope of transforming the Eastern Mediterranean into a "sea of peace," and began to collaborate with NATO units on maneuvers and in aerial surveillance, and strengthened her links with Spain. Since then, the Americans have repeatedly asked for stronger European efforts.

It has been proposed that Europe should strengthen its naval efforts through NATO by forming the present "on call" forces[7] into a permanent "standing force" with participation by countries not currently engaged in the area, notably Germany. The principal aim of this proposal is to demonstrate Atlantic solidarity, or more precisely, to demonstrate to American critics of the U.S. presence in Europe that the Europeans do their fair share. Yet it is just as likely that actual implementation would demonstrate the limits of that solidarity. Navies, more than any other branch of the armed forces, are diplomatic instruments as much as military tools. For Europe to play the role of junior partner to the U.S. Sixth Fleet would be diplomatically counterproductive — and as a concept outdated. The scheme would contribute little toward defense against the Soviet navy, while visibly tying Europe to American diplomacy vis-à-vis the Arabs. At any rate, Germany is cool to the plan, while French participation seems excluded.

What about a purely European naval force? This has several attractions, since it would be one of the easiest first steps to realize in

[7] NAVOCFORMED was created by a decision of the NATO Council of Ministers in January 1969. Activated three times, it now consists of a destroyer each from Greece, Turkey and the United States, as well as a British and an Italian frigate. *Atlantic News,* No. 407.

a prospective European defense collaboration, and would demonstrate to the Americans that the Europeans were playing their part. It would allow France's more wholehearted participation while detracting little from the NATO-supported but largely self-contained U.S. Sixth Fleet. Nevertheless, a large European surface fleet might do more political damage than could be offset by any increase in the defense capacity to which it contributed. The combined numerical weight of the West would appear overwhelming, leaving the Soviet Union in the role of underdog and "anti-imperialist" guardian – this at an important moment in Soviet-Arab relations when the USSR is beginning to acquire what Walter Laqueur calls "a past" because of its clients' accumulated rancor born of unsatisfactory relations of dependence.

Europe's efforts could more usefully be employed to stiffen its defenses by other means: an efficient common surveillance network, using the latest electronic devices; shore-based naval missiles; submarines and planes for anti-submarine warfare, and anti-naval hardware in general. Particular emphasis should be given to aircraft. The weather of the Mediterranean is uniquely suited to their deployment and Europe has ample air bases. Planes allow a greater degree of "conflict management" than guns or missiles: they can threaten without hitting, they can identify targets with greater certainty, and they can be recalled as a missile cannot be. Such a force should be Euro-financed, and eventually use planes that were jointly developed for the specific purpose. Detachments from "northern" air forces should participate as a demonstration of solidarity. Mixed "European" squadrons would be technically easy to realize.

As regards pressing political problems in the area, notably the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Community should be careful not to complicate an already confused situation by adding to the power politics involved, not least because its cumbersome decision-making structure makes it difficult to conduct subtle diplomacy. If Mediterranean troubles stem from a surfeit of politics, Europe's contribution should be the introduction of civilian relations based on welfare aims, equity and rules.

Thus, if it is in Western Europe's interest to reduce Soviet political penetration of the area, the EC should not attempt a counterpenetration of the same style, replacing one exclusivist claim by another. It should instead offer stable economic relations without political strings. The availability of an attractive alternative is the most effective means of reducing the possibility of the Soviets making political capital out of such economic and aid links as they have established. Once Moscow's initiatives were "neutralized" in this manner, East European aid efforts could and should be welcomed. This, indeed, is the only formula acceptable to countries but recently freed from Euro-American dominance. Arab diplomats, even those most sympathetic to Europe, insist on this point: only the simultaneous representation of both Eastern and Western Europe can assure their development while preserving their independence.

But the USSR's political role, as suggested above, will depend on how the states of the southern littoral perceive of the Community's hegemonial position. Algeria turned to the Soviet Union for its military needs during the period of French-Algerian cooperation. In the future one can easily imagine countries engaged in contentious negotiations with the EC making demonstrative gestures of economic and military cooperation toward Moscow in order to gain additional bargaining strength. Thus, the fewer the strings attached to relations with the Community, the smaller the need for a political role for the Soviet Union.

As regards arms exports, however, a no-strings policy by Europe is simply not possible — even though it is precisely as an exclusive arms supplier that Moscow came close to reducing Egypt to a client state. Events have proved that this sort of dependence, too, can become politically counterproductive, but as long as the Arabs' conflict with Israel persists, Europe is at a serious political disadvantage.

In the future, and in areas less touched by the Middle East conflict, Europe has an interest in limiting the flow of arms across borders. An agreed no-arms export policy by the Community would be an effective demonstration of its civilian character. Yet this implies that Europe, under all circumstances, would prefer to see the Soviets and the Chinese satisfy the arms needs of its neighbors. Clearly this is not the case, but Europe should still make an effort to hold such exports to the minimum. A mercantilist export drive in arms is incompatible with a responsible role for Europe. Self-restraint in this respect will be made easier if the Community can provide an internal market for British, and especially French, hardware — a market which at present is limited by commitments to purchase U.S. goods. In any case, a common policy on arms sales will become necessary as Europe progresses toward an integrated high-technology industry. Present practices, such as the Anglo-French agreement allowing France to market the jointly produced Jaguar aircraft in politically sensitive markets, cannot continue as Europe is increasingly judged as a unit in the eyes of the world.

CONCLUSION

In our attempt to sketch the fashioning of the European Community's future relationship with its southern neighbors, we have treated the economic and military factors as ancillary to the political. The most important aspect of the present relationship is inequality, and this characteristic is going to become even more salient in the politics of the region when the conflict with Israel demands less attention.

Expressed in basic political arithmetic, inequality plus proximity equals dominance. While there is little the EC can do about inequality in the short run, it can put a more favorable construction on proximity by encouraging the diversification of links beyond the main North-South axis, where they are translated into dependence. The alternative approach, which seeks to intensify economic and political links, is politically dated. No amount of good will and altruism on Europe's part will prevent a division of labor on the terms of the larger partner. To prove this point one has simply to point to the institutional structure of the Community: internal bargains are so difficult to strike that external factors are considered only if these are backed up by considerable pressure.

Europe's interest lies in the de-radicalization of Mediterranean politics. It should not lay the basis for a future conflict of which it would be the object. A preferential policy by the Community threatens to exclude the rest of the West from the region. Moreover, while Eastern Europe has an important role to play in the development of the Mediterranean area, the question is whether this can be done on "civilian" terms, rather than as part of a political struggle for influence that would produce further radicalization. Europe should make sure that in the choice between independence and dependence it does not appear to be on the wrong side.

It is also in this context that future military policy in the Mediterranean should be considered. Starting from the assumption that, even in the 1970's, large naval vessels are seen as gunboats by those who do not possess them, Europe should choose a politically less doubtful means of defense against the Soviet naval presence.

VIET NAM AND THE PROFESSIONAL MILITARY*

by Sam C. Sarkesian

"I will be damned if I will permit the U.S. Army, its institutions, its doctrine and its tradition to be destroyed just to win this lousy war."[1] In a moment of candor and frustration, a senior American general thus expressed the real tragedy of the Viet Nam involvement. The issue for the U.S. military in Viet Nam was not whether the war was just or unjust, nor that they should serve there, but rather how well the job was done to defeat the enemy, and what impact the total experience would have on the military institution and the profession. At best, the issue is in doubt and the experience painful.

This essay is an attempt to provide some insights into the nature of the professional reassessment occurring in the U.S. Army. Stemming primarily from the Viet Nam experience, the issues involved have not yet been clearly articulated or specifically associated with distinct groups within the officer corps. Yet there are discernible signs indicating that the monistic military order may be struggling to reassert itself in a professional environment which has developed some internal criticism and skepticism.

Many military officers would prefer to label Viet Nam an aberrant military experience. Because of the difficulties of the war, the highly political nature of our involvement, and the divisiveness it has caused in American society, they feel that it is not representative of the true role and efficiency of the military. Moreover, a number of political leaders as well as intellectuals believe it may be an isolated case of U.S. policy. On the other hand, various military officers particularly in the intermediate grades — the emerging elite — view Viet Nam as the face of the future, a kind of war that the U.S. military must be prepared for from now on. For these officers, Viet Nam represents a virtual watershed, not only in

---

*This article is a revised version of a chapter appearing in the author's forthcoming book, *The Professional Army Officer in a Changing Society* (Chicago: Nelson-Hall).

[1] Quoted in Ward Just, *Military Men* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1970), p. 185.

terms of victory or defeat, but in its impact on the profession and the military institution.[2]

It would be foolish to blame the Viet Nam involvement for all of the ills of our society or for those of the military. However, for the professional officer it undoubtedly has been a catalytic agent — the basis for self-examination and a reassessment of professional norms. There is no doubt that the military will survive and that the profession will endure. What counts is the substance of professionalism that will emerge from the experience.

That the military has become highly introspective concerning the war is shown by recent articles in professional military journals arguing the virtues of the traditional military approach in countering insurgency war. In analyzing these articles, one can identify distinctions between the traditionalists and modernists, and among modernists themselves, as to the proper response to this form of warfare. At professional schools, as well as the academies, there has been an ambiguous and ambivalent reaction to the U.S. role in Viet Nam.

Given the highly publicized military operations in Viet Nam, some professionals tend to be defensive, rationalizing the conduct of the war in apologetic tones. Others not only blame civilians for the involvement, but also charge that once the going got tough the military was abandoned by the same civilians who earlier had implored intervention. We have an interesting phenomenon in which civilians accuse the military and in turn are accused by the military of responsibility for the intervention and deepening commitment. Current charges and countercharges are only the prelude to serious recriminations that eventually will bring into focus contending versions of the U.S. role in Viet Nam.

From what do these problems stem? Faced with a major — and quite unprecedented — assignment in a war with little likelihood that conventional tactics and superior technology could bring about a victory, the U.S. military had to readjust its tactics, reassess its purpose and change its image. Compounding these difficulties was the lack of popular support of the war reflected in a variety of ways in the public attitude toward the military. The ambiguities of the conflict combined with its cost stimulated wide-ranging debate within the military concerning military policy and the limits of military power. Army officers from the rank of General on down were investigated and in some instances court-martialed for questionable roles in Viet Nam operations. Uncertainty about the legality of commands and implementing orders brought into question a whole range of issues concerning not only morality but the strategy and tactics of the war. The consequences have been a general questioning of the modes of conventional leadership and discipline and a critical reassessment of the meaning of professionalism by military officers themselves.

---

[2] In a survey of over 400 military officers attending the various war colleges in 1973, it was found that almost 70 per cent felt that counterinsurgency was the type of war most likely to be fought by the United States in the next decade. The survey was conducted by Bruce Russett, Yale University.

II

It would seem unnecessary after our years of costly experience and the volumes published on the nature of guerrilla insurgency, especially the oft-quoted works of Mao Tse-tung, to review the concept of this type of war that has caused such repercussions within the United States and the American military profession. Yet, for all the analyses and assessments, prevailing opinions indicate a degree of ignorance concerning the fundamentals of revolutionary and counterrevolutionary guerrilla warfare.

One of the major difficulties is that no amount of intellectual analysis and study can translate principle into policy. It requires psychological and cultural empathy to tailor a counterrevolutionary tactic conceived by a Western, technological, democratic society to an environment reflecting a non-Caucasian, underdeveloped system and an Asian culture. Certainly, one has to look beyond traditional practices and Western organizational structures. In studying the impact of Viet Nam on the U.S. professional, therefore, it would seem appropriate first to re-examine the nature of revolutionary warfare.

Although guerrilla warfare can be traced to the pre-Christian era, only in the most recent period of the twentieth century has it evolved into a systematic mode of action. In modern terms it is not simply military action by irregular troops of militia but a form of warfare whose main purpose is to subvert or destroy the existing government so that the revolutionaries can impose their own government. Not only can this include all of the forms of warfare normally associated with the conventional battlefield; it also embraces those forms that we conveniently label "unconventional." Indeed, this type of warfare combines action in practically all fields of human endeavor — political, social, economic and psychological. Its strategy is to mobilize the masses, make them politically aware, and incite them to demand from the existing government the kinds of things, such as an improvement in the quality of life, that the government may not be able to produce. In essence the revolutionaries attempt to achieve political goals by mass organization combined with military action. The main target is the existing political and social system and the main participants are the people. Involvement of the "people" is one of the revolutionary's basic tasks. In this sense both revolutionaries and counterrevolutionaries must concentrate on organizing the peasants, who in Viet Nam make up over 75 per cent of the population.

The success of the revolution depends on the effectiveness of the political cadres and their influence with the masses. According to the primer of a leading revolutionary: "Only on a basis of strong political organization could semi-armed organizations be set up firmly, guerrilla groups and guerrilla units organized which have close connection with the revolutionary masses, eventually to further their activities and development."[3]

Conditions for revolutionary warfare are found in political systems where the political organization and the government's administrative departments are incapable of dealing with problems at the local level; that is, where there are unresponsive rural societies, tensions, grievances, and in the main an uncompromising government. This well describes the situation in South Viet Nam beginning with the Diem regime in 1958, through the military governments following Diem's assassination until the most recent period.

How do you counter a revolution? In simple terms, the proper counterrevolutionary measures are those connected with more effective and efficient government.

> The most significant point to be noticed is that Communist influence can exist largely because of the absence of civil administration and government control in the areas concerned. This is basic in all Communist-dominated rural areas in all developing countries and is a crucial point in planning countermeasures against a Communist-led national liberation struggle to overthrow any government that is not Communist. No amount of military pressure can succeed unless it is carried out hand in hand with the introduction [of] government administration in the areas concerned.[4]

In other words, for counterrevolution to succeed in Viet Nam the counterrevolutionary forces would have to get down to the village and hamlet level to create effective local government. In turn, the legitimacy of the South Vietnamese government would rest on the degree of its responsiveness to the village society. How could the U.S. military accomplish this? The obvious answer is that it could not. No amount of major U.S. military effort could create a successful counterrevolution without a relatively efficient and committed South Vietnamese government. The American contribution was chiefly in the military area, which most revolutionists would recognize as an auxiliary part of the revolutionary struggle. Additionally, the U.S. effort was conducted in conventional terms, using conventional responses and bringing about ambiguous results.

---

[3] General Vo Nguyen Giap, *People's War, People's Army* (New York: Praeger, 1962), pp. 77-78.

[4] C. C. Too, "Some Salient Features in the Experience of Defeating Communism in Malaya, with Particular Regard to the Method of New Villages" (Paper presented at the International Seminar on Communism in Asia, Onyang, Korea, June 19-25, 1966), p. 3.

In 1965, when the first large-scale commitment of U.S. ground troops occurred, American units found themselves facing a Viet Cong on the verge of military victory and hence deployed in conventional large-unit fashion. The Americans responded accordingly, and the casualties they suffered, although small in comparison with the enemy's, were significant enough to cause dismay in the United States and a certain degree of uneasiness in professional ranks. Furthermore, enemy casualties coupled with the destruction of enemy units did not necessarily lead to progress in prosecuting the war. There are professionals who would argue that the search-and-destroy and attrition tactics followed by the United States were counterproductive to the cause of counterinsurgency; adhering to conventional perceptions, they were completely divorced from the psychological and political realities of guerrilla warfare.

A number of new tactics evolved, including helicopter troop movements and the massive use of air strikes and artillery. This not only limited U.S. casualties but provided a counterrevolutionary weapon that was difficult for the enemy to cope with. If enemy units could be located and pinpointed, they could be attacked successfully. However, in more populated areas, or where there was difficulty in locating and confining enemy units, the massive use of firepower destroyed huts, animals and ricelands as well as Vietnamese who happened to be in the way. Eventually, the use of advanced technology and massive firepower led to increasing criticism of battlefield tactics that failed to distinguish between peasants and the Viet Cong. Many critics began to wonder how such tactics could create sympathy for the counterrevolution, and questions were also raised in the professional ranks.

After the 1968 Tet offensive proved that military victory was improbable for either side, the U.S. military concerned itself more with the political and social aspects of the revolutionary war. Attempts were made to modernize the South Vietnamese army and give it a broader combat role — in what became the Vietnamization policy. By the time the North Vietnamese launched their offensive in 1972, which was predominantly a conventional invasion of the South, most American ground units had departed Viet Nam, and for better or worse the Vietnamese experience had left its mark on the profession.

III

The apparent inability of the U.S. military to bring the Viet Nam war to an early conclusion, despite its vaunted technological skills and relatively limitless resources, is at the root of the latest anti-military sentiments in the United States. On the other hand, few Americans recognize that not only were highly technical skills not always well adapted to the task at hand but resources were indeed limited insofar as permission to apply them to the enemy was concerned. Military logic rarely operates on the assumption that the weapons and resources available will be deliberately restricted with respect to the battlefield. Undoubtedly a quick victory — or one within a two-to-three-year period — would not have raised such issues concerning military effectiveness. It is forgotten that a number of the techniques used in Viet Nam were also used in Korea with little public outcry, for example, mass B-29 bombing raids, napalm, and free-fire zones in which anything moving became a legitimate target.

The large-scale use of manpower and the rapid turnover of combat troops brought into the military institution large groups of young men who had been exposed to the emerging youth culture and its anti-military sentiments. It was inevitable that these sentiments and life styles would find their way into combat units in Viet Nam. Moreover, this occurred, beginning in 1968, coincident with the political dramatics at home, which saw President Lyndon Johnson declining to run for a second term, the Eugene McCarthy phenomenon, the assassination of Robert Kennedy, and the chaos erupting at the Democratic National Convention in Chicago.

In such circumstances, it became difficult for the professionals to justify the war in the eyes of their men and to create the combat spirit and legitimacy needed to maintain organizational cohesion. While various sectors of American society as well as a number of elected national officials and members of the academic community were condemning the war and the military for the perpetuation of what they considered to be the United States' imperialist aggression in Viet Nam, the profession was committed to seeing the war through against all odds.

In the professional view it appeared that the society had committed the nation to war while at the same time condemning the military for implementing a policy initiated by elected civilian leaders. What is more important, this feeling gave rise to professional suspicion concerning the working of the political system and generated doubt about the military objectives associated with the war. Anti-war activities led to dissent even at the combat unit level. In a number of instances officers at the small unit level were faced with recalcitrance and subordinates' outright opposition to carrying out combat missions. Occasionally, combat leaders found themselves attempting to develop a consensus among their subordinates before undertaking a mission. Some junior officers, not far removed in age and experience from their men, sympathized with the troops and created difficulties in implementing orders. Sometimes passive acquiescence to orders reduced combat missions to "lip service" exercises. It was not unknown, for example, for combat patrols into contested or enemy-held territory to move a few yards from friendly positions, remain all night in relative safety and return the following morning reporting no enemy contact. Traditional professionals shook their heads and wondered what had happened to the U.S. Army.

Following the large-scale commitment of U.S. ground troops to Viet Nam in 1965, many professional military men felt that the military solution to the war could be found within a relatively short period of time. For the professional officer, it also meant that he had to "get his ticket punched," not only with a tour in Viet Nam, but hopefully with command duty. For the infantryman, working for his combat infantryman's badge, also, service in Viet Nam was a highly desirable assignment. After all, as Army men were inclined to say, "It's the only war we've got." As a result, from 1965 until 1970 the military sought ticket-punching service in Viet Nam as a prerequisite for success in their later careers. It was during this time that Army professionals became notorious for their scramble for command duty. A command position filled for six months or even less was readily evacuated to allow another professional to obtain his command time. Although the short tours of duty in Viet Nam as a whole and the much shorter tours for commanders created difficulties in combat and impaired efficiency and morale, the procedure served the purpose of allowing a great number of professionals to acquire combat command experience.

In this connection, there was an instance in which several battalion-sized U.S. Army units were engaged in close combat with a hard-core Viet Cong regiment. Many of the U.S. officers were killed or wounded in the battle, including a number of unit commanders. As one result, a staff officer from a higher unit took over temporary command of a battalion-sized unit. He performed well, leading his unit in several days of combat. The Viet Cong withdrew with heavy casualties. The American units had also suffered. Shortly thereafter, the staff officer was rewarded with the Silver Star for heroism. Even in the midst of battle, however, career considerations surfaced. Immediately following the combat action, the staff officer ensured that his record duly noted that he had served for three days as a combat unit commander and had been awarded the Silver Star. Special pains were taken to dispatch proper forms with this information to the Adjutant General in the Pentagon so that it could be included in the official records. To be sure, ticket-punching is not necessarily an evil, but it does provoke a degree of criticism about and among professionals, particularly when associated with combat roles.

IV

Besides assignment to U.S. combat units, professionals served as advisers to South Vietnamese army units or regional and provincial militia forces. Generally, these assignments were considered less important than service with U.S. units — at least for career purposes. The name of the game was to secure command duty or serve in your specialty in the U.S. command structure. Only belatedly was service with South Vietnamese forces recognized as an important element in the total counterrevolutionary role. But it still remained of secondary importance in career consideration. The ideal for career purposes was to have two tours of duty in Viet Nam or an extended tour of up to eighteen months. In this way the officer could not only serve with U.S. troops but could acquire experience with Vietnamese units as well.

Many professionals who served with the Vietnamese found their jobs frustrating. Recognizing that their function called for something more than small unit tactics and conventional military relationships, they became immersed in the Vietnamese social fabric and the complex social and political interrelationships of the South Vietnamese military system. In such positions, many discovered that they were ill-prepared to deal with an alien culture. Professional competence and technical skills proved inadequate to cope with the myriad problems associated with an Asian military structure bound up in governing as well as conducting counterrevolutionary war. Trying to assist, or simply to move, an enigmatic ally proved frustrating. The Oriental qualities of indirectness, patience and political shrewdness, to note but a few, were incompatible with the American culture and the professional military attitude of "getting on with it." The experience convinced many professionals of the need for a highly political and social approach to counterrevolution. As a result some felt that the U.S. effort had been misdirected, while others felt that engaging in counterrevolutionary efforts was futile given the cultural complexities of the Vietnamese personality.

Staff duty, epitomized by the Military Assistance Command Viet Nam in Saigon, was generally pleasant for senior officers. But for intermediate-grade officers who were younger, more aggressive, and perhaps more sensitive to the ambiguous nature of the war, Saigon represented many of the ills of the U.S. Army's involvement in Viet Nam. A significant gap opened up between perceptions of the war in Saigon and those in the field, and officers who served in both arenas were inevitably struck by the unreal view of the war from Saigon. Furthermore, the life style of the U.S. military in Saigon greatly differed from that in the field: Vietnamese mistresses, nightclubs, garden parties, and the helter-skelter life of urban Saigon plainly did not fit in with the realities at Firebase Charlie or Lai Khe.

While the optimists at higher echelons proclaimed the "light at the end of the tunnel," frustrated professionals serving in the field, particularly with the Vietnamese, knew better. Their attempts at correcting distortions regarding the progress of the conflict generally met with official indifference, and in some cases admonition. To them, Saigon represented an unresponsive bureaucracy divorced from the realities of the war.

Moreover, Special Forces units, operating primarily with the Vietnamese, hill people or mercenaries in covert counterrevolutionary efforts, comprised a nontraditional military structure and this created resentment among many regular military men. Because of this attitude, Special Forces officers were convinced that accusations in 1969 against five of their number concerning their role in killing a suspected double agent were part of a determined effort within the traditional Army to discredit the Green Berets. For the professional officer to be continually associated with the Special Forces and their activities came close to sounding the death knell to his career. The Green Berets and the purposes for which they were organized stood apart from and at variance with the formal Army structure, and they were thought of as unorthodox — their units an outlet for mavericks and rebels. Even though the Special Forces may be one of the most effective organizations in a counterrevolutionary campaign, such professional struggles were common on the battlefields of Viet Nam.

V

Officers' views on the war have obviously been influenced by their personal experience. Many who served in military assistance capacities or as advisers to the Vietnamese feel that the main effort should have been in these areas. In the long run, they may be right. Those who served with U.S. units, on the other hand, believe a greater U.S. combat effort would have solved the problem. In any case the different experiences and outlooks have evoked varied reactions to the U.S. role in Viet Nam. Within the U.S. Army, a "great debate" resulting from professional assessments and analysis regarding the Viet Nam experience finds some arguing that the military was successful since its prime purpose was to apply military power against the enemy's military power. In contrast, there are those who argue that the use of military power divorced from the realities of the environment creates a distortion in the relative success of the total war effort. Still others would argue that counterinsurgency wars are to be shunned and the focus placed on what the U.S. military is best at — the conduct of highly technical and sophisticated combat. The traditional orientation seems to favor a return to the Europe-type ground war for which American forces are so splendidly equipped and prepared.

An ethical or moral content for the profession has also developed out of the Viet Nam war, stemming particularly from the My Lai massacre and the case of Lieutenant Calley. For many, it is difficult to reconcile the wanton killing of civilians with the precepts of professional competence and ethics. To be sure, some military men consider My Lai an aberration, atypical of U.S. Army operations, while others claim that it is a virtue of the profession that more My Lai's did not occur. Nevertheless, there is a nagging suspicion that My Lai uncovered serious professional inadequacies, given the fact that it involved a number of professionals, including General officers. This incident has done much to stimulate a general reassessment of the profession, not only in terms of its corporateness, but primarily as regards individual attitudes and behavior. It may be years before the results are manifested in the profession and the military institution.

Most military men, feeling that they are ultimately servants of the state, view their Vietnamese involvement without bitterness, as part of their professional commitment. However, few desire to become involved in a war such as Viet Nam to gain combat experience or so that the profession may undergo testing under fire. Critics to the contrary, professional military men have needs and desires and a sense of right and wrong just as other human beings do. They do not subscribe to the idea of killing simply for the sake of killing. To be sure, there are those who relish combat duty, but rarely do modern professionals seek to lead the nation into war. As a matter of fact, a number of years prior to the United States' active involvement in Viet Nam, some of the highest ranking officers in the U.S. Army were counseling against it. General Matthew B. Ridgway, Chief of Staff in 1954 and 1955, wrote the following prophetic words in 1956:

> As I have pointed out earlier in this narrative, when the day comes for me to face my Maker and account for my actions, the thing I would be most humbly proud of was the fact that I fought against, and perhaps contributed to preventing the carrying out of, some hare-brained tactical schemes which would have cost the lives of thousands of men. To that list of tragic accidents that fortunately never happened I would add the Indo-China intervention. . . .
>
> We could have fought in Indo-China. We could have won, if we had been willing to pay the tremendous cost in men and money that such intervention would have required — a cost that in my opinion would have eventually been as great as, or greater than, that we paid in Korea. In Korea, we had learned that air and naval power alone cannot win a war and that inadequate ground forces cannot win one either. It was incredible to me that we had forgotten that bitter lesson so soon — that we were on the verge of making the same tragic error. . . .
>
> If we did go into Indo-China, we would have to win. We would have to go in with a military force adequate in all branches, and that meant a very strong ground force — an Army that could not only stand the normal attrition of battle, but could absorb heavy casualties from the jungle heat, and the rots and fevers which afflict the white man in the tropics. We could not afford to accept anything short of decisive military victory.[5]

[5] Matthew B. Ridgway, *Soldier: Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway* (New York: Harper & Row, 1956), pp. 277-278.

All that General Ridgway warned against in 1956 had taken place by 1972. Aside from the tragedies wrought by lives lost, divisiveness in society, and frustration's effect on the American psyche, the greatest casualty of Viet Nam in the long run may prove to be the military profession.

VI

What will ultimately emerge from this painful experience for the military is difficult to foresee. Providing a unique environment and a different kind of war, Viet Nam has tested the profession and the military institution to such a point that the professionals themselves have become openly critical of the system.

A number of officers were dismayed because they felt that the traditional approach to war was in this case inappropriate. Concern for body count and real estate simply did not get to the heart of the matter in combating revolutionary war. The use of air power and traditional modes of leadership likewise failed to make a decisive impact. Most of the larger unit (brigade and division) leaders had received their initial combat training and command duty in World War II or Korea. In essence, therefore, the tactics of World War II as modified by the Korean experience were applied to Viet Nam. Only the most farsighted officer could in the early years of the war sense the ineffectiveness of this policy or identify the basic dilemma inhering in the conventional military commitment. It is only in recent years that a number of professionals, frustrated and disillusioned by the U.S. military role in Viet Nam, have spoken out. By no means in the majority, there are still enough of them to suggest a possible alternative view of the war while stimulating debate within the professional ranks and casting some suspicion on prevailing norms.

As suggested earlier, the professional officer is probably not as concerned with the social morality of the war itself as with the military institution's response to the demands of the war — and especially with professional competence to deal with the nontraditional environment of revolutionary war. This concern has engendered debate among traditionalists, transitionalists and modernists within the professional ranks.[6] The traditionalists generally feel that more application of power in accordance with accepted Western concepts of the principles of war would have won. Transitionalists believe proper application of power with some new techniques and approaches could have given a significant advantage to the U.S. forces and might even have been enough to win. Modernists are apt to argue that revolutionary war in an alien culture cannot be "won" by the conventional employment of troops whose culture rests on a modern, Western value system. These are not to be taken as neat categories, but they do give some indication of the nature of the debate.

---

[6] See Sam C. Sarkesian, "Political Soldiers: Perspectives on Professionalism in the U.S. Military," in *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, May 1972, pp. 239-258. Generally the traditionalists are officers who gained most of their combat experience in World War II. Dominated by academy graduates, they are now usually of senior rank. The transitionalists' experience derives from the Korean War and

The profession, of course, can defend itself while rationalizing its role in Viet Nam by simply stressing that "We did our job." This not only avoids the major issue but suggests the dominance of the traditional view. It also invites increasing criticism from civilian intellectuals and political leaders who could justifiably raise the specter of a robot-like institution and naive military leaders. For their part, a number of modernist officers as well as some transitionalists would question the "professionalism" in this kind of response. They see the danger in perpetuating a profession that increasingly rests on past glories and prevailing institutional inertia while losing its ability to develop innovative and imaginative concepts for the future. The impact on the profession could be disastrous – leading to institutional decay and professional incompetence. Society, attuned to the new demands of the postindustrial era, could move rapidly ahead, leaving an obsolete military in its wake.

Hence, the debate over Viet Nam in reality reflects a larger concern with the nature of professionalism in the post-Viet Nam era, the premise being that the ambiguities of the Viet Nam experience and the ambivalence it has created in the professional ethic (within a context of societal disenchantment with the military) calls for a resuscitation of professionalism. It is not suggested that the profession undergo institutional revolution or ethical rebirth. Rather, there is a need to create greater institutional sensitivity and responsiveness consonant with professional reality and honesty. To do this there must be a concerted

---

shortly thereafter. Although many of these are today Lieutenant Colonels or Colonels (with some Generals), they were not so imbued with the professional ethic that they were oblivious to the ambiguities of limited war. The modernist category identifies those officers who are closest to the youth culture and the Viet Nam era and perhaps have the greatest empathy with civilian society and its problems. Most of the modernists are in the company grade or junior Major category with academy graduates in the minority. Obviously, however, these categorizations are relative. The younger officer with Viet Nam experience today will be the traditionalist of tomorrow.

effort to stimulate independent thought and foster an intellectual atmosphere in which an individual can inquire without being accused of professional treason. Moreover, these professional initiatives must be accompanied by new institutional "rules of the game" which foster adaptability and dynamism.

Whether this can be accomplished will depend on how quickly the younger modernist officers and those sharing their views reach the rank of General, and how quickly they can infuse the institution and the profession with a greater flexibility and a broader outlook. This assumes, of course, that today's modernist officers will retain their "modern" views. The institution has a built-in socialization process which favors orthodoxy, and the danger is that the institution will capture such officers before they can capture the institution. In early 1974, the issue does not appear to be near resolution.

OBSTACLES TO REFORM IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS: THE CASE OF NSAM 341*

by William I. Bacchus

HOW best to develop and carry out America's foreign policies has confronted each postwar administration with ineluctable dilemmas. The growth of U.S. foreign involvements, commitments and interests has outpaced the conceptual and institutional capacity of government to cope with such changes, in spite of and perhaps partially because of the proliferation of units, committees and task forces created to minister to these expanding responsibilities. The always difficult process of marrying abstract policy concepts to operational courses of action is enormously complicated when either or both become subjects of contention between competing foreign affairs bureaucracies. Recognition of these problems led Arthur Macmahon, writing two decades ago, to emphasize the essentiality of effective coordination in foreign affairs, both of policy and operations,[1] and a current observer would be rash indeed to conclude that the impediments to success have diminished in succeeding years.

The obvious limitations to engineering organizational arrangements and coordination procedures that can approach ideal standards of performance in this area have merged with the desire of each administration to place its distinctive stamp on the machinery of government. Together, they have been the motive forces behind the chronic urge to reorganize the foreign affairs community. Unfortunately, the resulting "improvements" have almost always suffered from one or more debilitating weaknesses. In turn, this has led to shortcuts and the adoption of informal patterns of operation, to the demise of formal arrangements, and to a continuing search for still other ways to bring some semblance of order to this complex field. A balance whereby the President retains control of the thrust of policy while at the same time effective use of bureaucratic expertise is ensured has never been reached, and many would argue that it has not been approached.

---

*This article was completed prior to the author's becoming a member of the staff of the Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy and should not be construed as representing the views of either the Commission or its staff.

[1] Arthur W. Macmahon, *Administration in Foreign Affairs* (Birmingham: University of Alabama Press, 1953), pp. 164-211.

The pitfalls are many, even when a President and his close advisers think they know what they want. An organizational arrangement may be so complex and so bound by procedural requirements that it becomes a paper mill rather than a means of developing and implementing intelligent and consistent policies, as was often charged against the Operations Coordinating Board of the Eisenhower Administration. It may fail to take account of the subtle relationships between policy concepts and "the operations side of foreign policy,"[2] as with some of the informal procedures used during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. It may lead to overcentralization and excessive burdens on a small number of proximate policymakers while the rest of government is functionally underemployed, as under the Nixon-Kissinger National Security Council (NSC) system. More to the point for the following discussion, such arrangements may not reflect the realities of power or operating styles of important individuals, which cannot be changed merely by promulgating new instructions; and the staff resources to do what is required may be lacking even if procedures and devices seem satisfactory on other counts.

The premise of this article is that insufficient attention has been given, as a rule,[3] to the reasons why past organizational experiments have failed, although there have been a plethora of critiques charging this to be the case.[4] For want of analysis of the underlying causes of past failures, each administration seems doomed to repeat the mistakes of its predecessors, and to generate new problems by overcorrecting for existing ones. Whatever the composition of the next administration, these old difficulties will reappear, warranting further investigation of the defects of past arrangements. Currently, a concerted effort to reorganize foreign affairs government may conceivably result from the work of a recently appointed joint Congressional/Presidential Commission.[5]

---

[2] See Roy M. Melbourne, "The Operations Side of Foreign Policy," ORBIS, Summer 1971, pp. 544-560, for a perceptive discussion of the "fusion of relation and purpose" between policy concepts and operations.

[3] But see Keith Clark and Lawrence J. Legere, editors, *The President and the Management of National Security* (New York: Praeger, 1969), first prepared as a report of the Institute for Defense Analyses, for an excellent consideration of some past problems and options available to the administration taking office in 1969. The work of Senator Henry M. Jackson and his subcommittee of the Senate Government Operations Committee through the years is another exception to this generalization. See also *Diplomacy for the 70's* (Washington: GPO, 1970) for the report of the internal reform program conducted in the State Department under the aegis of William B. Macomber, Jr., then Deputy Under Secretary for Administration.

[4] Two current examples are John Franklin Campbell, *The Foreign Affairs Fudge Factory* (New York: Basic Books, 1971), and I. M. Destler, *Presidents, Bureaucrats, and Foreign Policy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972).

Meanwhile, the short history of the NSAM 341 system[6] designed by General Maxwell D. Taylor for President Johnson and introduced on March 4, 1966, highlights some of the possible weaknesses in organizational arrangements previously mentioned. This system, initially given high marks for potential utility and viability,[7] survived only three years, although some components were incorporated with a diminished role in the Nixon NSC mechanism.[8] In the failure of Taylor's ideas to become operationally successful, there are lessons for future reform efforts in foreign policy management, development and implementation.

I

The logic of Taylor's proposals seemed convincing. In August 1965, upon completion of his tour as Ambassador in Saigon, he was asked by President Johnson to "review all of the activities of our Government in the Counter-Insurgency field, both at home and abroad, and to make appropriate recommendations."[9] From his own inquiries and those of four interagency task forces appointed to assist him, he concluded that this mandate was too restricted. First, to deal with insurgency alone would perpetuate an essentially defensive role for the United States; therefore activities abroad which might help to deter as well as combat insurgency, most notably developmental aid and other financial assistance, should also be included in the recommendations. Second, since the new procedures would presumably deal with most nations — Taylor estimated that some ninety were potential targets for insurgency — it would be logical to include U.S. activities in all countries, rather than to work with two sets of organizational devices and procedures. Third, since programs run by different parts of government often operated at cross purposes, all U.S. government programs should be coordinated from a central point. Fourth, this locus should be in Washington, since individual agency policies were developed there, and only there was a global perspective possible. In short, what began as an effort to bring consistency to a narrow range of programs in one group of countries grew into an attempt to improve coordination of all official U.S. activities anywhere abroad.

---

[5] This Commission was authorized by the Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 1972, through an amendment proposed by Senators Fulbright and Aiken. After an initial delay, all twelve of the members were appointed, and the Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy, to give it its proper name, began work in April 1973. Retired diplomat Robert D. Murphy was named Chairman of the Commission by the other members.

[6] Named for the *N*ational *S*ecurity *A*ction *M*emorandum of March 4, 1966, by which it was established.

[7] See John R. Probert, "Streamlining the Foreign Policy Machine," *Public Administration Review,* September 1967, pp. 229-236.

[8] The Nixon Administration system is described at length in the symposium, "Administration Problems of Multipurpose Diplomacy," edited by Herbert Emmerich, in *Public Administration Review*, November-December 1969, pp. 567-613, and especially in Edward A. Kolodziej, "The National Security Council: Innovations and Implications," *ibid.*, pp. 573-585.

[9] General Maxwell D. Taylor, Speech to American Foreign Service Association, March 31, 1966, reprinted in *Foreign Service Journal,* May 1966, pp. 34-36. The development of Taylor's thinking summarized in the rest of the paragraph is also from this source.

After discarding the ideas of revitalizing the NSC and creating a cumbersome White House organization of some other type to fill the void, in each case because their investigations revealed an almost universal lack of enthusiasm, Taylor and his colleagues turned to the Secretary of State as the logical central figure. When President Kennedy abolished the Operations Coordinating Board (OCB) of the Eisenhower NSC system, he said he "would look to the Department of State to assume the coordination function," but the task forces could find no formal official document that specifically gave the Secretary this authority. Viewing the lack of coordination and consistency which prompted his own assignment, Taylor decided something more was needed. Thus the White House introduced the NSAM 341 system with the announcement that the President had

> directed the Secretary of State, as his agent, to assume responsibility to the full extent permitted by law for the overall direction, coordination and supervision of interdepartmental activities of the United States Government overseas (less exempted military activities).[10]

To assist the Secretary with these new duties, two types of permanent interdepartmental committees were created: a Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG), with the Under Secretary of State as Executive Chairman and having as members the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the AID Administrator, the Director of the CIA, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of USIA, and the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; and five Interdepartmental Regional Groups (IRG), each with the Assistant Secretary of State responsible for the appropriate geographic bureau as Executive Chairman and with membership parallel to that of the SIG, at the regional level.

---

[10] "White House Announcement of New Procedures for Overseas Interdepartmental Matters," March 4, 1966, reprinted in *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents,* March 7, 1966, pp. 232-233.

The SIG was to aid the Secretary by resolving interdepartmental problems that could not be handled lower in the hierarchy, or for which existing procedures were inadequate. It was to do this by attending to important foreign policy issues as early as possible, by dealing with topics referred by its members or the Assistant Secretaries of State, by ensuring consistent use of U.S. resources, by absorbing responsibilities formerly held by the Special Group (counterinsurgency), and by periodically investigating the effectiveness of overseas activities and programs. The IRG's were to ensure the adequacy of policies for countries in their regions and the necessary means for implementing them. They were also to isolate potentially critical situations and to make recommendations to higher officials. Each level was intended to have both policymaking and operational responsibilities, in recognition of their close interrelationship.[11]

A key role was to be played by the Executive Chairman of each of the six groups. They were to have "full powers of decision on all matters within their purview," unless an appeal was requested to the next higher level. This provision was intended to strengthen State and to force decisions down the hierarchy, since it assigned more authority than chairmen of most interagency committees, who were forced to seek consensus, could muster.[12]

Formally, then, State had been given an opportunity to exert a significantly enhanced influence in interagency deliberations, and to recoup a pre-eminent position in the conduct of foreign affairs. In practice, ambiguities of intent and performance plagued the NSAM 341 system throughout its short existence, and it did not live up to its initial promise.

II

At the top, Secretary Rusk was at best ambivalent about the new system, even though he personally would have been the chief bureaucratic beneficiary had it been successful. The second level, the SIG, met about fifty times altogether, but its activity was uneven.[13] Between March and July 1966 it sat frequently under its first Executive Chairman, Under Secretary of State George Ball, but its deliberations were more technical than substantive, as members and staff alike concentrated on developing procedures, establishing working contacts, and deciding how the SIG should approach its tasks. In some respects, Ball was operating from a sense of duty rather than from deep commitment, for he did not favor government by committee.[14] It was also clear that his remaining time in State was limited, and he was understandably reluctant to embark upon any major new activities.[15] During this period, the SIG was criticized for its tendency to act primarily as an appellate forum rather than as a group whose essential tasks were to seek out major problems and direct their resolution.[16]

---

[11] See Melbourne, *op. cit., passim.*

[12] These details about the new system have been summarized from U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Affairs Manual,* Circular No. 385, March 4, 1966. This document repeats virtually word for word the text of the classified NSAM 341.

[13] These and subsequent details about SIG meetings and agendas are taken from interviews with SIG staff members in December 1968, and from an unpublished SIG Staff Study prepared in November 1968 (cited hereafter as SIG Staff Study).

Nicholas Katzenbach, Ball's successor as SIG Executive Chairman and Under Secretary, was initially even less impressed with its decision-making potential than his predecessor. Between July 1966 and July 1967 he called only three SIG meetings. Many officials concluded that the committee was dead or dying. One possibly apocryphal story circulating at the time held that Katzenbach revived the SIG only after direct chiding by President Johnson.[17] Some observers assert that Katzenbach's failure to use it during his first year in office resulted from his desire to familiarize himself with State before venturing into the interagency arena, from his continuing responsibilities outside State, and from his mandate to explore other, possibly more effective means of managing foreign affairs. By this interpretation, only when Katzenbach was more in command of his job, and when it became clear that the NSAM 341 mechanism was the only available means for carrying out State's coordinating responsibilities, did his interest revive.[18]

During its last eighteen months of life, the SIG began finally to take up important, if not fundamental, problems. More than thirty meetings were conducted, fueled by Katzenbach's new support. A wide sweep of matters was considered: long-range policy guidelines, "threshold decisions" where timely SIG discussion might establish a sound base for future action, preparations for international negotiations, questions of management and personnel, legislative strategy, and specific country problems. Perhaps the most telling commentary on the SIG's importance, however, is that at no time during its existence did it deal with the fundamental foreign policy problem of its era — Viet Nam. Its major success was much more mundane — deciding reductions to be made in personnel stationed abroad by each government agency under the BALPA (BALance of PAyments) program of 1967-1968.[19] Although it was functioning somewhat as originally intended by the fall of 1968, its reputation had been irrevocably tarnished in General Taylor's eyes by its previous difficulties.[20] The new administration, interested in reviving the NSC, consigned the SIG to a secondary position as the Under Secretaries Committee.

---

[14] Interview with State Department official who worked under Ball during his tenure as Executive Chairman of the SIG, December 5, 1968.

[15] Ball's departure, long rumored because of his opposition to Viet Nam policy, was reported as early as May 12, 1966, in the *New York Times*. He actually left State in late September of that year.

[16] SIG Staff Study.

[17] John P. Leacacos, *Fires in the In-Basket: The ABC's of the State Department* (Cleveland, Ohio: World Publishing Company, 1968), p. 359.

[18] SIG Staff Study. Katzenbach's search for other means and ultimate failure to be able to use them are graphically detailed in Frederick C. Mosher and John E. Harr, *Programming Systems and Foreign Affairs Leadership* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 172-187.

The record of the IRG's was generally parallel to that of the SIG, although two of them (Latin America and Near East/South Asia) were relatively effective throughout the whole period.[21] Without strong support from the Secretary and in face of a weak SIG, however, these groups were handicapped in their efforts to solve problems finally and authoritatively. They too were transformed by the new administration, becoming Interdepartmental Groups (IG's) with memberships substantially the same but lacking Executive Chairman authority for the Assistant Secretary in charge, and with a study function rather than an operating one.

III

There are several obvious reasons why the NSAM 341 system failed so conclusively, although when introduced it had given "reason to believe that it can and will work effectively."[22]

First, General Taylor's intention to give the Secretary of State clear authority and the means to manage all foreign programs effectively was partially compromised even before NSAM 341 was announced. A potentially useful control device, a country-based programming system, had been considered but finally omitted.[23] Perhaps more important, the Secretary's role was weakened by limitations on this mandate. Operational military forces were explicitly excluded. Individual agency programs had to "affect significantly the overall U.S. program in a country or region" before they were subject to the Secretary's authority, but no significance criteria were given, leaving other parts of government room to argue for exclusion of their own activities. The phrase, "to the fullest extent permitted by law" in the grant of authority was added to the initial draft either to avoid the need for possible Congressional approval,[24] or in answer to carping from a suspicious Bureau of the Budget.[25] This provided additional grounds for contesting the Secretary's right to dominate the policymaking process.

---

[19] SIG Staff Study.

[20] Interview, General Maxwell D. Taylor, August 13, 1969.

[21] See Mosher and Harr, *op. cit.*, pp. 188-192, for details of the CASP (Country Analysis and Strategy Paper) Program which occupied much of the time of the IRG for Latin America, usually considered to have been the most successful of the five groups.

[22] Probert, *op. cit.*, p. 234.

[23] Mosher and Harr, *op. cit.*, pp. 122-128.

Second, support for the system was lacking. General Taylor decided he would hold the proposals closely until they had been approved. Even department heads were not given drafts to keep, in order to avoid leaks, nitpicking, and suggested modifications that would result from their circulation at subordinate levels. Taylor assured himself of Presidential support in at least two meetings, and a "super cabinet meeting," of some thirty-five or forty key individuals, was also held. The President asked each participant how he felt about the idea, "and of course everybody said it was okay," given what appeared to be evident Presidential desires.[26] Later developments showed, however, that successful efforts to forestall most initial opposition and pressures applied to gain acceptance of the new system could not substitute for continuing support to make the new arrangements work.

In practice, Secretary Rusk and President Johnson did not actively use the system. The Secretary thought too much time was taken up with meetings in government, and cast a skeptical eye on the six new committees. He preferred to use task forces and *ad hoc* groups to deal with major issues, and commented after leaving office that "it was just as well" that the SIG did not meet as often as originally intended.[27] A close relationship between SIG and Secretary failed to materialize, weakening the former — and perhaps the latter — appreciably.

President Johnson, for his part, continued to use the "Tuesday lunch" and other informal techniques for important decision-making. As a politician who had little feel for organizations because

[24] See note 20.

[25] Mosher and Harr, *op. cit.*, p. 126.

[26] Interview, Taylor task force member later associated with the SIG, January 8, 1969.

[27] Interview, former Secretary of State Dean Rusk, August 14, 1969.

"he dealt with people," he was disinclined to say "let the SIG handle this problem." While he accepted the NSAM 341 system as something that might be useful, he did not push it once it had been created. According to one close observer, "he was not indifferent, but had a lack of understanding" of what it might accomplish.[28]

In sum, the wisdom of designing a system in secret and imposing it upon skeptical bureaucracies is suspect. Since most of the line officials involved had not helped to design it, they had limited personal stakes in its success. When principal officials' lack of support calls into question their degree of commitment to new arrangements, and when there is no continuing effort to force these to work, it is not likely that they will be successful.

Failure of effective staff support for the SIG was a third weakness. Materials were seldom circulated early enough to allow completed staffing by individual agencies before meetings, and little effort was made to ensure compliance with SIG decisions.[29] These shortcomings resulted in part from the small size of the SIG staff (never more than four officers), and in part because all staffers were "users of words" from State rather than "manipulators of men" from throughout government. There were no contact men or expediters who could ferret out developing problems for early SIG attention and oversee execution of SIG directives. A larger, multi-agency staff had been intended, but the first staff director proceeded slowly, adding personnel only as specific jobs were defined. He also wished to avoid having "front office hatchetmen" interfering with the IRG level of the system and the Assistant Secretaries heading those groups.[30] There was certainly justification for this position, but the result was to deprive the SIG of the advantages of a strong and active staff that would be respected and perhaps feared throughout the bureaucracy.

A fourth weakness, related to the others, was the failure of the Executive Chairman idea to take root. Presiding officers at both IRG and SIG levels frequently lapsed or were pushed into pursuit of consensus, thus functioning as committee chairmen in Washington almost always did. State's general weakness, the lack of demonstrated top-level support, and a growing conviction in other agencies that the NSAM 341 system was basically an instrument of the State Department rather than of the whole

[28] Interview, former senior adviser to President Johnson, August 3, 1969.
[29] SIG Staff Study, corroborated by interviews.
[30] See note 26.

government all contributed to this. Executive Chairmen had little "clout" with which to impose their decisions on other departments. Even in State, the assumption was that they could not be assertive because, as one official argued, "the boys won't play the game if they feel they won't get a fair hearing in this court."[31] Since the Secretary of State was unwilling or unable to dominate his opposite numbers in developing policy, his subordinates could not do so.

IV

These difficulties might have been avoided had there been different individuals in critical positions and perhaps a different configuration of foreign policy problems. Other, more fundamental weaknesses, however, were probably inherent in the NSAM 341 concept. It may not be possible today to delegate major foreign policy decisions to interdepartmental committees at the Assistant Secretary and Under Secretary levels, or even to the Secretary of State. Both Presidential responsibility and issue criticality may mean that the "Tuesday lunch," some more structured White House equivalent, or the President alone with his legal pad will invariably dominate all major decisions. Any lower-level group would then play a supporting role at best, however well it operated.

Second, the NSAM 341 system was designed to strengthen the Secretary of State, but none of its formal elements involved him personally. His enhanced position was to be arrived at only indirectly, and consequently he and those at his level had little obvious stake in the system's success. It may be vital to ensure that the advantages to be gained and the responsibility for success of any reorganization are centered in the same individual (s), if its objectives are to be met.

Third, any reorganization that from the beginning is so plainly contrary to preferred decision-making styles of major actors, in both concept and practice, is likely to find its impact diminished and its lifetime short. Since President Johnson never made it clear that he expected the Secretary of Defense, the National Security Adviser or other powerful "chiefs"[32] to subordinate themselves to the direction of the Secretary of State, there was little reason for subordinates of these men to defer to lesser officials in State.

---

[31] Interview, Department of State Country Director, December 4, 1968.

[32] This term is used by Graham T. Allison in his Bureaucratic Politics model of the foreign policy process to mean the major actors in the process, designated by the positions they hold. They include the President, the Secretaries of State, Defense and Treasury, the CIA Director, the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs. Chiefs are distinguished from other participants — staffers, Indians, *ad hoc* players. See Graham T. Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), pp. 162-166.

Finally, any innovation that leaves entrenched bureaucracies basically unchanged is unlikely to achieve more than a fraction of what was intended, because of vested interests in the status quo. One of those who worked earnestly to develop the NSAM 341 system asserted later that a 25 per cent improvement in processes of foreign affairs management was all that could be expected. Even that proved to be impossible, given the handicaps confronting the few officials strongly committed to making the system work.[33]

V

All of these factors vitiated the ability of the SIG and the IRG's to make decisions. Their essential irrelevance was therefore compounded by a reluctance to refer problems to them. Not only did they act slowly, but meetings frequently deteriorated into briefing sessions for the principals, or at best into an opportunity for "exchanging views and creating a better idea of what we're trying to do."[34] Only in specialized circumstances were they seen as useful by working-level officials, for example in resolving disputes from lower levels among more than two agencies (if only two were in contention, it was said to be easier to work bilaterally and thus avoid kibitzing by those not directly involved). Even then, meetings were successful only when specific problems rather than general discussions were on the agenda. This limited usefulness was a far cry from early hopes that the NSAM 341 system would at long last gather the multiple strands of American foreign policy into one centrally controlled and efficient decision-making process. In the end, the modest contribution it made was not enough to convince the new administration that the allure of reviving the NSC system should be resisted. Yet another effort to reform the foreign policy machinery of government came quietly to an end, giving testimony once again to the obstacles inherent in such endeavors.

---

[33] See note 26.

[34] Interview, Department of State Country Director, January 14, 1969.

THE BRAZILIAN ECONOMY: TRENDS AND PROSPECTS

by M. S. Marzouk

BRAZIL may well become a major global power by the year 2000. Based on the country's recent phenomenal growth rates (9 to 11 per cent) and a GNP nearly 50 per cent higher than that of its nearest South American rival,[1] Brazilians have been acquiring an ever increasing sense of national pride and already view today's Brazil as the pre-eminent regional power on the South American continent.

Brazil's aspirations for enhanced international status are not to be fulfilled through military or political influence, however, but rather by economic strength. Government policy has been oriented toward economic goals and in the process has put aside political reform and return to democracy, at least for the immediate future. This strategy was designed by the military regime in pursuit of internal stability and international investment confidence. To that end, it was successful in creating a bureaucracy-free environment within which the technocrats, headed by Minister of Finance Delfim Neto, are able to exercise their discretionary powers over economic policies largely without political or institutional constraints.

The result is a phenomenal economic performance. The objective of the technocrats has been to make Brazil one of the world's great trading and financial centers through expansion and further diversification of production and the national market by populating the interior of the country. The Minister of Commerce and Industry has stated that "by the end of this decade, Brazil will be one of the world's major industrial countries and one of its largest food suppliers."[2] This might be an overstatement but it reflects the self-confidence Brazilians presently enjoy and confirms that their future power aspirations are based on economic strength rather than military or political influence.

The purpose of this article is to analyze recent Brazilian economic trends as they bear on the country's economic prospects for the 1970's. We will then evaluate the political implications of Brazil's dynamism and assess the extent to which economic strength will lead to her ascendancy as a major power.

---

[1] The 1970 Brazilian GNP in approximate U.S. dollar equivalent was $36.5 billion while that of Argentina was $23.4 billion. Source: *International Financial Statistics, 1972* (Washington: International Monetary Fund).

[2] *Miami Herald,* August 21, 1972.

ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE, 1966-1972[3]

Brazil is the fifth largest country in the world and the second largest in the Third World. It occupies an area nearly the size of the United States (including Alaska) and its territory extends over half of the South American continent.

Well endowed with natural resources, the country contains possibly the last major unpopulated frontier of the world, the tropical rain forest of the Amazon. This jungle represents 12 per cent of the world's timber resources. It is estimated that 100 million head of cattle roam the hinterland highlands (*sertao*) and the southern plains (pampas). Minerals and ores are as much a part of Brazilian economic history (the gold cycle, the diamond cycle) as tropical cash crops (sugar, rubber, coffee), and certainly will continue to be an important element in the growth of future years. The recent effort to survey Brazil systematically is already bearing fruit. The iron ore deposits of the Carajas Mountains have doubled the estimated reserves of the country, which already were the largest and of the highest quality in the world. At present, the only minerals of strategic economic importance that Brazil lacks are petroleum, coal and copper. The national state-monopoly company PETROBRAS is conducting intensive oil search and exploration activities both abroad and in many parts of the country and even on the continental shelf, but so far it has not succeeded in filling the gap between demand and domestic production of crude oil.

The extension of Brazilian territorial waters to 200 miles off the coast considerably increased the potential wealth of the country, with a bonus from "fishing rights" already beginning to pay dividends.

In 1973 the Brazilian population passed the mark of 100 million and is expected to double by the turn of the century[4] — despite a declining birth rate, now at 2.9 per cent growth per year. This large population, which makes Brazil the eighth most populous country in the world, constitutes an expanding market with a fast rising per capita income. Also, the quality of the population, in health and education, is improving. Life expectancy now stands at sixty-five years. Investments at the rate of 5 per cent of GNP in literacy programs such as MOBRAL and in the schooling system as a whole should bring about the eradication of illiteracy. In some sectors — particularly the traditional fields of engineering and law — the number of graduates produced by Brazilian universities is adequate for present needs. In others, like agronomy, medicine and the newer technologies, there are immense shortages.

---

[3] Unless otherwise indicated, the statistical data are from the Statistical Appendix of the World Bank (IBRD) study of Brazil, entitled *Current Economic Position and Prospects of Brazil,* Vol. II, November 1971, and the CIAP (Inter-American Committee for the Alliance for Progress) study entitled *Domestic Efforts and the Need for External Financing for the Development of Brazil,* June 1972. The 1972 statistics have been obtained from the International Monetary Fund.

[4] Based on a 1970 population of 93.2 million and a growth rate of 2.89 per cent throughout 1960-1970. IBRD study, *op. cit.*

Over the period 1966-1971, Brazil's economic progress was remarkable. The rate of growth of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) averaged 8.5 per cent per annum in real terms. In 1971 the growth rate was more than 11 per cent, and in 1972 it was estimated to remain high at 10.4 per cent. Since population meanwhile rose by about 3 per cent, the net result was an average annual per capita growth rate of approximately 5.5 per cent. This is attributable to massive industrialization and growth in urban production. While the share of agricultural output in GDP declined from 23 per cent in 1967 to 20 per cent in 1971, the share of industrial and tertiary sectors increased from 32.2 and 44.4 per cent to 35 and 45 per cent, respectively.

Spectacular growth in the output of consumer durable goods, in manufactured exports, and in import substitution of capital and intermediate goods contributed greatly to the evolution and dynamism of the industrial sector, which grew at an annual rate of over 10 per cent during the period. Production expanded markedly in a wide range of industries: for example, motor vehicles and their components, steel and metal working, and the manufacturing of machinery and equipment. In the more traditional sector, special mention should be made of the construction industry: it provides more than one million new jobs yearly as it attempts to fulfill the housing needs of the growing Brazilian population. The country's infrastructure has kept pace with this expansion; notable progress has been made in hydroelectric power generation, petroleum refining and transportation.

Despite the dynamic growth of manufacturing, agriculture continued to play a key role in the economy by providing low-cost foodstuffs and industrial inputs, and a considerable exportable surplus. The annual rate of increase of total agricultural production rose from 1.5 per cent in 1968 to approximately 6 per cent in 1971. This was accomplished mostly by increased cultivation of Brazil's vast land area, continued expansion of the "frontier" in northern and western Brazil, the greater productivity that resulted from mechanization, the more intensive use of fertilizers (agricultural credit is available for fertilizer purchases almost interest free), and the government's price support mechanism which assures farmers of a minimum income.

Reduction of the inflation rate from 89 per cent in 1963-1964 to 28.4 per cent in 1966-1967 and to an average of 20 per cent in 1969-1971 is an extraordinary achievement of the Brazilian government. It is estimated that the inflation rate in 1972 ranged from 17.7 per cent (Wholesale Index) to 16.4 per cent (Rio Cost of Living Index). The improvement was effected through a massive program aimed at eliminating excess demand via reduction of fiscal deficits, deceleration of monetary expansion, credit curtailment and subjection of wages and profits to direct controls.

Gross fixed capital formation as a percentage of GDP increased from 14.3 per cent in 1967 to 18 per cent in 1970 and 21 per cent in 1971 and 1972 and has grown at an average rate of 14 per cent per annum. Private investment — encouraged by massive credit facilities — accounted for 75 per cent of the total and was concentrated mostly in manufacturing and construction. The public sector claimed the remaining 25 per cent, mostly in key industries and infrastructure. Also, as a result of the economic boom and liberalization of restrictions on foreign remittances, there was a marked increase in direct foreign investment in Brazil.

Exports as a percentage of GDP increased from 7.2 per cent in 1967 to an average of 8.1 per cent in 1970-1971, and were expected to comprise 7.8 per cent of GDP in 1972. Exports have grown at an average rate of 18 per cent per annum. The largest absolute gain was made by coffee exports, followed by iron ore and some primary products such as beef and corn. Most significantly, exports of manufactured products accounted for about 23 per cent of the increase in sales abroad and were mounting at an average of 85 per cent per annum. This testifies that Brazil is acquiring a competitive position in manufactured products in the world market.

Imports as a percentage of GDP increased also, from 7.4 per cent in 1967 to an average of 9.5 per cent in 1970-1971, and were estimated to amount to 8.2 per cent of GDP in 1972. Imports have grown at the average rate of 17 per cent per annum. About one-half of the increase can be explained by greater purchases of capital goods, which as a share in total imports rose from 31 per cent in 1967 to close to 40 per cent in 1971. The share of imports of intermediate products likewise increased, from 33.9 per cent to 37.4 per cent, while that of consumer goods and petroleum products fell from 10.6 and 8.9 per cent to 8.6 and 6.9 per cent, respectively.

Although surpluses on commodity accounts have been registered, net service and factor payments have been increasingly negative. This has induced Brazil to make a great effort in shipbuilding and the expansion of trading companies. The required amortization of medium- and long-term debt led to a 1970 current account deficit of $622 million, a 1971 deficit of close to $1.3 billion and a 1972 estimated record deficit of $1.462 billion. This, however, was offset by larger capital inflows, particularly medium- and long-term, and financial credits. The external debt is considered to be a major financial burden that Brazil will have to carry for some time to come — one that will undoubtedly influence her ability to sustain high growth rates.

Over the period 1967-1970, as a result of the rapid economic growth, job creation seems to have been well in excess of labor force growth, for the unemployment rate dropped from 3.7 per cent in 1968 to 2.4 per cent in 1970.[5] Employment creation has been concentrated primarily in the commercial and services sectors and to a lesser extent in the agricultural sector. Industrial sector employment increased very little, chiefly due to the utilization of modern capital intensive, rather than labor intensive, technology. Although unemployment is relatively low, underemployment seems to be the problem. Recent surveys indicate that the number of employed persons working forty hours per week or more has risen from 74 per cent to only 79 per cent of the total.

Brazil's impressive growth does conceal a basic structural weakness — the inequality in income distribution. The structure of production is a dual one wherein modern techniques coexist with traditional methods. Since industrialization has been accomplished by the adoption of modern techniques, the incomes of those connected with the modern sector have increased while the traditional sector's income has not kept pace and may even have decreased in per capita terms. This situation widens wage differentials and further intensifies the inequality in income distribution. The high-income concentration apparently revealed by the 1970 census engendered a lively debate. The Gini coefficient of income distribution seems to have moved from 0.48 in 1960 to 0.56 for 1970.[6] Could this trend become a constraint on the steep growth process suggested by the preceding analysis? Or is this a reflection of the fast growth rate itself, necessarily accompanying it because of the nature of modern technology, as Delfim Neto has argued? The fact is that definite answers cannot yet be given. The coefficients for 1960 and 1970 are not comparable, for census methods and income classifications differed in each case. The latter survey was done far more carefully. However, even this one considered only the money income of working individuals. It did not correct for regional cost-of-living differences, did not compute rent for home owners, and did not include self-production of goods in individuals' income.

---

[5] These employment statistics are based on sample household survey data covering most of Brazil. The study was conducted by the Brazilian Geographical and Statistical Institute (IBGE) in 1968, 1969 and 1970.

ECONOMIC POLICIES LEADING TO THE BOOM

The process of industrialization began in Brazil as a consequence of the collapse of world trade in the 1930's. World War II strengthened the trend toward an autarkic economy. Thus, the industrial growth witnessed in the 1950's, behind one of the world's highest effective tariff walls, was the result of past trends, a worsening of trade positions, a shortage of "hard currencies," and the popular policy prescription of the time, "import-substitution."

Demand for goods and services was kept high by a spendthrift government, by householders who preferred to consume rather than see their savings shrink owing to inflation, and by business firms, whose profits were increasingly based on speculation with inventories.

This industrialization process, coupled with prevailing exchange-rate legislation, favored: (1) the transfer of income and wealth from wage earners and export-farmers to the entrepreneurs; (2) the substitution of capital intensive technology and machinery for labor and labor intensive technology; (3) the operation of enterprises notwithstanding economies of scale, managerial competence and financial structure; and (4) increased price distortion. Just as in 1930 the collapse of coffee exports provoked the ascension of Vargas to power, so the industrialization scheme of the 1950's crumbled and permitted the military to take power in 1964.

[6] Mario H. Simonsen, *Brazil 2002* (Rio de Janeiro: APEC-Block, 1972).

The new government, advised by Roberto Campos as Minister of Planning, had as its top priority the reduction of inflation. The objective was to eliminate inflation in the shortest time possible. Three types of measures were employed: government budget balancing, which avoided expenditures and consequently reduced the money supply; a wage freeze; and credit curtailment to avoid the speculative expansion of business.

The results of these measures were quite dramatic — Campos' policies are often referred to as "shock therapy." The reduction in spending was brought about by removing subsidies on wheat, newsprint and petroleum imports, rationalizing operations of the railroads and other government-controlled enterprises, and placing a ceiling on expenditures of government ministries. The increase in revenue was accomplished by increasing corporate and personal income taxes, taxing the appreciation of fixed company assets resulting from increases in the general price level, imposing a 3 per cent payroll tax, increasing federal excise taxes by as much as 30 per cent, and finally, improving tax collections. Consequently, the cash deficit of the central government was reduced from the equivalent of 4.3 per cent of GDP in 1963 to .4 per cent in 1970, .3 per cent in 1971 and .17 per cent in 1972.

The years between 1964 and 1967 were years of reorganization. Within the government, politicians were replaced by young executives, later called "technocrats" because many had their training in engineering, business administration and economics. Budgeting limitations suddenly became more important to government agencies, as well as to business. The introduction of "monetary correction" of assets, liabilities, interest and dividends once again allowed one to calculate break-even points.

On the international scene, the government unified and stabilized exchange rates and improved the trade position. Measures included elimination of import subsidies on wheat, newsprint and petroleum and the removal of special exchange rates for exports of sugar, coffee and crude oil. Meanwhile, it encouraged manufactured exports by providing subsidies in the form of tax credits averaging in value some 15 per cent of respective export prices. In addition, a policy of frequent mini-devaluations has contributed greatly to the Brazilian external position, particularly by stabilizing trade prices and removing incentives for speculative operations. The government has also undertaken policies to encourage foreign private investment via liberalization of restrictions on profit remittances of foreign enterprises.

The Costa e Silva Government, which took office in 1967, felt that inflation had reached a tolerable level. To avoid stretching the recession of the previous years and risking possible popular discontent, the new Minister of Finance (Delfim Neto) reviewed government priorities and policies. The result was a policy granting incentives for the expansion of industrial and agricultural production.

The main objective of the incomes policy in the preceding government had been to check the wage push on costs and prices and break the wage price spiral. This was effected through measures such as a government review of demands for increased wages, government authority to forbid strikes in support of unwarranted wage demands, and the prohibition of strikes by government workers. Wage adjustments in the private sector were limited to once a year and were geared to adjustment coefficients to be applied by labor courts in resolving wage disputes. Money wages lagged behind inflation rates, resulting in reduction in real wages. Late in 1967, in order to remedy this regressive wage policy, the government modified the wage adjustment coefficients to yield increased real wages in accordance with productivity gains and at the same time imposed direct controls on profits.

Monetary management had the objective of making credit available to the productive sectors without triggering demand inflation or depleting external liquidity. The Brazilian financial structure has been modified in such a way that inflation — within 18 to 20 per cent — does not significantly alter the financial system's ability to mobilize savings and channel them to needed investment. Aids to this end were reforms such as monetary correction of debt par value, regular mini-devaluations of the cruzeiro, incentives for savings through the equities market, and rationalization of the interest rate structure.

A salient feature of the new monetary policy was the system of interest rate subsidization made available by the Central Bank and the Bank of Brazil. Finance for interest rate subsidization is provided by the non-interest-bearing deposits of the public sector agencies and the commercial banks. Principal beneficiaries are the agricultural sector, relatively impoverished regions such as the Northeast, and some dynamic subsectors such as manufactured export goods industries.

Other selective policy measures were adopted. For agriculture the government promoted an adequate support price system. The system is made effective largely through the allocation of production credits in amounts based on the support price, permitting the producer to sell under favorable circumstances. In industry the goal was to build an integrated industrial base to attain maximum forward and backward linkages and thus maximize national industrial value added. Public investment was raised substantially and, in order to control inflation, tax and credit reliefs were granted to producers who made efforts to restrain price increases. Notable among the government's social programs were those related to the alleviation of regional income disparities. Federal tax sharing — implemented on the basis of a tax formula involving a reverse relationship with per capita income in local jurisdiction — has funded a large part of public fixed investment in the Northeast.

The Médici Government took office in 1970 in an atmosphere of economic optimism. Retaining Delfim Neto in the cabinet signaled the continuation of basic policies. At the same time, the new government's priorities reflect a tendency to aim farther into the future, since short-run difficulties have largely been solved. The four main goals may be summarized as follows: (1) maximize growth of GNP irrespective of externalities; (2) unite the country physically (by means of the National Integration Plan — including the Trans-Amazon Highway), economically (by raising the standard of living of the Northeast), socially and culturally (by improving the social infrastructure and the communications network); (3) lead the country into new technological fields (petrochemicals, computers, aircraft) and research (nuclear, marine, space); and (4) take a constructive role in international affairs.

Summing up, the Brazilian economic boom in the late 1960's came about as a result of a well-prepared menu of policy measures. The reduction in fiscal deficits — through increased revenue and spending cuts — eased the pressure on inflationary currency emissions. That, along with an effective wage control policy and better management of the money supply, released the upward pressure on prices. Less inflationary pressures and reduction in relative price distortions encouraged higher savings propensities and created a more favorable growth milieu. Domestic savings increased from 14 per cent of GDP in 1967 to an average 17 per cent during 1968-1971, of which 75 per cent was created in the private sector and mixed enterprises. Expansion in credit facilities (partially dependent on external finance) while increasing external debt helped to meet the credit needs of an ambitious private sector and promoted industrial growth. The index of loans/money supply increased from 0.70 in 1966 to 1.08 in 1971, avoiding liquidity problems for business but keeping up some inflationary pressures. Careful mini-devaluations, along with export promotion policies and import subsidies curtailment, provided substantial improvement in the Brazilian foreign trade balance and increased foreign reserves necessary to finance growth.

FUTURE PROSPECTS

In order to ascertain the potential growth path of the Brazilian economy in the 1970's, alternative econometric projections made by independent studies will be compared. Special emphasis will be placed on the long-term implications of the IBRD forecasts[7] and the Brazilian government's projections included in its 1972-1974 plan.[8]

We will basically concentrate on the growth prerequisites (savings, investment, exports, external finance) of two hypothetical real (after allowing for inflation) GDP growth rates, namely 7.5 per cent and 8.5 per cent per annum. An assessment of Brazil's ability to satisfy those requirements will then allow us to draw conclusions about the likely path of Brazilian growth.

At the outset, two basic assumptions will be made. First, the incremental capital output ratio throughout the 1970's is assumed by the IBRD to be 2.5. This assumption is not unrealistic in view of the considerable variations in historical capital output ratio in Brazil: 2.3 in 1950-1960, 3.95 in 1960-1965 and 2.09 in 1965-1970. It should be noted, however, that the Brazilian government assumes the ratio to be 2.1 in its 1972-1974 plan. This will undoubtedly lead to different implications as to capital formation requirements to support certain GDP growth rates.

Second, merchandise exports will be assumed to grow at the annual rate of 10.8 per cent throughout the 1970's. This is justifiable in view of the positive effects of the government's export promotion policies and greater exports of minerals, manufactured products and nontraditional staples. The 10.8 per cent growth rate is composed of 30.4 per cent growth in manufactured products, 26.2 per cent in processed agricultural products, 16.8 per cent in mineral products, .5 per cent in main agricultural products, 11.2 per cent in other exports — while coffee exports are expected to drop at the rate of 1.2 per cent a year. The Brazilian plan cites a more optimistic exports projection at a rate close to 13 per cent per annum throughout the 1970's, composed of a .7 per cent growth rate in coffee exports, 4.7 per cent in main agricultural products, 18.2 per cent in main minerals, 31.5 per cent in processed agriculture, 33.5 per cent in manufactured exports and 15.5 per cent in other exports.

---

[7] See IBRD study, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 117.

[8] *First National Plan of Economic and Social Development 1972-1974,* September 1971. See CIAP: *Provisional Conclusions and Recommendations, Country Review of Brazil,* June 1972.

We should point out that although Brazil achieved growth rates of between 8 and 9 per cent per annum in the late 1960's, at least part of this performance was attributable to the availability of excess industrial capacity. In the 1970's growth will depend on the expansion of productive capacity and the complementary social and economic infrastructure.

A growth rate of 7.5 per cent in real GDP during the 1970's — composed of 4.6 per cent in agriculture, 9.5 per cent in industry and 6.9 per cent in services — would require an annual growth rate in investment of 8.3 per cent. Most of the required investments would have to be financed by domestic savings, which would have to grow at the rate of 9.5 per cent per annum. A 7.5 per cent real GDP growth rate will lead merchandise imports to grow at a 9.3 per cent rate, which is less than the assumed export growth rate. This would ease the pressure on external liquidity and thus, to cover capital income payments and debt amortization, would require a gross medium- and long-term loan capital inflow at the average rate of only $1.1 billion annually. Assuming that official lending agency disbursements average about $600 million a year — the current trend in agency support — and that Brazil secures supplier finance for about one-third of her capital goods imports, this requirement could be covered without relying on any additional increase of financial credits above net foreign reserves after 1971. A 7.5 per cent real GDP growth rate is therefore unlikely to encounter any major external liquidity constraints.

A growth rate of 8.5 per cent in real GDP during the 1970's — composed of 5.6 per cent in agriculture, 11 per cent in industry, and 7.6 per cent in services — would require an annual growth rate in investment of 12 per cent. In this projection savings will have to grow at the rate of 11.8 per cent. Due to the Brazilian high import demand elasticity, an 8.5 per cent real GDP growth rate will lead merchandise imports to grow at the rate of 11.6 per cent, which is high compared with the assumed annual export growth rate of 10.8 per cent. The rapid expansion of industrial capacity at 8.5 per cent GDP growth rate will require substantial importation of capital goods not presently produced in Brazil. While there is scope for import substitution in the case of some industrial imports, such as chemicals, petroleum and wheat will pose special problems. In the case of petroleum, higher world prices resulting from renegotiation of contracts by producer states in the Middle East will increase the unit cost of Brazil's crude petroleum imports by about 25 per cent. An import growth rate of 11.6 per cent (higher than the export growth rate of 10.8 per cent) would therefore expose Brazil to external liquidity problems and would raise the required medium- and long-term loan capital inflow to an average of $1.5 billion per annum. This would impose a heavy burden on Brazil's external debt management capacity unless external lenders were to provide liberal credit support.

Assuming that inflation will be contained within the range of 15 to 20 per cent per annum, and that the moderate export outlook (the 10.8 per cent annual growth rate) materializes, what is Brazil's potential to meet the requirements of mobilizing a savings growth rate of 11.8 per cent and an investment growth rate of 12 per cent to secure an 8.5 per cent real GDP growth rate which will lead imports to grow at the rate of 11.6 per cent? The answer to this question seems to be in the external liquidity constraint. Let us first examine Brazil's ability to generate the required savings and investment rates.

As to savings, private sector savings propensity has been markedly increased and will continue so, assuming that the stability in relative prices and savings and the investment incentives provided by the government are maintained. Substantial improvement in the efficiency of the commercial banking system and of the domestic share and debenture market has been witnessed. The public sector is mobilizing substantial savings through the federal budget and extra budgetary funds as well as through the operations of public enterprises. Public savings are expected to increase at an annual rate of almost 12 per cent and will provide more than half the total savings required for the economy.

As to investment, the 12 per cent annual investment growth rate needed to support an 8.5 per cent real GDP growth rate is not unreasonable. Public sector fixed investment is expected to increase at the average annual rate of 9.5 per cent, while indirect (or financial) public sector investment will increase by as much as 14.1 per cent annually. Together, public sector direct and indirect investment would make up roughly 70 per cent of the required total investment, much the same percentage of total investment as public sector agencies have financed over the past three years. Moreover, the fiscal incentives for exports are expected to make production for export sufficiently profitable that the need to expand capacity for export will of itself provide a major motive for investment.

If we accept that imports will grow at a rate of 11.6 per cent, what external liquidity problems are likely to be faced? Given an 8.5 per cent GDP growth rate and the above imports growth rate, the annual average gross capital inflow of $1.5 billion will be difficult to mobilize. Although external savings (resource gap) would finance only about 5 per cent of Brazil's investment, the needed capital inflow will be much larger than external savings because of having to meet the service on existing and future external debt. There is strong evidence that Brazil will be able to mobilize supplier finance to cover one-third of her capital goods imports.[9] This, while filling her residual external finance gap (the gap after presently contemplated official loan disbursements) at a 7.5 per cent growth rate, would leave an annual $217 million financing requirement to be met at an 8.5 per cent growth rate. If this gap is not filled by a substantial increase in official agency lending, the balance will have to be provided by either drawing down reserves absolutely or increasing financial credits without offsetting increases in reserves. The latter is the more likely outcome. If we assume, therefore, that official lending agencies can fill the gap, or that exports will grow at the optimistic rate of 13 per cent per annum, an 8.5 per cent growth rate throughout the 1970's is feasible.

The Brazilian government feels differently about this. Assuming a capital output ratio of 2:1 (as mentioned in the government plan), it hopes to achieve a real GDP growth rate of 9 per cent, which will require a 12 per cent annual growth rate in investment. The growth rate in exports should be close to 13 per cent through higher exports of manufactured products, minerals and nontraditional agricultural items such as soybeans, corn and beef. Imports are expected to grow at a little more than 9 per cent through import substitution policies and the encouragement of agricultural sector growth. The government claims that through its wide range of monetary, fiscal, income and exchange policy instruments it can achieve the highest growth rate while constraining inflation from accelerating or external liquidity from

[9] This is because of the confidence she now enjoys in international financial circles. See IBRD projections, *op. cit.*, p. 117, and CIAP projections, *op. cit.*, p. 96.

deteriorating. In regard to the latter, it will not permit its external debt service burden to rise above manageable levels, nor will it rely to any significant extent on financial credits to finance foreign exchange requirements. The intention is to maintain an appropriate relationship between financial credits and reserves. It is clear that the government's assurance of achieving the 9 per cent growth rate without external liquidity problems differs from the World Bank projections in two particulars: the government makes its projections, first, at a more optimistic export growth rate and, second, at a lower capital output ratio.

Taking adequate account of all the above considerations, a 9 per cent GDP growth rate — while not impossible — is unlikely, in view of the external liquidity constraint. A 7.5 per cent GDP growth rate is feasible and not likely to encounter major internal or external constraints. Keeping the government objectives in mind and considering the 9 per cent growth rate to be our upper limit and a 7.5 per cent rate to be the lower limit — and assuming that exports will grow at rates of between 11 and 12 per cent — it is reasonable to say that an 8 to 8.5 per cent real GDP growth rate can be expected throughout the 1970's in Brazil.

POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS

Social, economic, institutional and political attributes characterize Brazil as a "leader" in South America. Among her neighbors, she has the richest natural resources, the largest population, the biggest territory, the highest GNP and the most powerful armed forces. With her recent miraculous economic performance and an expected real GDP growth rate of 8.5 per cent over the next decade, she appears to have the basic economic qualifications to perpetuate her growing role as a major power in the continent. Although nearly all socio-economic groups and political factions in Brazil seem to subscribe to the nation's increased international stature, it is being pursued in a "low profile" manner in order not to provoke a hostile reaction from neighboring states.

The healthy economic performance in recent years is largely due to excellent policies selected by the government and the climate of cooperation between the public and private sectors. While the military holds power in matters of internal security and defense, it shares policy decisions in the socio-economic sphere with a highly competent team of technocrats who enjoy a great deal of autonomy in the management of the economy. The government has thus been successful in establishing a coalition of technocrats, the domestic and foreign business elites, and the major factions within the military. The result is a relatively stable political environment eliciting internal and external confidence, which is highly conducive to Brazil's growth and development. Based on its economic achievements, the military regime has been successful for the most part in "legitimizing" the present political order, although it has left open the question of a return to democracy after Brazil has been sufficiently developed.

Apart from purely economic considerations, two internal variables will influence the continuation of Brazil's economic "miracle" in the 1970's: political stability and social reform. The present regime's success in maintaining internal stability depends on the extent to which the military will continue to sustain the autonomy of the technocrats in managing the economy and the possibility that the military leadership may be challenged by dissatisfied military factions. On the grounds of its increased "legitimacy" and economic success, the regime is not likely to dilute the technocrats' autonomy. "Legitimacy" and economic success will also minimize the likelihood of the leadership being challenged by present or potential dissident groups from within the military during the 1970's. In the long run, however, this will not suffice to prevent dissension arising from emerging political groups demanding greater participation.

On the social front, the government will need to ensure a wider and more equitable distribution of growth benefits, improve the quality of human life through more accessible education and health care, and lessen regional disparities. This will be required in order to secure the stability of the present political order and promote adequate growth of the internal market.

In conclusion, Brazil seems to have the internal economic and political prerequisites to consolidate her position as a major power in South America. A role for her as a major power on the world scene depends on a number of factors, including: (1) Brazilian foreign policy profiles toward Spanish-speaking South American neighbors and the extent to which they will be willing to acquiesce in Brazilian leadership; (2) Brazilian foreign policy stances toward the superpowers, especially the United States, and the extent to which the latter will encourage Brazil's emergence as a major power; and (3) the access afforded Brazil in an evolving multipolar order in which Japan, China and the European Economic Community are themselves seeking greater international recognition.

Reviews

From Superiority to Sub-Parity*

by Colin S. Gray

Historically curious readers may care to be reminded that *parity,* in common with other current vogue terms, has been around before. To be specific, those commentators who argued in the 1920's and 1930's that parity was a strategically meaningless term were every bit as correct as are today's analysts who argue that parity is—in effect—the last resort of the strategic scoundrel. A condition of rough parity, constrained asymmetrically by an interim SALT agreement, is held by many to be good enough for the United States. Good enough for what? is the question contemporary analyses of the strategic balance suggest to this reviewer.

The two authors considered here enjoy very different doctrinal affiliations. Neither offers a systematic exploration of the driving factors behind the nuclear arms race, although Harland Moulton does suggest that "inexorable technology" (p. 11), uncertainty (pp. 280-281), and "the myth" that there is some political or military utility in a superiority in nuclear weapons (p. 310) are prominent arms race villains. Benson Adams —in a study with a narrow focus—properly eschews sweeping analyses of arms race behavior, but he is to be found vigorously asserting the political utility of strategic appearances (p. 12, fn. 6; p. 168, fn. 1).

Both works express concern with the political and military utilities of nuclear weapons, though neither begins to provide a case adequate for the support of the opinions expressed. This matters scarcely at all for Adams, because his book is devoted entirely to a detailed, historical account of policymaking on the question of BMD. The author's attitudes toward the international political meaning of it all are affixed largely in a few footnotes, which the reader may take or not as he chooses. In other words, Adams' conviction that it is better to be first rather than second in weaponry does not intrude upon his analysis of BMD history in any way likely to detract from the value of the analysis for those readers who disagree with him. As much cannot be claimed for Moulton.

The title of Adams' book truly reflects the subject matter, *Ballistic Missile Defense*. With rare and —in this case—salutary "tunnel vision," he tells the story and analyzes the choices from 1945 until Safeguard attained the status of

---

**From Superiority to Parity: The United States and the Strategic Arms Race, 1961-1971*. By Harland B. Moulton. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1973. 333 pp. $12.00.

Ballistic Missile Defense. By Benson D. Adams. New York: American Elsevier, 1971. 274 pp. $12.50.

a SALT "bargaining chip." Moulton aspired to a more general wisdom. The subtitle of *From Superiority to Parity* informs us that we are going to read about *The United States and the Strategic Arms Race, 1961-1971.*

The natural hostility of outraged authors notwithstanding, it is possible for a reviewer to place his doctrinal and/or policy disagreements with a writer into a "holding pattern," while the book is appraised on its own terms. For example, no matter how fundamentally a reader may disapprove of BMD and all its works, a close reading of Adams cannot but improve his level of knowledge. Hawk or dove, defensive emphasizer, minimum deterrer or full counterforce adherent — here is probably more about BMD than you want to know. Finding value in Moulton is a far more onerous —and ultimately unsuccessful— task. *From Superiority to Parity,* alas, purveys no new information, nor does it analyze familiar information in a novel way.

In a book purporting to analyze the strategic arms race from 1961 to 1971, we find that pages 45 to 246 comprise a rather bland exegesis of McNamara's military posture presentations before Congressional committees. This somewhat tedious centerpiece is bounded by chapters that canter through political and military events from 1945 to 1960 (Chapter 1) and offer an interpretative gallop through the strategic topography of 1945 to 1965 (Chapter 7). Needless to say, much repetition is visited upon us. Finally, the book begins to catch fire in the last chapter, which addresses the policy issues of BMD, MIRV and SALT in the 1970-1971 period. Chapters 1 to 7 having been devoted essentially to 1961-1965 (with two forays back to 1945), the reader is a little put out at being plunged, with no serious attempt to fill the 1966-1970 gap, into contemporary controversies.

These negative comments are structural in character, made without prejudice to the sense or otherwise of Moulton's substantive opinions. They would stand even had this reviewer totally endorsed Moulton's views on the lack of benefits attendant upon competitive strategic endeavor. The contrast with Adams could hardly be greater. Whereas Moulton strains to expand from his parish of 1961-1965 so as to offer interpretative comment on the entire postwar period, Adams exercises a self-discipline that is admirable yet a little frustrating. His only substantial deviation from telling the BMD story is to present the doctrinal bases of the growing opposition to BMD deployment (Chapter 8). He does not allow himself to employ his massively competent BMD analysis as a platform from which he could pronounce upon the totality of the United States' military posture. The few "wider" statements in the book tend to be presented as personal asides in footnotes and are not permitted to muddy the text. (See p. 170, fn. 4.)

There is no need to speculate as to Moulton's policy message. As early as page 11 we are instructed as follows: "Confidence in the efficacy of nuclear deterrence in meeting the challenge of new weapons technology grew slowly during the postwar period, successfully surmounted crises of confidence, and apparently has convinced the two superpowers that continuing to pursue military advantage in arms race is both futile and not worth the formidable price."

Later on we find that the momentum of Soviet offensive force improvements is to be explained as "efforts merely to stay abreast of major United States force improvements" (p. 301; also see p. 286). The author makes quite explicit his adherence to the notion that Soviet leaders accept American mutual assured destruction reasoning and see the benefits of a strategic balance characterizable as one in a state of parity. More to the point, we are told that "there is no firm evidence as of mid-1971 to indicate that the Soviet Union is in quest of a strategic capability in excess of parity . . . ." (p. 312.)

Statements of that type are best described as honest but misleading. After all, what evidence would Moulton accept as being "firm" enough for him to write, say, an article repudiating the views expressed in his book? We are all hard to convince of the validity of contrary propositions. Given the variety of ways in which the strategic balance may be assessed, and given his firm opinions concerning the political and military inutility of being "ahead" or "behind" in strategic armaments, Moulton's judgments as to Soviet motivations really reflect nothing more than his own premises.

Despite their pronouncements on the political (in)utility of strategic weaponry—in opposite directions—neither author approaches the matter with much care. This is particularly unfortunate with respect to Moulton, since his book is supposed to be charting the United States' relative decline from predominance. What are alleged to be the benefits of superiority? Unless this question is squarely faced, it is difficult to see how an author is qualified to discuss the hazards or otherwise of parity. Elsewhere, I have commented at length on the reasons that drive political leaders to endorse arms racing activity;[1] Moulton denies—at least implicitly, since he does not ask the more fundamental questions—the validity (if not the existence) of most of them and the *positive* dimensions to many of them. In other words, his state actors seem to be racing defensively to prevent various dimly perceived and most unlikely events from occurring. This is really the arms controller's view of the world—strategic men scampering to hedge against some of the consequences of their ignorance, impelled by an "inexorable technology," and bedeviled by fear and misunderstanding. Add to this model a most grave concern for the metaphysics of putative action-reaction chains (pp. 280-281), and you have virtually an ideal type of the genus of analysis that misconstrues Soviet behavior.

---

[1] "The Urge to Compete: Rationales for Arms Racing," *World Politics*, January 1974, pp. 207-233.

In part, of course, Moulton is correct. The future is unknown (we cannot photograph nonexistent ICBM silos), there are follow-on imperatives with regard to individual weapon systems for traditional service missions, and each superpower will not be indifferent to the activities of the other. What he misses is the arms race as purposive foreign policy behavior. To rephrase a question posed earlier, what are strategic weapons for?

They are not, I suggest, to be seen most usefully within an analytical framework bounded by the twin procrustean pillars of assured destruction and damage limitation. Rather they are to be seen as instruments of superpower diplomacy. With their analytical fixation upon "busting cities" or decimating the Soviet ICBM force, many American arms controllers are guilty of a form of reductionism that is only superficially sophisticated. In fact, much *rigorous strategic analysis* is profoundly unworldly. Among the reasons why strategic studies have no future as a quasi-independent discipline is the truth that most important strategic questions have to be answered with reference to criteria extending far beyond the *military strategic*. As some Soviet commentators have not been slow to indicate, there is often a curious unidimensionality to American thought. To Soviet political leaders there are no strictly military-technical questions. Moulton's notion that it is a myth "that superiority in nuclear weapons and delivery systems conveys to the possessor meaningful political or military leverage" (p. 310) would be worthy of little more than contemptuous dismissal were it not held so widely.

Suffice it to say that in the eyes of attentive publics, worldwide, the state of the strategic balance is the single most prominent index of the rise and fall of superpower fortunes. Thanks to the endeavors of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, the U.S. government and *Aviation Week and Space Technology,* the Soviet Union need not even conduct its own strategic public relations. However they are assessed, strategic weapons lend weight to their possessor's diplomacy, in peace, crisis and war. Rather than being prisoners of the mutual assured destruction credo, Americans would profit from the development of large and flexible strategic forces that would reduce the damage American society might otherwise suffer in some contingencies, that would offer some not-incredible first-use options in support of a European security system incapable, in the short to medium term, of providing anywhere near an adequate intraregional military balance—and so on. In brief, the future offers so many possible dangers that it is irresponsible to vulgarize strategic debate by posing a false alternative between assured destruction and counterforce strategies.

Moulton's book *should* be useful, for his extensive presentation of the "controlled nuclear response" debates of 1961 to 1965 finds more than a vague echo in some of the commentaries catalyzed by Secretary of Defense Schlesinger's announcement of a targeting shift to more flexible options (on January 10, 1974). However, 1974 is not 1961, and Schlesinger is not talking about a counterforce or damage limitation strategy, properly so called; he is prescribing a strategic equivalency for diplomatic balance, not advocating the attainment of a capability adequate for the forcible disarmament of the Soviet Union.

It is only fair to observe that Moulton's book was apparently substantially completed by mid-1971. Hence, the author might well wish to alter some of his judgments were he writing today. Nonetheless it seems not unfair to comment that he, in common with most 1960's-style arms controllers, has led himself astray by his denial of that very political incentive to arms racing that must be unequivocal to Soviet leaders, by his commitment to the cause of arms control, and by his identification of the "deadly . . . arms race." Why "deadly?" Moulton seems to assume that his readers will grant the deadliness of arms racing, so there is no need for him to substantiate the implications of his adjective. John Newhouse—who certainly shares most items of Moulton's strategic credo—offers far more sophisticated comment on assured destruction and arms race dynamics than Moulton does, despite his much more limited mandate (SALT only).[2]

Where you sit determines how you view the world. From where Moulton has sat (ACDA) and does sit (the National War College), it may well seem that the world is populated overwhelmingly by those who believe strategic superiority is politically and militarily meaningful. Whereas, to this reviewer, moving far less in official circles, the world seems to be populated by too many Moultons: men convinced that Soviet strategic programs are largely reactive in character and defensive and apolitical in motivation. One must note that Moulton's analysis of SALT issues has not fared well with the passage of time. Contrary to the implications of his comments on MIRV deployment (pp. 298, 305-306), it is now apparent that the Soviet Union was totally uninterested in banning MIRV's. The reasons for this stance bore (and bear) not merely on the hoary old issue of intrusive on-site inspection, nor even on the question of the extant American qualitative lead—rather they bore on the medium-term advantage Soviet leaders must have seen in the marriage of their enormous missile throw-weights to MIRV technology.

It seems reasonably clear to this writer that much of U.S. policy and strategic theoretical writing over the past decade has been quite inadequate. This judgment, however, implies no meanness to the men responsible. Particularly appropriate are the following comments offered by Benson Adams: "McNamara's attempt to control the arms race was a heroic one and only history will judge the correctness of his position. If he can be faulted, it was that he believed too long, in the face of overwhelming evidence, that the Soviets accepted his view of security and his rationale for structuring strategic forces and held a common interest with the United States in toning down the arms race." (p. 172.)

---

[2] *Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973), pp. 266 and 268 respectively.

With regard to the ABM, it would seem that SALT I was a giant step in the wrong direction. Doctrinal rigidities in the United States have ensured that the defensive track of strategic forces is now fairly securely blocked. Between them, Adams and Moulton (see pp. 298-299 of the latter book for useful comment) demonstrate both the shallowness of much of the anti-BMD critique and the powerful political and ideological-strategic doctrinal forces that eventually were to lobotomize BMD prospects. Particularly valuable is Adams' analysis of the 1965-1967 period, in which he proved—at least to my satisfaction—that the United States might today have some useful urban BMD if only McNamara had not been obsessed with hypothetical (and probably misunderstood) "arms race consequences." In connection with BMD, the best was the enemy of the good. By the time the technology was clearly ready, so were the scientific critics, so were limited attentive publics eager to seize upon the ABM as a symbol of the iniquity of the military-industrial complex, and so were the arms controllers, confident—for all their ignorance—that they knew how best to negotiate at SALT.

It may be harsh to say so, but America's dedicated arms controllers have endorsed the emergence of an era of strategic sub-parity. Unless the United States is willing to fund missiles of much greater throw-weight, she will have to endure a strategic context marked by a vast, unfavorable asymmetry both in counterforce capability and in countervalue capability. The political consequences of strategic imbalance are already with us. The Israeli offensive on the west bank of the Suez Canal was prematurely constrained by a U.S. government that chose to believe in the "extended deterrent" writ issued by the Soviet Union. I would be only too pleased were Moulton *et al.* to be proved correct, but I am convinced that strategic sub-parity leads to political accommodation or, more dangerously, that the strategically superior power will act as though its demands will be accommodated.

REPORTING ON WORLD AFFAIRS: THE MEMOIRS OF ISAAC DON LEVINE*

by Eugene H. Methvin

Today it is hard to believe we are a nation whose Secretary of State a few decades back shut down his code room with the comment that "gentlemen do not read each other's mail." Or to realize that we once housed our entire State, Navy and War Departments in the Victorian office building

---

**Eyewitness to History: Memoirs and Reflections of a Foreign Correspondent for Half a Century.* By Isaac Don Levine. New York: Hawthorn Books, 1973. 305 pp. $10.00.

next to the White House which now can hold only a tiny fraction of the executive offices. (Or that this same edifice of erstwhile innocence more recently housed the conniving leaders of the Watergate burglar squad.)

The nation did not make so vast a leap easily. Once we were so innocent we had to have many of the facts of modern life such as revolutionary terrorism and upheavals explained to us. And one of the leading explicators has been Isaac Don Levine, who was uniquely fitted for the role by his own vast leap across cultures and traditions. His memoirs of a brilliant journalistic career are aptly titled *Eyewitness to History.*

In 1911 at the age of eighteen Levine journeyed from the Ukrainian town of Mozyr on the Dnieper to Kansas City on the Missouri. He came from a town whose most famous native had participated in the 1881 assassination of Czar-Liberator Alexander II. Seized by the revolutionary fever in his early teens, he attended secret forest meetings of socialist revolutionary groups, and marched in protest demonstrations carrying (because he was the youngest) a basket of concealed revolvers, in case of trouble with the Cossacks. At the university in Kiev, he was tutored by a graduate student who had once attempted to assassinate a Czarist instigator of pogroms. Uncharacteristically, his tutor was a mild and civil fellow, no prototype of twentieth-century assassins, who disabused his worshipful pupil of any idolatrous belief in an Olympian elite of human infallibles. One morning Levine was startled to hear himself saying out loud, "There are no supermen." He was thus vaccinated against modern myopias and well prepared to launch upon a career as an international correspondent in a century of such major and minor actors as Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin, Mussolini, Hitler, Castro, Alger Hiss, Whittaker Chambers and Lee Harvey Oswald.

Levine taught Hebrew while attending a Kansas City high school to perfect his own English, and did a journalistic apprenticeship on the *Kansas City Star* before moving to the journalistic Big Apple, New York. Then, just in time for the 1917 upheavals in Russia, this Americanizing, Russian-speaking young writer walked into the city room of the *New York Tribune*—and onto front pages all over the world.

A newly-arrived traveler from St. Petersburg came in one day shortly after the February Revolution with a sheaf of Russian handbills. He had spent days peddling them to other newspapers, but no one on their staffs could read Russian. They turned out to be the official news bulletins published during the revolution when all the papers were shut down—the first authoritative inside account. Levine scooped the world with his series. Within weeks he was *the* authoritative commentator on Russian affairs. Circulation trucks all over the city bore his picture and posters: "Isaac Don Levine on Events in Russia!"

His meteor flared dazzlingly. As the only fluent Russian-speaking

American journalist who could also produce front-page copy, he became a magnet for all sorts of emigré politicos in the large New York Russian community, who became invaluable contacts and sources. He was soon contributing to Wilson's famed Fourteen Points, via background memos to a twenty-eight-year-old *New Republic* editor-turned-War Department aide, Walter Lippmann. Early in 1919 Levine secured an assignment from the *Chicago Daily News* to go to Russia, then under a total Allied blockade. He wangled letters from Lenin's unofficial diplomats in New York, and by sheer *chutzpah* on a bridge at the Finnish frontier, leaped the blockade to become the only bourgeois reporter inside the new USSR.

His first story was a global scoop: Petrograd was not wild with raging mobs of anti-Bolsheviks, and Lenin's regime was not about to fall, as all the outside world then believed. (For telling it like it was, Levine was roundly denounced as a Bolshevik sympathizer or worse.) He soon found himself on Red Army Commissar Trotsky's famed armored train, dashing from front to front in the civil war, and his appraisal of the morale of Trotsky's troops enabled him to forecast correctly—in face of universal expectation to the contrary—that Kolchak and other White forces would never take Petrograd and Moscow.

We can be thankful that Levine's apprenticeship on American newspapers was too brief to inculcate in him the occupational notion that anything more than twenty-four hours old is not "news" and maybe did not even happen. He took advantage of the Bolsheviks' own fear that Kolchak was about to seize Petrograd to gain access to secret Czarist archives, on the theory that the Whites would probably quickly suppress and destroy them. With a derring-do that prompted one Bolshevik to suggest he would have made a great clandestine operator, Levine thus was able to smuggle out of Russia a suitcase full of historical and journalistic sensations. He had copies of the "Willie-Nicky" letters between the Czar and the Kaiser from 1894 to August 1914, and the Czarina's pitiable diary continuing right up to the day she and her husband and children were slaughtered in Ekaterinburg on Lenin's order. This treasure trove, too, he turned into front-page news copy.

For six months in the crucial civil war year of 1919, Levine was the only foreign correspondent in Russia. He was then twenty-six years old, thoroughly conditioned by his seven American years with a love of democracy, and carrying a passionate dream of a free and democratic Russia. On this and later trips he watched the tragic unfolding of Lenin's Bolshevik dictatorship, the shock of Kronstadt, the defeat of Trotsky and triumph of Stalinism. (He wrote the first full-length biographies in English of both Lenin and Stalin.) Covering the diplomatic front, he was at the Lausanne Peace Conference in November 1922 when another of Lenin's progeny, Mussolini, made his debut. And as Stalin's purge after the 1934 Kirov assassination produced a fallout of terrified Soviet agents fleeing death sentences, Levine began to pick them up and report their stories from the inside of the terror.

He "debriefed" such Stalinist agents as General Walter Krivitsky, the chief of the Stalin *apparat* in Western Europe, and an obscure character named Whittaker Chambers. When the Stalin-Hitler pact plunged Europe into World War II, Levine persuaded both men to tell what they knew of Stalinist agents remaining in place. Krivitsky made a trip to London and was able to identify one extremely important agent in the code room of the British Cabinet and a number of others. Unfortunately, on his return to America he became careless in his personal contacts, with the result that he was murdered in a Washington hotel room, undoubtedly by Stalin's secret police.

With Chambers, Levine had less luck. He conveyed his information to President Roosevelt's appointments secretary, and was referred to one of FDR's most trusted brain-trusters, Adolf Berle. Levine, Chambers and Berle dined together the evening after Hitler's invasion of Poland. The other two men listened in rapt astonishment as Chambers outlined the operations of two Soviet undercover rings in Washington, described his firsthand involvement, and named six State Department officials who had knowingly given secret data to Soviet agents, himself included. (Alger Hiss and his brother, then in minor positions, were listed but not singled out; Chambers had no "vendetta" against Hiss, as was later charged.) He also named Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Harry Dexter White, whom Berle knew well. "I cannot believe it!" Berle exclaimed, evoking from Chambers an explanation of the nature of totalitarian espionage, which prizes policy sabotage far more than routine military blueprints. Berle wrote a lengthy memo of Chambers' revelations, but tragically, Roosevelt dismissed it: "Oh forget it, Adolf."

Levine carefully notes that the telephone directory of the President's party in the American delegation at Yalta ranks the Hiss phone as No. 4, separated only by two names from No. 1, and topping such others as General George C. Marshall, Admiral Ernest J. King, Secretary of State Edward Stettinius, Ambassador W. Averell Harriman, James Byrnes and Harry Hopkins. By his own admission, Hiss had a large share in framing the Yalta pact, which Levine brands as "an infamous betrayal." Levine's rendering of Hiss's ultimate downfall, and his own role in it, is an illuminating new account of that oft-told tale.

Levine also devotes chapters to his investigations into Soviet subversive efforts in Iran and an attempt to assassinate the Shah; and into the background of Lee Harvey Oswald, killer of President Kennedy at Dallas. His is the most revealing concise analysis of Oswald yet published.

Especially fascinating to me was Levine's evaluation of character, ranging from such figures as Trotsky to Richard Nixon, Whittaker Chambers to Lee Harvey Oswald, Mussolini to Joe McCarthy. He has a fine attunement for the psychological nuances. This he demonstrated impressively in his visit to Iran to interview the young Maoist leader whose followers had attempted to assassinate the Shah. Levine found in him the prototype of the brilliant young intellectual who gets wrapped up in the Marxist mythology, plunges into the revolutionary frenzy—but is too bright to fail to find the contradictions and to come out some day on the side of realism, given a fortuitous break or two. Levine recommended clemency, and the Iranians, impressed with his background and knowledge of the "mind of the assassin," commuted the death sentence. "Give him five years for study and reflection, and he will develop into a superior political figure," Levine had said. Precisely five years later, the young activist-intellectual issued a renunciation of his violent revolutionary beliefs. "Don't repeat my error," he advised his erstwhile followers, urging them to return home to "shoulder the responsibility for advancing progressive objectives" in Iran's peaceful evolution.

Levine's last chapter, surveying the Sino-Soviet conflict and the Moscow-Washington-Peking "tilt-a-whirl" President Nixon set spinning with his 1972 opening to China, delivers a bucket of cold water for the rosier commentators and those who applauded Nixon's bold initiatives. We must remember that Levine published his book before Soviet behavior prior to and during the 1973 War of Atonement knocked some of the bloom off "détente," and before Watergate washed away much of Nixon's support. When Levine wrote, he was being rather unfashionable—a trait that has marked his long and lustrous career.

"The revolutionary creed began to trouble me very early," he says, "and after my experiences in Soviet Russia, I arrived at the heretical view that violent revolution was a barrier to progress and a giant step backward in the march of history. . . . The social revolution unleashed by Lenin opened an unbridgeable gap in the human family which no amount of nostalgic crying for One World can close. It is inconceivable, for example, that any czar in modern history would have prevented a Nobel Prize winner for literature from traveling abroad to receive his honors—and from returning to his homeland—as has happened in the cases of Boris Pasternak and Alexander Solzhenitsyn. There is simply no substratum on which a structure of peace can be built among the Big Three nuclear powers except transient expediency covered by the rhetorical formula of coexistence. There is instead a manifestly irreconcilable ideological conflict between the free and totalitarian worlds." (pp. 273, 282-283.)

Given this world view, we should hardly be surprised to find Levine sternly critical of the Nixon policy toward both Peking and Moscow. The record shows, he declares, that Nixon worked hard over three years to wangle his invitation to Peking and made at least fifteen significant concessions to Mao to win his good will. Levine lists them, and pronounces the Presidential visit to Peking "in itself a triumph for Mao's dictatorship."

The SALT I agreement gave Moscow the right to build its submarine fleet to one-and-one-half times the present U.S. undersea strength, ensuring future escalation in the arms race in the fantastically expensive nuclear submarine category. Moreover, that agreement quickly entailed the Brandt government's nonaggression pact with Moscow and Warsaw, ratifying provisional postwar boundaries in Eastern Europe and giving Moscow a goal sought for a quarter-century—and "the Kremlin did not even have to agree to remove the Berlin Wall in return for that trophy." (p. 281.) Interwoven in the sensational Nixon summitry "is the process of a nascent Japanese-Chinese entente in Asia and of an embryonic Russo-German rapprochement in Europe. The seeds of both developments, buried deep in the subsoil of history, have never withered. Should they be allowed to sprout, they would be bound to augment alarmingly the colossal burden of the arms race, which the United States must of necessity carry." (p. 283.)

In short, from Levine's experience of fifty-five years with totalitarian regimes of all hues, the "appeasement at the summit" practiced by President Nixon "leaves little doubt that in the West the arms race is again about to leap upward to critical dimensions." (p. 282.)

The one opening out of this irreconcilable global conflict Levine sees for the United States would be to follow "a policy which would allow the feud between China and Russia to run its course and develop its own momentum." (p. 273.)

In 1964 Levine traveled to Hong Kong to interview 594 Russians expelled from the embattled Sino-Soviet border zone in Sinkiang. These people had spent decades in China. While Levine was there Mao threw down the gauntlet to Moscow, laying claim publicly to the enormous areas Russia had obtained from China. From the interviews Levine gained a fascinating picture of the Chinese development in Sinkiang—mines, roads, the Lop Nor nuclear plant. He sees this Central Asian zone as the likely cockpit for an imperialist-revanchist struggle between the two Asian giants. And he thinks we should get out of the way and let them at it.

As an uncommonly perceptive and scholarly reporter of the twentieth-century "world civil war" between totalitarian terrorists and democratic reformers, Isaac Don Levine exploited his unique transcultural background to the hilt. As an international journalist of the first rank, he helped millions to comprehend our age. Now his memoirs add brilliantly to that understanding. I have rarely read so magnificent a moral statement and analysis as the letter he wrote in 1934 to Albert Einstein, whose collaboration he had secured in earlier condemnations of Stalinist atrocities. Einstein declined to join such figures as John Dewey, Clarence Darrow and Upton Sinclair in condemning Stalin for a new summary slaughter of sixty-six persons in retaliation for Kirov's death. Einstein's excuse was a tragic display of moral confusion—that it would distract public attention from Hitler's persecution of the Jews in Germany. Levine answered: "The modern phenomenon of the state becoming an instrument of social hatred, as exemplified under the Nazis, is the consequence of the Bolshevist successful experiment in organizing hatred against all classes except the proletariat, a small minority in Russia. Hitler's anti-Semitism is patterned after the Bolshevist state persecution of all elements the social origin of which is nonproletarian.

"The only known effective weapon against such hatred and oppression is the Anglo-Saxon system of justice, theoretically the only classless system of justice yet devised. In practice, it has been frequently abused. In theory, it remains unexcelled. It is the shield of civilization and has been the salvation of the Jew in the Western world." (p. 173.)

THE CHANGING PROSPECTS OF EUROPEAN UNIFICATION*

by Werner J. Feld

Gerhard Mally's *The European Community in Perspective* is an ambitious effort to bring together in one volume a summarization of various theoretical concepts regarding the process of regional integration, a description and evaluation of the European Community and its progress toward political unity, and an assessment of the status of Atlantic relations. Mally has been largely successful in accomplishing this triple task, and the results are found concisely presented in 253 pages of text, not including several appendices of useful information.

In the first two chapters of the study the contemporary international system is analyzed and different theories on regional integration are expressed in summary form. The author's own "Gestalt" model is presented, a model characterized by a large number of variables and a list of propositions about integration and disintegration. Chapters 3 to 6 examine the internal and external dynamics of the Community with special attention paid to "federators" and "inhibitors," actors impelling or impeding progress in European unification, as well as catalysts for integration and disintegration. The former are structural and functional changes in the European Parliament, the hoped-for adoption of a Community-wide "European company statute," the intensification of cross-national communications, and "Eurosocialization," meaning primarily the education of a new generation of "genuine" Europeans. The catalysts for disintegration are considered to be the resilience of the nation-state, transcommunal interdependencies with

---

**The European Community in Perspective: The New Europe, the United States and the World.* By Gerhard Mally. Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1973. 253 pp. $12.50.

the United States, and global systemic constraints such as the pursuit of Germany's Eastern policy.

The impact of external relations upon the internal development of the Community flowing from enlargement and associations with third countries is also examined in these four chapters. Speculation regarding the political structure of a new Europe is the main topic of Chapter 7, and Chapter 8 focuses on the present and future role of a unifying Europe in its relationship with the United States and more generally with the world. The last two chapters offer a partial application of the author's Gestalt model to his findings and examine the prospects for the future.

While I would like to single out for special praise the summarization of major integration theories which is particularly helpful to students and instructors offering courses in international regionalism, it is somewhat disappointing that the author did not test more fully his own Gestalt paradigm. He admits this but believes an apparent "positive correlation" exists "between the original proposition of the 'Gestalt model' about the integration-disintegration syndrome and the actual performance of the European Community." (p. 237.) Clearly, these propositions, while generally plausible, need intensive testing that might refine some of the Gestalt variables. Moreover, they open up a wide field for empirical research.

Favorable mention must also go to Chapter 6, which provides an excellent, concise exposition of Britain's tortuous road to Community membership. The book as a whole draws together important historical, political and strategic background material that assists the reader in better understanding the complex experiment in regional integration which the European Community constitutes. However, Mally appears to lean somewhat too much to the optimistic side when evaluating progress toward political unification of the Six—and now the Nine. The many programs of the Commission in various functional fields, including those for economic and monetary union, seem to be represented as close to realization, whereas past experience and political realities in the member governments should raise all sorts of caution flags as to when or if these programs will actually materialize. Even were they implemented, the budget power of the European Parliament, to take only one example, would be woefully weak and it is not at all certain that the grant of the new, still limited budget authority would be the starting point for the Parliament's enhanced strength. The author's optimism is also reflected in his reference to direct elections of members of the European Parliament in Germany. (p. 130.) While the first reading of a bill to this effect in 1972 showed a favorable vote, ultimately the bill was not adopted and as of this writing no member of the European Parliament is elected directly.

There is no doubt that the mass public opinion polls taken in the Community over the last fifteen years and reproduced extensively in Mally's book (pp. 152, 153, 207) suggest increasing support for political unification except in Britain and Denmark. Moreover, these polls appear to indicate greater support by the young (up to thirty-four years) than the older generation. Several caveats are in order, however, when interpreting these data. First, it is doubtful that the mass public is really knowledgeable about European affairs. Tests have shown that the more detailed the question about European unification, the smaller the support for political integration.[1] Second, many of the young, especially in the universities, distrust the Brussels technocracy and EC institutional framework which they label as undemocratic and a "trust of the large corporations." As Mally points out, the Socialist youth is especially disenchanted. (p. 159.) Third, policy is not made by the mass public, but by those elites who have their hands on the levers of national power.

Detailed interviews of 164 national parliamentarians and upper-rank civil servants in the nine Community countries, undertaken by this reviewer in the first half of 1973, suggest that political integration is a diffuse ideal espoused by many of the respondents, but that for the majority it offers neither personal-material, nor electoral-partisan, nor institutional-prestige rewards. In the short run, at least, political integration is not perceived by the influential elites as providing utilitarian value, added votes, or increased status for legislators or civil servants. At the same time, public opinion on this issue is not regarded as breathing down their neck and the judgment of most of them is not influenced by it to any degree. The upshot is that these important elites have little real incentive to push the levers of power they control toward promoting unification, regardless of the pro-integrationist statements of leaders such as former Chancellor Brandt and former Italian Premier Moro. Perhaps James Rosenau is closest to the truth when he states that despite the growing interdependence of world affairs and the emergence of new supranational political entities, the nation-state system, with all its accompanying conflicts and procedures, is likely to persist undiminished. (Cited in Mally, p. 246.)

Notwithstanding these observations and discounting an occasional factual error—for example, the Council is not required to vote unanimously to reject a Commission proposal, as contended on p. 70; it simply does not vote in favor[2] —Mally's book is a valuable contribution to the literature on regional integration and transatlantic relations.

---

[1] See Jacques-Rene Rabier, "The European Idea and National Public Opinion," *Government and Opposition,* April-July 1969, pp. 443-454, and Rabier, "L'Europe est bien vue par les Europeens," *European Community,* February 1974, p. 3. See also Rabier, "Europeans and the Unification of Europe," in Ghita Ionescu, *The New Politics of European Integration* (New York: Macmillan, 1972), pp. 153-177, and Ronald Inglehart, "Public Opinion and Regional Integration," *International Organization,* Autumn 1970, pp. 764-795.

[2] It is amendment of a proposal that requires unanimous Council vote (Article 149, EEC Treaty).

Tito's Victory, 1941-1945*

by Andrew Gyorgy

The Embattled Mountain and *Tito, Mihailovic and the Allies* are worthy products of a historically significant second wave of monographs dealing with wartime and early postwar Yugoslavia. The first round produced a spate of studies within five to eight years after the full establishment of Tito's regime, as a sort of hurried appraisal of the communist takeover in Yugoslavia. Subsequently, in reaffirmation of the premise that it takes historians twenty-five to thirty years to place the world's politically important events and developments in proper perspective, new scholarly works began to appear in the early 1970's offering invaluable hindsights of the cataclysmic 1941-1945 period in Yugoslav political life.

The books by Deakin and Roberts complement each other felicitously. While the first author, a distinguished British historian and recently retired Warden of St. Antony's College at Oxford University, offers a deep *vertical* slice and a set of specific incidents in Tito's liberation struggle, the latter, an experienced American foreign service officer and retired Associate Director of USIA, reviews a rich *horizontal* five-year segment of Balkan geopolitics. Both studies will prove invaluable for future historians: their judicious combination of varied personal experiences in the field with a scholarly re-creation of the broader East-Central European political scenery will make them "required reading" for specialists and students alike. In their differing methodological and personal styles, Deakin and Roberts both devote themselves to the dissection of the same mysterious phenomenon, namely, the often heroic, often defeatist and frequently tragic fluctuation of Yugoslavia's resistance struggle during World War II.

The Embattled Mountain, in particular, is an eyewitness story of the utterly disunited front or, more aptly, the mounting and irreversible civil war between Tito's Partisans and Mihailovic's Cetniks. The formless battles waged around the epic mountain of Durmitor, primarily during the crucial years of 1943-1944, help to clarify and explain the causes and extent of Mihailovic's collaboration with the Axis, as well as the final break between the Cetniks and the Allies. But the book also paints a dramatic picture of Tito and his immediate entourage, the structure of the Yugoslav Partisan forces, and the emerging military and political patterns of organization. As a member of the first team of British officers parachuted to the highlands of Montenegro in May 1943 to establish a liaison force with Tito's headquarters, Professor (then Captain) Deakin draws on memories forming part and parcel

---

**The Embattled Mountain.* By F. W. Deakin. New York: Oxford University Press, 1971. 284 pp. $15.00.

Tito, Mihailovic and the Allies, 1941-1945. By Walter R. Roberts. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1973. 406 pp. $9.50.

of a microscopic perspective, while Walter Roberts offers the reader a truly macroscopic sweep of the same series of events.

The transitional and varied stages of this drama are highlighted in Roberts's book by the sequence of four major chapter headings: "The Beginnings of Resistance," "Mihailovic — Allied Hero," "Civil War," and "Tito— Allied Hero." Within this framework he concentrates on the interplay of three major, and often tactically incalculable, forces: the ferocity of the Nazi armies in pursuing and tracking down members of the Partisan resistance; the eternal wavering of the Cetniks and Mihailovic's administrative inability to weld his supporters into an effective fighting force, and—last but not least—the overriding ideological fact of the entire 1941-1945 period (well summarized on p. 47): "Yugoslavia was divided internally, and most of the nationalities of which the country was composed resented the Serbian hegemony. *There were no 'all-Yugoslav' political parties except one: the illegal Communist Party.*" (Emphasis added.)

By way of a valuable cross-referencing of the two books, Roberts summarizes the Deakin mission to Tito (pp. 117-118), and properly credits its intelligence as furnishing early but instrumental arguments in turning the Allies' supportive, logistical backing from the Cetniks to the Partisans. The terse remark by the leaders of the Anglo-American Middle East Defense Command that "the Partisans are now the most formidable anti-Axis element in Yugoslavia and our support of them is therefore logical and necessary" (p. 118), is a clear-cut prelude to the rapid emergence of Tito as the undisputed leader of Yugoslavia's successful liberation. At the proper moment in his analysis, Roberts shifts from military targets to political-ideological priorities. The long story of how noncommunist elements within the Partisan movement had gradually become communists during the war; how others saw in postwar communism the lesser evil compared with a return to the *status quo ante bellum,* while yet others simply decided to make the best of a dim and hated prospect (the fear of violent retributions against those who had opposed the Partisans) is ably and dispassionately discussed in *Tito, Mihailovic and the Allies.* (See Chapter 12, pp. 275-295, especially pp. 294-295.)

Within the confines of these broad historical perspectives, each book has a number of illuminating highlights which should not be ignored by either reviewer or reader. Viewing first *The Embattled Mountain,* the turning of the tide from a vast initial German preponderance to the Partisans' strategic and guerrilla-style superiority is succinctly portrayed in a "from-beginning-to-end" sequence. The first battle in which Captain Deakin participated is described as a fanatic engagement by some 20,000 men to outmaneuver more than 100,000 elite German SS and Alpine troops, "equipped with heavy weapons and mountain artillery, supported by fighter and light bomber aircraft." (pp. 95-96.) After an often devastating and occasionally triumphant series of skirmishes in the vicinity of embattled Durmitor, with Allied military help beginning to assert itself and following the Italian surrender of September 1943, the last phase of victory is depicted by the author in the following terms: ". . . the striking power of the Partisan forces was increased to a point which gave them effective superiority throughout Yugoslav territory. . . . " (p. 242.) In a sense, both Deakin's original mission and subsequent scholarly reporting culminate in the arrival of Brigadier General Maclean's mission to Tito in September 1943. The presence of this senior official at least implicitly marked the de facto recognition of the Yugoslav National Liberation Army as a major military force fulfilling a decisive role in Southeast European politics. (See Epilogue, especially pp. 242-268.)

As an experienced diplomat, Walter Roberts has an intuitive feeling for broad-brush political concepts and operational factors. This reviewer was particularly impressed by his recurring emphasis on the Soviet-British and, to a lesser extent, Soviet-U.S. negotiating stances concerning the "spheres of influence" or "percentage deal" debates in the Balkans. The fifty-fifty application to Yugoslavia of the original Stalin-Churchill agreement of October 1944 (first discussed on pp. 240-243 and followed up on pp. 266-270) is objectively presented, including even Marshal Tito's reaction as the leader of the target-country in these superpower deliberations. When Tito learned about the Soviet-British understanding to "go fifty-fifty about Yugoslavia," he apparently was both annoyed and pleased; "annoyed that it was reached behind his back, yet *pleased that neither the West nor the East laid sole claim to postwar Yugoslavia.*" (p. 267, emphasis added.)

Unlike Deakin, whose acquaintance with Mihailovic was incidental and knowledge of the Cetniks rather limited, Roberts offers detailed and cogent comparisons between the Partisans and Mihailovic's followers. A brief Epilogue stresses four principal differences between Tito and the Cetnik leader: in personality, ambition, actual policies and military programs. Tito was by far the stronger personality, with a much wider range of ambitions; his allegiance was to the Soviet Union as the world leader of communism, while militarily he preached direct and dynamic guerrilla-action against the external enemy. Mihailovic, less pretentious both in personality and ambition, was politically content to visualize a mere return to the prewar royalist status quo. Worst of all, although hostile to the Germans and Italians, he allowed himself "to drift into a policy of accommodation with both in the face of what . . . [he] . . . considered the greater danger." (p. 322.) This complete misreading of the strategic facts of life in occupied and war-torn Yugoslavia was the undoing of Mihailovic and the Cetniks. His epitaph is the comment he made at his postwar war-crimes trial describing himself as a man who "wanted much . . . began much, but the gale of the world swept away me and my work." (p. 321.)

If the concept of *negative* highlights is meaningful at all, the overwhelming impression emerging from both books is that American foreign-policymakers had relegated East-Central Europe in general, and Yugoslavia in particular, to a peripheral and unimportant role in world politics, "remote from U.S. interests and not central to Allied military operations." (Roberts, p. 323.) What compounded this error in strategic calculations was that while Great Britain and the Soviet Union shifted gears from a military to a political dimension relatively early in the game (certainly by 1944), President Roosevelt and his top military advisers concentrated exclusively on a rapid termination of the European war so that U.S. might could be shifted to the unfinished war in the Pacific.

This lack of American concern during the most crucial phase of the international political decision-making process proved fatal in the long run to several East European countries, although—in all fairness —it did not directly affect Yugoslavia's postwar fortunes. There was an atmosphere of inevitability in the political emergence and ideological predominance of Tito and his communist regime, an aura of truly historic "predestination" which can best be traced back to the convulsive wartime events ably analyzed by these authors.

THE PUBLIC CAREER OF ADOLF A. BERLE*

by Willard Barber

At the outset it should be noted that more than fifty years of Adolf A. Berle's intermittent, varied and brilliant contributions to American foreign policy are spanned in *Navigating the Rapids,* which its author and editors candidly state is neither a biography nor a history. It is, rather, an account in Dr. Berle's own words "of his adventures, whether academic, political, economic, international, or familial." He was a man of many parts: practicing lawyer; professor at Columbia University; organizer and leader of the Liberal Party in New York; friend, adviser and admirer of Franklin Roosevelt, John Kennedy and Nelson Rockefeller; political activist-reformer; government administrator; diplomat and negotiator. He was also in his many-faceted life (1895-1971) the co-author, with Gardner Means, of *The Modern Corporation and Private Property,* which became a classic in its field and required reading for scholars of economics and of law. An indefatigable traveler, he lectured in foreign countries in various languages. During all of his adult life he was a devoted Latin Americanist. Scarcely mentioned in the present book was his quiet private role as philanthropist.

It is eminently fitting that supervision over the choice of Berle's

---

**Navigating the Rapids: 1918-1971. From the Papers of Adolf A. Berle.* Edited by Beatrice Bishop Berle and Travis Beal Jacobs. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1973. 859 pp. $18.50.

papers to be published should have devolved in great measure upon his wife, Beatrice Bishop Berle. Educated at Vassar and the Sorbonne, Mrs. Berle obtained a medical degree after her marriage in 1927 and the couple combined their talents in complementary professional activities as she taught and practiced in hospitals and clinics in this country and abroad (when her husband was Ambassador to Brazil). Hard choices were necessary to reduce Berle's diary file to one-fifth its extent in order to fit it in a single lengthy volume. Among the materials that had to be shelved were drafts of speeches for public officials and details of political or diplomatic negotiations. (Mrs. Berle corrected and rewrote her spouse's draft of Governor Roosevelt's speech at the Commonwealth Club of San Francisco, September 23, 1932.)

The title for the published diary, *Navigating the Rapids,* came from one of Berle's frequent letters to FDR during the latter's first term: ". . . so far the brain trust rides high; but I have a vague feeling that the rapids are near and require some careful shooting." (p. ix.) His communications to the White House were uniformly addressed to "Dear Caesar," and a postscript to one letter in 1934 stated: "Caesar, of course, is historically accurate. A supreme power, elective, subject to Senate and people." (p. 94.) Later, however, fearful that the salutation might be discovered by the press, Berle ended its use. In this period, Dr. Berle served as Special Counsel for the Reconstruction Finance Corporation in Washington; then as Chamberlain of the City of New York, during Mayor La Guardia's administration.

A diary entry in 1937, assuming that FDR would not seek a third term, was revealing: "I think the Roosevelt administration is making heavy weather and is going to make worse, for everything devolves into a mess of trouble . . . . the last couple of years of the regime will be very bitter bread to eat." (p. 148.) Of a conversation with the President regarding an offer that he become Assistant Secretary of State, Berle wrote: "I pointed out that what State wanted was not a third Assistant Secretary; they want to plant a Brain Truster in the White House; after spending a year to get Raymond Moley out, they want to put another Raymond Moley back . . . . The President said it was the President himself who put Moley out. But he thought that State needed a Brain Truster. Hull was magnificent in principle but timid; Sumner [Welles] was fundamentally a 'career man'." (p. 151.)

When the appointment was announced, Berle lamented: "Washington is the last place in the world any sensible person would like to be in. It is a good deal of a sewer just now . . . . I am sick at heart about this Washington business . . . . I wish we could work out some way of being safe from [sniping] by colleagues . . . . the poisonous atmosphere in Washington is appalling." (pp. 161-163.) Having taken office, he remarked that "about half [of the State Department] is following a Wilsonian moral line which in my judgment would lead eventually to our entry into a war on the British side . . . . As nearly as I can make out the nice people have declared war already." (p. 169.) (This in March 1938, some forty-five months prior to Congress' declaration of war against Japan.)

Many years later, in an evaluation of FDR, Berle expressed his views on the necessities of political leadership. "The parting of the two men [FDR and Rexford Tugwell] was, I think, inevitable. A Statesman, or if you choose, a politician, necessarily practices the art of the possible during his term of office. When compelled to leave aside great and sound visions with which he agrees, and with them their chief advocates, the politician is neither deserting a friend nor betraying a principle. He is merely practicing his profession, as he is bound to do . . . . When the Brain Trust was organized FDR said to me, and he meant it for the whole group, 'Don't mix in politics—it is unpleasant, sometimes a dirty business. Leave that to me.' " (p. 114.) Berle was no less candid in assessing the New York delegation to the Democratic Convention in 1952: ". . . they are politicians, and many of them crooks, and are therefore tolerant." (p. 604.)

While Berle was in the State Department from 1938 through 1944, an unhappy relationship developed with his fellow Assistant Secretary, Dean Acheson. This together with the widely known antagonisms between Secretary Cordell Hull and Under Secretary Sumner Welles, which Berle tried valiantly but in vain to reduce, justified the diarist's forebodings about life and work in Washington. Despite his sympathetic interest in Latin America, his rapport with Presidents Figueres of Costa Rica and Betancourt of Venezuela and with Governor Muñoz Marin of Puerto Rico, his attendance as a member of the U.S. delegation at conferences in Buenos Aires, Lima and Havana, and his cooperation with young Nelson Rockefeller's Institute of Inter-American Affairs, Berle could not free himself from the shadow of Under Secretary Welles, who personally directed or conducted major hemispheric relationships. It was Hull who was linked to the program of reciprocal trade agreements with Latin American governments, and FDR who was identified with the "Good Neighbor Policy." Berle's influence on policy was limited. He turned to economic work, attempts to coordinate security-intelligence gathering, and the initiation of a comprehensive plan to regulate international aviation.

It was while presiding over an international civil aviation conference in Chicago in 1944 that Berle received a telegram from FDR assigning him to Brazil as the U.S. Ambassador. Max Ascoli, who wrote the Introduction to the book, comments: "There could be no doubt about the meaning of the whole thing: Berle had been resigned. He complied, and sent a formal letter of resignation. Embittered by his humiliation, he could not refuse the appointment to Rio" for this would be construed as letting the President down in wartime. (p. xxx.) "The crude liquidation" served as a new opportunity to the two Berles. He was successful in obtaining collaboration from the Brazilian government and simultaneously helped with vast plans for educational advances, while Mrs. Berle achieved great successes as practitioner and teacher of modern medicine.

In the first six months of President Kennedy's administration, Berle served as consultant to the White House and to the Secretary of State on Latin American affairs. He wanted to take the responsibility for directing Latin American policy, but only if he received the rank of Under Secretary. When this was not forthcoming, he resigned, again to return to beloved soirees at his Manhattan home, to resume his law practice and to teach at Columbia University.

Throughout this entertaining and analytical account of personalities and events there emerge the foresights and penetrating evaluations so characteristic of Berle's sharp intelligence, his compassion for human frailties and his insight into political realities. Because he was nearly always in a hurry, with several irons in the fire requiring daily or hourly attention, his comments were sometimes acerbic, reducing to a single word or phrase the result of his observations and his prescience. In 1961 the diary says that "Trujillo [of the Dominican Republic] would be more at home in hell than in a presidency"; "Herbert Matthews [retired editorialist of the *New York Times*] has really slid over the Marxism watershed"; "The Haitian situation is a combination of incompetence, corruption and the incapacity of anyone else to organize something better"; "The Organization of American States is now useless."

Those dispirited thoughts about his favorite area, Latin America, were reflected as he weighed the situation elsewhere—for example, "Vietnam looks to me like a lost cause"; "The United Nations is breaking up." In 1964 he wrote: "Perhaps Kennedy died at the right time for his reputation. His administration will go down as great poetry, but not as political achievement." Also, "As Russia is increasingly divorced from the headship of the Communist world, it will become increasingly imperialistic." In 1967 he warned: "If Nasser wins [the Arab-Israeli conflict] the Russians will take over everything from the Persian Gulf to the Red Sea."

Berle's public career was a long one, varied and exciting. In government service as in academic pursuits, he embodied the attributes of the pragmatist. He struggled for years, as he put it, with "the essential problem [of] how to connect the intellectual with dynamic forces."

Books Received

I. POLITICS, HISTORY, ECONOMICS

Annual of Power and Conflict 1971. Edited by Brian Crozier. London: Institute for the Study of Conflict; New York: National Strategy Information Center, 1972. 141 pp. $3.60 (paper). This book "has two overriding purposes: to narrate and explain the actions of the more important extremist groups throughout the world; and to assess the changes in the balance of political influence throughout the world." Part I elucidates the nature, goals, strength, and success or failure of revolutionary and nonrevolutionary challenges to the internal security of states, especially where these lend themselves to exploitation by outside powers. Part II analyzes the gains and losses of political influence of the United States, the USSR and China in the Mediterranean and Middle East, Africa south of the Sahara, South and East Asia, and Latin America. The editor is Director of the Institute for the Study of Conflict; and other contributors include William Gutteridge, Malcolm Mackintosh, Robert Moss and Francis Watson.

The Case for Development: Six Studies. A United Nations Centre for Economic and Social Information Book. New York: Praeger, 1973. 304 pp. $11.00. Another of Praeger's Special Studies in International Economics and Development, this volume contains six essays on various aspects of development. Max F. Millikan writes on A Strategy of Development, W. Arthur Lewis on The Development Process, Josef Pajestka on the Social Dimensions of Development, Jean-Marie Domenach on Our Moral Involvement, David Wightman on The Export Stake of Industrial Countries in the Third World, and Robin Clarke on The Great Experiment: Science and Technology in the Second United Nations Development Decade.

Comparative Political Violence. By Fred R. von der Mehden. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1973. 124 pp. $7.25 ($3.95, paper). The author presents a typology of violence intended to provide a systematic evaluation of the forms of political violence that have been experienced in the postwar era. Through the use of case studies, he then discusses some of the elements contributing to the incidence of mass violence, including economic conditions and class-communal social patterns, and goes on to note the various justifications for violence advanced by its perpetrators.

Comparative Politics: The Quest for Theory. By James A. Bill and Robert L. Hargrave, Jr. Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill, 1973. 261 pp. $4.95 (paper). This evaluation of the literature and conceptual frameworks used in comparative politics draws heavily on the empirical analysis of non-Western societies. The authors discuss the scope of comparative politics, issues of political development and political socialization, and both elite and group behavior. From a summary and critique of what they suggest are the two most influential and controversial models in the field—"systems analysis" and "functionalism"—they conclude that each has some merit, although additional work is required in each case. Moreover, since some perspectives on comparative politics are more useful than others at different stages of the research process, it would be better not to concentrate on one approach but to integrate all of them into a comprehensive research design.

Contemporary International Theory and the Behaviour of States. By Joseph Frankel. New York: Oxford University Press, 1973. 134 pp. $4.00 ($1.95, paper). An exposition and application of behavioral approaches to international relations, primarily using postwar British foreign policy as illustration. In nontechnical terms, the author surveys systems analysis, integration theory and the interaction and actions of states, placing emphasis on the role of values and concepts of "national interest" in the formulation of foreign policy.

Developing Democracy. By William A. Douglas. Washington: Heldref Publications, 1972. 232 pp. n.p. In this study, prepared under the auspices of the Center for International Studies at New York University, the author, Education Director of the American Institute for Free Labor Development, analyzes the application of democracy to the political systems of the Third World, with a view to determining whether some special form of democracy can take root in these developing nations. He discusses the dangers and shortcomings of such alternatives to democracy as dictatorship and communism, explains "the necessity for democracy," explores obstacles to and characteristics of democracy in the developing world, and points to differences between Western and Third World democracy. He concludes by imploring the developed nations to supply the Third World with "political aid, now the missing dimension in development assistance," to help them build mass political parties and competitive electoral systems.

Development Today: A New Look at U.S. Relations with the Poor Countries. Edited by Robert E. Hunter and John E. Rielly. New York: Praeger, 1972. 286 pp. $9.00 ($3.50, paper). This book, published for the Overseas Development Council, presents essays on American foreign policies toward the world's developing countries in the 1970's. Four essays give an overview of the subject; three examine particular problems of the poor countries such as violence, population growth and food needs; four concern foreign trade, investment and the multinational corporation; and three selections look at American views toward and aid programs for the poor countries. Robert Hunter is a Senior Fellow at ODC; John Rielly, a former ODC Senior Fellow, is Executive Director of the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations.

A Dictionary of Modern Revolution. By Edward Hyams. New York: Taplinger, 1973. 322 pp. $9.95 ($4.95, paper). A guide to modern radical movements, ranging in scope from the rise of the Black Panther Party to theories of anarchism. The author also presents biographical sketches of leading figures in revolutionary movements, including George Habash, Sergei Nechayev and Amilcar Cabral, and portrays in historical perspective contemporary events such as the French student insurrection of 1968 and the revolution in Portuguese Africa.

Diplomat: The World of International Diplomacy. By Eric Clark. New York: Taplinger, 1974. 276 pp. $8.50. A basic survey, written in journalistic style, of the institutions and practices of modern diplomacy by a man who has been a reporter for *The Guardian* and *The Observer.* Subjects covered include the recruitment and training of the "new diplomat"; the nomadic life style of the diplomat today; the privileges he enjoys; embassies and espionage; the impact of the Cold War upon diplomacy; Vatican and new-nation diplomacy; and diplomats at the UN. Clark notes that if, as many have alleged, modern technical communications have rendered diplomacy obsolete, diplomats themselves are the last people in the world to realize it—perhaps because they are so busy proliferating in numbers and taking on a variety of new tasks that governments want done. A readable and insightful account of a much misunderstood and often unfairly criticized profession.

BOOKS RECEIVED

Fascism. By Paul Hayes. New York: The Free Press, 1973. 260 pp. $7.95. The author, a Lecturer in International Relations at Oxford, begins by noting that no satisfactory definition of fascism has yet been produced, despite (or because of) the fact that it is a favorite pejorative term of propagandists. Hayes is interested in delving into the intellectual origins of fascism and the development of fascist theory and practice in Germany and Italy. Among the hallmark characteristics he discusses are the myth of racial superiority, the idea of an elite, belief in a charismatic leader, totalitarianism, nationalism, militarism, a a policy of economic self-sufficiency, and socialist sloganeering. He examines the possibility of fascism in Greece, Latin America and Africa, and warns the West not to "dismiss fascism as an unfortunate product of a few misguided or diseased minds."

Great Issues of International Politics. (Second edition.) Edited by Morton A. Kaplan. Chicago: Aldine, 1974. 612 pp. $17.50 ($5.95, paper). A reorganized and significantly expanded anthology in international relations studies, this edition contains a balanced compilation of thirty-seven articles, two-thirds of which were not in the first edition. New sections of particular interest focus on "Relations with Europe," "The Arms Race and SALT," and "The Defense Budget Controversy." The thirty-one contributors include Richard A. Falk, Stanley Hoffmann, William R. Kintner, Donald G. Brennan, Robert E. Hunter and the editor.

Inducing Technological Change for Economic Growth and Development. Edited by Robert A. Solo and Everett M. Rogers. Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1972. 238 pp. $8.50. A ten-chapter reader in development, devoted to a consideration of technological transfer and development planning, the communication and diffusion of innovations, and the agencies of change. Contributing authors include W. Paul Strassman, Vernon W. Ruttan, William A. Herzog, Jr., Amar N. Agarwala, Arthur Niehoff and the editors. The volume is unified by its general concern for the transfer of technology to developing nations and its problem-solving approach.

International Systems: A Behavioral Approach. Edited by Michael Haas. New York: Chandler, 1974. 433 pp. $14.00. Fourteen well-written and cogently argued papers summarize recent research and current trends in the behavioral study of international relations. Specific topics cover the problems and prospects of deterrence, alliances, and conflict resolution in the international system, and there are introductory and concluding chapters on the scope and development of international relations theory and research. Contributors include Lloyd Jensen, Nazli Choucri, John R. Raser, John D. Sullivan and the editor.

An Introduction to Ecology and Population Biology. By Thomas C. Emmel. New York: W. W. Norton, 1973. 196 pp. $6.95 ($2.95, paper). This scientific introduction to the study of ecology discusses such topics as population and ecology, interactions of organisms, elements and energy, environmental alteration, the ecology of communities, and pollution and human population growth principles. There are many charts and photographs, also an index, glossary and supplementary bibliography.

An Introduction to International Law. By Ronald B. Kirkemo. Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1974. 235 pp. $7.95. Designed as a supplementary text for use in undergraduate courses on world politics, this work, in the words of the author, is meant to "provide the student with an overall view of the corpus of the law, to give a feel of the law by using excerpts from cases and conventions, to provide some of the rationale for the law and specific rules, and to present some of the schools of thought on the nature and function of law in the international system"—all to aid the student in gaining a realistic (neither too optimistic nor too pessimistic) view of what international law might contribute toward a solution of world problems.

The Limits of Foreign Policy: The West, the League and the Far Eastern Crisis of 1931-1933. By Christopher Thorne. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1973. 442 pp. $12.95. Thorne, a Reader in International Relations at the University of Sussex, sets out to provide a scholarly burial for the once popular proposition that the Mukden Incident and the ensuing Japanese seizure of Manchuria from China marked the real start of World War II. The author spent many years working in the archives of the State Department, the U.S. Navy and Army-Navy Joint Board, the British Cabinet, Foreign Office and Admiralty, the League of Nations, and the governments of France, the Netherlands and Germany. He now calls attention to the ambivalent manner in which the United States conceived its national interest in the Far East, and how the Western attempt to create a new morality of international politics and a new system of collective security in the interwar period contributed to the background of World War II, which hastened the decline of Western influence in Asia.

Models of Doom: A Critique of the Limits to Growth. Edited by H.S.D. Cole, Christopher Freeman, Marie Jahoda and K.L.R. Pavitt. New York: Universe Books, 1973. 244 pp. $8.00 ($2.95, paper). A project of the Science Policy Research Unit at the University of Sussex, these fourteen essays examine and evaluate the assumptions and methodologies employed in Jay Forrester's *World Dynamics* and Dennis Meadows' *Limits to Growth.* The essayists are especially critical of the facile Malthusian premises of these futuristic forecasts and their reliance on computer projections over human adaptability. The book concludes with a rebuttal by Meadows, offering a contrast between technological optimism and Malthusian projections.

The Nutrition Factor: Its Role in National Development. By Alan Berg and Robert J. Muscat. Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1973. 290 pp. $8.95 ($3.50, paper). This volume explores the effects of malnutrition on aspects of development, with particular reference to overpopulation, agricultural priorities, and work capacity; and it also examines the facilities for solving the problem, for, as experience in India and elsewhere indicates, educational and technical solutions to malnutrition do exist. Nearly one-third of the book is made up of tables and other relevant data, and the concluding chapter is devoted to guidelines for public policy.

Political Opposition and Dissent. Edited by Barbara N. McLennan. New York: Dunellen, 1973. 393 pp. $15.00. Prefaced by a chapter tracing historical changes in the concepts and values relating to political opposition, the case studies in this anthology describe and analyze political opposition in ten countries—as varied as Tanzania, Chile, Japan, the Soviet Union, and nations of Western Europe. The book concludes with a comparison of opposition movements through the application of a model based on equilibrium theory.

The Politics of National Development: Political Leadership in Transitional Societies. By Taketsugu Tsurutani. New York: Chandler, 1973. 192 pp. $5.00. A study of the crucial role of leadership in national development. The author appraises the leader as the arbiter of economic, political and social change in Third World countries, discusses government capabilities in relation to typically stated goals, presents a typology of leadership, and assesses various development strategies from the perspective of the national leadership.

Quantitative Analysis of Political Data. By Samuel A. Kirkpatrick. Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill, 1974. 509 pp. $15.95. A well-organized presentation of the development of behavioral research techniques and their application to specific issues in both domestic and world politics. Topics discussed include basic statistical techniques used in the "scientific study of politics," causal modeling, multidimensional scaling, and the analysis of political change over time. In each case, the author's summary of the basic elements of a given topic is followed by studies prepared by other scholars reflecting the use of a particular analytic mode in actual research.

Secrecy and Foreign Policy. Edited by Thomas M. Franck and Edward Weisband. New York: Oxford University Press, 1974. 453 pp. $15.00. Many perspectives are brought together in this volume in a search for a theory of the balance between the people's right to know and the government's duty to govern. The twenty-four essays not only deal with the United States' predicament in the matter of excessive secrecy in foreign policy and the relationship of the media and the security managers when it comes to disseminating information, but also consider the problem as it exists in Great Britain and Canada. Among the contributors are Senator Charles Mathias, former British Foreign Secretary Patrick Gordon Walker, journalist Haynes Johnson and British social critic Anthony Sampson. In the final chapter the editors offer a model of the role of secrecy in foreign policy.

The Strategy of Political Revolution. By Mostafa Rejai. New York: Doubleday, 1973. 189 pp. $1.95 (paper). "Although the literature on political revolution is literally staggering, only scant attention has been devoted to the topic of strategy," writes the author. Dr. Rejai, a Professor of Political Science at Miami University (Ohio), seeks to fill the gap with this theoretical and empirical study. After developing a fairly precise definition and constructing a typology of political revolution, he sets forth the theoretical components of strategy. He then applies the theory to the 1952 Bolivian revolution, the Vietminh Revolution of 1946-1954, and the abortive revolution in France in 1968. He also examines—and discounts—the possibilities for political revolution in the United States of the present day.

Superpowers and Victims: The Outlook for World Community. By Charlotte Waterlow. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1974. 181 pp. $6.95 ($2.95, paper). Examining the development policies of emerging nations, the author documents how their efforts to enter the modern world are impeded by the worldwide energy and resource crises as well as by internal corruption, political instability and militarism. In these circumstances, she argues, the gap between the industrialized powers and the developing nations is steadily widening. She concludes by making a case for world planning of natural resource utilization and the development of a world community through the efforts of international bodies such as the United Nations in managing natural resources.

Treaties and Alliances of the World: An International Survey Covering Treaties in Force and Communities of States. (Revised and updated edition.) A Keesing Publication. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1974. 254 pp. $15.00. An authoritative guide to major bilateral and multilateral treaties and international alliances currently in force, as well as formal agreements concluded under the auspices of the United Nations and comparable regional organizations. Although the emphasis is on politico-security arrangements, including arms limitation agreements, significant socio-economic and humanitarian treaties and declarations are also presented. In each case, key points of the agreement, signatories and their obligations under the terms of the treaty, and a concise description of the history and significance of the arrangement are provided. The international agreements are arranged chronologically within topics and regions.

The Year Book of World Affairs: 1973. Edited by George W. Keeton and Georg Schwarzenberger. New York: Praeger, for the London Institute of World

Affairs, 1973. 462 pp. $19.50. A collection of twenty-two original papers, by as many authors, covering a broad range of theoretical and policy-relevant subjects of current interest. Topics discussed include various aspects of both East-West and North-South relations, prospects for international relations studies, Sino-Soviet relations in East Asia, West Germany's *Ostpolitik,* and international law and justice in world affairs. Among the contributors are James N. Rosenau, Modesto Sera Vasquez, C. C. Pentland, Geoffrey Williams and Georg Schwarzenberger.

II. MILITARY AFFAIRS, ARMS CONTROL, TECHNOLOGY

Armies in Revolution. By John Ellis. New York: Oxford University Press, 1974. 278 pp. $10.95. How military policy affected the development of selected revolutions, and how the social roots of those revolutions affected methods of war and military organization, occupy the focus of this analysis. By means of seven case studies from the English Civil War of the seventeenth century to the Chinese Civil War of the 1940's, the author shows how the revolutionary army was mobilized and initially sustained by integrating political aspiration and military service. He concludes with the argument that no revolution can succeed without an army, but few such armies can tolerate for any length of time the ideology that created them.

The Causes of War. By Geoffrey Blainey. New York: The Free Press, 1973. 298 pp. $7.95. In this traditional analysis of the causes of international war since 1700, Professor Blainey argues that developments in military technology have not altered the basic pattern of international relations, even though the potential destructiveness of war may be greater now than in the past. Instead, he asserts that all wars have similar origins in disputes over the distribution of power among contending nations. Moreover, "peace" is not the normal condition; wars occur more frequently than is often believed, and periods of "peace" have simply had shorter and less costly conflicts than periods marked by general wars involving many nations. The author recommends a careful study of history in order to facilitate our understanding of international relations, with the object of eventually controlling those factors which make war more likely.

The Dynamics of the Nuclear Balance. By Albert Legault and George Lindsey. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1974. 273 pp. $14.50. The authors have prepared a guide to strategic issues in contemporary international affairs, a clear presentation of a complex topic in a form that is understandable to the layman and still has sufficient detail to be useful to the more advanced student and practitioner of world politics. One chapter treats "nuclear explosives," and two chapters (plus a good mathematical appendix) deal with questions of "deterrence." There is also a concise discussion of major international efforts and treaties intended to limit the proliferation of nuclear weapons and restrict the testing of existing nuclear devices.

International Safeguards and Nuclear Industry. Edited by Mason Willrich. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973. 307 pp. $11.50. The first comprehensive study of the international safeguards on nuclear industry as established by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and the International Atomic Energy Agency. Contributors, representing many academic disciplines, include Henry Smyth, Bernhard Bechhoefer, Paul Szasz, Edwin Kinderman, Victor Gilinsky, Theodore Taylor, Lawrence Scheinman and the editor. The editor has provided a documentary appendix of approximately fifty pages.

Psychological Bases of War. Edited by Heinrich Z. Winnek, Rafael Moses and Mortimer Ostow. New York: Quadrangle Books, 1973. 261 pp. n.p. The results of a combined meeting of American and Israeli psychoanalysts, using Freud's letter to Einstein, published under the title "Why War?," as a point of departure. Intended to elucidate the role unconscious forces play in conflicts between groups and nations, the essays address such topics as the cultural patterns of aggression, the individual, group and war, and woman's role in aggression.

Warfare in Primitive Societies: A Bibliography. By William Tulio Divale. Santa Barbara, Calif.: American Bibliographical Center — Clio Press, 1973. 123 pp. $4.50 (paper). One in a bibliographical series of the Center for the Study of Armament and Disarmament, California State University at Los Angeles, under the general editorship of Richard Dean Burns, this unannotated bibliography of more than 1,600 items is drawn primarily from anthropological, historical and sociological rather than political science sources. Entries are listed topically and geographically. The compiler has written an introduction to the first edition and a foreword to the revised edition, which together constitute a useful fourteen-page overview of the literature covered.

III. United States and Canada

Creating a New World Politics: From Conflict to Cooperation. By David V. Edwards. New York: David McKay, 1973. 191 pp. $6.95 ($2.95, paper). In assessing the Nixon Administration's foreign policy, its divergencies from past U.S. policy assumptions, and its prospects for contributing to a more stable world order, Dr. Edwards argues that current U.S. foreign policy reflects the same military approach to political problems as was evident in the years immediately following the Second World War. The remedy, as he sees it, requires the conscious construction of a positive world view to break "the stranglehold that our normal assumption of the existence of an independent, uncontrollable reality has had on our action."

Defense Policy Formation: A Comparative Analysis of the McNamara Era. By Clark A. Murdock. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1974. 209 pp. $8.95. In this study of defense-policymaking during the past two decades, the author compares the management of defense policy in general, and the weapons-acquisition process in particular, during the Kennedy-Johnson Administrations with those during the Eisenhower and first Nixon Administrations. He specifically evaluates the effectiveness of the Planning-Programming-Budgeting System (PPBS) and systems analysis brought into the Defense Department by Robert S. McNamara in contrast to the less centralized practices of the other Secretaries of Defense. While recognizing that the McNamara innovations did not actually accomplish all that their more enthusiastic proponents have claimed, Murdock nevertheless concludes that the combination of a more centralized control of research and development and the utilization of systems-analysis techniques improved the efficiency of the weapons-acquisition process during McNamara's tenure.

The Energy Crisis. By Lawrence Rocks and Richard P. Runyon. New York: Crown Publishers, 1972. 189 pp. $5.95 ($2.95, paper). "America faces an immediate, severe power shortage during the 1970s and 1980s," declare the authors. "We face this disaster without any coherent national design for meaningful power procurement." Asserting that not even the best energy strategy could permit the entire world to consume at American energy levels, that some form of rationing of power sources is inevitable in the United States, and that many American institutions will not survive the next fifty years of crisis, they call for immediate action to ameliorate the effects of dwindling energy resources. Dr. Rocks is a research chemist and Dr. Runyon is Dean of the Science Department at Long Island University.

The Foundations of the American Empire: William Henry Seward and U.S. Foreign Policy. By Ernest N. Paolino. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1973. 235 pp. $9.75. Contending that the distinction drawn by some historians between the expansionist policy pursued by Seward in the 1860's and the imperialism of the 1890's is more apparent than real, Paolino depicts the U.S. Secretary of State as being just as interested in making the United States the dominant commercial power in world trade as he was in territorial expansion. In support of this hypothesis, the author traces Seward's policies supporting the establishment of the intercontinental telegraph, the unification of the world's coinage, an open trading door in China, Formosa, Japan and Korea, and the acquisition of Alaska, the West Indies and a part of Panama for an isthmian canal.

The Fulbright Premise: Senator J. William Fulbright's Views on Presidential Power. By Naomi B. Lynn and Arthur F. McClure. Lewisburg, Pa.: Bucknell University Press, 1973. 224 pp. $10.00. This discussion of the interaction between Congress and the Presidency during Senator Fulbright's career of the past two decades focuses on foreign policy in general, and the growth of Presidential war powers in particular. Relying heavily on excerpts from the Senator's speeches and published works, the authors document Fulbright's shift from the advocacy of Presidential autonomy in foreign policy to support for a more balanced relationship between the President and Congress, wherein the latter is given a clear edge in warmaking powers.

Globalism and Its Critics: The American Foreign Policy Debate of the 1960's. Edited by William Taubman. Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1973. 216 pp. $2.50 (paper). Twenty selections from the works of both academicians and policymakers reflect the debate concerned with the theory and practice of American foreign relations during the Cold War. The editor has identified four basic "schools" in this debate: (a) the *globalists,* who argue for the internationalist role pursued by the United States in the East-West rivalry of the past quarter-century; (b) the *realist critics* of that role, who assert that this country misperceived both the magnitude of the communist threat and the ability of the United States to influence affairs in many parts of the world; (c) the *radical-liberal critics,* who maintain that the real threat to American security came not from the communist powers but from socioeconomic problems within the United States and throughout the Third World; and (d) the neo-Marxian *radical critics,* who place the blame for the Cold War on the United States and condemn American policy as the simple expression of class-based economic imperialism. W. W. Rostow, Hans J. Morgenthau, Michael Harrington and Gabriel Kolko are among the authors represented.

The Great Nixon Turnaround: America's New Foreign Policy in the Post-Liberal Era. Edited by Lloyd C. Gardner. New York: New Viewpoints, a division of Franklin Watts, 1973. 350 pp. $3.95 (paper). A collection of speeches by Richard Nixon and articles about the foreign policy of the first Nixon Administration. Following the editor's brief introduction, which argues that American foreign policy is rooted in economic imperialism, the selections are organized under four headings: The Cold Warrior Transformed; The Road to Peking; The Nixon Ploy: A World Turned Upside Down; and Post-Cold War: The End of U.S. Hegemony. Contributors include Stanley Hoffmann, James Chace, Hugh Sidey, William Safire, Earl C. Ravenal, John Kenneth Galbraith and Nicholas von Hoffman.

BOOKS RECEIVED

Holy War: The Lure of Victory and the Passing of America as a World Power. By James A. Thomas. New Rochelle, N.Y.: Arlington House, 1974. 272 pp. $8.95. A strongly worded discourse on the origins, conduct and consequences of American foreign policy during the Cold War. Particular attention is paid to the similarities between the Korean and Vietnamese conflicts, including the inconsistencies between the war *goals* of the American government and the allocation of the *means* necessary to achieve those objectives. The author concludes that the United States is essentially unable to fight a protracted limited war. A major reason for this, he suggests, is the existence of an overarching emphasis on "moral imperatives" in American war policies. By requiring a war to be a *jihad* if it is to be fought through to a successful conclusion, Americans are almost psychologically incapable of sustaining a commitment in a Viet Nam-like situation.

Liberal America and the Third World: Political Development Ideas in Foreign Aid and Social Science. By Robert A. Packenham. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973. 395 pp. $15.00. An Associate Professor of Political Science at Stanford University traces the impact of the "liberal tradition" upon the doctrines of political development held since World War II by government officials concerned with economic and technical assistance programs abroad, as well as upon the theories of political development held by social scientists (especially political scientists and sociologists) in the field of comparative politics. He is at pains to make clear that the book is not primarily about political development in the Third World, or about foreign aid as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy, but rather is a study of American values and ideology during a period of history in which liberal policymakers and scholars became deeply involved in the affairs of a largely illiberal world. After reviewing and analyzing the ideas that informed the foreign aid and political development programs of five Administrations, Packenham concludes that an excessively dogmatic liberal tradition has contributed and will continue to contribute to American misconceptions about political development in poor countries.

Reflections on the Cold War: A Quarter Century of American Foreign Policy. Edited by Lynn H. Miller and Ronald W. Preussen. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1974. 207 pp. $10.00. This anthology of nine articles developed from a lecture series conducted at Temple University during the 1970-1971 academic year. The authors examine the origins and course of the Cold War, paying particular attention to the American role and the effects of American actions on current U.S. foreign policy. Although some of the papers take a balanced approach to the subject, the overall collection is weighted in the direction of the "revisionist" critique of the Cold War and American policies. Contributors include Stanley Hoffmann, Walter LaFeber, Richard J. Barnett, Richard A. Falk and the editors.

Through Russian Eyes: President Kennedy's 1036 Days. By Anatolii Andreievich Gromyko. Washington, D.C.: International Library, 1973. 239 pp. $9.95. The author, who is the son of Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko and the head of the Foreign Policy Section in the USA Institute of the USSR's Academy of Sciences, traces the course of the Kennedy Presidency, criticizing Kennedy as a servant of capitalist interests but arguing that "in the last year of his Presidency, Kennedy began to depart from the 'cold war' dogmas." Professor Gromyko implies that this departure may have been one of the causes of his assassination. The book discusses Kennedy's early political record and election to the Presidency; his domestic policies; his actions with regard to the Caribbean, the Vienna summit, Berlin, Viet Nam and other problems; and his attitudes and policies toward the Third World. Translated into English by Philip A. Garon, it was originally published in Moscow in 1971.

The U.S. Intelligence Community: Foreign Policy and Domestic Activities. By Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr. New York: Hill & Wang, a division of Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1973. 212 pp. $7.95. Written by a former CIA official, this study analyzes the work of the American intelligence apparatus, both foreign and domestic, including the CIA, the FBI, and the National Security Administration. The author discusses intelligence successes and failures, with special emphasis on the Bay of Pigs invasion, the Cuban missile crisis and the Viet Nam war. The book also addresses the question of executive or legislative control of the intelligence community and the role of intelligence in a free society.

IV. WESTERN EUROPE AND ATLANTIC COMMUNITY

Germany and Eastern Europe Since 1945: From the Potsdam Agreement to Chancellor Brandt's "Ostpolitik." Keesing's Research Report 8. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1973. 322 pp. $9.95 ($4.95, paper). A chronological documentary summary of the "German Question" from the end of the Second World War to the *Ostvertraege* of the early 1970's, with emphasis on the main provisions of treaties, agreements, diplomatic proposals, official speeches, governmental communiqués and notes, and correspondence between political leaders. The volume contains a useful compilation of materials, derived from a variety of governmental and press sources, on the division of Germany, the incorporation of the two parts of Germany into the Eastern and Western blocs, exchanges on reunification, many phases of the Berlin problem, and the treaties concluded by West Germany with the Soviet Union, Poland and East Germany.

International Theory and European Integration. By Charles Pentland. New York: The Free Press, 1973. 283 pp. $9.95. A critical analysis of four of the major Integration Theory approaches and the consequences of each for (a) the *process* of political integration, and (b) the type of political *structure* that would develop. Professor Pentland examines similarities and differences among the "pluralist," "functionalist," "neofunctionalist" and "federalist" models of political integration, as well as the impact of integration on the international system, the nations following a path toward political integration, and the behavior of individuals within those nations. Although his primary focus is on the relationship between specific European organizations and these different theories of political integration, his analysis and conclusions are applicable to Integration Theory in general.

Modern Political Systems: Europe. (Third edition.) Edited by Roy C. Macridis and Robert E. Ward. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1972. 654 pp. $11.95. "This third edition," report the editors, "is a continuing effort to translate our own versions of some of the recent theorizing and writing in the field of comparative politics into a text for American undergraduates." Politics are analyzed in the context of a nation's entire social system, and historical, ideological, social, economic and other factors are taken into account. Samuel E. Finer of the University of Manchester writes on Great Britain; Professor Macridis of Brandeis University, on France; Karl W. Deutsch of Harvard University, on the German Federal Republic; and Vernon V. Aspaturian of Pennsylvania State University, on the Soviet Union.

The Short-War Illusion: German Policy, Strategy and Domestic Affairs, August-December 1914. By Lancelot L. Farrar, Jr. Santa Barbara, Calif.: American Bibliographical Center—Clio Press, 1973. 207 pp. $14.75 ($4.75, paper). Prior to World War I, most European political and military leaders assumed that the approaching war would be decisive, limited and short. "Few of them would have opted for war if they had foreseen a protracted, revolutionary or unsuccessful conflict" (p. 148). Even those who feared that the struggle might be a long one prepared only for a short war. Yet the short-war assumption was shot through with contradictions. It implied a limited, nonrevolutionary conflict, but all the participants sought to bring about far-reaching changes in the international system by considerably expanding their own power or curtailing that of others. The author, a historian, combines historical research methods and some theoretical concepts from international relations to demonstrate, primarily but not exclusively from the perspective of Germany, how the short-war expectation proved to be a military, diplomatic and political-strategic illusion by December 1914. The contestants, by rejecting an early compromise peace, made general exhaustion the likely outcome.

Strategy for the West: American-Allied Relations in Transition. Edited by Richard B. Foster, André Beaufre and Wynfred Joshua. New York: Crane, Russak, 1974. 258 pp. $11.00. Thirteen papers from a colloquium held at Juan-les-Pins, France, in 1973, in which strategic analysts from six countries examine a wide range of strategic and politico-economic issues of current significance. Among these are the general implications of the developing American global strategy, specific interests and perspectives within Europe in the context of European-American-Soviet relations, and the impact of SALT and force reduction discussions on those relations. Contributors include Walter Laqueur, Johan J. Holst, Walter F. Hahn, Duilio S. Fanali and the editors.

Umano and the Price of Lasting Peace. By Edgar Ansel Mowrer and Lillian T. Mowrer. New York: Philosophical Library, 1973. 158 pp. $6.00. This book details the life and ideas of an Italian thinker who devised a formula for lasting world peace and "of whose wisdom," the authors assert, "the world today is in desperate need." Gaetano Meale (1858-1927) gave up a promising judicial career, voluntarily accepted poverty, and suggested a way for the world to rid itself of domestic despotism and international war. He wrote under the name of UMANO—"a human being" or "humane."

V. Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

Infrastructure and the Marxist Power Seizure: An Analysis of the Communist Models of Revolution. By Andrew P. O'Meara, Jr. New York: Vantage Press, 1973. 130 pp. $6.95. A collection of essays addressed to the techniques of Marxist revolutionary warfare. Major O'Meara, a career officer in the U.S. Army, posits two models of communist revolution based on the Bolshevik and Chinese communist experiences and analyzes their implementation by the Viet Minh and the Viet Cong, focusing on the organizational structures of the revolutionaries. He concludes by pointing up specific lessons to be drawn from the American experience in Viet Nam.

The Myth of Liberation: East-Central Europe and U.S. Diplomacy and Politics since 1941. By Bennett Kovrig. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973. 360 pp. $11.50. A thorough examination of U.S. policies toward Eastern Europe from the signing of the Atlantic Charter through the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia. The author, an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Economy at the University of Toronto, compares the rhetoric of liberation with actual policy, appraising the U.S. propaganda effort and how it was affected by domestic politics and pressures. He concludes his study of international politics in a bipolar world by stating: "The United States, remaining loyal in principle to the prescriptions of the Atlantic Charter, must look upon East-Central Europe as a living testimony to the limits of its power."

Science and Technology as an Instrument of Soviet Policy. By Mose L. Harvey, Leon Goure and Vladimir Prokofieff. Miami, Fla.: University of Miami, Center for Advanced International Studies, 1972. 219 pp. $5.95 ($4.95, paper). Three specialists in Soviet economics, military affairs, and science and technology provide a documentary account of the Soviet leaders' views of scientific-technological progress and the role it is expected to play, especially in the sphere of East-West competition. They examine strategic issues and the pursuit of military superiority; the continuous search for a more effective performance; levels of expenditures; the search for an optimum organizational and administrative approach; and the system for acquiring and disseminating foreign scientific and technological data. More than 100 pages of documents are included.

The Soviet Union and the Arab East Under Khrushchev. By Oles M. Smolansky. Lewisburg, Pa.: Bucknell University Press, 1974. 326 pp. $15.00. A detailed analysis of Soviet Middle East policy under Nikita Khrushchev. The first section, "Points of Entry, 1955-1958," covers the rise of Nasser in Egypt, the Suez crisis, the Syrian crisis and the birth of the United Arab Republic, the Lebanese crisis of 1958, and the Iraqi revolution. Part II, "Cooperation and Recrimination, 1958-1963," deals with Soviet policy caught between Iraq and the disintegration of the U.A.R. The conclusion, "The Limits of Rapprochement, 1963-1964," assesses Khrushchevian policies in the Middle East in relation to the overall Soviet foreign policy of the period. The author writes that the failure of Khrushchev's Third World policy, particularly in the Middle East, contributed to his downfall in October 1964.

Turkestan Zwischen Russland und China. By Baymirza Hayit. Amsterdam: Philo Press, 1971. 414 pp. n.p. This book briefly surveys Turkestan history from the fourteenth-century empire of Samarkand to 1700 and then discusses in depth the history of the Central Asian region during the past 250 years. A native of Turkestan now engaged in scholarly pursuits in Germany, Dr. Hayit traces the recurring Russian and Chinese aggressions against Turkestan that were resisted by the Muslim Turkish inhabitants of one of the world's earliest seats of civilization.

VI. MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA

Arab Culture and Society in Change. Compiled by the Staff of CEMAN. Beirut, Lebanon: Dar El-Mashreq Publishers, 1973. (U.S. distributor: Near East Books Co., New York.) 318 pp. $15.00. A partially annotated bibliography in fifteen subdivisions on aspects of Arab society. Selections range in time from the middle 1950's through December 1971 and include books and articles in English, French, German and Italian as well as a small number of older "classics." There are indices for cross reference, a list of periodicals consulted, an author index and a topical index.

Ben-Gurion: State Builder. By Avraham Avi-hai. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Halsted Press, 1974. 354 pp. $12.50. A political biography of David Ben-Gurion, the first since his death in November 1973. The author, a Canadian by birth but an Israeli citizen for over twenty years, has held posts in the Prime Minister's office and interviewed Ben-Gurion on a number of occasions. The book reviews the Israeli statesman's early years, his type of socialism, his handling of such issues as the religious/secular axis and the Arabs in Israel, Israel's foreign policy under his stewardship, and his political fortunes in the year or so preceding his retirement from politics in 1963.

From Paris to Sevres: The Partition of the Ottoman Empire at the Peace Conference of 1919-1920. By Paul C. Helmreich. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1974. 376 pp. $15.00. Of the five treaties that comprised the post-World War I peace settlement, the Treaty of Sèvres took the longest to negotiate and was in many respects the most complex. It involved numerous claims from independence-seeking groups within the Ottoman Empire (Greek, Armenian and Arab especially) as well as from Zionists for Palestine; the establishment of international control over the Turkish Straits; controversy over the status of Constantinople; the division of vast territorial spoils among the victors from the detached portions of the Sultan's historic possessions according to the wartime Sykes-Picot Agreement; and the creation of the British and French mandates in the Middle East. The author, an Associate Professor of History at Wheaton College, Massachusetts, traces in careful, scholarly detail these and related factors which led to the conclusion of a peace settlement that could not hold up for long in a dynamically changing region.

Israel: Social Structure and Change. Edited by Michael Curtis and Mordecai Chertoff. New Brunswick, N.J.: E. P. Dutton, Transaction Books, 1973. 443 pp. $4.95 (paper). Twenty-seven essays, mostly by Israeli scholars, on Israeli society from a series of conferences in 1971-1972 sponsored by the American Academic Association for Peace in the Middle East. The selections lend themselves to five topical sections: urban and institutional development, the kibbutz today, economic and labor development, ethnic relations and problems, and social and educational change. Contributors include Bruno Bettelheim, Michael Curtis, Shlomo Avineri, Raphael Patai and Seymour Martin Lipset. Notes follow each selection, and statistical data are interspersed throughout the text.

The Middle East: A Political and Economic Survey. (Fourth edition.) Edited by Peter Mansfield. London: Oxford University Press, 1973. 591 pp. $19.95. In the 1950's Sir Reader Bullard edited the first three editions of this standard and authoritative regional survey. Now it has been brought up to date by Peter Mansfield, who served as the Middle East correspondent of the London *Sunday Times* from 1961 to 1967. The general introduction to the area is followed by seven thematic studies, each written by a specialist, on such topics as the origins of the Palestine problem, oil, U.S. and Soviet policies, and literary and cultural trends. More than three-quarters of the book is devoted to separate chapters on Arabia, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Sudan, Syria and Turkey, plus forty-four pages of statistical tables. The volume will serve as an important reference tool on the political history and economic development of the republics, kingdoms and sheikhdoms of the region until the fifth edition appears.

Modernization Without Revolution: Lebanon's Experience. By Elie Adib Salem. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973. 174 pp. $7.95. A chronicle of Lebanon's development experience since 1947, emphasizing the cultural, historical and political aspects of the country's non-planned, laissez-faire economic growth. Lebanon's communal society, educational system, historical contacts with the West and experience under the French Mandate are described, and data about the economy are provided in the text and in statistical tables. The book ends with a consideration of recent planning for modernization and some suggestions about alternative courses for the future.

South Africa's Foreign Policy, 1945-1970. By James Barber. New York: Oxford University Press, 1973. 325 pp. $14.50. A generally balanced, well-written discussion of South Africa's foreign policy since World War II with emphasis on the unusually close relationship noted between domestic and foreign affairs, particularly with regard to racial matters. Dr. Barber suggests that, in many respects, adherence to *apartheid* both defines South Africa's "policy imperatives" and often tends to produce something akin to a "siege mentality" among its policymakers. This, however, may be changing, as the country's foreign policy shifts from one reflecting "uncertainty" to a relatively confident "outward policy" more in keeping with its new regional prominence.

Who Rules Israel? By Yuval Elizur and Eliahu Salpeter. New York: Harper & Row, 1973. 342 pp. $8.95. "Despite immigration to Israel during its twenty-five years of existence," maintain the authors, "despite the fact that within that period its population grew almost fourfold—and perhaps because of these factors—the range wherein all political, economic and perhaps even cultural power is concentrated is extremely narrow." In this study, two Israeli journalists look at those who control Israel's destiny: the ruling party leaders, the Histadrut bosses and the parties of the Left, the nationalists and clericalists, the top administrators, generals, businessmen, technocrats, scientists, and others who hold—and seek—power. They also treat such topics as the leadership's liaison with World Jewry, the primacy of agriculture, the molders of public opinion, and the politics of the arts.

VII. East and South Asia

Black Star Over Japan: Rising Forces of Militarism. By Albert Axelbank. New York: Hill & Wang, 1972. 240 pp. $7.95. The author's thesis is that the conditions for Japan's remilitarization, which would probably be detrimental to the peace of Asia and the world, are present in factions of the Japanese Right and Left and are likely to assert themselves sometime during this decade. He examines Japanese security requirements and the positions of the various political parties, and maintains that the circumstances which allowed Japanese pacifism to flourish through the last twenty-five years, as a consequence of World War II, are largely absent today. The book is replete with firsthand observations, obtained from personal interviews of many Japanese, about the prospects for militarism in the future.

India, Russia, China and Bangla Desh. By J. A. Naik. New Delhi: S. Chand & Company, 1972. 163 pp. Rs. 20.00. An Indian author discusses the relations of India, the USSR, China and the United States with reference to the crisis that gave birth to Bangladesh, paying special attention to Indian-Soviet relations and Sino-Pakistani relations in the context of the 1971 war in the subcontinent. The work concludes with an essay on Indian foreign policy in the post-Bangladesh period. There are fourteen appendices containing documents and speeches from Pakistan, India, China, Bangladesh and the Soviet Union.

Law & Policy in China's Foreign Relations: A Study of Attitudes and Practice. By James Chieh Hsiung. New York: Columbia University Press, 1972. 435 pp. $12.50. "To what extent," asks the author, "does Communist China, armed with a militant ideology, accept the existing rules of the game in international relations?" To answer his question he examines Communist Chinese attitudes toward international law, the international law of peaceful coexistence, differences with the Soviet Union over proletarian internationalism, territorial jurisdiction and sovereignty, sovereignty and self-determination, law relating to diplomatic relations, practical use of international law, the law of treaties and treaty compliance, recognition practice, and the pacific settlement of disputes. The author, an Associate Professor of Politics at New York University, argues that in some regards China has charted an independent course, breaking with the guidelines set by the Soviet Union and eschewing ideology when Chinese interests might be served by more pragmatic decision-making.

Listening to Korea: A Korean Anthology. Edited by Marshall R. Pihl. New York: Praeger, 1973. 249 pp. $9.00. Seeking "to evoke the Korean experience without undue recourse to cold statistical material," the editor, who is now completing a Ph.D. dissertation at Harvard on Korean fiction, presents a collection of fifteen essays. Subjects range from Korean attitudes toward Japan, the Korean press, the liberation from the Japanese in 1945, the war that followed five years later, to city and country, youth and age, and evaluations of Korean society. This anthology draws only upon Republic of Korea sources, but the editor claims that much of its content also applies to the northern half of the country. The contributors, all Korean natives or residents, include professors, politicians and publishers.

Matching Employment Opportunities and Expectations: A Programme of Action for Ceylon. An International Labour Office Report. Geneva: International Labour Office, 1971. Volume I, Report, 251 pp. $4.00. Volume II, Technical Papers, 251 pp. $4.50. This highly technical, exhaustive analysis of employment problems in Ceylon is part of a series published by the ILO that suggests economic planning to rectify various problems in developing countries. Presented in two volumes, it doubles as a case study in economic development and as a statistical source for the Ceylonese economy. Issues such as government structure, education, technology and aid are treated in the context of the employment problem.

Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis. By S. M. Burke. New York: Oxford University Press, 1973. 432 pp. $20.25. A former Pakistani Minister, Ambassador and High Commissioner in eleven different countries traces his country's foreign policies in the nonaligned years (1947-1953), the aligned years (1954-1962), and the period of reappraisal (1963-1970). A postscript covers the span from January 1971 through July 1972. "The greatest danger to Pakistan's well-being," concludes the author, presently Professor and Consultant in South Asian Studies at the University of Minnesota, "still lies in the chronic disease of political bickering and in the traditional regional rivalries which have received new encouragement from the unfortunate East Pakistani episode."

Le Parti Communiste Chinois au Pouvoir. By Jacques Guillermaz. Paris: Payot, 1972. 549 pp. 56 F. An in-depth study of the Chinese Communist Party and regime from October 1, 1949 to March 1, 1972. Divided chronologically into four parts, the book examines the period of Chinese neo-democracy (1949-1953), the first five-year period (1953-1957), the Chinese view of socialism (1958-1962), and the socialist education movement and the Cultural Revolution (1962-1971). Guillermaz, Director of Studies and Director of the Center of Documentation on the Contemporary Far East at l'Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes, wrote the predecessor to this volume, *Histoire du Parti Communiste Chinois (1921-1949)*, in 1968.

Political Development in Modern Japan. Edited by Robert E. Ward. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974. 637 pp. $3.95 (paper). This volume, the outgrowth of a seminar held under the auspices of the Conference on Modern Japan in Bermuda in 1965, contains more than a dozen studies by scholarly authorities on various historical-political aspects of the development process in Japan—the monarchy, the Genrō, nationalism and foreign policy of the Meiji period, war and modernization, popular political participation, elections, interest groups, law, decision-making, and the impact of the Allied occupation. The original hard-cover edition was published in 1968.

Psycho-Chemical Warfare: The Chinese Communist Drug Offensive Against the West. By A. H. Stanton Candlin. New Rochelle, N.Y.: Arlington House, 1973. 540 pp. $14.95. Examining the current use of narcotics as a weapon in political warfare, this study focuses specifically on Chinese involvement in the world pattern of opium and narcotics trading and the impact of the international drug trade on the American public. Maps of each Chinese province and the "golden triangle" of Southeast Asia show major areas of poppy cultivation, the location of heroin factories, and the routes by which drugs are smuggled around the world.

VIII. Latin America

The Panama Canal: Heart of America's Security. By Jon P. Speller. New York: Robert Speller & Sons, 1972. 163 pp. $5.95. In this account of current issues relating to the Panama Canal, the author argues for continued U.S. sovereignty over the Canal Zone and modernization of the canal, and attacks those who call for U.S. abandonment of the canal and the construction of a new sea-level canal. Mr. Speller discusses basic principles of U.S. policy and security, U.S.-Panamanian relations, Soviet policy with regard to the canal, and engineering considerations.

Venezuela and Paraguay: Political Modernity and Tradition in Conflict. By Leo B. Lott. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1972. 395 pp. $3.45 (paper). Professor Lott of the University of Montana presents an introduction to the political systems of Venezuela and Paraguay, choosing these countries, he explains, "because . . . they offered an excellent case study in contrast and similarity." He looks at their histories from colonial times, their Hispanic heritage, national, state and local governments, legal systems, foreign policies, party systems and interest groups. The book is part of the Modern Comparative Politics Series edited by Peter H. Merkyl.

PALESTINE AND THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

An Annotated Bibliography edited by
WALID KHALIDI

One of the very few comprehensive bibliographies to appear on the subject of the Palestine problem and the Arab-Israeli conflict, this volume offers a unique collection of source material on the subject. Comprising a total of over 4,500 entries taken from six languages—Arabic, English, Hebrew, French, German, and Russian—it is indispensable to the study of the Palestine problem as it has been prepared with the special needs of the political researcher in mind.

English, Hardcover, 732 pages
US $30.00, £10.50

Published jointly by the Institute for Palestine Studies, Beirut, and the University of Kuwait, Kuwait

Obtainable from:

INSTITUTE FOR PALESTINE STUDIES

P.O. Box 7164
Beirut
Lebanon

Box 329, R.D. 1
Oxford, Pa. 19363
U.S.A.

Monographs and Reports Received

The Allende Victory: An Analysis of the 1970 Chilean Presidential Election. By Michael J. Francis. Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, for the Institute of Government Research, Comparative Government Studies, No. 4, 1973. 76 pp. $1.50.

Canada and the Middle East. By Tareq Y. Ismael. Toronto: The Canadian Institute of International Affairs, Behind the Headlines Series, December 1973. 32 pp. 60 cents.

The Canadian Dilemma. By Charles Pentland. Westmead, England: Saxon House, D.C. Heath Ltd., for the Atlantic Institute for International Affairs (Paris), The Atlantic Papers, No. 2, 1973. 56 pp. n.p.

Europe's Common Agricultural Policy in a Time of Shortages. By Jon McLin. Hanover, N.H.: American Universities Field Staff, West Europe Series, Vol. VIII, No. 10, December 1973. 17 pp. n.p.

Force Reductions in Europe. By Olga Sukovic. Stockholm, Sweden: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Monograph, November 1973. 105 pp. Sw. Kr. 38.00.

The Horn of Africa: Strategic Magnet in the Seventies. By J. Bowyer Bell. New York: Crane, Russak & Company, for the National Strategy Information Center, Strategy Paper No. 21, 1973. 55 pp. $4.95.

La Industria Del Petroleo En America Latina: Notas Sobre Su Evolucion Reciente y Perspectivas. New York: United Nations, E/CN. 12/940, 1973. 165 pp. $4.50.

Research and Development and the Prospects for International Security. By Frederick Seitz and Rodney W. Nichols. New York: Crane, Russak & Company, for the National Strategy Information Center, Strategy Paper No. 22, 1973. 71 pp. $4.95.

Resources and Authority in the North-East Atlantic. Part II, Fisheries Conservation; III, Oil and Gas; IV, Pollution. By Jon McLin. Hanover, N.H.: American Universities Field Staff, West Europe Series, Vol. VIII, Nos. 6, 8, 9, June 1973. 13, 12, 24 pp. $1.00, each.

The Revolution of Sober Expectations. By Martin Diamond. Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Distinguished Lecture Series on the Bicentennial, 1974. 17 pp. $1.00.

SALT II: A Selected Research Bibliography. Compiled by Jerry Parker and Thomas A. Meeker. Los Angeles: California State University, Center for the Study of Armament and Disarmament, Political Issues Series, Vol. 2, No. 8, August 1973. 36 pp. n.p.

The Soviet Union's "Asian Collective Security" Proposal: A Club in Search of Members. By Arnold L. Horelick. Santa Monica, Calif.: The RAND Corporation, The RAND Paper Series, P-5195, March 1974. 21 pp. n.p.

Contributors to this Issue

William H. Overholt, a political scientist at the Hudson Institute; author of a recently completed three-volume study of international relations in East Asia and alternative U.S. policies toward that region.

Frank N. Trager, Professor of International Affairs and Director, National Security Program, New York University; Director of Studies, National Strategy Information Center, New York; member, Editorial Board, ORBIS.

Justus M. van der Kroef, Charles Anderson Dana Professor of Political Science and Chairman, Department of Political Science, University of Bridgeport, Connecticut; author of *Indonesia Since Sukarno* (Asia-Pacific Press, 1971).

George H. Quester, Professor of Government, Cornell University; has served as Director of the University's Peace Studies Program; author of *Nuclear Diplomacy* (Dunellen, 1970) and *The Politics of Nuclear Proliferation* (Johns Hopkins, 1973).

T. C. Rhee, Associate Professor of History, University of Dayton, Ohio; author of numerous articles on Japan, China and Korea.

G. W. Choudhury, Professor of Political Science, North Carolina Central University, and Adjunct Professor of Political Science, Duke University; formerly, Professor of Political Science, Dacca University, Pakistan, and a Cabinet Minister in the Pakistan government, 1969-1970; author of six books and numerous articles.

Mojmir Povolny, Henry M. Wriston Professor in the Social Sciences, Lawrence University, Appleton, Wisconsin; author of articles on interstate integration and the role of small nations in the international system; currently working on a study of East-West European relations.

Wolfgang Hager, Director of Studies, European Community Institute for University Studies, Brussels, Belgium; co-author and co-editor of *A Nation Writ Large? Foreign Policy Problems Before the European Community* (Halsted/Macmillan, 1973).

Sam C. Sarkesian, Professor of Political Science, Loyola University of Chicago, and Associate Chairman of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society; served for more than twenty years as a U.S. Army officer with tours of duty in Germany, Korea and Viet Nam.

William I. Bacchus, Associate Research Director of the Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy; formerly, Assistant Professor, Woodrow Wilson Department of Government and Foreign Affairs, University of Virginia; author of *Foreign Policy and the Bureaucratic Process: The State Department's Country Director System,* to be published in 1974 by Princeton University Press.

M. S. Marzouk, Assistant Professor of Economics, Atkinson College, York University, Toronto, Canada.

Colin S. Gray, Ford Fellow, Department of War Studies, King's College, University of London; consultant to the RAND Corporation and to the Hudson Institute; Visiting Associate Professor of Political Science, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, 1972-1973; author of *Canadian Defense Priorities: A Question of Relevance* (Clarke, Irwin, 1972).

CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS ISSUE

Eugene H. Methvin, a senior editor of *The Reader's Digest* assigned to the Washington editorial office; author of *The Riot Makers* (Arlington House, 1970) and *The Rise of Radicalism* (Arlington House, 1973).

Werner J. Feld, Professor of Political Science and Departmental Chairman, University of New Orleans; author of *Nongovernmental Forces and World Politics* (Praeger, 1972), *Transnational Business Collaboration Among Common Market Countries* (Praeger, 1970), and *The European Common Market and the World* (Prentice-Hall, 1967).

Andrew Gyorgy, Professor of International Affairs, Institute for Sino-Soviet Studies, The George Washington University; author of *Problems in International Relations* (Prentice-Hall, 3rd edition, 1970).

Willard Barber, Lecturer in International Affairs, University of Maryland; formerly, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American affairs, with tours of duty in several Latin American and Middle East countries; worked with Dr. Berle on Caribbean matters while both were serving in the State Department.

For any researcher, scholar or individual interested in the Palestine problem and the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Institute for Palestine Studies gives you access to documents normally inaccessible to the English language reader and material from the widest possible range of important sources, in:

INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTS ON PALESTINE
1970
edited by Walid Khadduri

This documentary publication is the fourth of an annual series, each volume of which includes a wide variety of official statements, interviews, speeches, communiqués and resolutions on the Arab-Israeli conflict issued by local and international policy makers and political organizations. Documents are organized into three sections: International (including Israel), United Nations and Arab World.

English, Hardcover
US $30.00, £10.50

Published jointly by the Institute for Palestine Studies, Beirut, and Kuwait University, Kuwait

Obtainable from:
INSTITUTE FOR PALESTINE STUDIES

P.O. Box 7164
Beirut
Lebanon

Box 329, R.D. 1
Oxford, Pa. 19363
U.S.A.

THE INTERCOLLEGIATE REVIEW

A journal of scholarship and opinion publishing articles in the fields of philosophy, political science, economics, literature and social criticism. THE INTERCOLLEGIATE REVIEW is made available free of charge to faculty and students four times during the academic year by the Intercollegiate Studies Institute. Subscriptions are invited from those outside the academic community: one year, five dollars; two years, nine dollars; three years, twelve dollars. Subscriptions and inquiries should be addressed to: ISI, 14 South Bryn Mawr Avenue, Bryn Mawr, Pa. 19010.

TO EDUCATE ISI FOR LIBERTY

Contributors to recent issues:

Hanson Baldwin
Louis I. Bredvold
Goetz Briefs
Yale Brozen
George Carey
John Davenport
Roger Freeman
Henry Hazlitt
Will Herberg
Russell Kirk
Thomas Molnar
Gerhart Niemeyer
Robert Nisbet
Stefan T. Possony
Peter Stanlis
Frank N. Trager
Stephen Tonsor
Ernest van den Haag
Eliseo Vivas
Robert Penn Warren
Françis G. Wilson
Donald Atwell Zoll

Contributors to previous issues:

Raymond Aron
William Bark
Andre Beaufre
Karl Brandt
Colin Clark
Donald Davidson
Lev E. Dobriansky
M. Stanton Evans
Lawrence H. Gipson
Otto von Habsburg
Arthur Kemp
Willmoore Kendall
William R. Kintner
Wm. Oliver Martin
Ludwig von Mises
Leo Strauss
Robert Strausz-Hupé
Eric Voegelin
Richard M. Weaver
Simon N. Whitney
Frederick Wilhelmsen
David McCord Wright

ÖSTERREICHISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSSENPOLITIK

keeps you informed on Austrian foreign policy and international relations.

The recent issues contained articles by:

Barbara Könitz, Ergebnisse deutscher Friedensforschung

Dieter Senghaas, Über Struktur und Entwicklungsdynamik der internationalen Gesellschaft

Documents, Speech delivered by the Federal Chancellor, Bruno Kreisky, on the events of Schönau-Marchegg

Chronicle of Austrian foreign policy

Book reviews

Annual Subscription $9.50—six copies a year.

Published by:

ÖSTERREICHISCHE GESELLSCHAFT FÜR AUSSENPOLITIK UND INTERNATIONALE BEZIEHUNGEN

A-1010 VIENNA, JOSEFSPLATZ 6, AUSTRIA

Politique Etrangère

la grande revue des questions internationales

SOMMAIRE

(39ème année) No. 1—1974

William E. GRIFFITH	La quatrième guerre du Proche-Orient, la crise de l'énergie et la politique américaine
Henryk BIRECKI	L'URSS et la crise énergétique de l'Occident
Alain JOXE	Où vont les militaires chiliens?
Jean KLEIN	Désarmement et arms control en 1973: bilan et perspectives
René Albrecht-CARRIE	Les règles du jeu ou un retour au concert des puissances

---

Prix de l'abonnement

France .... 56 F
Etranger .... 75 F

Adresser les abonnements au **Centre d'études de Politique étrangère,** 54, rue de Varenne—Paris 75007—C.C.P. 1865-41 Paris

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Spring 1974 **Volume 28, No. 1**

WORLD TRADE AND UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

U.S. TRADE POLICY: AN OVERVIEW
Geza Feketekuty

TRADE BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: DIFFERING EXPECTATIONS IN A CHANGING POWER RELATIONSHIP
Werner Feld

THE U.S. POLICY SHIFT ON EAST-WEST TRADE
Walter Krause, F. John Mathis

THE OUTLOOK FOR U.S.-JAPAN ECONOMIC AND TRADE RELATIONS
Yasuo Takeyama

TRADE PEACE IN THE PACIFIC THROUGH A FREE TRADE AREA?
Richard Kosobud, Houston Stokes

U.S.-DEVELOPING COUNTRY TRADE AND RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICE POLICIES
Robert L. Curry

WHY U.S. COMPANIES CAN COMPETE
Lewis Young

BOOK REVIEWS

D. J. Mathieson
Robert A. Isaak
Joan E. Spero
H. Barger
Murray Belman
Charles Issawi

Subscriptions: Single current issue $2.25; single back issue $2.50; one year $4.50; two years $8.50; three years $12.50. Plus 50 cents per issue for foreign postage and handling.

School of International Affairs, Columbia University
Offices: 420 West 118th Street, New York, N.Y. 10027

THE WORLD TODAY

The monthly journal of the Royal Institute of International Affairs provides the general reader with up-to-date and authoritative information on current world problems.

The May and June 1974 issues include:

Nato's twenty-five years	*Philip Windsor*
West European defence identity: the French paradox	*Uwe Nerlich*
Turning the clock back in Yugoslavia	*K. F. Cviic*
The Malaysian miracle—and dilemma	*Pran Chopra*
South Africa: authoritarian reform?	*Merle Lipton*

Annual Subscription: £3.25 post free (U.S.A. and Canada $10)
28p per copy

Orders may be sent to booksellers and newsagents, or to the Oxford University Press, Press Road, Neasden, London NW10 ODD (Tel. 01-450-8080).

THE ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
CHATHAM HOUSE, 10 ST. JAMES'S SQUARE, LONDON S.W. 1

A good way to keep informed about European and World Affairs is to read regularly the journal of the German Society for Foreign Affairs:

EUROPA-ARCHIV

Zeitschrift für internationale Politik

Begründet von Wilhelm Cornides

EUROPA-ARCHIV, now in its twenty-ninth year of publication, contains articles and documents on international relations and a current chronology of world events as well as a monthly bibliography of recent publications in the field of international relations.

Articles in recent issues:

Edward M. Kennedy	**Die Atlantische Welt in Krise und Bewährung**
Jamshig Amouzegar	**Ölpreis und weltwirtschaftliches Gleichgewicht. Die Vorschläge des Schahs von Iran für eine internationale Entwicklungs- und Hilfsorganisation**
Christian Lutz	**Nachruf auf die europäische Währungsschlange**
Dieter Schumacher	**Forschungs- und Technologiepolitik der Europäischen Gemeinschaft**

Annual subscription (24 issues): DM 98.—plus postage

Specimen copies on request

VERLAG FÜR INTERNATIONALE POLITIK GmbH
53 Bonn - Stockenstrasse 1-5

THE CHINA QUARTERLY

An international journal for the study of China

April-June 1974	**Issue No. 58**
The Tenth Party Congress: The Power Structure and the Succession Question	**Richard Wich**
The Cultural Revolution and China's Search for Political Order	**Byung-joon Ahn**
National Development and Social Revolution in Early Chinese Marxist Thought	**Arif Dirlik**
Prison Management in the Kiangsi and Yenan Periods	**Patricia Griffin**

QUARTERLY CHRONICLE AND DOCUMENTATION
REPORTS FROM CHINA **BOOK REVIEWS**

Editorial Office: School of Oriental and African Studies
Malet Street, London WC1E 7HP

Subscription Agents: **Research Publications Ltd.**
Victoria Hall
East Greenwich, London SE10 ORF

Subscription Rates: £4 or U.S. $10.00 a year
For full-time students: £2 or U.S. $5.00 a year
Individual copies: £1 or U.S. $2.50

Just published...

Three timely monographs on major foreign policy issues.

from the
FOREIGN POLICY
RESEARCH INSTITUTE

ORDER FORM

Please send me the following monographs, at $3.50 each:

___copy(ies) of NATIONAL SECURITY THROUGH WORLD LAW AND GOVERNMENT: MYTH OR REALITY?

___copy(ies) of SOVIET MILITARY STRATEGY ON THE EVE OF SALT.

___copy(ies) of THE LIN PIAO AFFAIR: EPILOGUE TO MAO'S CULTURAL REVOLUTION.

Payment enclosed for $_____ (Please add 50¢ for postage and handling)

Sorry, no billed orders except for institutional purchase orders

Name __________

Address __________

City __________

State _____ Zip _____

FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE
Suite 350
3508 Market Street
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104

01

- **NATIONAL SECURITY THROUGH WORLD LAW AND GOVERNMENT: MYTH OR REALITY?** *By James E. Dougherty.* The likelihood of continued global fragmentation out paces the potentiality for a world community based on shared values. Dr. Dougherty not only analyzes the current weaknesses in international law and organization and proposals for general disarmament, he also offers a perhaps more practical alternative to international security—through great-power policies of prudent restraint and the development of a global system in whose preservation all states have a stake. 64 pages. $3.50

- **SOVIET MILITARY STRATEGY ON THE EVE OF SALT.** *By Stefan T. Possony.* How do Soviet political goals, strategic doctrine, technological progress and economic difficulties affect current U.S.-USSR negotiations—in such areas as arms control, détente, trade and European security? An important new study by a Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace—providing a needed assessment of both American and Soviet policies, military strength and objectives. Approx. 100 pages. $3.50

- **THE LIN PIAO AFFAIR: EPILOGUE TO MAO'S CULTURAL REVOLUTION.** *By Tai Sung An.* Defense Minister Lin Piao died in a sickbed—not in a planeload of conspirators, as officially claimed. With this startling assertion, Dr. An begins to unravel the mysterious events of Fall 1971 . . . follows their continuing impact on China today . . . and provides an intriguing, pessimistic view of the future of Maoism. Approx. 100 pages. $3.50

CONTREPOINT

REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE

Directeur: Patrick DEVEDJIAN
Rédacteur en chef: Georges LIEBERT
Rédacteur en chef adjoint: Jean C. TEXIER

No. 12 **1973**

ACTUELLES

Alexandre SOLJENITSYNE: L'hypocrisie de l'Occident
François BOURRICAUD: L'engrenage chilien
Ernest LAHARANNE: La France et Israel

MELANGES

Raymond RUYER: La gastronomie comme refuge
Antoine GRIMOD: Quand un chercheur se met à table
Georges SOUTOU: Péguy et la Sorbonne et Dreyfus
Jean T. NORDMANN: Péguy, Taine et Renan
André FERMIGIER: Une vie de Maupassant
Alain G. SLAMA: Barrès réconcilié
Jean PLUMYENE: La chèvre sauvage
Bertrand d'AUBAGNE: Une saison d'opéra
Antoine SCHNAPPER: Les tâches de l'historien d'art
Pierre MANENT: Raison et violence chez Aron
Alain BESANCON: Freud, Abraham, Laios
Louis de VILLEFOSSE: Mort de Staline

Le numéro: 15 F l'abonnement: un an 50 F deux ans 80 F
I rue du Mail 75002, Paris, France CCP 2605-96

FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE

Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Director

Research Monographs

No. 11. *The Political Dimensions of Foreign Aid.* By Karl von Vorys. $2.00. 1967.

Special Analysis. *Soviet Military Trends: Implications for U.S. Security*. By William R. Kintner and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. $3.00. 1971. (Published jointly with the American Enterprise Institute.)

No. 12. *Aden and British Strategy, 1839-1968.* By Harvey Sicherman. $3.50. 1972.

No. 13. *The Impact of President Nixon's Visit to Peking on International Politics.* By William R. Kintner. $3.50. 1972.

No. 14. *The United States and the Demands of Détente Diplomacy.* A Conference Report. $3.50. 1973.

No. 15. *National Security Through World Law and Government: Myth or Reality?* By James E. Dougherty. $3.50. 1974.

No. 16. *Soviet Military Doctrine on the Eve of SALT*. By Stefan T. Possony. $3.50. 1974.

Recent Books

Britain Faces Europe, 1957-1967. By Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1969. 228 pp. $6.00.

Safeguard: Why the ABM Makes Sense. By William R. Kintner. New York: Hawthorn Books, 1969. 413 pp. $6.95.

Contending Theories of International Relations. By James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1971. 415 pp. $9.95 ($6.25, paper).

SALT: Implications for Arms Control in the 1970's. Edited by William R. Kintner and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1972. xxiv + 447 pp. $11.95.

Message Dimensions of Television News. By Robert S. Frank. Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath and Company, 1973. 144 pp. $10.00.

The Power Capabilities of Nation-States. By Wayne H. Ferris. Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath and Company, 1973. 192 pp. $12.50.

Strategy and Values: Selected Writings of Robert Strausz-Hupé. Edited by William R. Kintner and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath and Company, 1974. 127 pp. $13.00.

Copies of Institute monographs may be obtained from The Foreign Policy Research Institute, 3508 Market Street, Suite 350, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104. Institute books may be obtained from the publisher or from your local bookstore.